

THE ANGLO-SPANISH WAR 1655-1660

VOLUME 2: WAR IN JAMAICA

PAUL SUTTON

Century of the Soldier 1618-1721
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

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About the author:

Paul Sutton hails from England but currently resides in Australia. He owns and manages an international removal company that operates across Africa, Asia and the Pacific. He has written numerous articles on different military subjects of the English Civil War period and the Great War. He is married to Kanya and together they have two sons, Stuart and Jamie.

The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660

Volume 2: War in Jamaica

Paul Sutton

'This is the Century of the Soldier', Fulvio Testi, Poet, 1641



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To
Kanya
'I will survive'

Helion Editorial Note
Some period terminology is now considered offensive; in this work, such terms have only been retained within historical quotations.

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Preface

The Anglo-Spanish War of 1655–1660 was a truly global war fought at the behest of England's Oliver Cromwell in Europe, in South America and on the high seas. In December 1654, for political, religious and economic reasons, the Lord Protector dispatched a large and powerful fleet under the command of William Penn and a not-so-powerful army under Robert Venables to attack Spain in South America, with the express intention of wresting territory and more particularly wealth from England's Catholic foe.

The expedition arrived at the English colony of Barbados in January 1655, where it recruited the army from amongst the island's English population before attacking the city of San Domingo on the island Hispaniola in April. This attack was a fiasco and the English were defeated by their own lack of preparation, an incompetent commander, the weather, disease and not least by a resilient Spanish commander who gave the English a lesson in tropical warfare. Humiliated, the English left Hispaniola and headed for the altogether easier target of Jamaica which was occupied in May without any immediate resistance. By now the English force was wracked by sickness and hunger while the commanders bickered amongst themselves, leading to first Penn (June) and then Venables (July) returning to England without orders, leaving the army on Jamaica to fend for itself as best it could. Having botched the negotiations for the surrender of the island from the Spanish, the leaderless English now found themselves confronting a small but determined resistance on the island, the perpetrators of which were determined to make life for the English as difficult and dangerous as they could; all the while the English army continued to be ravaged by disease, and the soldiers starved.

A previous work entitled *The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660: War in The West Indies*[1] described the origins of the war and why Cromwell chose to attack Spain in the West Indies. It followed the events from the preparation of the expedition, the raising of the army and organisation of the fleet through its time in Barbados and the failed attack on Hispaniola. It then described the relatively easy occupation of Jamaica and subsequent failure to treat with the Spaniards who refused to recognise the English occupation, and the breakdown of relations between the English commanders; it ended

1 Paul Sutton, *The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660: War in the West Indies* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2021).

with the hurried and unauthorised departure of Penn and Venables. This current work begins after their departure and will describe the war of resistance fought by the Spanish up to 1660, then will review in some detail various aspects of the English garrison on Jamaica prior to the disbanding of the army in 1662, and the rise of the privateers; it will conclude with an analysis of the nascent colony from 1655 until the establishment of civilian government also in 1662, the economy and the beginnings of slavery on the island. Two appendices will introduce the importance of nearby Tortuga and the Cayman Islands to the fledgling English colony. Throughout this present work reference is made in passing to the expansion of the war in Europe. In writing this present work it has been my intention to provide the reader with the facts and let them draw their own conclusions, keeping my opinions and conclusions to a minimum. I have extensively quoted the participants directly, for their words are more meaningful than mine, whilst I have, as much as possible, tried to provide insight and background in to many of the fascinating characters that it has been my privilege to learn about. History is, after all, the sum of the stories of individuals. Inevitably this work is written from an English perspective but I hope that through the liberal use of Spanish sources the reader will be provided with a balanced view of the events that transpired on the island long ago. It is the intention that future works will describe the formal breach with Spain in the autumn of 1655 and the outbreak of European war, the establishment of the military alliance with France, the naval war with Spain, the privateer menace and the English campaign in Flanders of 1657–1658 which resulted in the Battle of Dunes and the English occupation of Dunkirk. The argument can be made that the war in the Caribbean between England and Spain did not end in 1660 with the formal cessation of hostilities between the two nations but continued for many decades as privateers and pirates fought out an economic war in the waters around the West Indies; however space precludes the inclusion of such in this present work, and so this volume concludes with the disbanding of Cromwell's English army in Jamaica in 1662 and the establishment of civilian rule under Lord Windsor.

I would like to thank the staff at The National Archives at Kew, the British Library in London and the Bodleian Library, Oxford, for their assistance. Also Charles Singleton and Murray Johnson for their encouragement. As always my grateful thanks to Stuart, Jamie and above all my wife Kanya for all their help and support.

Queensland, Australia
10 August 2020
Cry 'God for Harry, England and St George'

Conventions

During the seventeenth century the English used the Old Style [OS] Julian calendar which was 11 days behind the New Style [NS] Gregorian calendar used by Spain and France. Throughout this work the Old Style dating has been used unless otherwise specified. Where a dated Spanish source has been cited, or to avoid confusion, the date is first given as [NS] and then as [OS], that is 10 August 1656 [NS]/1 August 1656 [OS], except when the date forms part of a quotation where it has been left in the original form. Also the first day of each year for the English commenced on Lady Day 25 March and not 1 January, and so the year number of the date of New Year changed on this day also, hence 24 March 1655 was preceded by 25 March 1656. To avoid confusion for the reader all years have been rendered as commencing on 1 January.

The actual spellings used in the contemporary sources have been used throughout, even if these appear incorrect by modern usage, and only to avoid significant confusion have individual words been corrected or extended by the use of square brackets [ ]. English sources of the period frequently used the *long s* (ſ) instead of a regular *short s*, as well as 'v' instead of 'u' and 'i' instead of 'j'. The spelling has been modernised throughout. Likewise the contemporary symbol for pound sterling was '*l*' instead of the modern '£' sign and the contemporary symbol has been used throughout, as have 'd' for penny and 's' for shilling. Twelve pennies were the equivalent of one shilling, while 20 shillings made a pound. A pound consisted of 240 pennies.

Notes on Sources

The historian is spoiled with an abundance of surviving source material that recounts the events that transpired in the West Indies between 1654 and 1663.

The National Archives, Kew, preserve the Ordnance Office *Journals of Proceedings* (WO47/3) and *Debenture Books* (WO49/87) which provide details, albeit incomplete, of equipment and materials issued to the fleet and the army prior to its departure from England. They also hold various army-related pay and supply papers in the voluminous SP28 series from which much light has been gleaned on (mostly) the officers' careers prior to enlisting in Venables' army. Many documents, reports, petitions and orders of the Council of State have been calendared in the invaluable *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series* edited by Mary Anne Everett Green during the nineteenth century, the originals of which can be found in SP18 and SP25 series. Similarly the work of W. Noel Sainsbury in editing the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series (America and West Indies)* must be acknowledged, but the original manuscripts in CO1 and CO139 are much harder to locate. Also available at the National Archives are the High Court of the Admiralty papers (HCA9 and 49) which provide fascinating insight into the workings of maritime justice at the time.

The British Library of course is a treasure trove knowledge of which Additional MS 11410 includes the original of Venables' *Narrative* amongst other documents, Add MS 11411 which contains an extensive collection of papers belonging to Thomas Povey which relate to the West Indies, and Add MS 12430 known as *Doyley's Journal*. This invaluable volume is not a journal but a sort of copy book of orders, commissions, statements and instructions given by Edward Doyley during his tenure as de facto governor of Jamaica, and contains an incredible amount of detail relating the early years of the colony, and is a source surprisingly underutilised by historians. Much of the description of the army and fleet activities throughout this current work has been drawn from this volume, however the secretary hand is extremely difficult to comprehend in much of it; thankfully it had previously been painstaking transcribed in three parts by F.J. Osborne. The first two parts were edited by S.A.G. Taylor and published in the *Jamaican Historical Review* in 1973 and 1978, while a copy of the third part, never published, has been obtained from the Jesuit Archive and Research Center, St Louis, Missouri.

My thanks to the kind staff there who provided me with a digital copy. Where the *Journal* has been quoted in the text the citation relates to the page of the relevant transcription rather than the folio of the original manuscript.

In Greenwich, the National Maritime Museum holds the *Wynne Papers* which include the letter-book of William Penn and two seafaring journals written at the time, as well as other useful documents. The Huntington Library, California, is the repository for the *William Blathwayt Papers* which contain some useful papers relating to the provisioning of ships in Jamaica in 1660. Hidden in the list of crew members of an English merchantman (privateer?) in Cagway harbour in early 1660 is probably the first reference to the later privateer par excellence in Jamaica, Henry Morgan.

The Archivo General de Indias in Sevile, Spain, contains a lot of original letters from the Spanish side. I have not been fortunate enough to visit the archives but many of these letters have been translated and published and so provide a fascinating insight into Spanish activity. The *Archivo* also contain a collection of fantastic maps and plans relating to events on Hispaniola and Jamaica which have been used extensively in this present work, and which are available online at the institution's website, some of which have been produced in this work as colour plates.

The *Thomason Tracts* collection of Civil War and Commonwealth era newsletters and broadsheets have been widely consulted and these are now, thankfully, available on the internet through Early English Books Online (EEBO). Where cited the first number relates to the microfilm reel which is followed by the item number which is the same referencing sequence as provided by the EEBO website. Also now available online to the lucky few with access to it through an institution of higher education is the *State Papers Online* collection, being digital copies of the extensive State Papers collection at The National Archives, Kew. Hopefully this crucial resource will become more widely accessible to historians and students in the future.

The indispensable *Thurloe State Papers* contain an extensive collection of letters sent from the West Indies to John Thurloe, Oliver Cromwell's secretary of state. Much of this collection was published by Thomas Birch in the eighteenth century, while the originals are at the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, in the *Rawlinson Collection*.

A surprising number of first-hand English accounts exist that cover the first year of the expedition. Robert Venables' attempts at exonerating himself survive but need to be used with care. Venables' *Narrative* is an attempt to clear his name and he blames everybody but himself for the disaster on Hispaniola. His narrative was edited and published by Sir Charles Harding Firth in 1900, along with a collection of other eyewitness accounts including the anonymous *Letters Concerning the Expedition* and extracts from *Henry Whistler's Journal*. These two provide much detail and seem to be generally reliable without the tinge of bias that Venables' own account contains. However, as Whistler was a naval officer his comments about Venables are particularly scathing. Also included in this publication are transcripts of various commissions and other letters plus the muster rolls of the army on Barbados in March 1655. None of these accounts continue beyond the end of 1655, however. William Penn left no personal testimony of his activities at

this time but Granville Penn's *Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn* (1833) includes transcripts of Penn's letters and the *Swiftsure Journal*, the originals of which are held at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. All were written at the time and concern the detail of managing a fleet at war, and so are considered a more accurate depiction of events without the influence of hindsight. Other first-hand accounts include the scathing attack on Venables by the mysterious 'I.S.', which was published in the *Harleian Miscellany* Vol. 6 (1810) and much of Venables' own narrative is his own attempt to discredit the accusations of negligence and incompetence made by I.S. The anonymous *Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo*, published in the *Clarke Papers* Vol. 3 (1891) is believed to have been written by an officer in Fortescue's regiment and is deemed a reliable source, as are the letters of Francis Barrington contained in the Duke of Portland's papers and published in the *Seventh Report of the Royal Commission of Historical Manuscripts* (1879).

The early years of the occupation of Jamaica are well documented in the various letters from Doyley, Goodsonn, Sedgwick and Brayne to be found throughout the *Thurloe State Papers*. Edmund Hickeringill's *Jamaica Viewed* (1661) and William Beeston's journal commencing after his arrival in 1660 and reprinted in *Some interesting tracts relating to the island of Jamaica* (1800) throw some interesting light on the early colony, as does Edward Long's *A History of Jamaica* (1774). Long was a descendant of one of the English officers in Venables' army. Extra detail regarding these early years can be found in the numerous letters found in various volumes of the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series (America and West Indies)*.

Much background biographical detail on many of the participants has been obtained from the online version of the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. These have been simply cited as ODNB followed by the persons name and the editor of that particular biography.

A full compilation of printed sources consulted in the preparation of this work and cited in the text will be found at the rear, but some deserve special mention. All serious historians of the period are indebted to work of Sir Charles Harding Firth, whose passion and ability seems to have had no bounds. My personal indebtedness to this gentleman can be measured by the number of works he produced, without which I and countless others who have tried to emulate him would not have had the benefit of his labours. For the West Indies war alone his works consulted include *Venables' Narrative* (1900), *The Clarke Papers* (1891), *Letters and Papers Relating to the Military Government of Scotland* (1899), *Cromwell's Army* (1902), and *The Last Years of the Protectorate* (1909) as well as *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army* (1940) (with Godfrey Davis) and *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum* (1911) (with Robert Sangster Rait). In a similar vein the works of Professor Samuel Rawson Gardiner are invaluable, especially his epic *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate* (1903).

Frank Cundall's *Historic Jamaica* (1915) was a mine of anecdotal detail from somebody who lived in Jamaica, as was his and Joseph Pietersz' *Jamaica under the Spaniards* (1919) which published for the first time Spanish archive material regarding the war from the Archivo General de Indias in Sevile that

had been translated by Irene Aloha Wright. Wright also translated *The English Conquest of Jamaica* (1924) and *Spanish Narratives of the English Attack on Santo Domingo 1655* (1926) for the Camden Society, without whose energy and linguistic skills this present work would be very one-sided.

More modern works include S.A.G. Taylor's *The Western Design* (1969) and the numerous articles that he contributed to the *Jamaican Historical Review* and whose local knowledge proved invaluable. Professor Robert Brenner's *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (1993), on the colonial adventures of the English was an inspiration, as was Arthur Newton's *The Colonising Activities of the English Puritans: The Last Phase of the Elizabethan Struggle* (1914). Professor Bernard Capp's *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648–1660* (1989) provided insight into the workings of the navy. I cannot but acknowledge the various works of Professor Carla Gardina Pestana on the subject of early English colonisation of the Americas, in particular *The English Conquest of Jamaica: Oliver Cromwell's Bid for Empire* (2017) and whose comments on previous attempts to write this book inspired me to do better this time. I hope I am successful in this. Also used extensively was Dr Timothy Venning's *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (1995) which made a complex set of issues understandable. And finally Professor Nuala Zahedieh's articles *The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692* (1986) and *Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in Early English Jamaica, 1655–89* (1988) were both informative and stimulating.

Part 1

The War on Jamaica

1

Jamaica 1655–1656

I

Despite the English bungling the negotiations with the Spanish to surrender in May 1655 they had quickly asserted their presence on the plains around the capital, Santiago de la Vega, and for the most part the Spanish had soon withdrawn into the remoter parts of the island. With the Spanish gone from the plains and unlikely to return in the near future as a result of raids carried out by Colonel Bland in early June, the English next focused their attention on attempting to stop them fleeing to nearby Cuba with all their valuables. The Spaniards had initially withdrawn towards the Clarendon Plains, from where some continued further west into the Pedro Plains and possibly as far as the Westmoreland Plain, though most seem to have headed north over the mountains to seek shelter or escape from there across the sea to Cuba. As early as 4 June Robert Venables and Commissioner Butler were able to inform the Lord Protector that having sent out 'strong parties' to pursue them, the Spaniards now only 'feed themselves with hopes of escaping to Cuba' which they intended to prevent by sending some ships to patrol the northern coast to prevent their flight.[1] Accordingly on 6 June Admiral William Penn, commander of English naval forces until his departure for England later that month, ordered the *Falmouth* and *Ostrich* brigantine to blockade the northern coastline of the island after having received intelligence 'that ye Enemy doth from ye Port, on the other side [of] this Island called St. Anna, & other places thereabouts Sculk frequently over[?], & convey away goods unto Cuba'. They were ordered to prevent the fleeing Spaniards by sailing 'unto ye said Coast, & ply too & againe looking into all ye Harbors, & Creeks … & use all meanes for taking, or destroying all such Boats or Vessells belonging to ye Enemy, as ye shall find most to conduct for ye good of the service.'[2] Spanish sources confirm that such a move considerably impacted their ability to flee the island, though the English intention was more to intercept and plunder

1 Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe* (hereafter *TSP*), Vol. 3 (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), p.511.

2 The National Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM), WYN/18, Letterbook, 26 Jul 1654–4 Sep 1655, includes list of ships in squadron, Wynne Papers, f.68.



Map 1 Spanish Jamaica, **c**.1655.



Ysla de Xamaica, c.1656. (Archivo General de Indias MP-SANTO-DOMINGO, 53) See Colour Plate A.

those fleeing rather than prevent their departure.[3] A week later Venables was optimistically able to inform Secretary John Thurloe back in London that the Spanish were on the run and their surrender imminent when he wrote:

> Since my last wee have onely taken some few prisoners; the rest continue in the mountaines, wanting houses, bread, &c. willing to submitt, if not awed by a few and discouraged by some souldiers, that are unruly occasioned by extreame wante, which to redresse was the worke of this day; and wee hope to make them good subjects, being most of them Portuguezes. The Spaniards wee shall remove, and endeavour to gaine all of them by our civillity.[4]

By mid July one English army officer was able to report how effective the English policy seemed to have been thus far, when:

> About 6 dayes since there came into us voluntarily 50 of the enemie, greate and small, which wee suppose the raine which already falls dayly on the mountaines hath caused, those parts, as wee are told, being scarce habitable then: soe that in all wee have about 70 of the enemie among us, who have equal freedome and

3 Irene Aloha Wright (ed.), *The English Conquest of Jamaica: An Account of What Happened in the Island of Jamaica, from May 20 of the Year 1655 ... Up to July 3 of the Year 1656*, Vol. XXXIV (London: Camden Society Publications, 3rd Series, 1924), p.17.

4 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.545.

> victuals with us as yet till the others are reduced, which wee doubt not will be shortly; they now oppresse us not, having not killed any of ours these 3 weeks, though before they dispatcht [*sic*] about 100 of our straglers unarmed in the mean time.[5]

Those who surrendered were soon deported, probably with the former Spanish governor of the island, Ramirez, when he was sent to Campeche, Mexico in September, though he himself died en route.[6]

Prior to Penn's departure with most of the fleet late in June he sent the *Martin* to enter the harbour of the Spanish city of Cartagena, in modern-day Venezuela, so that it could 'discover ye Number & Quality of Shipping there. And for ye better gaining intelligence of the Enemy in point of Strength or otherwise … and afterwards you are to make all Speed to ye ffleet againe at this place.'[7] This was a gutsy move on the part of Penn. The *Martin* was a galley mounting only 19 guns, and was to enter as far as possible into the one of the most important, and heavily defended, ports in Spanish America. Even before the *Martin* returned, the English were confident they were secure on the island when one army officer boasted 'neither doe wee feare the enemie from the maine, he having noe shipping, nor wee thinke force of men sufficient to oppose us'.[8] By sending an English ship into the harbour at Cartagena Penn wanted to make a statement to the Spanish: the English were in the West Indies and could sail anywhere they pleased.

The English then focused their attention on clearing the Pedro Plains and Santa Cruz, on the western side of Jamaica. In mid August a small force – of around 160 men according to the Spaniard Damian Castilla, who was present on the island during the first year of the occupation and who wrote a detailed account of the fledging resistance – embarked on four vessels and headed for Perada, modern-day Great Pedro Bay. This was in fact 'a small Party' under the command of Captain Adam Baynard of Anthony Buller's regiment.[9] With them was an Englishman known to the Spaniards as English John, 'an apostate' who was presumably one of the English deserters from Jackson's earlier raid of 1642, and Corrapacho, a former African-Caribbean slave belonging to Captain Gaspar de Acosta. The English were hoping to push the Spaniards further into the interior as well as seize any food and provisions that they found and to round up what horses and cattle they could. But they also had information that Don Francisco de Proenza, at this point the leader of the Spanish resistance movement on the island, was in the vicinity and whom the English 'wanted to lay hands on … judging that with him captured

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5 Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Narrative of General Venables, with an appendix of papers relating to the expedition to the West Indies and the conquest of Jamaica, 1654–1655* (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1900), p.141.

6 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.22 n.1.

7 NMM, *Wynne Papers 18*, f.62.

8 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.141.

9 John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656, 78:E.492[3]. The composition of the English army in 1655 has been discussed in Chapter 3 of Paul Sutton, *The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660: War in the West Indies* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2021), and will be further examined in Chapter 4 of this present volume.



Mapa de la bahia de Cartagena de Indias, c.1631. (Archivo General de Indias. MP-PANAMA, 51)

and killed, they would become absolute masters of the island.' Once again the English intelligence was accurate, for Proenza was in the area but managed to narrowly avoid capture during the ensuing raid.[10] Showing an excellent appreciation of the terrain, the English planned to sweep across the plains clearing them of any Spaniards and then head towards the upper reaches of the *Rio Caobana* (Mahogany River) bypassing its swampy lower reaches and after crossing it to the north enter the area known as Santa Cruz at the foot of the Manatines mountains, in an attempt to clear that area as well. Obviously their two guides were reliable, for after marching all night from their landing area they reached the only reliable water source on the dry plains, the *Laguna Sucia* (Dirty Lake), where they were able to slake their thirst. The English force then descended on the Perada ranch, narrowly missing a group of Spaniards led by Fernando de Castañeda 'who had come to get meat for their barracks and camps' and who managed to escape in time 'for they all jumped out of bed, just as they were, at the first cry that the English were coming'.[11] After spending three days there the English headed further inland, searching for the Jaguaytabo and Caobana ranches where they believed Proenza to be. Not finding him they headed for the *Rio Caobana*, which was only fordable in two places close to the modern-day settlement of Lacovia, and where they needed to cross to enter the Santa Cruz region. Proenza had been at the lower ford (known as the Jaguatabo ford) only days before and had ordered a makeshift breastwork, sheathed in hides, to be erected to protect the crossing.

10 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.17.
11 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.17.

Although passable the river was deep and could only be crossed by canoe, while animals would need to swim across, but 'there was always a danger to some of them, both because of the river's rapid current and also because of the numerous alligators'.[12] As the English column advanced towards the river, probably on 16 August, the Spaniards prepared to resist and the first battle of the war on Jamaica was fought. 'On that day, with fifteen firearms and the favour of God, our men defended themselves from morning until afternoon, when the enemy retired, having lost more than 20 Englishmen killed, and a larger number wounded, who died afterwards', wrote Castilla.[13] There are no English sources that recount this first skirmish and so the veracity of the Spanish claims cannot be confirmed, but there is no reason to suppose that this English force was not held up. The ground along the river was swampy and treacherous, as well as thickly wooded, making it almost impossible to get around the sides of the Spanish. With the Santa Cruz mountains at their backs the English had little room to manoeuvre. Given the circumstances it is plausible that after failing to take the ford by a head-on attack they thought it prudent to retire and try a different approach.

A letter from an unnamed officer in Colonel Andrew Carter's regiment was printed by *Mercurius Politicus* in January 1656, and this provides an English account of subsequent events while the Spaniard Castilla, who was also present, provides a Spanish perspective. Castilla noted that after this initial reverse the English retired back to Perada, to which around 600 reinforcements from Guatibacoa were dispatched by sea. This seems an unlikely figure given the weakness of the English army at the time and so it was probable that the force was significantly smaller than this. According to the anonymous English officer the reinforcement consisted of elements of Philip Ward's and Carter's regiments.[14] On 6 September the English, in two separate columns, once again advanced over the plains heading for the fords. The column that consisted of Carter's regiment was led by Lieutenant Chamles[?] who commanded the forlorn hope, the main body was commanded by the unidentified letter writer, but who might have been Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bushell, while the rear was commanded by Captain Nicholas Halford.[15] This time they attacked both fords simultaneously with Ward attacking one and Carter's men the other, but once again they could make no headway with a frontal assault. However, improvising this time, Ward's contingent at the Jaguatabo ford built some palm rafts from 'a Cabbage tree' and were able to launch these between the fords with about 20 men, unseen, and managed to cross the river, forcing the Spanish to retire. When the Spanish holding the ford that Carter's men were attacking learned that the English had crossed the river above them they retired, but not before they had killed two Englishmen and wounded 11 more (of whom two later died). Carter's men 'by the help of a Canow' then managed to get their entire force over the river during the night. Despite

12 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.18.
13 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.17.
14 *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656.
15 *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656.

searching the woods for the Spanish that night they 'could light upon none of them', except for one family that they took back to Santiago.[16] During the attack Gabriel Benito de Varona, 'curate rector of the Holy Collegiate church' who had been 'exposed to all danger, animating and exhorting our people to the defense of our Holy Catholic Faith', was shot by an English sniper 'lodged in a tree'. He died 'of his wound a few days later ... Certainly the Devine Majesty will have placed him upon the empurpled seats of the martyrs!'[17] Other Spaniards who performed nobly that day, according to Castilla, were Don Francisco Cartagena de Leiva (Treasurer of the Holy Crusade) and Don Blas de Figuero Ysassi both of whom 'encouraged our people (like good leaders)'. Sargento Diego de Torres, of Cartagena, 'while distributing powder and bullets among his followers, employed his own gallantly'. Also singled out was a slave named Diego Pimienta who during the fight 'showed how greatly does virtue adorn the individual, and how diversity of color is no obstacle to nobility of blood, and worth'. In total the Spanish believed they 'killed more than forty of the enemy, among them some military officers'.[18] After the Spanish had withdrawn the English were able to enter the nearby ranches, where 'We burned all their Houses and Hutts, and chased them from place to place but could do noe good on them.'[19] Here the English remained for the next five days before retiring to Perada and re-embarking onto their ships. The Spanish source implies that the English proceeded no further and so did not enter the Santa Cruz plain beyond, as they had planned. From this single ranch that they occupied Castilla wrote that he got 'no profit but the capture of the wife of Sargento Diego de Torres and another poor woman. He lost, however, heavily indeed.'[20] The Spanish might well have looked upon the fighting on the *Rio Caobana* as a victory (or at least not a defeat) but the prolonged contact they had with the English here exposed them to the 'plague' that the invaders carried with them. This 'contagion of fevers, cold pains and fevers, phresnsies [*sic*] or madness, carbuncles, swelling in such manner that men and women puffed up like hogsheads, of this malady, and almost none escaped dysentry.'[21] The sickness spread rapidly amongst the Spanish and their slaves, having no immunity to it, dwindling their numbers even further. Worse still, the refugees took it with them to Santiago de Cuba, killing even more there. Castilla, writing in July 1657, believed 'more than a thousand five hundred persons have died of this plague and pests in this island, and in Cuba'.[22]

With the fighting at the *Rio Caobana* over, the main Spanish forces under Proenza retreated north into the mountains to reorganise before the autumn rains descended upon the island. The English had now effectively cleared the southern plains of significant concentrations of Spanish, who were now fragmented and scattered across the northern part of the island, with many

16 *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656.
17 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.18–19.
18 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.19.
19 *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656.
20 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.19.
21 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.19–20.
22 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.20.

suffering (and dying) from the diseases transmitted to them by the English. They were low on food, other provisions and had little ammunition. By the end of the year Proenza was himself virtually incapacitated being 'almost blind, suffered chills and fevers, and had a fistula in one leg, which gave him great pain'.[23] The Spanish at this low point needed an energetic and capable leader to carry on the fight against the English. Proenza knew that in 'order that the English might … be checked' somebody was needed to 'prick, assault and keep them [the English] in arms day and night' and so he appointed his kinsman, Don Christoval Ysassi Arnaldo, to be his *sargento mayor*, and it was he who was tasked to take the fight to the English. From a Spanish family that had been on Jamaica for many generations, Ysassi was a person 'possessed of qualities, demanded by this occasion, and for the handling of others, greater, since in many before this, being captain of horse, he has given proofs of his valor'.[24] Undoubtedly brave, his selection as the wartime commander of the Spanish resistance proved to be a good one, even if he might have been appointed by default since 'the captains of the militia companies had crossed to Cuba, with the rest of the militia officers'.[25] For the Spanish, evicted from their homes and land, dispersed and hungry, their priority had become keeping a foothold in Jamaica at all costs until such time as a relief effort could be mounted from Spain or more locally, while at the same time aiming to conduct a guerrilla war against the English with the minimal men and weapons at their disposal. The Spanish had been forced from the fertile and productive lowland areas of the island by the effective raids conducted by the English army, even though the invaders were struggling to feed themselves and maintain their army due to the horrendous death rate brought on by disease and hunger. The Spanish were desperate for supplies, food and ammunition and so turned first to their compatriots in Cartagena and then Santiago de Cuba for assistance.

With the plains cleared the English were able to consider plans for utilising what remained of the fleet to project English power across the Caribbean. Oliver Cromwell had made it clear in his instructions to both Penn and Venables before they left England in 1654 that the expedition was expected to attack multiple targets across the Spanish Empire, though not necessarily to occupy all of them. Secure from a base deep within the Spanish territories he expected his army and navy 'as often as there shal be occasion to land your men' upon the territory 'claymed by the Spanyards in America, and to surprise their forts, take or beate down their Castles and Places of strength, and to pursue, kil, and destroy by al meanes whatsover al those who shal oppose or resist you'.[26] Without giving the two generals specific targets he did suggest, amongst other targets, that they consider an attempt upon the strategically important harbour at Cartagena. In early 1655 the influential Martin Noel seems to have written to Venables, expressing 'my Lords [Cromwell's] mind in the managing this design'. Whilst this letter no longer exists, Venables'

23 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.21.
24 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.22.
25 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.23.
26 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.113.

reply from Jamaica dated 13 June 1655 does. It is clear from Venables' response that Cromwell had, in his further instructions relayed via Noel, directed him to make an attack upon Cartagena to which the General responded that he was unable to do that at the present time.[27] Despite Venables' inability to comply with the Lord Protector's instructions, Vice Admiral William Goodsonn, almost as soon as Venables had left for England, made preparations to do exactly what Cromwell had instructed. Penn had given him specific instructions to 'infest and annoy the enemy'[28] whenever he had the opportunity, and Goodsonn perhaps saw this as his opportunity to hit back at the Spanish and to assert English supremacy at sea in the region.

He departed Jamaica on 31 July and headed east, 'beating to the windward' until he reached the western point of Hispaniola on 9 August. En route the frigate *Grantham* 'lost both her top masts, and being very leaky bore up' and was forced to return to Jamaica, while at the same time the captain of the *Arms of Holland* died. After landing on a remote part of Hispaniola to take on water Goodsonn's men were able to refresh themselves by eating local oranges and limes. On 10 August the fleet headed south, and eight days later reached the Spanish Main. Once there Goodsonn called a council of war to discuss what it should do next. It was decided that the best course of action, for which the fleet had the authority to undertake, was to attempt to raid some Spanish settlements along the coast with the intention of capturing provisions and any treasure they could find. It was therefore 'resolved to attempt Rio di hatch [Riohacha, Colombia], being as by an intelligent [*sic*] rich and of small strength, only having a small castle with four guns, whose trade consist of pearl and fishing, the inhabitants of the town not being above 100 all Spaniards.' Goodsonn was aware that Riohacha was situated in a narrow bay 'as no great ships can come near it'. He ordered that 350 men be loaded onto three of his smallest boats, the galley *Martin*, the *Arms of Holland*, and the hoy *Galliot* to attempt the landing. However, when these three vessels attempted to enter the bay they were unable to find the passage that led towards the town, and as the boats were by that time easily discernible from the land, and so the element of surprise lost, they decided not to attempt a landing considering that the 'wealth of the place would be carried away' while they had been attempting to navigate to a landing spot.[29]



Portrait of Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of England, c.1653–1664. Jan van de Velde, after Robert Walker. (The Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-1890-A-16095)

27 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.49.

28 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, pp.582–584.

29 Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 4 (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), pp.159–160.

With that the flotilla headed westwards along the coast towards Santa Marta, where it arrived around five o'clock in the afternoon on 24 August. The main produce of Santa Marta was cocoa and tobacco, while it was also renowned for making earthen pots and manufacturing a thread which was used in Spanish lace. The English found the small but important settlement sparsely defended, there being but two forts:

> [a] musket shot the one from the other, being close by the waterside. In the one fort was mounted 14 guns, being 22 feet high; in the other nine, being 11 feet high. Between these two forts was a breast work, which was all their strength; but God was so pleased to order it, in little more than an hour to give us a possession both of town and forts.

Landing quickly, the English captured a handful of prisoners while the rest of the population fled into the woods, where, due to darkness falling, Goodsonn thought it 'not convenient to follow them'. His men found little of any value in the town, which consisted of some 200 properties. The following day a delegation of Spaniards arrived to ascertain English intentions, whom Goodsonn informed that he would leave the town undamaged and release all the prisoners in return for a ransom of 20,000 pieces of eight, but would destroy the fortifications. Initially the Spanish seemed to agree to this, but it soon became apparent that they had no intention of paying this ransom and were just procrastinating. Goodsonn wrote that the delay 'caused us to send a strong party into the country some 10 miles from the town of St Martha, and their burned all Spanish houses and churches they met with; and at their return we demolish[ed] their town and forts, burning all the houses and churches'. The English captured 30 pieces of ordnance plus some powder and shot which were transported back to Jamaica, and which were placed in the forts the English constructed to defend Cagway harbour. Goodsonn added that 'as the town was reported poor, so we found it; all with the plunder that could be gathered in, and with much exactness being sold at each ship's mast, in the whole amount to four hundred seventy one pounds. Our men got some refreshing in the said town, as Hens, hogs, and other provisions.'[30]

The English remained at Santa Marta for almost two weeks and departed on 7 September, once again heading west towards Cartagena where they arrived on 10 September. Upon their arrival the flotilla sailed within full view of the city, which subsequently fired some poorly aimed cannon shot at it, to which the English replied by firing a single squib. In the harbour there were six Spanish vessels but there was no sign of the Spanish plate fleet, nor did it seem that any preparations were being made for a retaliatory attack upon Jamaica. Goodsonn lacked the forces to attempt any sort of attack upon the city itself and so this visit was more a show of bravado than anything else. The English having been on the Spanish coast for three weeks and their presence well advertised, he 'concluded it little advantage to lie there' and so

30 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.159–160.



Mapa de la costa septentrional de América del Sur, desde la Peninsula de Araya, en Venezuela, hasta Portobelo, en Panamá, c.1629. (Archivo General de Indias. MP-PANAMA, 264)

the fleet returned directly to Jamaica.[31] No doubt disheartened by a lack of success or gaining of any significant plunder, Goodsonn was emboldened by the ease with which he had been able to cruise along the coast and land at will, and so he and his officers made 'immediate plans' for an attack upon Santiago de Cuba with a force 'consisting of 500 fighting men'; however this attack never eventuated and it was to be over six years before the English once again made a plan to attack Santiago de Cuba.[32] Only a few days after his return, Colonel Richard Fortescue – who had replaced Venables as army commander when the latter returned to England – died, and Colonel Edward Doyley became commander-in-chief of the army in his place. Then within weeks of Goodsonn's return to Cagway a new commissioner, Robert Sedgwick, arrived from England.

Goodsonn, well aware that Cartagena was a likely base from which the Spanish could mount an attack upon Jamaica, was keen to keep a frequent English presence in the waters off the coast to keep a watch for any preparations that might be being made for just such an attack. On 22 November Captain Benjamin Blake, Goodsonn's second in command, left Jamaica with nine vessels to once again cruise the coast near this important harbour. However:

31 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.159–160. See also John Cane, *The Publick Intelligencer*, 28 January–4 February 1656, 78:E.492[2], pp.294–295.

32 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.159–160.

> [a] small time after their coming there [he] met with very foul weather, in so much that the Vice Admiral [Blake] near Rem. D. Grand [the Rio Grande, now called Rio Magadalena, Colombia] spent his foremast; the sea running high could not save anything, but was forced to cut away his yards and top mast with al to them belonging, so making with a spare top mast at your mast returned hither 14

Also forced to return due to damage were the *Dover* and the *Hound*. The remaining ships, now under the command of Captain Newberry, once again fell upon the Spanish settlement of Santa Marta seeking plunder but again found none. The Spanish had begun to rebuild their houses after the first English raid, but Newberry destroyed them again. Leaving Santa Marta Newbury then intercepted and captured two small coastal craft carrying provisions to Cartagena.[33] Upon interrogating the crew he was informed that the city was expecting three or four laden merchant vessels to return from Porto Bello imminently, and so the *Laurel*, the *Arms of Holland*, the *Paul* and the *Martin* remained offshore in an attempt to capture these returning vessels, but without success.[34]

Throughout the rest of 1655 the English maintained vessels on the north side of the island, to intercept any fleeing Spaniards and to deter any vessels from Cuba landing supplies for those that remained on the island. In early December Goodsonn sent the *Selby* and a small brigantine to sail around Jamaica:

> to take knowledge of the coast, harbours, bays, rivers, creeks, et cetera and for the intercepting of any that might be trading with Cuba with the people of this island … And to destroy all houses, plantations, boats, perriagoes [small sailing boats], or what he could light on of the enemies; upon which work he saith he discovered the enemy into three places, but at no place so many, as they durst encounter sixty or seventy men when they landed. In this design he saith they burned about 50 houses, a bark, five perriagoes, and two canoes.[35]

However it was no easy feat to sail from Cagway to the north side of the island, a voyage that entailed slow and laborious tacking into the wind around Point Morant and up to Point Antonio where the trade winds could carry the vessels westward along the coast. On their return the English had the same problem once they reached Point Negril, and were again forced to sail into the wind as they passed the south side of the island on their way to Cagway. On the return of these two vessels, at Point Pedro, a shore party located two Spanish houses which they raided and found 'seventeen fixed fire arms' and then they burned the houses. Close by a party of 40 mounted Spaniards were spotted but they quickly disappeared into the woods.[36]

It had always been hoped that the English would be able to locate and capture the Spanish plate fleet, so much so that its capture was vital for

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33 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.452.
34 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.452.
35 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.452.
36 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.456.

them to finance the expedition. In this the English were to be disappointed, however. On his return to England Penn had attempted to see if it was in Havana, and he had instructed Goodsonn to pay attention to see if he could locate it in Cartagena. They had heard rumours that it had departed Cartagena in March, but had never been able to locate it. Back in Europe another English admiral, Robert Blake, received secret instructions from Cromwell around the end of April 1655 instructing him to redeploy his fleet, then in the Mediterranean, into a position off the Spanish port city of Santa Cruz with explicit instructions to attack and seize the Spanish fleet if he encountered it when it arrived from the West Indies. In June he was also clearly instructed to hinder any attempts by the Spanish fleet to send reinforcements or provisions to the West Indies.[37] It was at this point that the war, hitherto restricted to the West Indies, now spread to Europe.

II

By early 1656 the Spanish resistance on Jamaica was in a state of disarray. The island's official governor had been deposed and later died, and Proenza, now de facto governor, was old, sick and physically incapable of leading any resistance. Most of the senior members of the Spanish community had fled with their families to Cuba, and only a handful remained who could provide a semblance of resistance under the command of Don Christoval Ysassi Arnaldo against the English who now occupied their lands. Ysassi's brother, Don Blas Arnaldo Ysassi, was a senior member of the government in the nearby city of Santiago de Cuba and he was to play a leading role liaising between his brother and the governor of Santiago, Don Pedro de Bayona, for supplies and reinforcements. Ysassi appointed as his second in command his own nephew, Don Christoval de Leiva Ysassi. But it was the governor of the Spanish city of Cartagena, Don Pedro Zapata, who was the first official to provide supplies and relief to the Spanish on Jamaica in both late 1655 and again in early 1656,[38] and throughout the resistance proved to be a staunch supporter of Ysassi. The Viceroy of Mexico, the Duke of Albuquerque, was also to lend Ysassi much material and moral support throughout the war of resistance in the face of the increasingly hostile attitude of Bayona in Cuba.

Ysassi and his Spanish resistance fighters had a very simple strategy with which to combat the English invaders. At all costs they needed to maintain a Spanish foothold on the island, creating as much disruption as they could for the English, while the Spanish authorities, both in Spain and throughout South America, mustered sufficient forces to launch an invasion for the reconquest of Jamaica. Throughout the resistance Ysassi continued to believe that a fleet would be sent to reconquer the island, but in reality the Spanish

37 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.452; Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1656*, Vol. 4 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903), pp.164–166; Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, pp.611–612.

38 Frank Cundall and Joseph Luckert Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards: Abstracted from the Archives of Seville* (Jamaica: 1919; reprint 2017), p.85.

had no fleet to send. At different times a force known as the Windward Squadron had been established to provide a permanent naval presence in the Caribbean with which to counter any such aggression from European interlopers, but a lack of funds and inept command saw it active for a few years at a time and then dissolved, only to be recreated some years later when official enthusiasm had been rekindled. The last time Spain was able to utilise this understrength force was in 1647, but it was soon dismantled and only reconstituted in 1665 as a result of the growing privateering menace. As such it was incapable of providing any assistance to Ysassi.[39] Though he did not know it at the time, the only support Ysassi would receive would be that which could be mustered from the much maligned colonial forces, as King Philip of Spain had nothing to spare that could be sent from Spain.

Having spent the winter hiding in the thick forests on the north side of the island, Ysassi was ready to finally start an offensive against the English early in the new year. With the winter rains at an end on 27 February 1656 [NS], and with few provisions and little ammunition, he left the Spanish settlement of Santa Anna to cross the mountains accompanied only by his nephew and a mere 30 foot soldiers who were 'two skeleton companies which he had raised, by virtue of the faculty of his commission conferred upon him'. his way south he was able to raise an additional handful of men and perhaps as many as 15 African-Caribbean slaves 'belonging to private citizens', and so had barely 60 men under his command when he conducted his first attack upon the English in March.[40] In October 1655 a Spanish ship en route from Cartagena to Havana put into a small bay called Pozo Ayron on the south coast of Jamaica, and was informed by the local population that the English had occupied the southern part of the island and that most of the Spaniards had fled north across the mountains. This vessel was able to pass on the information to Zapata in Cartagena, who immediately fitted out a vessel with sundry food supplies which were shipped to the southern part of Jamaica for the use of the Spanish. A second vessel was dispatched by Zapata in January 1656, along with a letter from the governor notifying the resistance that a relief force was to be assembled and that the Spanish on the island should concentrate in the vicinity of the Pedro Plains to await its arrival. This vessel also brought much-needed weapons and ammunition. It was presumably this message that encouraged Ysassi to head south in February 1656 and to begin his attacks upon the invaders. The English had learned of the arrival of this second Spanish vessel during a raid on Parottee in February.[41]

In early February Robert Sedgwick, the new English commander, sent a raiding force into the Pedro Plains carried by the fleet, with 'a hundred soldiers'[42] under the command of Captain Kimpo Sibada, a Dutch guide who

39 Roland D. Hussey, 'Spanish Reaction to Foreign Aggression in The Caribbean to about 1680', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1929), pp.296–297.

40 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.23; J.L. Pietersz, H.P. Jacobs and S.A.G. Taylor, 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', *The Jamaican Historical Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1952.

41 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.17.

42 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.542. Interestingly there is no record in the council of officers records made by Doyley that confirms army participation in this raid, although Sedgwick did confirm in a letter to Cromwell in March that 'a party of 100 land soldiers' were involved.

knew the islands in the West Indies well, and had been in the employ of the English since April 1655 when he was hired by Commissioner Butler in Antigua.[43] The small force, which does not seem to have included any cavalry, consisted of Sibada and infantry under Captain Foster (his regiment has not been identified) and Ensign Thomas Hoskins; Hoskins wrote a brief account of the raid, as did Sibada. The English landed somewhere near to Point Pedro on the afternoon of 4 February with the intention of attacking a settlement the following night on what is now Parottee Bay, and 'where we expected the enemy'. However, being spotted almost as soon as they landed by 'one man on horseback', the English decided to fall on Parottee immediately. On their march they 'visited 3 houses, but could see no sign of any people but two men that lay dead, as we supposed to be of our last party that was there'.[44] Continuing their march to Parottee under the surveillance of some unidentified mounted men they found the 'town burnt as it was left by our party' the previous year. Leaving Parottee that night the English camped next to a spring from where they sent out reconnaissance patrols, but 'finding nothing' other than 'houses newly forsaken'. That night an African-Caribbean approached their camp to ask why the English had come, and if they were searching for provisions. The English replied that they were there to 'seek out the Spaniards in those parts'. The man replied that he and his companions had nothing to do with the Spaniards, and were there only looking for 'cattle to kill'. He made it clear that if the English attempted to attack the African-Caribbeans they would 'kill our men as they pleased'.[45]

The following day Sibada and Captain Foster led another reconnaissance patrol into the interior 'about ye circumforence of 4 miles' from their overnight quarters.[46] On their return they learned that some English from the main party 'had straggled abroad with their arms, and how the enemy had killed one of them'. In retaliation Sibada immediately gave the order to 'fire all the houses' where the English had just quartered. After this they marched 'west, towards a place where I [Sibada] thought to find the enemy to be retreated'. During their march they were shadowed by more mounted men, whom the English believed to be Spaniards, and who on at least one occasion attempted to lead the English into a trap. On another occasion the English fired on a party of African-Caribbeans who quickly withdrew. In the afternoon the English marched through a wood and into an open savannah where they saw 'the enemies on the other side' and whom they immediately rushed 'taking seven prisoners, the rest escaped'. From these prisoners the English learned they were a party of 20 and that another party of 40 nearby had 'fled over the river towards the north side'.[47] The next day, 6 February, the English marched back to Parrotee in heavy rain. The following day some

43 Granville Penn, *Memorials of the professional life and times of Sir William Penn ... From 1644 to 1670*, Vol. 2 (London: J. Duncan, 1833), p.130; The National Archives (hereafter TNA), CO1/33, Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series), Addenda, 1656, f.46.

44 Most likely from the English attack on the Rio Caobana in August 1655.

45 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.543.

46 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 34, 1656, f.891.

47 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.543.

of the Spanish prisoners, 'seeing they were civilly used, contrary to what was told them by the mr. del Campo [Proenza]', requested to speak to Sibada. They informed him that the Spanish in Cartagena had dispatched a frigate with supplies for the beleaguered Spaniards on the island some time before. With the supplies came a message telling Proenza to concentrate his men in the Parrotee vicinity, 'for there was two galleons to come over, and 1000 men to be landed at Point Pedro, to join with them, and the armado from Spain to come to Jamaica harbour to beat the English from the land'. These captured Spaniards were probably the advance guard of the islanders, as they were 'expecting the rest from St Ann's [Santa Anna on the north side of Jamaica] to come to them'. The Spaniards also informed their captors 'that there had a great sickness been amongst them, whereof 500 men died' and many had fled to Cuba.[48] Due to contrary winds Sibada was unable to return to Santiago with this intelligence immediately. After further unsuccessful forays inland, as well as taking on board water, he was only able to return to Santiago on 16 February.[49] Until this raid the English had little knowledge of Spanish intentions, although late in 1655 they had been personally warned by Cromwell of the rumours circulating in Europe that suggested the Spanish would dispatch a fleet to the West Indies to retake Jamaica.[50] The English had been informed that any such fleet would most likely use Cartagena as a base and so Goodsonn had periodically sent vessels there to observe what naval activity there might be in the harbour. This intelligence was probably the first certain information the English had received that resistance was now being organised on the island, and that external assistance, along with supplies, was being provided from Cartagena. However it was clear that the English were aware of the threat of an external attack when on 27 January Buller's regiment and part of Doyley's own were ordered to deploy further to the west of Santiago, towards Old Harbour Bay, in anticipation of a Spanish landing there should an attack be launched against them.[51]

The news that Sibada brought back was reinforced the following month when an expedition to capture horses encountered Ysassi and his men on 9 March in Guatibacoa. Some of his men were captured, and after their interrogation the English believed these men to be the advance guard of a Spanish relief force and so hastily withdrew back to Santiago.[52] According to Castilla the English were very much frightened by what they thought was the advance guard of an invasion and quickly withdrew their isolated outposts in the Guatibacoa and Anaya areas and 'retired in all haste, abandoning what they had planted, and their blockhouses, which they had erected to protect themselves against us'.[53] Ysassi then 'burned all the houses where they

48 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.543–544; Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 34, f.891.
49 Birch , *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.544.
50 Thomas Carlyle (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, Vol. 2 (London: Methuen & Co, 1904), p.476.
51 F.J. Osborne and S.A.G. Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', *The Jamaican Historical Review*, Vol. X, 1973, p.44.
52 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.17; Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.23–24.
53 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.23–24.

were living' when he found them.[54] With the Clarendon Plains now free of English occupation Ysassi led his small force through Anaya and into the St Catherine Plain, from where he planned to launch a small-scale assault upon the English. While in Anaya, on 15 March, he spotted '18 men with a sergeant to get water, with many jars and waterbutts and three horses'.[55] He first ordered 'two men to mount on horseback so they might not get away from me' and then he attacked and 'killed all, none escaping'.[56] Ysassi also wrote that he first captured the sergeant, whom he interrogated and then seems to have killed in cold blood.[57] They then 'stripped the dead men of their arms, pikes and munitions they carried'
towards Santiago where they camped overnight near the bridge (La Puente) about six miles west of the town, which was also unoccupied by the English.[58] Ysassi noted, as he made his way across what had been until recently English-held territory, that they had not 'sown anything but a few vegetables'.[59]

Ysassi left his men at the bridge with instructions that on the following day they were to set some ambushes along the routes from Santiago to the area to the north called Los Angeles, and along the track leading from the town to the Guanaboa Vale, 'to try to make some effective attacks upon the enemy coming and going between said farms and the town'.[60]
nephew Leiva Ysassi, with some other Spanish officers and some African-Caribbeans, headed across country and climbed what is now called Port Henderson Hill, but then was known to the Spaniards as the Morro, which at the time was unoccupied by the English; from the summit a clear view of the harbour could be gained from which Ysassi wanted to get intelligence as to how many vessels the English had there. From the summit, by the lime kilns, he saw 'eighteen small ships, three or four large ones and four pinnaces – about eighteen houses on the point of Cayo de Carena and on the inner harbour seven thatched huts.'[61] He added in a letter to his brother that 'They say there was a little fort on the point to carry artillery. I did not see it because it must be low.'[62] Ysassi, who 'with his own eyes … satisfied himself as to the ships in the port and the buildings on Careen Key [Point Cagway, later the site of Fort Royal]' then withdrew for Port Henderson Hill, and 'advancing along the way from the port to the town, they went into ambush in the bush, that they might not be seen, and waited an opportunity to play into good luck against the English coming and going'.[63] Before long a group of five or six English soldiers came along the road on horseback followed by a loaded cart, presumably bringing supplies up from Passage Fort. Ysassi ordered his

54 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.30.
55 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.30.
56 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.24.
57 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.21.
58 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.23–24; Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.24.
59 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.30.
60 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.24.
61 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.24.
62 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.31.
63 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.24–25.

Spanish soldiers to attack the mounted English and the African-Caribbeans to attack the cart and driver. 'Hardly had the riders reached the place where the Spaniards waited, than their souls abandoned their bodies.' Another party of English soon appeared and Ysassi 'killed five more, the rest ran away to the sea and one badly wounded, to the town'.[64] According to the Spanish one of these English soldiers was a captain who carried his commission on him, and which was later spent by the Spanish to their King as a trophy. The captain also wore a nice pair of leather gloves.[65] As the Spanish dispatched the English soldiers their African-Caribbean allies took care of the cart in the bush, 'lightening it of many sacks of flour and other things it was conveying, as they also lightened the cartman's soul of his body. They hid the dead in the bush. The trail of blood remained in the road, which three other carts, and some persons on foot and mounted, who were escorting these, stop to consider with astonishment' as the Spanish looked on from the safety of nearby trees, no doubt with a degree of amusement.[66] Ysassi sent the African-Caribbeans back with their booty with Leiva Ysassi while he and one other Spaniard sneaked into Santiago under cover of darkness.[67]

Earlier that day the main body of the Spanish force which Ysassi had left on the outskirts of the town had set up an ambush along the road to Los Angeles. In the early evening, this group later recounted, 'a large troop of English foot and horse, were advancing towards the town. It was then about Vespers. Our men fell upon them, killing 22 English. The rest, abandoning the burdens they were carrying, returned, fleeing, along the road they had travelled.'[68] The English, apparently returning from the house of Father Estacio, were relieved of all that they were carrying, 'cloth, hammocks, biscuit, flour, hens, eggs, cabbages, peppers, rye, spades, hatchets'. [69] The fleeing English ran into another group of soldiers proceeding along the same road. 'Both then halted, convinced that it was the Wrath of God which had fallen upon them, to which conclusion the fact that it was night added not a little, for our sovereign Lord had arranged it all.'[70] This group of Spanish then withdrew under cover of darkness and rejoined Ysassi near the town. Previously Ysassi and his companion had:

> as they passed by the outskirts of the town ... burned three *buhios* or straw huts, to which conflagration the general and colonels and all the infantry came running, not comprehending who could have set fire to those houses – certainly not realising that they were the same aggressors who had done the damage at Cardenas, on the highway to the sea, and on the Angeles road.[71]

64 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.24.
65 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.24–25; Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.25.
66 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.24–25.
67 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.25.
68 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.25.
69 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.32.
70 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.25.
71 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.25–26.

Ysassi himself was to describe that nervy attack at the heart of the English main base as they 'went to the town and set fire to the two houses of Bartolo to scare them more … Englishmen came out like bees.'[72]

Ysassi and his men withdrew from the area a few days later, satisfied with killing, he claimed, between 40 and 50 English, as well as creating havoc and disruption amongst them. Apparently no English pursuit was mounted.[73] A comparison of ration strengths for the English army between 6 and 27 March shows that provisions for 83 fewer men were issued on 27 March than on 6 March. Whilst this cannot be taken as a definitive casualty number for the period it does indicate that perhaps the Spanish assessment of English losses was reasonably accurate. At the end of this period the regiment formerly belonging to Carter required provisions for 40 fewer men than it did on 6 March, Buller's 27 fewer and Richard Holdip's regiment 16 fewer. These figures suggest that it was perhaps these regiments that suffered the most as a result of Ysassi's raid.[74] No mention is made of any Spanish casualties.[75]

English sources confirm that this raid did take place and that the English lost heavily. Sedgwick admitted to Thurloe on 30 April that 'more than 40 of our soldiers were cut off by the African-Caribbeans, as they were carelessly going about their quarters, such as sordid neglectful spirit doth still possess them as 'tis to admiration'.[76] In a letter to Cromwell dated 12 March Sedgwick and Goodsonn wrote that 'of late we find some of our men daily killed by them, and they were so bold one night not long since to fire a house in the headquarters at St. Jago de la Vega'.[77] On 19 March a council of officers evidently discussed the recent raid. The senior officers felt that the reason why Ysassi had been able to penetrate so far towards Santiago was partly because many of the regimental officers had not been present with their units and were unable therefore to provide the command and leadership required to stop such a raid; the council 'taking into consideration the many inconveniences that doe and may happen by reason of divers of the officers of the army they continual staying and abiding heere in town from their companies'. As a remedy to this the council resolved 'that all officers and soldiers belonging to the several regiments of this army and not uppon the guarde shall forthwith depart this town and immediately repaire to their severall and respective charges and from them not to absent themselves without leave the chiefe officer of ye regiment they belong to the Commander-in-Chief the army'. They further resolved that the 'provost-marshall of the army take special notice of what officers or shoulders should come to towne from their quarters and examine them by whose permission they soe come and to give him account thereof to the commander-in-chief of the regiment to whom they belong'.[78] In a further response to the raid the council decided that:

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72 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', pp.33, 25.
73 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.33.
74 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.112.
75 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', pp.25, 33.
76 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.749.
77 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
78 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.52.

> [for the] more convenient and safe quartering of ye regiment of the late Colonell Carter and the drawing together that regiment and the regiment of the late Major-General Fortescue, Major John Fillkins and Major Richard Wells doe forthwith goe to view and find out some convenient quarters neare to the riverside about five myles hence fitting for the said two regiments, and that they make return to the two chief officers of those regiments that are to settle the two regiments there with all speed.[79]

The purpose of this redeployment was to plug the gap at the entrance to the St Catherine Plain through which Ysassi had been able to advance unopposed. The council noted that the 'enemie hath very lately made an assault upon several of our men and killed them in the passage from hence [that is, from Santiago] to the seaside, and whereas it is expected they may dayly doe more mischief if not timely prevented'. It was resolved that:

> fower fyles of men commanded by a commission officer and a sargeant from the guarde at the seaside and as many from the guarde in the towne keepe moving every day, those from the towne to the halfway tree,[80] and those from the guarde at the seaside to meet them there, and so keep moving to and again between sun[rise] and sun[set] and then to repaire to their quarters.[81]

This daylight patrol to protect the vital road from the landing ground to the town was continued until October when it was ordered to be discontinued.[82]

According to Ysassi he led a second, though less successful, raid around the end of April or the beginning of May 1656. Advancing into Anaya 'to raid the countryside and ranches to which the enemy had withdrawn' the Spanish burned all the 'blockhouses the enemy had in that district'. During this raid a party of English who were rounding up horses were able to ambush some advanced scouts from the Spanish column. After killing two Spaniards and wounding another the English party were all killed by the advancing main body of the Spanish force. The Spanish then spotted an English force of 'two hundred and fifty foot and eighty horse' in the area, and Ysassi decided to avoid a confrontation with such a large force and to just 'watch these people, fearful lest they go to our base and catch the women and persons who were in charge of their supply'.[83] Ysassi later admitted that at least two Spaniards were killed and another wounded in the arm by this counter-attack. He then went on to claim that the English force was then defeated and all the English killed except for one wounded man who escaped and set fire to a nearby house. Ysassi then withdrew, he noted, when a larger body of English infantry and cavalry arrived.[84] English sources make no mention of this raid nor of any reaction by the council of officers to it. Doyley, in a letter

79 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.52.
80 Evidently halfway between current Spanish Town and Passage Fort, possibly in the vicinity of Grange Lane.
81 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.52–53.
82 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.93.
83 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.26.
84 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.20.

to Thurloe dated 18 April, was to write, 'it have pleased God to give us some success against the Negroes. A plantation of theirs being found out, we fell upon them, slew some, and totally spoiled one of their chief quarters.' This reference might refer to this raid or perhaps to some other incident around this time which suggests that the English had initiated some sort of retaliatory raid upon the Spanish.[85] The Spanish recorded only five dead Spaniards and 'some negroes' as a result of these two raids. They also claimed that along with the dead English they captured at least five English soldiers who were to be sent either to Cartagena or Santiago de Cuba, and from whom they obtained a detailed knowledge of English activities on the island since their arrival.[86]

With limited men, weapons and ammunition Ysassi was in no position to do much more than harry the more exposed English outposts for the rest of the year. In Spain the King finally received news of the events surrounding the English invasion, the death of Ramirez and the fractured state of the Spanish resistance. On 25 October 1656 he wrote to Ysassi 'that having considered in my Royal Council of the Indies and taking into account the services that you state you have rendered in defence of the island, I have named you as governor thereof in the interim to I decide what is most suitable as you will see in the dispatch I send you'. He continued:

Portrait of Philip IV, King of Spain, c.1615–1657. Jacob Louys. (The Metropolitan Museum, New York. 51.501.7557)

> I have also decided (in order that you may the better attend to my service and attain the good wishes and activity you have shown in defence of the island and the expulsion of the enemy) that you be sent two or three hundred armed soldiers and as many firearms in portions of one-third each of muskets, arquebuses and flint-lock carbines with their flasks and other accessories and the quantity of leaden balls or metal corresponding to the supply and that you be likewise sent one hundred quintals of powder and the corresponding cord and the largest quantity possible of salt, corn and cassava and other provisions that there is in the islands of Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Habana and Cuba.[87]

The King also noted that he was writing to the governors of the aforementioned places requesting them to send Ysassi more soldiers and weapons, as well as food, and that all such men and provisions were to be sent:

85 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.711.
86 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.28.
87 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.52–53.

to the port and city of [Santiago de] Cuba, where a store must be made, directed to the governor, Don Pedro de Bayona, in order that he may keep sending the same to Jamaica, to the port and safe landing places that you will point out … you will at the same time advise him and take care to appoint a person of integrity, who will keep a strict account, to receive in Jamaica all the provisions and munitions and distribute them without waste to the best advantage and care for the sustenance and defence of the infantry and troops that are holding out and would join in Jamaica with the reliefs referred to.[88]

The King continued, stating: 'I have every assurance and confidence that by means of your valour and zeal for my service you will arrange not only to make a very rigorous diversion against the English to keep them continually with arms in hand, but will attempt to dislodge them with valour and prudence, compelling them to embark on their ships and leave Jamaica, abandoning the posts they have occupied.'[89]

This letter from the King would only have been received by Ysassi in early 1657, but would no doubt have encouraged him to continue his resistance, now having been made officially governor of the island, and with the promise of reinforcements soon to be sent. However, the choice of appointing Bayona to coordinate the relief through the city of Santiago de Cuba was to prove a poor one. Bayona was to show himself to be anything but helpful to Ysassi, and did much to undermine his resistance efforts by withholding support and attempting to undermine his authority. Furthermore, relief from Santiago de Cuba would haved to be landed on the northern shore of Jamaica, requiring a lengthy and arduous carriage of all supplies across the mountains to the southern areas which was where the war had to be fought and won if the English were to be defeated. Ysassi was to continually plead over the next two years that supplies should be dispatched not from Santiago de Cuba, but from Cartagena where they could be landed on the southern shore of Jamaica where they were actually needed. Unfortunately for the Spanish Ysassi's sensible advice was ignored, and when relief did come it was landed on the north of the island.

III

Following Ysassi's raids of March and April 1656 the English did little immediately in response. The army, whilst in a better state of health than during the winter, was racked with discontent and depleted in numbers. Morale must have slumped further when Sedgwick died in May leaving Doyley, once again the most senior officer, as both commander of the army and de facto governor as well. It was only after two attempted mutinies, which occurred after the Spanish raid, that Doyley felt comfortable enough to continue the pattern of clearance raids that had proved successful the

88 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.53.
89 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.53.

previous year.[90] On 24 June a council of officers discussed whether it was 'very fitting and convenient [if] a party should be sent forth'. The officers agreed that it was, however they questioned whether any private soldiers could be spared 'unlesse they should be taken off from planting, which is thought and are judged very unfitting'. They decided that men could only be spared from Doyley's own regiment supported by some of the regiment under the command of Ward, and so it was ordered that eight files of men from Doyley's regiment and two files from Ward's be prepared under the command of Major Robert Smith.[91] A file consisted of six men, so this force must have amounted to almost 100 men once Thomas Blunter's troop of cavalry was included.

Smith was instructed to march with his party, which included cavalry, towards Guatibacoa, or more specifically to the Bay of Micario (Micary) to the east of the Milk River on the Clarendon Plain or up Saint Ann's Gully, 'To find out ye enemy, and you are to burne and destroy such houses and plantations of ye enemy as you and your officers with you shall think there's if you find it not otherwise inconvenient.' They were instructed not to 'stay abroad above twelve days … Unless by your intelligence you can do something considerable.' Doyley specifically instructed Smith that he should 'use ye best endeavour to see if you can speak with some of them and persuade them to a parley'.[92] Smith most likely departed on 26 June when he was issued with 'one barrel of powder with match and bullet proportional thereunto for the use of the party now going forth'.[93] Unfortunately no records exist to record how successful, or otherwise, this raid was or how long it was out for, but it is known that John Davies, a trooper under the command of Lieutenant Blunter, was wounded within days of their departure after 'being shotte by the enemy since he went out with the party commanded by Major Robert Smith'.[94] Smith was back in Santiago by 8 July when he attended another council of officers when it was agreed to dispatch another column, this time under Lieutenant Colonel Francis Barrington, into the same area. This suggests that Smith's raid was neither successful nor lengthy but that it did at least engage with the enemy, though whether against the Spanish or the African-Caribbeans is unclear.[95]

Barrington's force, larger than Smith's had been, was to be made up of three files (18 men) from each of the regiments of Buller, Ward and Henry Archbould and six files (36 men) from Doyley's regiment. It also included cavalry once again under the command of Lieutenant Blunter, and so this force must have numbered in the region of 120 men. Prior to its dispatch the men were issued with new shoes as well as a half barrel of powder 'with bullet proportionable'.[96] Barrington's orders were 'to march with ye direct way to

90 The condition of the army and the events leading up to the mutinies will be considered in Chapter 4.
91 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.64.
92 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.64–66.
93 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.68.
94 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.69.
95 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.70.
96 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.70–72.

the great savannah at ye entering into Guatto-bicoa' and then, depending on circumstances 'march towards the Bay of Micario or towards St Jago[97] making it your chief endeavour to find out the enemy's quarters or plantations and to spoil, burn and destroy' them. Should he, after consultation with the other officers, 'judge it convenient' they could establish a 'standing campe' from where he could 'send forth parties of horse and foot to annoy the enemie'. If, in his good judgement, Barrington believed there was 'little good to be done against the enemy and that there is plenty of provisions for your party you are employing them in getting of horses or killing of beife, and dispose of both as you shall think fitt'. As in Smith's case, Barrington was ordered not to 'stay abroad above fourteen days unless you find some extraordinary cause for advantage of the service'.[98] Once again the outcome of the raid is unknown but it is most likely that the force had returned to Santiago by the end of July when the regiments involved received their full ration strength of provisions. Barrington himself was certainly back before 6 August, when he was appointed 'to make a survey of goods yet remaining in the public storehouse at ye seaside for ye use of the army'.[99]

At the beginning of August another raid into the interior was planned, with a party of infantry to be dispatched by sea to Micario and these to be joined by a party of horse that would march overland in search of cattle. On 7 August Lieutenant Groves, of Doyley's regiment, was instructed 'to boat ye men at ye forte and by ye assistance of the pilot to take hold of all advantages of the wind and weather to bring you safely to your landing place' along the Micario Bay, probably to the east of the Rio Minho. They were instructed to 'be very careful at ye landing' and to send an officer with a small body of men to 'search the bushes or any secret places that there be no ambuscades and you are not to march to any savanna nor any champion ground till you have well searched the woods'. If Groves encountered any Spanish he was to attempt to attack them but was warned to be careful of their horses. This suggests, perhaps, that the English had recently fallen victim to further ambushes in their recent raids and that mounted Spaniards (or African-Caribbeans) had proved particularly effective against them. However if Groves was to find himself 'clear of ye enemy' his party was 'to kill and jerke biefe making no spoil, and take special care (if you find the cattle tame) that you suffer not your man to affright them'. Groves was to return 'overland if you find a sure way home' after sending his transport vessels back to Santiago. He was instructed to keep a watch out for the cavalry column, under Cornet Wiseman, and that if he saw a party of cavalry he was to place a hat with a white handkerchief around it on the top of a pike so that they could be identified as English. Once again he was advised not to remain in the area for longer than two weeks.[100] Wiseman, for his part, was instructed to depart Santiago and cross through Anaya and 'endeavour your best to finde out a way through ye woods to you find the savanna near the seaside wither our party your foote

97 The area called 'Santiago at the base of the Manatines'.
98 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.72.
99 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.75, 77.
100 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.79.

is marched'. He was likewise instructed that if he saw 'any foote which you suppose may belong to this army you are then to put a hat upon the topp of a pike with a handkerchief in it by which you shall know that you are friends'.[101] It is not entirely clear whether this raid eventuated or not. Three days after Wiseman's orders were issued it was noted by a council of officers that he and his 20 troopers were to attach themselves to a force under the command of Archbould instead, which was to attempt to capture Proenza, and so it is possible that the urgency for the second raid necessitated the cancelling of the first raid, or perhaps Groves continued with his raid on his own.

On 11 August a council of officers met to discuss information that had recently been provided to them by Jasper de la Rois, 'a Spaniard lately come in'. La Rois had informed the English that Proenza was encamped somewhere along Saint Ann's Gully, probably along the upper reaches of the Milk River on the Clarendon Plain, and the English officers discussed whether they ought to send out an expedition to attempt to capture him. It was decided that a force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archbould would be dispatched consisting of 12 files of men (72 plus officers) assembled from Doyley's, Ward's, Barrington's, Archbould's and Wells' regiments as well as a force of 20 horse under the command of Cornet Wiseman. Archbould received a barrel of powder and 'a hundred pound weight of musquett bullet for you use of the party now going forth under his command'.[102] Evidently La Rois had either agreed to lead the English to the camp where Proenza was reported to be or to provide a guide to do so, as Archbould was ordered to march speedily to Saint Ann's Gully with a guide and this guide 'shall direct you to ye quarters of ye enemie where you shall use all means possible to beat up their quarters by night and to pursue them'. It was by now the beginning of the rainy season and as such he was instructed to 'take special care that you observe ye weather, and if it be probable to rain that you presently take back your party and not adventure their being distressed by the waters' of the Rio Minho, which might be too deep by then to cross. Archbould was instructed to confer 'with your guide and if you find his integrity at your first attempt so be directed by him to ye other adjacent quarters of the enemie. You are to bring home to ye Headquarters all such prisoners as shall be taken and not dispose of them until further order.' Archbould was also given the authority to continue his march towards Parottee in the Pedro Plains if he felt it necessary, and that if that was the case Doyley would provide him with additional provisions. He was instructed 'not to stay above tenn days unless your [*sic*] and the officers find some other attempt feasible and probable'.[103] Again the outcome of the raid is not known, however Proenza certainly was not captured during it. It seems likely that the English did make contact with the Spanish at some point during this raid, for William Paxton, a 'soldier belonging to the company of Capt. Lieut. Baker in ye regiment under your command of Lieut. Coll Archbold [*sic*] taken long since by the enemy' was liberated. As he was 'without clothes' it was necessary to issue him, on 21

101 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.79.
102 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.78.
103 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.80.

August, with 'one paire of drawers, one paire of stockins, one paire of shoes, one shirt and jacquet and one hatt or capp'.[104]

In September it was decided to send out yet another raid consisting of around 126 foot soldiers plus Blunter's troop of cavalry, and this time they had instructions to proceed up the Rio Minho valley with the assistance of guides and to attack 'the quarters of the Negroes'.
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francis Mercer, who was instructed that during the attack he was to 'keep your partie entire till ye quarters be cleared of the enemie so that they might not rally and fall upon your partie plundering'. Any prisoners were to be returned to Santiago while he was instructed 'to endeavour to treat with ye enemie and give them passes and other assurance if they will come into us and treat here'. Mercer was instructed to leave Santiago on 13 September and 'to return within sixteen days at ye furthest'.[105]
barrel of muskett shott, and half a skeyne of match'
pound of bread for the use of the party going forth under his command'. Accompanying him was 'Mr Hillsman chirurgion belonging to ye regiment under the command of Major Wells and Joseph Pierre Marshall belonging to the regiment of ye Right Honourable Coll. Doyley'.[106] It is interesting that this raid was specifically targeting African-Caribbeans rather than Spanish, and it illustrates the growing threat posed by them and the English realisation that they were in fact a distinct enemy, a point that will be discussed later. Again the details of the raid are unknown but Mercer himself was back in Santiago by 10 October. On 1 October provisions were issued for 'ye use of the fower Spaniards last brought in', and it is therefore possible that these four prisoners were captured during Mercer's raid.[107]

Spanish accounts provide no detail about these raids, which were a combination of search and destroy missions and sweeps for provisions, cattle and horses. There is no evidence that the Spanish were occupying the plains in any strength, and certainly none that suggests the level of daring attacks that had been made earlier in the year. That these English raids were targeting the Clarendon Plain rather than the nearer St Catherine Plain suggests that the latter was free of any Spanish activity entirely. The extant Spanish sources all imply that they were forced to hide in the mountains for the rest of the year, and they only sent the occasional party onto the plains to forage. This was obviously a risky operation for the small, and dwindling, number of Spanish as they risked being attacked by the frequent English parties that scoured the area. The English were once again dominating the southern part of the island and forcing the Spanish to remain far away from Santiago and the newly established English plantations.

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104 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.83.
105 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.87–88.
106 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.89, 93, 88.
107 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.94, 92.

IV

Whilst the army was again able to dominate the plains after Ysassi's raids earlier in the year, the fleet was also active in securing the seas around Jamaica. At the beginning of 1656 Goodsonn had a fleet of 22 vessels under his command.[108] Having received Cromwell's warning that the Spanish were planning to send a fleet to the Caribbean to retake Jamaica, Goodsonn was in a quandary as to how to best deploy his ships. He and Sedgwick had told Cromwell in January 1656 that it was:

> marvellously difficult to think where to meet with the Spanish, before they either come to us, or are to leeward of us. Which way he intends down we know not, on this side the island or on the other; the seas between us and the main are a hundred and thirty leagues at least. To divide our fleet, we think, in prosecution of such a design were not convenient; neither do we think it convenient or any way safe to leave the harbour without ships, before conveniently fortified, being well assured, that the enemy on the back-side of us vieweth our harbour often; and had not a considerable force of ships staid here, we do believe the land forces had been put to some difficulties.[109]

Goodsonn was sure that Cartagena would be used as a base for any attack upon Jamaica, and so constantly needed to seek intelligence of what shipping was at anchor there or if there was any activity that might signify preparations for such an attack, and so it became a regular destination for his ships. Captain Newberry, who had returned from Cartagena in early January, brought with him news that the city was expecting three or four laden merchant vessels to return from Porto Bello imminently; therefore on 11 January Goodsonn dispatched him in the *Portland* and with the *Arms of Holland*, *Laurel*, *Paul* and *Martin* in support to attempt to intercept the merchant vessels and to again call in on Cartagena to gather what detail he could of Spanish shipping in the harbour.[110]

Newberry arrived 'three leagues to leeward of Sand-bay' on 17 January and immediately sent Captain Kerby in the *Laurel* into the outer bay of Cartagena to observe the activity there. He reported back that evening that 'he saw in the harbour eleven sail, whereof six considerable ships'. After spending two days close to Cartagena, Goodsonn anchored off 'Palme-island' and at night he 'sent our boats towards the main to surprize [*sic*] boats or vessels, that trade between Cartagena and Tuloo [Tolŭ], for the attaining true intelligence of state of business at Cartagena or elsewhere'. These scouts returned the following day, 20 February, having only 'chased a boat ashore, which they sunk, by reason that the Spaniards carried away her sails, oars and rudder'. Attempting the same again the following night the boats again returned empty handed. After a council of war on 23 January Newberry attempted to head for Porto Bello, but that night the *Paul* 'spent her foretopmast' and

108 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.457.
109 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.457.
110 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.452, 537–538.



Map 2 English naval activity in the West Indies, 1655–1662.

no progress was made. The following morning the ships were hit by a 'hard gale northerly and a great sea' whereupon, given the condition of the *Paul*, it was decided to cancel the attempt on Porto Bello and return to Palm Island for shelter, while sending the *Martin* 'to look into the said port [of Porto Bello]'. During the night of 26 January boats were once again sent ashore to gather intelligence, but again came back with nothing to report. At around two o'clock on 31 January the English spotted a sail on the horizon and 'gave chase' but upon getting close they found it to be the *Martin* returning from Porto Bello, where it had seen just 'four ships in the harbour'.[111]

The following day a council of war once again decided to send boats ashore that night under the command of Captain Kerby, to 'go a shore to a village' some three leagues 'to the eastward of Palme', but these were defeated by the wind and unable to arrive at their destination in time. Instead, at around three in the morning of 2 February, they sent some boats to the mainland which did not return until late morning. The sailors in this party reported that they had 'chased ashore a boat near Tuloo, she was laden with Indian corn, burthen about 25 tuns: the enemy sunk her before our men got on board, so our men fired her.' Shortly after this Newberry 'saw a sail, to whom gave chace with good hopes … but our hopes were frustrated; about 7 at night we lost sight of her.' The chase had brought the English ships 'about 18 leagues to the westward of Furtee [probably Fuerte Island, in the Gulf of Morrosquillo]'. The following morning, 4 February, Newberry and his flotilla descended upon the island but 'having looked abroad and saw no sail' they continued their fruitless search for a vessel they had spotted the day before. The following day they were still off the island and on 6 February 'we weighed about 6 this morning, and stood to the eastward and about 5 in the evening we met with the rest [of the English vessels] near an island called Mengler [Mengler Island in the San Bernardo Archipelago]'. Once here another council of war decided 'to clear ourselves of the island, and to ply to the eastward, and to look in at Cartagena, after which to repair to Jamaica'. At around five o'clock on 8 February Newberry was once again off Cartagena where he had 'a good view of the ships in the harbour. I saw 9 in number, 5 good ships, two about 6 or 7 store, two small vessels in close by the walls of the town.' Returning to Jamaica his ships 'fell in with the land some 8 leagues to the westward of the harbour of Jamaica' on the morning of 14 February but 'we plyed to windward all day but got little'. Having better luck with the wind the next day they 'weathered the island that lyeth before the harbour of Jamaica, by the good hand of God arrived in the said harbour about five in the evening'.[112] After a month at sea Newberry returned having achieved very little other than reminding the Spanish that the English had the capacity to sail unhindered up and down the South American coast. Perhaps more reassuring for Goodsonn was the lack of activity in both Cartagena and Porto Bello that would signify an impending attack from that direction.

While Newberry was away Goodsonn dispatched the 'Hunter galliot', under the Dutchman Captain Sibada and 100 soldiers, to raid the Pedro

111 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.537–538.
112 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.537–538.

Plains,[113] while the *Falmouth* had been posted off the northern shore to intercept any movement between Jamaica and Cuba. During this deployment it had 'landed some men, and took 15 prisoners'.[114] On 16 February a 'small vessel from Anguilla' arrived in port with news that it had been to Tortuga, a small island off the north coast of Hispaniola, and 'found there no people, but the fortifications demolished'.[115] The Spanish had evacuated the island, and like Jamaica, in the years to come it was later to become a base for privateers and pirates as they preyed on unsuspecting shipping in the Caribbean.[116]

By mid March Sedgwick and Goodsonn had formulated a general strategy for the fleet for the rest of the year, but due to so many of the ships needing to be careened, they were unable to implement it immediately. Nearly all of the ships had been away from home for over a year now and were in much need of maintenance and repair. In a letter to Cromwell on 12 March the commanders advised the Lord Protector that the fleet, unlike the army, was 'not only in a prosperous condition, but ready to embrace any action it shall put upon'. The sailors were, however, 'beginning to murmur … they lye so long [in] that harbour' it was therefore imperative that they keep the fleet active. As such they had decided that 'Six or eight ships being left here to secure the harbour, and to countenance the army, the rest of the Admiral should go to sea' to await any Spanish attack and to cause trouble where they could. Immediately they dispatched the *Dover* and the *Selby* to position themselves off Cartagena to 'bring us intelligence of the Spanish armardo, and to prevent the succours expected from Cartagena by the enemy'. The *Arms of Holland* and *Cardiff* were sent 'to the leeward of this island to ply between cape Megril [*sic*] and point Pedro' whilst the *Paul* with one other vessel 'are gone on the north side, to discover if there be any shipping or intercourse between Cuba and this island'. All were ordered to return to Cagway 'by that time fleet can be fitted for service', which was about two weeks away.[117] These vessels, however, were still at sea in mid April when Goodsonn sent the *Grantham* and *Hope* to New England 'for masts, deal, tar, and other provisions useful for the fleet; as also to give passage to what people are willing to come hither from thence, or any of the windward islands.'[118]

With his squadron now careened and those repairs that he could undertake himself completed, Goodsonn set out with 'ten of the best sailing ships' on 15 April 1656 for another raid along the Spanish Main as part of his strategy of pressurising the Spanish in their bases whenever he could. The fleet headed eastward first, along the southern coast of Hispaniola as far as the island of Alto Velo in search of any Spanish shipping, and then southwards to the Main which it reached in early May. On 4 May Goodsonn landed 'neere 450 men at Rio de la Hacha [Rio Hacha]' but the inhabitants, who had 'six houres sight of us before our arrival, fled out of the town,

113 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.543.
114 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
115 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
116 See Appendix II.
117 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.602.
118 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.695.

carrying their wealth or what was considerable with them'.
dozen men 'to secure a castle' which Goodsonn's sailors 'stormed, and in less then halfe an houre had possession of it'. They captured 'foure greate brasse pieces of ordnance of neere 4000 pound weight each' and then 'demolished part of the fort'. When the Spaniards proved reluctant to pay a ransom to the English to 'redeem their town' Goodsonn ordered it to be burned. The English then departed on 8 May.[119] Sailing west along the coast, on 11 May the English landed at Santa Marta for a third time in less than a year and took on fresh water before departing during the morning of 13 May. Almost immediately they 'espyed a smal vessel in the offering which we chased'. They easily captured this vessel, which turned out to be a Spanish merchantman of 100 tons, en route from Saint Lucia to Cartagena with a cargo 'for the most part being jarres of wine', which the English happily seized, and also arrested the captain, who happened to be an Englishman and 'late merchant in Sivil'. Of more importance was the news he provided that a large convoy of 28 ships had departed Spain on 10 March bound for the West Indies, most of which were merchantmen bound for a 'scattering of ports in the Indies'. This was most likely the fleet Cromwell was referring to when he sent word at the end of 1655 that Spain was preparing to send an expedition to the Caribbean to retake Jamaica, but in Goodsonn's opinion he did not reckon this convoy of merchantmen to constitute a threat to the island.[120]

The following day Goodsonn and his flotilla 'anchored in view of Cartagena' in a show of force and spotted 'six ships rideing in the same equipage as formerly'. Lacking sufficient strength to do anything more but watch the mighty fortress from afar, he departed for Jamaica leaving Vice Admiral Blake with two ships 'to lye yet some time upon the coast, to intercept any scattering ships, that might come thither'. These two ships returned to Jamaica on 3 June but with nothing of note to report. Goodsonn also left the *Portland* and *Falmouth* to ply the coast off Colombia to see what mischief they could cause. On 21 May, while Goodsonn was en route back to Jamaica, he captured 'a small vessell of about 80 or 90 tons laden with cocao, comeing from St. Domingo'. He arrived back in Jamaica on 23 May after once again achieving very little for his endeavours. The *Portland*'s and the *Falmouth*'s only encounter of significance occurred on 8 June when 'they chased a frigat ashoare upon a drowned island neere Rio Grande [River Magdelana, Colombia]'. The Spanish vessel, laden with tobacco, grounded and 'staved al to pieces' as did an English boat dispatched to capture it, with the loss of its crew.[121]

Robert Sedgwick died the day after Goodsonn returned to Jamaica, leaving Goodsonn and Doyley once more in command. Believing there was little likelihood now of a fleet coming from Spain in the near future to threaten Jamaica, Goodsonn redeployed his fleet with the aim of trying to capture any Spanish ships leaving the Caribbean through the narrow passage

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119 Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 5 (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), p.151. See also *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656.
120 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.151.
121 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.151–152.

between Cuba and the Yucatan Peninsular in Mexico. On 25 June he advised Thurloe he was leaving seven vessels at anchor in Cagway harbour 'to guard this port, and lye upon the coast', whilst 14 were 'appointed to lye between Cape St. Antonio [the most westerly point on Cuba] and the Havanna, or thereabouts, to encounter such ships as coming from Cartagena, Nova Spagna, or elsewhere, and bound for the Havanna, although it is to be feared, but the Nova Spagna fleet coming so late will not return this year'. These ships, he instructed, were 'to lye there as long as the time of year or condition of the ships will permit'. The *Church* was at this time sent to New England for provisions.[122] Despite the running repairs the fleet was able to perform for itself, many of the ships, now away from England for almost a year and a half, were in serious need of proper maintenance. Goodsonn notified Thurloe in June that, 'We find many of our ships upon the surveys much defective; especially those, that have been longest out. Yet the Cardiff, one of the latest, is judge disabled for the sea. As stores are much exhausted, and the sails exceedingly decayed.' Goodsonn was aware that soon he would be forced to return some of his ships to England for essential repairs, depleting his strength but also limiting his ability to capture the much desired treasure fleet.[123]

Whilst the fleet was reasonably content Goodsonn, like Doyley upon the land, did have his own disciplinary issues to worry about. Captain Benjamin Blake, brother of the more famous General-at-Sea Robert Blake, had been appointed Goodsonn's vice admiral when Penn left Jamaica in June 1655.[124] Despite being Robert Blake's brother Goodsonn was forced to send him home in June 1656 for disciplinary reasons. Blake, upon his elevation to vice admiral, took it upon himself to take a more 'vigilant inspection into the affaires of the fleet, and a more free and frequent giving advice concerning the same'. According to Blake, in October 1655 Sedgwick had asked him for his advice on how to handle the affairs in Jamaica, which he did in the form of a paper shortly thereafter. In January 1656 he produced a second paper which he 'humbly and privately' presented to the Commissioner and in which he admitted that he thought many of the problems facing the English in Jamaica were as a result of 'the indulgent remissnes (as I conceived it) of the commissioners'. He then followed this up with a third paper 'after much trouble of spirit' which he volunteered to submit to Sedgwick in February. What the 'general miscarriage in his highnesse affaires on the land' that he alluded to actually were is not recorded. Undoubtedly Goodsonn felt his interference unwarranted and inappropriate, as no doubt did Sedgwick.[125] Blake was called before a 'convention' of land and sea officers to explain what they all probably saw to be his interference in matters of no concern to him. According to Blake, the conciliatory Sedgwick said the matter would be dropped if he ceased his interference. Unfortunately, the following day, Blake

122 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.152.
123 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.152.
124 British Library (hereafter BL), Add MS 18986, Original papers relative to the navy office; 1644–1699, f.202.
125 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.367.

– believing his advice was still necessary – chose to submit a fourth paper, based on his experience as a 'soldier and planter'. This advice he noted was 'better accepted than followed'. In April Blake sailed with Goodsonn to raid the Spanish Main but it is evident that Blake was opposed to this course of action when 'the fleet [was] to be expected from Spaine into the Indies about this time'. He was of the opinion, as were others (according to him) that the fleet would be better deployed to 'ly off cape Antonio, in order to meeting with that fleet, which if we had done, we had probably met with them'. No doubt Blake freely offered this advice to Goodsonn, who would have seen his suggestions as a personal criticism of his handling of his command. On Blake's return and in his own words he admitted he was 'ignorant of the grounds of many things in the fleete' but chose to submit yet another paper 'containing my wishes towards the best ordering of his highness affaires'. The no-nonsense Goodsonn was clearly unimpressed by his junior's constant interference in the running of his fleet and 'which paper (as alsoe all things else, that came from me verbally) he disliked'. Not surprisingly this all led to an argument between the two, in front of other officers, after which Blake was relieved of his responsibility as vice admiral. He then resigned his commission in a huff and promptly sailed to England on board the *Great Charity* to clear his name, no doubt much to the relief of Goodsonn and his fellow officers.[126] Goodsonn wrote to Thurloe at the time that Blake was 'a person of such a turbulent spirit, and so opposite to me in most of my commands, that in regard of my duty to his highness and his affairs, I could not but think it necessary to remove him from hence'. He went on to criticise his 'frequent feasting and entertainments … [which] seduced a great party in the fleet, so that it was more than probable nothing could be done therein by an ordinary way, I was content to admit of a charge against him.' The charge against Blake was brought by William Aylesbury, Sedgwick's previous secretary, who also wrote to Thurloe that the business was:

> very repugnant to my nature; but being a witness of his proceedings divers moneths, and finding he is not only a great obstacle in obstructing his highnes affairs, but, as I conceived, an extreme affliction to the admirall, I was willing, in the discharge of my duty and the trust that is reposed in me, to prefer a charge against him, with a desire, that he might be sent for England…[127]

Aylesbury died on 24 August 1656.[128] Blake had had a chequered career in the navy and owed much to his brother for his advancement. He had boarded and captured a Portuguese vessel in September 1650 when serving under his brother but was then dismissed from his command of the *Triumph* after his brother's defeat at the Battle of Dungeness in November 1652. The outcome of Aylesbury's charge against Blake is unknown, but Blake did return to England in 1656; the following year he was again serving with his brother at the Battle of Santa Cruz, but was once again dismissed from his command

126 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.368.
127 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.154.
128 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.374.

for being 'guilty of some mistake in his conduct'. He eventually moved to South Carolina where he died in 1689.[129]

On 19 June the *Lion*, *Dover* and *Selby* departed Jamaica to take up station, as Goodsonn previously planned, off Cuba. They were followed on 27 June by the *Indian*, *Arms of Holland*, *Martin* and *Success*, and on 3 July by the *Gloucester* and *Laurel*. Goodsonn himself, with the *Convertine* and *Portland*, left Cagway on 11 July, leaving the *Marston Moor* and *Matthias* to follow.[130] This was the largest number of warships the English had yet dispatched into the Caribbean since their arrival the year before, and with such a powerful armada they must have been optimistic that it would lead to the capture of a significant amount of Spanish shipping and perhaps even the elusive plate fleet. Unfortunately the expedition had an inauspicious start. While en route, the *Arms of Holland* blew up after a fire started in the powder room and only five of the crew survived, including the captain.[131] Then the *Laurel* was hit 'by a clap of thunder [and] her main-top mast shiver'd to pieces, and her mainmast so floade [*sic*], that it is feared notwithstanding we have used what means we can, it will scarce carry her home.'[132]

The squadron rendezvous was off Cape San Antonio, Cuba, where the ships regrouped on 13 July and maintained a blockade of the northern side of the island off Havana. On 3 August they 'chased and took a small bark belonging to the Havanna' but to the disappointment of the English it was carrying only ballast. More disappointment was to be had when the crew of the bark advised them that eight ships, including one galleon, two 'great Flemish ships, which had brought negroes from Angola' and an assortment of smaller vessels had arrived in Havana from Cartagena on 13 May and had departed for Spain on 13 June.[133] As the Spanish vessels always travelled in convoy and sailed infrequently for Spain, the English knew they had probably missed a opportunity for a significant clash at sea. Goodsonn, disappointed, wrote to Thurloe, 'If the advice had come timely to my hands, I should have sent away a frigate to general Blake [known to be cruising off the Spanish coast], but being 21 days after their departure, conceived it too late.'[134] To add to Goodsonn's frustration his ships then spent many days becalmed, and he was afraid his vessels would drift into the Gulf of Florida which would have proved disastrous as they would then be unable to re-enter the Caribbean against the prevailing winds. On 19 August at a meeting with his officers it was decided that due to the 'deficiency and inability of some ships to remaine in the country' they had no choice now but to return some

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129 John Barratt, *Cromwell's Wars At Sea* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006), pp.59, 135; W. Innys, *Biographical Britannica: Or, the Lives of the Most Eminent Persons who Have Flourished in Great Britain from the Earliest Ages Down to the Present Times*, Vol. 2 (London: 1763), p.815; Langdon Cheves, 'Blake of South Carolina', *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, Vol. 1, 1900, p.155; John Cane, *The Publick Intelligencer*, 8 September–15 September 1656, 78:E497[19], p.834.

130 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.340.

131 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1656–7* (hereafter *CSPD 1657–7*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1883), p.425.

132 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.340.

133 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.340.

134 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.340.



Havana op 't Eyland Cvba (Havana, Cuba), *c.*1639. Joan Vinckeboons. (The Library of Congress, Washington DC. G3291.S12 coll. H3)

of them to England for repair. Goodsonn therefore ordered the *Torrington*, *Gloucester*, *Portland*, *Laurel* and *Dover* to head for home, whilst he moved his flag to the *Marston Moor*. Furthermore, knowing they were entering the hurricane season in the Caribbean and as such it was 'not safe to stay longer upon this coast' he resolved to return the remaining ships to Jamaica and resupply.[135]

However, returning from Cuba to Jamaica in a sailing ship is no easy matter. The prevailing wind is easterly and so from a position off Cape San Antonio it is not an option to simply sail back along the south coast of Cuba. After Goodsonn discussed it with his other captains it was agreed that the squadron would enter the Gulf of Mexico, tack (the manoeuvre used to sail into the prevailing wind) through the Strait of Florida and slowly along the north coast of Cuba with the Bahamas to the port side. That this was not a simple, nor safe, manoeuvre is testified by the number of shipwrecks that have occurred in the seas off Florida over the years. As such Goodsonn and his squadron entered the Gulf of Mexico on 29 August and 'not without hazard; for God was pleased to show his great power, by bringing of us to the pitt's brinck, and yet say to us, Return ye sonns of men.'[136] Due to 'an extremity of wind' blowing east-south-east and south-south-east the ships were, luckily, pushed south and so did 'not weather the dangers of cape Florida' and missed the Keys by 'three quarters of a mile at most'. They ran into 'soe much wind at south, that many ships had their sayles blowing off the yard, so were constrayned to spoone afor the sea with our sprit sayle yard armes ballanced up'. Having survived the Florida Keys Goodsonn decided to make for Nevis, however he was 'mett with contrary winds' and frequent calms and so by 23 September, almost one month since leaving Cuba, the

135 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.341.
136 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.441.

English were still around 297 leagues from St Christopher.[137] They finally arrived at Nevis on 9 October, 41 days after first leaving the post off Cuba.[138]

Once Nevis was reached, the English squadron joined up with the *Marmaduke*, *Adam and Eve* and the flyboat *Mary*, which Goodsonn had sent there in June to prepare and transport some settlers of the island who were preparing to relocate to Jamaica. Luckily he decided to oversee their movement personally, for on his arrival he found the three ships sent previously were insufficient to carry the '1400 men, women, children, and servants' who were preparing to travel to Jamaica. It was quite a time-consuming process to get this number of people and all their possessions and provisions loaded, and by 19 October Goodsonn had still not finished but was hopeful he would be able to depart Nevis by 21 October.[139] He was finally able to depart on the 22nd, with around 1,400 settlers plus some of the reinforcements that had been sent out under Colonel William Brayne from Ireland and Scotland, which had been separated from their commander en route and had found their way to Nevis. Goodsonn, short of provisions and with a squadron of battered ships, finally arrived back at Cagway harbour on 4 November, four months after setting out, with high hopes, for Cuba.[140] A disappointed Goodsonn had very little to show for his efforts, yet again. He had demonstrated once more that the English could sail at will around the Caribbean and that they had free rein to intimidate Spanish settlements, but was unable to seriously impact their trade nor, with all the shipping at his disposal, was he able to make contact with, and seize, Spanish vessels carrying the wealth of the Indies which the English were desperate to get their hands on. He also lacked the strength to attack, let alone hold, any significant Spanish settlement in the Caribbean. This voyage had reinforced what Goodsonn, competent mariner that he was, probably already knew: no matter how many ships he had, the ocean was still vast and it was always going to be through luck, rather than judgement, that he would be in the right place at the right time to meet up with any significant Spanish shipping to prey upon. Most of the English fleet had been away from home for two years now, and the men were getting restless and the vessels were in much need of repair. A frustrating year for the squadron had ended as it had begun – stuck in Cagway harbour unable to do much more than offer a deterrent against any Spanish attempts to attack the English from the sea (not that the Spanish themselves were in any position to do this).

V

Back in Europe, however, the English fleet was having better luck in the war against Spain. After the formal outbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 1655 Cromwell made preparations for the fleet to commence offensive operations

137 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.441.
138 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.500.
139 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.503.
140 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.771.

against the Spanish mainland during the following year. Cromwell had neither the resources nor the inclination to challenge Spain on land, and there was no strategic imperative to do so for he fully intended to use the dominance of the English fleet to blockade Spanish ports and to clear the English Channel from the growing threat of Spanish-backed privateers operating from Dunkirk and Calais. By doing so he was able to fight the war on his terms and with little risk, as he knew full well that Spain had few warships that could challenge the vast English navy. In April 1656 Robert Blake and the newly appointed general-at-sea Edward Montagu set sail with a fleet to blockade Cadiz in an attempt to place increasing pressure on the Spanish government, to disrupt their trade and commerce as well as to sit and await the arrival of the Spanish plate fleet from South America which was sure to come. Blake and Montagu blockaded Cadiz all year, however were unable to affect any landing or create any significant disruption to Spanish activities. A victory of sorts was gained when Blake was able to force the King of Portugal to ratify the terms of the peace negotiated with between Portugal and England in 1654, and in doing so Portugal agreed to pay England 50,000*l* compensation for losses incurred to English trade due to Portugal's sheltering of Prince Rupert in Lisbon in 1649 to 1650. During the summer Blake did consider attempting to capture the Spanish stronghold of Gibraltar but this idea was given up due to a lack of land forces being available to him. The blockade of Cadiz continued throughout the summer with English ships coming and going frequently to seek resupply, but in early September a much-diminished English fleet was forced out of Cadiz harbour by adverse winds. As luck would have it these winds pushed the English into the path of a Spanish convoy that was returning to Spain from the Caribbean. This is the same convoy that Goodsonn had heard about earlier and had narrowly missed when he took up a position off Cuba in July, and the same one he wished he had been able to notify Blake of had it not sailed three weeks prior to his arrival.

On 9 September an English squadron under the command of Captain Stayner attacked the unprotected Spanish convoy and easily captured one Spanish galleon carrying a cargo of 45 tons of silver, 700 chests of indigo and 700 chests of sugar. Another galleon was attacked but could not be boarded and was later scuttled by its own crew after being set on fire. A Spanish merchant vessel also caught fire and was sunk along with all of its precious cargo. Despite only capturing one of the galleons it was a spectacular success for the English, who captured an estimated quarter of a million pounds worth of silver and significantly more in other commodities. The success demonstrated, at least to Cromwell, that his strategy of attacking Spanish shipping could prove profitable and that the rewards from such could finance his war against Spain. Blake continued his blockade of Cadiz throughout the winter of 1656–1657, which was the first time an English fleet had ever been able to remain at sea during the winter months in Europe.[141]

141 Barratt, *Cromwell's Wars At Sea*, p.548.

At the outbreak of hostilities in Europe with England, Spain – unable to match the might of the English navy – chose to fight a commercial war against the English, utilising her privateer fleets based primarily in Dunkirk to prey on English shipping in the Channel. These private men-of-war ranged the Channel attacking unprotected merchant shipping, plundering their cargo and severely disrupting trade and forcing the English to instigate a convoy system with State ships acting as a protection as the merchantmen sailed through the Channel, putting yet more demands on an already overstretched navy. In a further escalation of the war in April 1656 the exiled Charles Stuart signed the Treaty of Brussels with the King of Spain, who promised to provide an invasion army to help the exile regain the throne of England once the Royalists in England were able to secure a suitable English port that could be used to disembark the Spanish forces. Given the weakness of the Royalist opposition in England the Spanish were fairly confident that they would never have to comply with the terms of this treaty, as it was unlikely the Royalists would ever muster enough strength to achieve such a formidable feat. Nevertheless it was a threat that needed to be taken seriously whilst pushing the Royalists ever closer into a reliance upon the Spanish, who now harboured both Charles and a growing exiled English and Irish army in the Spanish Netherlands. The escalation of the war in Europe now pushed Cromwell inexorably closer to an offensive military alliance with France and the negotiations that ultimately led to this were ongoing throughout 1656. At one point the French did attempt to negotiate a general peace with Spain but this soon fell through due to the unreasonable demands made by the Spanish. Once the prospect of peace between France and Spain had faded the French were much more determined to conclude a military alliance with the English and obtain the services of an English army to fight alongside the French in Flanders. In return for this France agreed to pay for an English army of 6,000, men, and once the coastal town of Dunkirk was captured it would be handed over to the English and provide them with the most cherished of strategic objectives – a foothold in Europe. This agreement with France was only reached in March 1657 and preparations began immediately to dispatch an English army to Flanders to fight the Spanish. This coincided with the Spanish finally being able to muster a force in Cuba with which to attempt the reconquest of Jamaica from the English.[142]

142 Timothy Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), p.559.

2

Jamaica 1657–1658

I

In March 1657 the English on Jamaica received news that must have sent shock waves through their community. The *Selby*, on a routine patrol along the north shore of the island, intercepted a small Spanish vessel called *St Bartholomew* with an assorted cargo of molasses, cassava, tobacco, salt, sugar and clothing aboard. The captain, Pedro de Salas, was very forthcoming in providing the English with much-needed intelligence of the state of the Spanish resistance, both on Jamaica and in Santiago de Cuba. He told them that over 3,000 Spanish had fled the island since the English arrival, and he himself had transported at least 160 in the past year and a half. He reckoned there remained on Jamaica about a dozen Spanish families, numbering perhaps 200 people, including slaves. He also revealed that the Spaniards on the island had a camp along one of the rivers on the north side which he regarded as 'a secret close place, and cannot be discerned from sea.'[1] However it was his other news that would have worried the English the most. According to Salas a ship arrived in Santiago de Cuba from Spain only a few weeks before, notifying the governor that 'there was a very great armada ready to come for the Indies, and that they were to come first to an island to the windward called Tortugas, and that they expected them in April at the farthest.' Salas also informed his English captors 'That there are eight hundred soldiers to be raised in St. Domingo, Havanna, and Cuba, and five hundred of those that went of this island' to be sent imminently to Jamaica whilst Bayona, the governor of Santiago de Cuba, had instructed Salas to let the Spanish on Jamaica know of this plan so that 'they should have a little patience, or they should have succour very speedily'.[2] Naturally the English had expected the Spanish would make an attempt sometime to retake the island but they had always thought it most likely would be attempted from Cartagena, with a landing on the south side of the island which allowed for an easier and more direct approach to the English base in Santiago, rather

1 Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 6 (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), pp.130–131.

2 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.130.

than to the north which would necessitate a trek over the mountains before facing the English. News that the attack was likely to be imminent would have surprised and shocked the English, as would the news that a fleet was sailing from Spain. William Brayne, the new English commander who had just arrived from England, knew better than anybody the parlous state of his army: dispersed across the plains of southern Jamaica to grow its own food, weakened by illness and disease, on the verge of famine and short of naval support after sending away so many ships, the news that it would shortly have to face an invasion must have worried Brayne immensely. Whilst the strength of the Spanish force alone was probably insufficient to retake the island, a resistance of such strength could make English occupation of Jamaica extremely uncomfortable while a Spanish fleet could easily blockade it, severely disrupting the much-needed flow of provisions from England. The information provided by Salas was essentially accurate, except in scale, timing and the involvement of a fleet from Spain. The long anticipated Spanish fightback was about to begin.

Ysassi claimed that he was active throughout the first half of 1657 and that he had:

> always kept in check those living between the town [Santiago] and point Negrillo, which is at the western end, for the island lies from east to west. They have no cultivation or settlement whatever because those that attempted and made, I have burnt and dislodge them from, that is from Anaya, Bonducu, Rio Arriva and Yama and many other places where they already had strongholds, where, now, if any squadron enters, I go to wake them on the roads and make attacks on them, killing them and capturing many whom I have sent to all the governors of the Windward Islands with all their designs.[3]

Barrington, writing in March 1657, had a different opinion. He noted that, 'Such is the enemy amongst us that they will not stand a shot, but so unknown are their abiding places that we cannot find them out; and their custom is such that when any of our armed men meet them accidentally they fly for it.' He added that if he had '[a] couple of whelps of the blood-hound strain' he could 'clear the black rogues from this place'.[4]

Ysassi would have received the letter from the King appointing him as governor and notifying him of his instructions to his regional senior administrators to provide him with soldiers and aid in early 1657.[5] The King had instructed that the relief force was to assemble at the city of Santiago de Cuba and the governor, Don Pedro de Bayona Villeneuva, was to coordinate the relief effort. Looking at a map it would seem logical that the relief force came from Cuba, being much closer than Cartagena, but any landing on the north side of the island would require the force to trek and carry all their supplies over the high mountains and along the narrow pathways to get to

3 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.56.

4 *Seventh Report of the Royal Commission of Historical Manuscripts* (Account of Francis Barrington) (London: 1879, reprint), Part 2, p.575.

5 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.52–54.

the south side of the island where the English were, and where any decisive engagement would need to take place. Ysassi was to frequently request that relief be sent to the more practical south side where he could deploy it immediately, but his requests were always ignored. The decision to use Santiago de Cuba as a base, with the complicated logistics involved, was to prove to be costly a mistake only compounded by the attitude of Bayona. He was an old soldier but arrogant and stubborn, and he refused to listen to any advice that Ysassi, with all the benefits of local knowledge, offered. His intransigence and obstruction frequently delayed the collection and dispatch of supplies to Ysassi, causing extreme hardship on the island while his insistence on trying to dominate the command of the forces on Jamaica led, inevitably, to clashes between his appointees and Ysassi once the relief force had been sent; all of which contributed to the failure of the Spanish efforts to recapture Jamaica. Ysassi was to rightly blame Bayona for the failure of the relief effort.

During the first half of 1657 a reasonably small force of around 400 men concentrated in Santiago de Cuba, while awaiting supplies and shipping to take them over to Jamaica. In July Ysassi informed Albuquerque that the relief force consisted of 95 men with 'firearms most of them foreign muskets and arquebuses' under the command of Captain Don Cristoval de Anuez; 23 men 'with their arms' from Puerto Rico under Captain Juan de los Reyes, and 83 soldiers commanded by Captain Don Domingo de Silva from San Domingo. In addition two companies of Jamaican exiles were formed to join the relief force. One comprised '99 men armed with guns and lances' led by Captain Lucas Borrero and the second comprised 85 men under Captain Francisco Cartagena de Lyeba. They had also gathered ammunition which included 52 quintals of powder (approximately 5,000 lb/2,268 kg) and 60 tierces (casks) of cord for the matchlock muskets they had, plus '5 cases of balls with 9,200 for arqubuses and muskets' and a case of medicine. For food they had 832 arrobas (approximately 20,800 lb/9,934 kg) of cassava, 60 tierces of salt, six of biscuits and 66 of 'salted beef that came from Santo Domingo. This is putrid.'[6] There was also an additional force of around 140 men being sent by the Viceroy of Mexico under Captain Don Francisco de Salinas that was to join the growing body of men in Santiago de Cuba, but these men only arrived in Cuba after the force had departed for Jamaica and played no role in the events that were about to unfold that year.[7] Nearly all the assembled men were of a poor calibre, while there was also no fleet to assist.[8] Reyes was an old soldier and Silva might have fought against the English in Hispaniola, but of the rest they were most likely newly raised with little or no military experience, and none of them were to distinguish themselves once they arrived in Jamaica. The force was also too small to be anything but an irritant to the English, who outnumbered it almost 10 to one, but this was all the resources the King of Spain could muster.

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6 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.56.
7 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.57, 86.
8 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.86.

Bayona chose to appoint Juan de los Reyes as commander of the relief force, with the expectation that once they arrived in Jamaica he would also command the forces Ysassi had under his command. He also refused to allow Salinas, who had arrived before his men, to accompany the expedition, for the petty reason of internal politicking between himself and the Viceroy.[9] Despite a frequent exchange of correspondence between Ysassi and Bayona regarding where these forces were to be sent, in which Ysassi made it clear his preference was to send them to the south side, Bayona refused and insisted they were sent to the north.[10] Some of Bayona's instructions to Reyes were later captured by the English, and they illustrate Bayona's complete lack of understanding of the strategic situation on Jamaica and his poor knowledge of the geography of the island. He instructed Reyes that after he had sensibly constructed both a magazine and a headquarters close to the coast where they had landed, 'from whence correspondence may be kept with this city [Santiago de Cuba]', he unbelievably added that this camp needed to be at 'such a distance from the enemy, that you may be able to make war with him without making of long marches'. This is an incredible statement to make given that he knew full well that the English were on the south side of the island, and that the *only* route overland to get there from where he had chosen the force to land was by a long, and exhausting, march over the mountains. He then further demonstrated his ignorance of the situation on the island by suggesting that Reyes first attack the isolated English settlements at Port Morant and that he (and Ysassi) were to ensure that the 'soldiers be not weary with marching when they come to fight'. Any number of the Jamaican exiles in Cuba, whom Bayona disparagingly called 'the natives', could have told him, had he chosen to ask them, that there was no pathway from the north side to Port Morant and that the only way to get there would be by a long and exhausting march along the coast which would have been virtually impossible to undertake given the terrain.[11] In yet another display of gross ignorance of the terrain and a lack of appreciation of the challenges involved in traversing the dense forest and narrow paths, Bayona further instructed Reyes that when they were marching he should ensure:

> eight musketeers, commanded by an able serjeant, to march before the van, and as many before each flank, at a good distance from the body, which are carefully to discover all ambushes; and in case they meet with any, to fire upon them, and to retreat fighting, and in good order, to the body, which ought to be formed with the best advantage the place shall give leave, to receive the charge of the enemy.[12]

He further demonstrated his stupidity when, during the campaign, he chastised the Jamaican commander Lucas Borrero that his 'long march to the Vermegales (instead of going to seek out the enemy) hath procured nothing

9 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.86.
10 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.86.
11 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.540.
12 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.541.



Map 3 Relief map of Jamaica illustrating the mountainous terrain.

but waste of provisions, and sickness of the soldiers.'[13] The route from the north side to where the enemy was necessitated a 'long march to Vermegales', from where he had instructed Reyes to land. When he concluded this rebuke with the statement 'In my opinion, every thing goeth amiss', he was proving himself blind to the fact that he was to blame for the miscarriages. The force that was being assembled in Cuba was obviously too small to reconquer Jamaica, and so the best that could reasonably be expected from it was to provide Ysassi with sufficient men to commence a continued harrying offensive against the English. It would have been obvious to most involved that as long as the English dominated the seas there was little hope of forcing them off the island, unless the Spanish were able to inflict a military defeat on land after which the enfeebled English resistance would collapse and they would choose to evacuate. For all their problems there was a steely determination amongst the English to remain on the island and defend to the utmost the gains they had so far won for themselves. The Spanish King had notified Ysassi that he was gathering a fleet of 30 warships in Spain to send to his aid, hopefully in September 1657, but the reality was that the King lacked the resources to send any fleet to the assistance of the Jamaican resistance.[14] No doubt Ysassi wanted to believe the King's promises about the fleet, and that with these troops coming from Cuba he could at least maintain pressure upon the English and attempt to exploit any small successes he had to the fullest. Ysassi sensibly advised Albuquerque that it was his intention, once he had joined up with some of the relief force, 'to dislodge the enemy from the most important places in the island' and deny him access to the food he needed from the hinterland, and force him to 'retire to his forts and prevent him doing any planting or benefiting from what planting he has already done'.[15]

The Spanish relief force, commanded by Reyes and supported by Silva, landed at Las Chorreras (modern-day Ocho Rios) on 17 July [NS]/27 July 1657 [OS]. Ysassi was then in his main camp high in the mountains at Los Vermejales, from where he had sent instructions for Reyes to make a secure camp to store his supplies after which he was to proceed to Los Vermejales, after which they could advance into the Guatibacoa region and commence the offensive against the English. In anticipation of this, Ysassi had sent previously some men south to gather pack horses together to provide the transport needed to carry the supplies and munitions over the mountains. These horses had been rounded up and kept at Oristan (modern-day Bluefields), but an English foraging party had stumbled upon them, 'entering the place where they were and carried them off'. The loss of these vital transports severely restricted Ysassi's mobility as the supplies from Cuba were too heavy and cumbersome to be carried by his men alone.[16] Reyes took this opportunity to assert his independence by telling Ysassi that without the transports it was impractical for his men to participate in Ysassi's grand plan

13 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.541.
14 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.55.
15 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.60.
16 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.59, 60.

as they barely had enough men to protect the supplies they came with. He thought it 'not advisable' for Ysassi to 'go seek the enemy' at this time for fear of the consequences they would suffer if they were defeated and if the English were to learn how 'you are suffering', how their forces were 'divided' or where they were located. Reyes warned Ysassi that if he chose to proceed, 'which is not advisable', he would be unable to 'lend any assistance in case you should ask for it'.[17] He continued that he had hardly enough men to garrison his camp as it was and that his men were already falling sick. Ysassi was probably dumbfounded when he received this letter and he immediately went to Las Chorreras himself to confront Reyes and his apparent lack of enthusiasm for the venture. Ysassi made it clear to Reyes upon his arrival that he was in charge of the forces on the island, by virtue of his commission from the King, and that Reyes was follow his instructions. Despite arguing, Reyes had little ground to dispute this but he was nonetheless unprepared to assist Ysassi to the extent demanded of him.

Ysassi ensured a small fort was constructed at Las Chorreras in which he stored the ammunition and some of the supplies from Cuba. He left a small garrison to guard this and made arrangements for his, as well as Reyes' men and those Jamaican Spanish who had returned, to depart and head to Los Vermejales. However, during the march the troops under Reyes soon began to grumble as they trudged up the difficult track carrying all their equipment and provisions. Perhaps this was not surprising given the steep terrain they had to traverse. The route from Las Chorreras to Los Vermejales was around 20 miles/30 kilometres along a treacherously steep mountain trail, as Figure 1 clearly demonstrates. Reyes then insisted that his men return back to Las Chorreras, which Ysassi rightly saw as being '[the] same as if the relief had not been brought'. Rather than let the dissatisfaction spread to the other troops and 'to avoid any mutiny' Ysassi agreed for Reyes and his men to return whilst he continued on with his own men and most of the Jamaican returnees. He instructed Reyes to move the provisions to a more secure site and build a stronger fortification at Baycani further west along the coast, which was a 'more hidden place and better suited for transporting them to the part of the south where the war was going on'.[18] Ysassi probably thought he was better off without these men whom he described as being 'badly clothed and not fit to stand the excessive hardship of the marches through rugged mountains, the mosquitoes and the rains'.[19]

The sources are not clear as to how many men Ysassi actually had with him when he came down from Los Vermejales to attack the English, but at the most it was probably only a couple of hundred soldiers plus some African-Caribbeans. He intended to continue with his plan despite Reyes' unwillingness to assist, and to raid through Guatibacoa into Anya and head towards Santiago as he had the previous year, but he was aware how problematic this would be without sufficient horses for transport. On 29 August [NS]/19 August [OS] Ysassi wrote to the King of Spain of

17 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.60.
18 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.86–87.
19 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.61.



Elevation profile from Las Chorreras to Los Vermejalas (approximate).

his intention of 'marching to beat the enemy from the harbours he hath in Oristan and Guatibaton, and from thence to unlodge him from the town', and promised him he would 'do my utmost endeavour to expel the enemy out of the island this year of 1657, or at least-wise to reduce him to his forts on the sea-side.'[20] Throughout August he claimed to have secured the land in what is now the Westmoreland and Pedro Plain and boasted in a letter to Albuquerque that he was 'master ... of all the cattle' in the area and that the English did not 'profit by them as formerly, because those who come to get beef die without anyone being left to carry the news'. Given that the English do not seem to have had any permanent settlements in these areas at the time, his boasts were absurd. He added that, 'I have not been able to do more as I am looking for a good ground to fortify myself and to reorganise the infantry after the very painful marches they have had to reach the spot and to refurnish myself with horses for a company as the enemy has many.'[21] It was also claimed that during this time Ysassi had 'several encounters with the enemy, and in them killed more than a hundred men and captured arms and horses and burnt 10 houses they had rebuilt in Guatibacoa'.[22] Despite these grand boasts it is important to note that the English had no real permanent settlements beyond the St Catherine Plain. They may have had temporary camps erected in the Clarendon, Pedro and even the Westmoreland Plains when they sent out foraging parties to capture horses and to kill cattle, but it is unlikely that there would have been any large-scale attempts to create plantations in these isolated areas at this stage in the occupation. As such Ysassi had not really occupied any territory previously held by the English at all, but more likely, if his claims can believed in their entirety, he had been able to make himself master of some the disputed land on the periphery of the English settlements. Certainly he was making his presence felt, for in early September Doyley, now once again commander of the army after the death of Brayne, wrote of 'the enemie's more than usual boldness in killing two men neere our quarters'.[23]

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20 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.542.

21 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.61.

22 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.87.

23 F.J. Osborne and S.A.G. Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', *The Jamaican Historical Review*, Vol. XI, 1978, p.67.

To counter this growing threat, Doyley, who had received intelligence that suggested the Spanish were in some considerable force, dispatched a cavalry force of around 60 men to gain more information on 1 September. This force was ambushed on a narrow track leading through a wood somewhere to the west of Santiago – the exact whereabouts are unknown – and were 'furiously assaulted on all sides by about 400 Spaniards and Negroes with launces and firearms, never seene by us since we came unto the island'. The surprise attack 'rather put life than feare into ours' and the English counter-attacked killing around 40 of the Spanish before forcing them to retire. The English lost heavily with James Butler, now commanding the troop, Quartermaster Clarke and 12 troopers killed and a further seven wounded. Doyley added that this loss 'though it were grievous to us, yet hath added more courage in us all by finding ours would fight so well'.[24] During the fight the English captured one Spaniard from whom they learned of the landing at Las Chorreras, and that they now faced what seemed to be the long-awaited Spanish attempt to regain the island. The prisoner also quickly led the English to a farm the Spanish had been using for almost a year and a half where was found 'a great store of provisions'. The source for this raid implies that it took place immediately after the ambush, which would be in early September.[25] Ysassi also describes this encounter in a letter to Albuquerque dated 13 September [NS]/3 September [OS]. In his version he wrote that he learned the English had sent out a party to discover his whereabouts, but he and around 80 men, being all he had that were serviceable for the rest, were 'without shoes and clothes and not accustomed to the discomforts of the open country'. He ambushed the English and 'killed them all and took all their baggage they were carrying'. He concluded optimistically that 'besides those I have killed he is short of his best troops'.[26]

Doyley also describes, in a letter to England that was published as a broadsheet in 1658, another attack on Ysassi somewhere on the plains to the west of Santiago that year. It is not clear if his letter describes the attack on the Spanish farm mentioned above or a different one, and nor is it clear when the attack took place, although Doyley implies that it took place in October. Doyley recounted that he had learned from the same prisoner that Ysassi 'was fortifying himself at St. Anne, about Thirty five miles from us'. This is possibly Saint Ann's Gully in Guatibacoa. He decided to attack Ysassi once the Spaniard had had time to fortify himself, so that he 'might think himself secure enough to stand us' rather than having to continually be 'put to the toyl of hunting them in the Woods'. Doyley sent his own major, Richard Stevens, with a 'Party of Stout, Well and Willing men', who were joined by 60 officers who volunteered 'exceedingly desirous of action (after so long a cessation)'. According to Doyley the Spanish were surprised, and 'as soon as the Enemies Centinels discovered them, they threw down their Arms, gave the Allarm to the Governour, who with the rest fled to the Woods, leaving behinde them all their Arms and Ammunition: so, finding the vanity of following them

24 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.67.
25 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.67.
26 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.62.

in the Woods and Mountains, we left them'.[27] It is likely that this attack by the English occurred in mid September, when *Doyley's Journal* mentions some preparations for an expedition, which included an order to Barry to 'send over eighty private souldiers and a sergant of every company' from Liguanea on 18 September. At the same time Captain Wilkes was ordered to prepare 'three shallopps to transport the souldiers aforementioned from Ligonea to the Passage Fort'. Captain Van Alfan, formerly of the cavalry, but now a captain in John Humphrey's regiment, was issued with 30 lancers for the same expedition. Lances were generally a mounted weapon, so this might indicate that Humphrey's men were mounted at the time.[28] The extant Spanish records make no mention of any such English attack but there is no reason to suppose that it did not occur. Most likely a form of cat-and-mouse game was being played out across the plains with small parties of English being attacked by the Spanish and the English attempting reprisals.

The English, by their own admission, constantly lacked intelligence as to Spanish intentions. They had few Spanish speakers to interrogate those they captured so they were not able to really capitalise on the information they could get from them. The English frequently boarded Spanish ships plying between Cuba and Jamaica but the detail they received from these captives was of limited military value. What they seemed to lack was being able to capture the Spanish resistance fighters on a regular basis, from whom they might extract more meaningful intelligence. Certainly in the clash that took place in September Doyley was able to capture somebody with critical information on Spanish activities, as it was from this source that he first learned that a Spanish relief force had landed in strength on the north side and which, along with men, also provided the resistance with more weaponry. It would seem that the English offered their men a bounty if they captured any of the enemy, for on 4 September William Crane, a trooper in the cavalry, was paid 3*l* 'for the taking of a Negro'. Given that this was paid only days after the skirmish involving the cavalry when a prisoner was taken, it is possible that it was this African-Caribbean who advised the English of the landing of the relief force.[29]

When Ysassi had allowed Reyes to return to Las Chorreras he had ordered him to move the supplies to a place they called Baycani, further to the west and closer to modern Saint Ann's Bay and evidently a place that had frequently been used by Ysassi in the past, where 'his flanks were secure', and to there build a more substantial fortification to hide their powder and supplies. Reyes never complied with these instructions, blaming a lack of slaves to do the building for him, and despite having 'the whole of the paid infantry under his command' that he could have utilised. Instead he moved everything from the fort Ysassi had previously constructed to a new

27 Edward Doyley, *A narrative of the great success God hath been pleased to give His Highness forces in Jamaica, against the King of Spains forces; together with a true relation of the Spaniards losing their plate-fleet, as it was communicated in a letter from the Governour of Jamaica*, 1658, 142:E.948[5], p.570.

28 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.76.

29 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.71.

location nearby, where he constructed what Ysassi called a corral of his own.[30] According to Ysassi this was 'a weak stockade where a man could be seen from his feet to his head', with no fortified blockhouse inside and with no fascines to block up the wooden fencing from which the corral was built.[31] It was close to the seaside but did not dominate the open beach. The water supply was outside of the fortification, closer to the beach, and so if the English were on the beach the Spanish were unable to access the water supply. The fort was, again according to Ysassi, overlooked by a hill and two large fig trees which 'made the corral useless'.[32] Here Reyes waited for further instructions from Bayona.

According to Doyley, at around the same time that the cat-and-mouse antics between the two forces were being played out, a routine English naval patrol along the north coast intercepted a Portuguese vessel 'running into Cuba' which was subsequently seized, and from the crew it was also learned that a relief force of around 500 men had landed on the north side 'about the middle of July'. The English were also informed that this relief force, upon 'finding the scarcity of provisions … were almost starved, had endeavoured to mutiny.' The Portuguese crew added that around 300 of these men 'returned to a place called Chareras [Las Chorreras], in the North, over against Cuba, where they first landed'. They added that this force had fortified itself and was receiving supplies from Cuba.[33] Spanish sources corroborate that this is almost exactly what had happened to the relief force, and Ysassi himself confirmed he believed that it was the Portuguese who gave the English the knowledge and location of their encampment on the north side.[34] Once Doyley had learned that the Spanish had landed on the north shore he was determined to attack them immediately. He prepared the *Indian*, and taking some of the men that Stevens had just returned with he set sail to locate the Spanish base. There is some uncertainty as to the actual dates of this expedition, however. According to Doyley he departed Cagway on 24 October and they attacked the Spanish camp on 30 October.[35] However his *Journal* indicates he had returned to Cagway by 31 October on which date supplies were provided for the wounded that he brought back with him.[36] One writer concludes that Doyley must have departed Cagway on 16 October and that the battle was fought on 23 October, basing this assumption on an uncited letter from Reyes which stated the date of the battle.[37] A more recent writer, based on the dates of orders issued by Doyley and recorded in *Doyley's Journal*, believes that the expedition was away between 13–31 October.[38] It seems likely that

30 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.64, 87.
31 This lack of lining is corroborated in Doyley's account of the fort. See *A narrative of the great success.*
32 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.66–67.
33 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success.*
34 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.65.
35 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success.*
36 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.80.
37 S.A.G. Taylor, *The Western Design: An Account of Cromwell's Expedition to the Caribbean* (London: Solstice Publications Ltd, 1969), p.159.
38 Carla Gardina Pestana, *The English Conquest of Jamaica: Oliver Cromwell's Bid for Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, Harvard University, 2017), p.326 n.

Doyley was incorrect about the dates he gave in his letter about the attack, actually written over three months later; that he departed Cagway shortly after he ordered his own shallop be placed aboard the *Indian* on 10 October and after other supplies were ordered to be loaded on board on 13 October, and that he returned on or before 31 October when provisions were given to the wounded.[39] To sail to the north side would entail tacking into the wind, and a transit time of about a week is reasonable whilst to sail back might only have taken a few days. It is therefore most probable that the attack took place 20–25 October, and so Reyes' claim that is was on 23 October might well be accurate.

Doyley in his account of the battle does not state the number of soldiers he took with him, other than implying that it was at least 100 fewer than had gone out with Stevens some days before.[40] Ysassi was to later claim the English landed 335 men, but he was not present himself.[41] For the first time on Jamaica Doyley now demonstrated his competence as a commander, and so he is unlikely to have been so rash as to not send sufficient troops for what he had planned. Given that he seemingly only sailed in one vessel, his strength was limited to how many soldiers the *Indian* could carry. Spanish sources, however, claim that the English came with 'five or six ships'.[42] Upon the return of the *Indian* to Cagway on 31 October order was given to Cornelius Burrough to deliver to the purser provisions for 14 days for 'three hundred, fowerteen men … beinge so much expended by him on the party sent forth under the command of Major Richard Steevens to the Chorreras.' Another order given just days after the force's return to Cagway states that three hundred men were shipped on board the *Indian* to Las Chorreras.[43] The ration strength of the army on 10 November was 2,188 persons (including women and children), but this number excluded Brayne's old regiment in Morant, which in September had numbered 219 persons.[44] Doyley's force was therefore probably slightly in excess of 300 men, around 12 percent of his entire army at the time.

The exact location where Reyes made his camp is unknown. Las Chorreras means 'the bay of waterfalls'[45] and is so named after the numerous falls that cascade down the mountains on the north side of the island. Traditionally the site has been identified as Ocho Rios, the bay where the River White discharges into the sea. At the time of the battle the area was heavily forested down to the shoreline with numerous small coves and inlets that were virtually invisible from the sea. The sources imply that the English landed at the eastern end of the bay and then marched around six miles to where the Spanish camp was located, whilst Spanish sources state the camp was quite close the seaside. This suggests that the probable location was

39 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.80.
40 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success.*
41 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.64. 67.
42 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.87.
43 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.83, 85.
44 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.84, 78.
45 Frank Cundall, *Historic Jamaica: With fifty-two illustrations* (London: The Institute of Jamaica, 1915), p.281.

about halfway between the River White (just to the east of modern Ocho Rios near Shaw Park) and Point Iortalenza (modern-day Mammee Bay). One local historian, familiar with the geography of the island, believed the location of the Spanish camp was close to the River Dunn; this has become the accepted site of the Spanish camp and a plaque commemorating the battle was placed here by the Jamaican Historical Society in 1967.[46] It is dear from English sources that they were unaware of the exact location of the Spanish camp and it was only once Doyley arrived aboard the *Indian* that they were able to start searching the coast for signs of occupation. The English had a lucky break almost as soon as they arrived when they spotted and captured a supply vessel from Cuba attempting to land, and the location of the camp was obtained from its crew.[47]

The English landed at the River White, 'there being no place nearer' and immediately marched towards the Spanish camp. The Spaniards, aware of the English presence, had dispatched a small force to lay an ambush along the approach march to the camp. According to Doyley his force was 'saluted with a round Volley out of the Wood' and promptly returned fire 'boldly at the Ambuscado', during which exchange four of the Spaniards and one of the English were wounded. The Spaniards then 'made hast to their Fort, and ours so fast after them, that onely the [Spanish] Captain, and Four of forty could get in'.[48] Lyeba, in a letter to Bayona written in December 1657, added that this ambush had been commanded by Captain Don Domingo de Silva who fled 'in the first charge they [the English] made upon him'.[49] As the English approached the Spanish camp they were surprised to see it was only made of wood but it was, nevertheless, 'very well prepared with Matches lighted in the Stockadoes'. Doyley immediately sent his musketeers up to the walls of the fort where they were able to fire through the slits and onto the Spaniards, 'the Work being not Lined'. A 'stiff dispute' ensued for about three-quarters of an hour as both sides kept up a continuous fusillade until some of the English, who were carrying hatchets, were able to make a breach in the outer fence and enter the fort. Upon seeing this the Spanish, according to Doyley, 'betook themselves to run over the Rocks, leaping into the Sea, and shifting for themselves'. Despite the attempts of the Spanish officers to rally their men they all fled into the surrounding woods leaving the English in possession of the fort.[50] The only contemporary source describing the battle is the letter written by Doyley in early 1658's no detailed Spanish account of the actual attack survives, although letters from Ysassi and Leybe that mention it provide little of substance, other than implying that the poor quality of their men (and their commanders) was to blame for lack of resistance they were able to show.[51]

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46 Taylor, *The Western Design*, p.153.
47 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*.
48 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*.
49 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.67.
50 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*.
51 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.65, 67, 87.

Doyley reckoned the English killed around 120 Spaniards, including many of the officers; the Spanish, on the other handed, admitted that they lost only 40 to 50 men.[52] The English took a haul of prisoners, including the aged Don Francisco de Proenza and 'some others whom we found in the Rocks (whom though we had received barbarous usage from them) we could not kill in cold blood'. One Spanish source claims 16 were captured by the English.[53] More significantly the English also captured all of the supplies and provisions that had been sent over from Cuba for Ysassi, less what he had carried with him to Los Vermejales. This included 33 barrels of powder 'with Match and Bullet proportionable' as well as the store of bread and salt. The English also captured the Spanish muster lists and 'their Commissaries book' from which they could calculate that from what they had captured at Las Chorreras and in their earlier attack on Ysassi farther south, only two barrels of powder were short from what had been shipped over from Cuba, which would have been taken by Ysassi when he departed. As such the English were reasonably sure that they had captured almost the entire supply of powder and weapons that the Spanish had on the island.[54] English casualties were light for such a significant victory. Doyley advised 'we had onely Four men killed, and about Ten wounded, some whereof I have sent home, and humbly and earnestly desire they may be provided for'.[55] On 31 October, the likely date Doyley arrived back in Cagway aboard the *Indian*, he ordered that 'eight canvas suits, eight shirts, eight paire of stockings and eight paire of shoes for the use of the wounded men' be issued. He also ordered Mr Jenner, who seems to have been the surgeon appointed to care for the wounded, to receive 'such a quantity of medecines as he shall conceave requisite' for the wounded. On 10 November and 21 December, and on 23 January 1658, he ordered that bread, oatmeal, beef and sugar be provided for the wounded. On 9 January 1658 five gallons of brandy were issued 'Mr Jonnes in consideration of his great care in careinge the men wounded att the Chorreras'. A merchant vessel departed Cagway on or just after 3 February 1658 carrying tobacco exports and it seems likely that this vessel carried some of those wounded back to England, along with Doyley's letter to Cromwell concerning the battle. However, at the end of February four wounded were still being cared for in Cagway.[56] Even though English casualties were relatively light, it seems some were severely wounded, needing a lengthy recuperation.

After this rout the English would no doubt have destroyed the remains of the fort and anything else of use to the Spanish, and loaded all the captured supplies on board the *Indian*. Doyley sent 'small Parties in several little Boats' to scour the coastline searching for any other Spanish camps, and to destroy any small Spanish craft they could find. During the time that the English remained in the vicinity some of the fleeing Spanish had returned and surrendered, 'almost starved'. No record of the number of Spaniards captured

52 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*; Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.67.
53 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.64.
54 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*.
55 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*.
56 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.80, 83, 84, 89, 92, 93, 94.

is given, nor what fate befell them, but they were most likely transported to Santiago and from there sent to England or perhaps released later in Cuba. Interestingly, there is no mention of provisions being issued to prisoners in the aftermath of the battle, as there was after the battle at Rio Nuevo the following year. Doyley then returned to Cagway where he arrived on or before 31 October. On his return he immediately ordered Captain William Burrough in the galley *Martin* to head 'for the north side of this island and to ly off and on neere unto the Chorreras untill the 15th of November next and then with the Grantham and the rest of the shipps to sett saile for this harbour [Cagway]'.[57] This order implies that the *Grantham* and other English ships had remained at Las Chorreras after Doyley left, and that his expedition consisted of more than just the *Indian*, which seems plausible.

The defeat effectively ended Ysassi's offensive in its tracks. The loss of powder was perhaps more significant than the losses to Reyes' force, which had shown itself of no real value to Ysassi anyway, but without the powder and shot Ysassi was unable engage the English as he had planned. Ysassi was quite clear where the blame for the defeat lay. In November he wrote to Bayona that the 'misfortune to my infantry … [was] All caused from the disobedience of Captain Juan de los Reyes', who he claimed 'would not observe the orders I gave him'. He asserted that not only did he refuse to move all the Spanish provisions to a securer location but he also disregarded Ysassi's order that 'if the enemy were in great strength he should set fire to the provision store, [but] he did not, although he had much time in which to do it', which resulted in it all being captured by the English.[58] He was scathing in his attacks on the conduct of the men that came with the relief and Reyes in particular. In February 1658 to wrote to Bayona, when still on reasonably cordial terms with him, and requested the Governor question Reyes directly to see if he had even notified Ysassi of the defeat after it had happened, but commented 'I think he will tell the truth, namely that he did not inform me', and that Ysassi only found out about it when a captured Englishman told him of the defeat. Ysassi was quick to notify Albuquerque of Reyes' insubordination and refusal to follow orders, who then in turn instructed Bayona to return all the fleeing soldiers back to Jamaica except Reyes in whom 'there is a lack of obedience and respect and an excess of inquietude'. Ysassi went further by suggesting that Bayona, in another letter, arrest him and send him to Spain to answer for his actions. Instead Bayona rewarded Reyes on his return and even suggested he be returned to Jamaica to take command of the army, a suggestion that only further fuelled the rift between the two of them. Ysassi also suggested Bayona should ask Don Benito and Don Francisco Caravaxal 'how they left, whether they fled and, if so, whether from fear of the enemy' or not. Out of frustration he wrote, 'Would to God and His holy Mother that I had been there, for although I am an ignorant man, there would have been other arrangements.'[59] Don Cristoval de Leyba, of a prominent colonial family, was equally adamant that those responsible for the defeat be held

57 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.84.
58 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.64–65.
59 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.69, 72, 73.

accountable. In December 1657 he wrote to Bayona and told him that after the defeat he gave Don Cristoval Anuez explicit orders 'to transfer all men to Baycani' and await him there and cautioned him 'under pain of death as a traitor to the King ... he must not abandon the infantry and the island.' But abandon them he did, as did Reyes also, along with most of the other officers, who all fled back to Cuba as soon as they could. Leyba requested that if Anuez appear in Santiago de Cuba then Bayona should arrest him and any others that had fled, including Reyes.[60] Leyba in another letter to Bayona in January 1658 blamed Reyes for poorly constructing the fort that he did build. He also accused Reyes of lying to the King in his dispatches and exaggerating the strength of the fortifications. He added that the fall of the fort 'manifested well the truth about evil designs and ill will, for, from the time Captains Juan de los Reyes and Don Domingo came here they did not seek to serve his Majesty but to take away the Governor's reputation and mine'.[61]

The divisions between Ysassi and the relief force were apparent well before the English attack. Within days of his arrival Reyes was challenging Ysassi's authority by suggesting his plans to take the relief force to Guatibacoa were rash and dangerous. Reyes also provoked dissent amongst the newly arrived troops by encouraging them to not follow Ysassi's orders, even though he was officially the island's governor. Ysassi's brother, Don Blas Ysassi Arnaldo, who was actually Bayona's deputy in Santiago de Cuba, believed Bayona was the root cause of the division. In a letter in September 1658 to Albuquerque he said that all Bayona's actions were 'designed to bring failure and discredit' on his brother 'even though they may be in known disservice of his Majesty'. He went further by claiming 'that the war in Jamaica has not been made by the enemy there but by Governor Don Pedro de Bayona Villannueva'. He accused Bayona of constantly attempting to delay the dispatch of provisions, money and food. He went on to explain that the reason for this was very simple: Bayona 'wishes to govern Jamaica as well as Cuba' and to attain the position of viceroy of Mexico which Albuquerque held, and he was prepared to cause the failure of the Jamaica relief force to discredit both the Viceroy and Ysassi.[62]

The English victory at Las Chorreras was extremely significant. For the first time since leaving England the army had actually fought and won a major engagement with the Spanish, which would have boosted morale and confidence considerably. The successful transporting, at short notice, of a joint army and naval force to the other side of the island demonstrated that the English still had the ability and resources to conduct offensive operations at will, and that the officers and men were capable of performing despite the almost two years of hardship they had endured. Apart from the impact the defeat would have had on Spanish morale, this was a crippling blow to them. The relief force that had taken almost two years to gather and equip was virtually destroyed in only a few hours of fighting and all the supplies it brought with it were lost. Many of the officers of the relief force fled back

60 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.66, 67, 69.
61 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.66.
62 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.63, 64.

to Cuba leaving Ysassi in the same position that he was in at the beginning of the year – understrength and undersupplied. The Spanish had not at this point lost the war against the English, but a savage blow had been dealt to their capabilities and morale, though one from which they were able to recover in a few months. However the recriminations between Ysassi and Reyes were to continue, much to the detriment of the Spanish cause.

Despite the defeat of the Spanish at Las Chorreras the English were acutely aware that their position in Jamaica was still precarious. They were surrounded by Spanish territories from where further relief attempts could be launched, whilst the ever-present fear of a Spanish fleet descending upon them was still a major concern. From Spanish prisoners taken at Las Chorreras Doyley was informed of an additional relief force assembling on the island of Cuba, so he knew a further attempt to retake the island was in the offing. In February 1658 Doyley wrote to the Council of State beseeching them to consider 'that the enemy is now active, and a war upon us is vigorously intended; for which purpose eight hundred men are expected at St. Jago in Cuba this month.'[63] Doyley added that due to a want of shoes his army was in a poor state and the enemy 'will come to our quarters, for we cannot go to them'.[64] However he assured the Council that though his 'forces moulder every day ... you shall never hear the place is basely lost.'[65] In February 1658 the bellicose naval captain Christopher Myngs had returned to Jamaica with the *Marston Moor* and brought with him much-needed supplies and food, though much of it spoiled by the time it arrived. Nonetheless what he brought was very much needed and appreciated, as was the money he brought to pay for the fortifications.[66] But Doyley warned the Council of State that the English position was still parlous despite the victory, and cautioned them from believing everything that returning officers to England were saying about plenty of food being available in Jamaica. He added, with a hint of humour, that it was 'a received maxim amongst those that goe home, to speak well of Jamaica is to hope to get their arrears; but no landman, that ever went liked it so well as ever to return.'[67]

II

The much-reduced English fleet in the Caribbean was once again unable to intercept the Spanish plate fleet when it headed for Spain in early 1657. At that time Goodsonn had returned to England with almost half the fleet as the vessels were in much need of repair, leaving only a handful of ships in Jamaica under the command of Captain Christopher Myngs. The English had enough ships for the defence of the island but not enough to undertake the forays into the Caribbean that Goodsonn had made in 1655 and 1656.

63 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.833–834.
64 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.833.
65 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.833–834.
66 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.95.
67 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.833.

Back in Europe Admiral Blake, after blockading Cadiz throughout the winter of 1656, received intelligence that the plate fleet was on its way but was unable to seriously search for it due to his own lack of supplies. Once resupplied he headed for Santa Cruz in the Canary Islands, a known transit point for Spanish vessels from the Americas. He arrived on 19 April and saw that the fleet had arrived and was at anchor in the port. He attacked the harbour the following day and destroyed 17 of the Spanish vessels and was then able to extricate his own ships without loss. Unfortunately for the English all the precious cargo had been offloaded from the Spanish vessels before the English attack, and so whilst the attack was significantly disruptive for the Spanish, they had retained possession of their treasure. However it could not then, and for some time to come, be used to finance their wars in Europe and so was a crushing blow nonetheless.[68] In August Blake set sail for England leaving the fleet to continue its blockade of Cadiz, but died before arriving home and shortly after was buried in Westminster Abbey.

Cromwell's earlier belief that the war in the West Indies would not spread to Europe was proven wrong in 1657. After his decision to extend the war to include attacking Spanish shipping in 1656 it was only a matter of time before England would be drawn into war alongside France on the Continent. In March 1657 Cromwell signed an offensive military alliance with the French, valid for just 12 months, for a joint attack on Spanish-held Dunkirk, which would be handed over to the English once captured. In June an English army of around 6,000 men under the command of Sir John Reynolds was in Flanders fighting alongside the French army under the command of Marshal Turenne. An English fleet was by then operating in the Channel to block the Spanish ports of Gravelines, Mardyke and Dunkirk, and resupply the English army while also attempting to stop the activities of the Spanish-backed privateers which had become a major thorn in the English side. The English and their French allies spent the summer in a series of fruitless manoeuvres around Flanders in an attempt to draw the main Spanish army – which now included a large English Royalist force under the Duke of York and renegade Irish contingents – away from the coast. The Anglo-French army was unable to commence a serious siege of Dunkirk until the outlying town of Mardyke had been captured, which it was on 22 September. Mardyke was immediately occupied by the English who then fought off a relief attempt from Dunkirk the following month. With winter fast approaching it was now too late to attempt an attack upon Dunkirk, and so the English army remained in Mardyke until the following year.[69] So by the end of 1657 the war that was originally intended to be limited to the West Indies had now spread to Europe, with an English army, once again, campaigning in Flanders.

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68 Barratt, *Cromwell's Wars At Sea*, pp.171–176.

69 Charles Harding Firth, *The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656–1658*, Vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1909), pp.268–301.

III

Undeterred by Reyes' defeat the Spanish remained active in Jamaica during the winter of 1657. Ysassi only learned about the battle at Las Chorreras when a raiding party he led attacked an English hunting party in Oristan a short while later and he captured an ensign, who gave him a full account of what had happened.[70] Upon hearing of the defeat Ysassi instructed his lieutenant, Cristoval de Leyba, to take command of the north side of the island, reorganise the troops that were left after Reyes and the other officers had fled, and prepare to receive further reinforcements.[71] Still upbeat, Ysassi wrote to Bayona on 10 February 1658 requesting food, and more weaponry to replace what had been lost the previous year. He also urged him to send the additional reinforcements that had been mustered in Cuba while adding that those who ran away after Las Chorreras should also return as soon as possible and 'that everything is forgiven'.[72]

With little ammunition Ysassi was in no position to launch an attack upon the English and was more concerned with finding food locally for his men and keeping them safe from English raids across the plains. During the first months of 1658 the English continued to send out regular parties to search for signs of the Spanish, although little evidence survives to determine how effective they were. Captain Meeres (who was later killed at the Battle of Rio Nuevo) led one such party in January,[73] while in February Captain Wiseman of the cavalry was evidently on an extended deployment around Point Pedro when a ship was sent to deliver 'brandy and other things' to him. With him at Point Pedro were four files from Captain Vavasour's company, of Doyley's own regiment.[74] Possibly these men were deployed at Point Pedro to deter any Spanish landing there or a build-up of forces that could then threaten the English on the south side. In March Captain Walter was dispatched with a party of soldiers but to where is not known.[75] Doyley was sensibly keeping the pressure on the Spaniards through these raids, ensuring they had no opportunity to settle on the plains and so forcing them to remain in their camps in the mountains or their isolated encampments on the north side, from where they could do little to bother the English. Aware that the Spanish were planning to send another relief force to Jamaica Doyley continued to send ships to the north coast to keep watch. On 18 February he sent the Dutchman Captain Kempo Sibada in the *Cagway* to Cuba to 'ride as neere as you may without apparent danger to the harbour there of St. Jago and discover what shipps are thereabouts and by any other meanes to endeavour to gett intelligence of the state of the enimie and with all possible speed returne unto this harbour of Cagway'.[76] Whether Sibada left is not clear, for

70 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.67.
71 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.67.
72 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.67.
73 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.92.
74 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.94, 98.
75 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.102.
76 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.95.

on 8 March he and Captain Burrough of the *Martin* were ordered to take up a position off the north coast to watch for any relief attempt and to intercept it, whilst the *Blackmore* was sent to join them on 16 March with orders to remain off the north coast for three months.[77] At the same time Major Richard Stevens, of Doyley's regiment, was ordered to take a force of infantry on board the *Hector* and *Grantham*, as well as the small force in Point Pedro under Captain Vavasour, and head for the north side. Stevens' orders were:

> to annoy and disturbe the enemy on the north side of this island by parties, either in beatinge upp their quarters or spoylinge or disturbinge their plantations or in any way infest them and prevent the landinge of other forces, and hinder those of the women and children to go off without licence. And if any party shall land unawares, whereof after you get notice, you shall inform us by the Pearle that I may gauge the number and from time to time give us with your best conveniency and account of your proceedings.[78]

This is the first recorded land incursion to the north side to seek out the Spanish, and further illustrates the confidence that the English now had in their control over the island. There is no record of Stevens actually making any contact with the Spanish during this extended deployment, but most likely Ysassi was aware of this presence and he would have disrupted Ysassi's plans somewhat by just being there. Perhaps Stevens' presence forced Ysassi to retire further inland, which might explain why he was not at Rio Nuevo when the second relief force did land. The *Hector*, *Martin* and *Grantham* had all returned to Cagway by the time the Spanish relief force arrived in May 1658 but it seems that the *Cagway*, *Blackmore* and *Pearl* were on guard and were the vessels that spotted and engaged the Spaniards at the time of their landing at Rio Nuevo. It was probably the *Pearl* which brought the news of the landing to Doyley.

77 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.97, 100.
78 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.98.

3

Jamaica 1658–1660

I

This second attempt to send a relief force to Jamaica in the summer of 1658 comprised men mostly from Mexico, organised by the Viceroy Albuquerque and under the command of Don Alvaro de la Raspuru, and sent to Santiago de Cuba in four boats. The force numbered about 557 men of whom 467 were infantry.[1] Ysassi was later to claim that 'not one had ever borne arms in his life; the greater part being boys, negroes and mulattoes.'[2] After much delay this force was dispatched from Santiago de Cuba on the evening of 16 May [NS]/6 May [OS] 'and had a prosperous and safe voyage', and arrived in the bay at Rio Nuevo on the afternoon of 18 May [NS]/8 May [OS]. However, despite arriving at the prearranged landing spot as instructed by Ysassi there was no sign of the governor.[3] Raspuru immediately commenced landing his forces and sent out scouts to look for Ysassi. Rio Nuevo bay then, as now, was open and exposed and Raspuru was concerned that he would be spotted by an English naval patrol and so he insisted that his men 'be put ashore as quickly as possible' despite the continual rain. However, once again the English got lucky, for on the afternoon of 19 May [NS]/9 May [OS] 'a large ship appeared near this port with every sign of being an enemy'. The English ship remained offshore observing the landing, but was obviously unprepared to attempt to disrupt it; the vessel departed at sunset the following day, but returned with another vessel on 22 May [NS]/12 May [OS] to continue its observance of the disembarking Spanish.[4] Doyley, in his account of the later battle, claims that although the Spanish landed on 18 May [NS]/8 May [OS] they 'were there about 12 days, before they were discovered'.[5] This seems to be implausible, for it is recorded that he was aware that the Spanish had

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1 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.70, 71.
2 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.82.
3 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.73.
4 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.74.
5 Edward Doyley, *A brief relation of a victory, obtained by the forces under the command of Gen. Edward Doyley, commander in chief of his Highnesse's forces in the island of Jamaica. Against the forces of the king of Spain, commanded by Don Christopher Arnaldo Sasi, commander in chief of the Spanish forces there*, 1659 (California State Library).

landed as early as 11 May [NS]/21 May [OS] and it would not be possible for him to have been notified of this in Cagway only a day after the English ships had spotted the Spanish on the north side.[6] The Spanish version of the dating seems more reliable and that it was perhaps some 12 days after the landing that Doyley learned about it. Both English and Spanish sources agree that the English ships did attempt to attack the Spanish transport vessels in the bay, according to Raspuru on 29 May [NS]/19 May [OS], but without success. Doyley wrote that they made an attempt to board them but 'being becalmed could not effect it'.[7]

Ysassi, in a letter to Bayona dated 21 June [NS]/11 June [OS], wrote:

> On the twenty-eighth of May [NS] a warship arrived to reconnoitre the port, and as it saw our ships it began to fire on them and they on her. When she was exhausted she put out to sea and returned in the evening with two others from the fleet under her convoy and entered the port with their spirit sails topped to board our ships. The troops that were on garrison attacked them in such a way there is no doubt that many were killed, and as we pressed them from land with the artillery we obliged them to retire. They placed themselves in mid channel and cannonaded us until after prayers, and the following day were in sight without daring to return. Therefore at night I sent out the [transport] ships under pain of death if they did not go out, and, having gone out without being perceived, the enemy sent a despatch boat to the town and having received help one of the ships came back. Seeing that our boats were absent it gave notice to the others, whereupon five ships came with their launches astern to land troops. To do this under cover of their artillery, it was necessary to sweep the whole mountain and some damage was done them by our artillery, for we gave the leading ship two very dangerous hits so that it was obliged to cut the cable and leave the anchor in the water; whereupon they went away and up to now have not appeared.[8]

Raspuru gave a more colourful description of the attack when he wrote that:

> Each little frigate of ours seemed a galleon of the royal fleet, the way they fought and palpably damaged them. Although their force was so great they were so discouraged that in all haste they left the port and according to the signal lights and the noise that went on all night, the injury they received was great, and, although at the present time they have not been very distant from us, they have not attempted to enter again.[9]

Raspuru was able to land his force and supplies without interruption, and by 'force of much labour' he got them all safely into a small fort that had been built on a hill overlooking the Rio Nuevo as it flowed into the bay. The Spanish called it the Camp of the Concepcion. Finally Ysassi arrived on 28 May [NS]/18 May [OS] by which time Raspuru was extremely ill with

6 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.195.
7 Doyley, *A brief relation.*
8 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.77.
9 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.75.

rheumatism; it was feared that he would die, a chaplain was called and he was 'given a viaticum and extreme unction'.[10] Once ashore the Spaniards strengthened the fort atop of the hill and prepared themselves for the inevitable English attack. Although this fort was only made from wood it was substantial enough for the remnants of it to still exist in 1688 when Sir Hans Sloane visited the battle site accompanied by (Colonel) Thomas Ballard.[11]

Doyley most likely received the news of the Spanish landing on or about 11 May [NS]/21 May [OS] and immediately called a council of war of his senior officers to decide how to respond. The officers debated whether to attack the Spanish immediately or 'let them partake of the distempers and want of the Country, and when sicknesse had weakened them, to attempt them'.[12] No doubt they also discussed whether this landing was part of a coordinated attack upon the southern, more practical, side of the island as well. The officers agreed after much debate that a 'sudden Resolution to fall upon them before they were Fortified' was the best course of action and so it was decided that Doyley would lead a force of '750 Officers and Souldiers' to attack the Spanish, and he then set about his preparations.[13] The first issue to be addressed was the matter he had brought to the attention of the Council of State in February, namely the lack of shoes for this army. Without them his men could not march or fight, but by chance a merchant ship in the harbour had a stock on board and these were purchased.[14]

Another problem Doyley needed to contend with was the lack of available shipping now that much of the fleet had returned to England for repairs. Furthermore many of the ships he did have in the Caribbean were away from Cagway at the time and so he was necessitated to use some of the prizes then in the harbour 'for the carrying on of landmen for the service'. He therefore ordered Lieutenant John Edgar of the *Marston Moor* to board both the *Mary* and *Galliott* to survey them 'and repaire them to be sett forth and manned for the state's service'.[15] To crew them the *Grantham* supplied 16 seamen for the *Mary* while the *Martin* supplied 'seaven seamen and one cheife mate' for the *Galliott*.[16] John Spicer was on 26 May granted a 'commission impoweringe' him to be master of the *Mary* while William Coward received similar to command the *Galliot*.[17] The *Marston Moor* then provided the *Mary* with 'such caskes, iron hoopes and rivetts as … can spare' to carry water, but as this was insufficient for their needs, Edgar was ordered on 26 May 'to breake open the seales of the prizes now in the harbour' and remove whatever water casks were aboard. Three days later Edgar was ordered to remove 'one anchor of three hundred-weight' from one of the Dutch prizes that Myngs had seized

10 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.74, 73.
11 Sir Hans Sloane, *A voyage to the islands Madera, Barbados, Nieves, S. Christophers and Jamaica* (London: 1707), p.lxvii.
12 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.2.
13 Doyley, *A brief relation*, pp.2–3.
14 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.105, 107.
15 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.105.
16 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.105.
17 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.106.

in Barbados earlier in the year.[18] On 28 May Doyley ordered 'any commander of the state's shipps to spaire John Spicer, the master of the Mary, an able seaman, a carpenter and a spritt-saile'.[19] Despite preparing these two prizes for sea Doyley still did not have enough shipping for his needs. As a sign of his desperation to find suitable vessels he was forced into requisitioning the *Three Cranes*, another Dutch prize taken by Myngs.[20] Both the *Mary* and *Three Cranes* were in a state of limbo as he had requested the Admiralty in London to decide if they were prize or not, and Doyley was taking a great personal risk in authorising their use as neither had been condemned and legally were still the property of their actual owners, so he was now technically using them without permission. He could have been held personally responsible by their owners if they were lost or damaged should it later be found that they were not legitimate prizes. Luckily for him neither were damaged.

On 4 June the *Mary* was issued with more equipment needed for the expedition including 60 shovels, spades and felling axes, as well 20 hatchets and 30 pickaxes. At same time she was provided with 'twenty barrels of powder that came last from England'.[21] The *Paul* was issued with new canvas for its sails; the *Martin* was issued with new ropes, twine and cables as well as canvas and hundreds of nails and 62 feet of 'oake board' for urgent repairs to the superstructure, and the *Grantham* also received a supply of new ropes.[22] The *Hector* was given lumber, spikes and nails to construct 'a floate for the use of that shipp'. Ammunition was of course also needed. The *Martin* was issued 18 sheepskins for the ramrods of its guns as well two barrels of 'small shott', 12 firelocks, a hundredweight of match, 151 'culverin round shott', wads, rope, 'fifty culverin hamer shot', and 20 roundshot for sakers as well as 20 'saker hamer shott'.[23] The *Grantham* was issued with match, 50 lb of sheet lead, three barrels of musket balls and 'pistoll shott one barrell'.[24] On 3 June Nicholas Keeyne, the army's fire-master, was issued with 'two brasse gunns', 206 sheepskins, 50 saker roundshot, 'ipswich canvas bags for the case-shott', 36 fathoms (216 feet) of 'three-inch rope to drawe the carriages by land', 593 feet of 'deale planke', a multitude of different sized nails plus 232 barrels of musket shot, and three hundredweight of match, as well as 51 head pieces.[25]

That Doyley was concerned about the possibility of a simultaneous landing by the Spanish on the south side of the island is illustrated by the extent of the detailed instructions he gave Colonel William Moore, who was to command the forces around Cagway in his absence on 2 June.[26] Expecting an attack from the direction of Old Harbour, Moore was instructed to set up his headquarters in Santiago and direct the defence from there and at all times, 'to proceed accordinge to the advice of a councell of officers', and to

18 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.106.
19 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.106.
20 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107.
21 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107.
22 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.108–109.
23 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.109.
24 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.110.
25 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.109.
26 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.107–108.

draw such ammunition from the main stores as required. As Barrington's regiment in the Guanaboa Valley and Barry's forces in Liguanea were well dispersed throughout the countryside on plantations, Moore was ordered to ensure that these units be concentrated into a single quarter in each location at night for greater protection and for rapid deployment if required. The horse, around 30 in number,[27] were to be concentrated in Santiago but scouts sent out 'to discover the motion of the enemy'. If the Spanish landed on the south side Moore was to concentrate Ward's regiment (from Los Angeles) at Santiago as well as bring in Barrington's from Guanaboa and the units from Liguanea as 'shall be thought most conduceable to His Highnes' service'. If, however, they attacked Barrington in Guanaboa he was to order all the forces in Liguanea to concentrate on Santiago. Moore was instructed 'nott to fight the enemy upon evident disadvantage' but if pressed hard he was to concentrate all his forces in Santiago but to only engage the enemy 'butt on equalle termes'.[28] No mention was made concerning the defence of Cagway harbour, which presumably Doyley thought was sufficiently strong enough to be held by both Fort Cromwell, which had been constructed at the entrance, and by the part of the fleet that he left behind. To Doyley the threat of a seaborne landing on the south side was real. He was well aware of the logistical problems that the Spanish would encounter should they launch an offensive from the north side and so he would have been concerned that the landing at Rio Nuevo was just a feint and that the real attack would come from the south. He possibly also thought that the Spanish would not make the same mistake that they had made the previous year by only landing to the north. The English had always believed the greatest threat was posed by a seaborne attack from Cartagena, and it was for this reason that English warships had frequently been sent there since 1655 to see if there was any build-up of an invasion force in the harbour. It is therefore not surprising that after the battle at Rio Nuevo Doyley returned almost immediately to Cagway to be ready for an attack from the south should it materialise.

There is no extant record as to the composition of the force that sailed with Doyley to Rio Nuevo. He certainly had with him at least seven vessels when he departed Cagway and he joined the two or three ships already off the north coast. Ysassi concurred with this number.[29] In previous expeditions the English had drawn men from each of the individual regiments to make a composite force and there is no reason to suppose this time was any different. According to Doyley his force numbered some 750 men,[30] and this was by far the largest force that had yet been dispatched and amounted to about one third of the entire English army at the time;[31] Doyley was taking a gamble by sending such a large portion of his forces away in one go, especially as he was evidently concerned about a southern landing as

27 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.112.
28 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.107–108.
29 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.79.
30 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.2.
31 In March 1658 the ration strength of the army was just over 2,050 men. Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.101.

well. Of the senior army officers only Barry is mentioned as having been with Doyley, for he was sent to England after the battle and was described as 'an eye-witnesse, and principall Actor herein'.[32] Certainly the composite force included elements of those quartered in Yallah as a ship was dispatched to collect them on 29 May with orders to then rendezvous with the main force off Port Morant.[33] This force included 14 men under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Heblethwaite as well as a force under Captain (George) Ryley, both of whom were officers in Doyley's own regiment in 1656.[34] Of the officers killed the most senior was Captain Wiseman, who was actually in the cavalry but as there were no horse with Doyley he must have served in some other capacity. Captain Meers was also killed but his unit cannot be identified. The Captain Lieutenant Robinson also killed might be Rowland Robinson who was promoted to ensign in Barrington's regiment in May 1656 and again to lieutenant in August that same year, and so it is likely that an element from Barrington's regiment was present.[35] It is probable that elements from all regiments of the army were present. There is no mention of Captain Christopher Myngs, by now commander of the English naval forces in Jamaica, as having any involvement in the expedition and it is not clear if the *Marston Moor* accompanied Doyley or not. As the most senior naval officer it might be that he remained to command the naval forces in Cagway although in March 1658 he was stationed off Port Morant.[36]

Doyley claims in his account of the battle that he left Cagway on 11 June and landed at Rio Nuevo on 22 June but this seems to be incorrect. The last recorded order that he gave before leaving Cagway was dated 7 June and the first he issued on his return was dated 25 June, so it seems plausible that he was away between these dates, whilst it seems unlikely that if he landed on 22 June he could have returned to Cagway by 25 June.[37] Ysassi gives the date of the battle as being 25–26 June [NS]/15–16 June [OS] and so once again the dates given by the Spanish seem to be more accurate than those given by Doyley in his own account.[38]

The bay of Rio Nuevo is situated between the current settlement known as Caribbean Park and Rio Nuevo and is easily accessible from the modern A3 road which runs along the north coast of the island. On the eastern side of the bay is a headland that protrudes almost horizontally into the sea, while the western side gently curves up to another headland in a 'J' shape. About one third of the way along the curve of the shoreline the Rio Nuevo discharges into the sea, and to the west of this, being the left bank of the river, a steep hill ascends to plateau on which the Spanish had built the Camp of the Concepcion. Although the Rio Nuevo is not a large river, as it enters to

32 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.8.
33 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.106.
34 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.110; BL, Add MS 12423, Edward Doyley's Journal, 1655–1662.
35 BL Add MS 12423.
36 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.100.
37 BL, Edward Doyley's Journal, f.3; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.110.
38 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.79.

sea it is deep and so was only fordable by going further inland. According to Doyley he landed at the eastern end of the bay on the morning of 22 June but almost certainly it was earlier than this, possibly around 15 June. The Spanish had placed a force of about two companies of infantry on the beach to contest the landing, while the first English ashore 'went on with such gallantry, and leapt into the water with so much chearfulnesse, that perswaded the Enemy they would not be denied entrance'.[39] At this the Spanish retreated 'leaving one of their Captains, and about 23 slain', giving the English control of the beach onto which, in the space of an hour, they were able to land their entire force while the Spanish fired upon them 'with little successe' from their fort on the hill overlooking the bay. The English ships maintained a regular bombardment of the fort for the rest of the day but it 'being so vast a height, they could bear to do them little harm'.[40] The English force spent the rest of the day regrouping out of cannon range on the foreshore, and also sent out scouts to reconnoitre while the rest of the men set about making some scaling ladders.

The Spanish were in a very commanding position overlooking both the beach and the bay with the river, of an unknown depth, between them and the English (Plate B). Doyley, unsure where he could ford the river or what lay on the other side, but believing that the Spanish outnumbered him, decided to play for time by sending a drummer towards the Spanish camp to demand their surrender. The drummer took a letter from Doyley to Ysassi on the evening of the day following their landing, in which Doyley wrote that:

> Being here with the Forces of the Mighty Prince, the Protector of England ... I do in his Name, and for his use, require and summon you, to deliver-up the Fort of Rio Nuva [*sic*], with the Ordnance and Ammunition therein; assuring you honourable terms, and transport to your Country: which if you refuse, I shall be acquitted of the bloud which shell be shed. I expect the return of my Drummer within an hour.[41]

Ysassi gave the drummer '25 pieces of Eight' and sent Doyley a 'Jar of Sweetmeats' along with his answer to Doyley's demand. In a show of bravado Ysassi pointed out to Doyley that as the English had neither advanced nor opened fire on him he would not consider giving up so easily. He concluded that 'I want no Powder, Ball, Provisions, nor gallant Men, that know how to die before they be overcome.'[42] With the pleasantries out of the way Doyley knew he needed to act quickly and so 'made no more demurs, but resolved to march the morrow morning'.

In the morning Doyley sent two of his vessels to the leeward of the fort in an attempt 'to perswade them we intend to stand on that side of them' while sending his other ships closer into the bay to fire onto the fort. As soon as it was light he sent his infantry inland along the eastern bank of the river

39 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.3.
40 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.3.
41 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.4.
42 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.5.



Plano del puerto de Santa Ana (Jamaica), c.1658. (Plate 8)

to find a crossing point, which they found after marching about two miles through the woods. Crossing the river they then headed back towards the fort, where, only about a quarter mile from it, they came across a Spanish party on a small hill behind a breastwork they had hurriedly constructed. This the English immediately attacked causing the Spaniards to fire 'a fruitless Volley' and then run back to their main fort telling the defenders that 'All the world was coming'. The English occupied this hillock and after a brief halt to refresh 'our weariness' and reorganise, they continued their march. At this point they were gladdened to see that the rear side of the fort 'was not finished to that height as that to the Seaward'.[43]

Doyley, having learned from his attack on Las Chorreras, had ordered fire-master Keeyne to make hand grenades prior to the army leaving Cagway, as he rightly judged the Spanish would most likely be encamped in a fort of sorts and so the grenades would prove useful, which they were.[44] The scaling ladders he had immediately upon landing had the soldiers construct were also useful in the attack. The English forlorn hope, once close to the Spanish fort, immediately 'ran up to their Flankers', being the bastion or bulwarks projecting outwards from the curtain wall, which 'in a quarter of an hour, we gained'. Once the English were able to breach the bulwarks they were soon inside the fort and the defenders quickly fled, 'and ours followed their chase

43 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.6.

44 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.104.

about three or four miles, doing execution'. Seeing the enemy fleeing north along the coast the seaman 'came out with their Boats and killed many of them.'[45]

The English victory was easily gained but at the cost of five officers and about 23 soldiers killed with around 'thirty four wounded, where of some are since dead'. Doyley also noted that some of the officers were 'slightly wounded with stones'.[46] William Dalyson, an English naval officer, believed that they 'lost about sixty men' in the fight.[47] At least 13 of the wounded were sent back to England later in the year aboard the *Grantham*.[48] According to Doyley around 300 Spaniards were killed including 'divers Captains, two priests, and their Serjeant Major'. Included amongst the Spanish dead was Ysassi's second in command Don Cristoval de Leyba.[49] The English also captured 'an hundred ordinary Prisoners' plus six captains who were subsequently 'sent home',[50] and also gained an impressive list of captured trophies from the fort as well. These included 'Ten double Barrels of Pouder; Shot, great store; Six Peeces of Ordnance; great store of Provisions, Wine, Brandie, Salt, Oile, and other Provisions for eight months, as they termed it.' Also captured was the 'King of *Spain*'s Standard, and ten Colours'.[51]

Don Francisco de Leyba, father of Ysassi's second in command, travelled to Spain in 1659 to provide the Spanish government with a first-hand account of what had happened on the island since the English invasion, and he gave a much-exaggerated account of the battle. He claimed the English landed with 3,000 men and in the first engagement on the beach nearly all the Spaniards 'died fighting' whilst 'Many of the enemy also died in this encounter.' He continued by noting how the artillery fire from the English fleet upon the Spanish fort was so heavy 'that in one day it levelled the trees with which it was covered'. The English then attempted to storm the Spanish defences twice but were repulsed both times 'with loss to their troops'. After three days of 'continuous fighting' the final assault was made on the Spanish fort 'with a thousand men on three sides and killed three hundred of ours with a loss of as many of their own … and took the fortification and its contents. The last man to leave it was the Governor.'[52]

This was a catastrophic defeat for the Spanish. For the second time in less than a year a relief force had been destroyed before it could even be deployed against the English, with the loss of all supplies and provisions. Once again the Spanish forces were incapable of mounting any significant defence and were quickly overrun with most men either surrendering or fleeing. Ysassi could

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45 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.7.
46 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.8.
47 W. Noel Sainsbury (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies. 1675–1676, Also Addenda 1574–1674*, Vol. 9 (hereafter *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*) (London: 1893), p.123.
48 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1658–9* (hereafter *CSPD 1658–9*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1885), p.268.
49 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.89.
50 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.7.
51 Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.7.
52 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.89.

rightly blame the defeat at Las Chorreras on Reyes, but at Rio Nuevo he had nobody to blame but himself. Again the English mastery of the sea allowed them to land their forces when and where they wished with the initiative fully on their side. By now the English soldiers were acclimatised and toughened by the hardships they had endured on the island for the past three years, and the raw Spanish recruits were no match for them. Despite all the resources of their American Empire at their disposal the Spanish authorities lacked the ability and expertise to mount anything but two feeble attempts to retake the island. Ysassi had long argued a Spanish fleet and experienced soldiers in large numbers would be needed to regain Jamaica, but the authorities lacked the capacity to provide them, being distracted in Europe by wars with France and England while their regional administrators proved to be lazy, incompetent and inept (just as Gage had said they were). With this second defeat Spanish prestige was left in tatters as it was finally demonstrated to the English, and to the rest of Europe, that Spain was impotent to defend its possessions in the New World in the face of determined aggression, just as Cromwell had predicted. It was England's misfortune that it lacked the ability to capitalise on this weakness and to follow through with its initial plan to supplant the Spanish in the Americas. After this defeat, and despite Ysassi's encouragement, the Spanish made no further effort to retake Jamaica from the English by force and Ysassi was left to his own devices to continue the war of resistance as best he could, with what little material support he could obtain from Cuba. The longer the English remained on the island the harder it would be to dislodge them, and so it seemed to the Spanish that their only hope was that they could somehow negotiate a return of the island from the English at some time in the future when the circumstances were right.

For the English Doyley's gamble paid off. He seized the opportunity and destroyed his enemy. Unaware that the Spanish had virtually lost the political will and capability to continue the struggle, the English were still to live in fear of an attack from the Spanish over the coming years but increasingly that threat could never come from within the Caribbean itself but only from Spain, and only if the will and resources could be mustered. Doyley was quickly back in Cagway, no doubt concerned that a further Spanish attempt might be attempted on the south side. He most likely left a sizeable force on the north side to round up as many of the fleeing Spanish as it could find as well as demolish what remained of the Camp of the Concepcion. He brought back with him some of wounded, who were immediately given extra provisions.[53] Doyley, who surely recognised the magnitude of the victory, was pleased to hand out rewards to his victorious troops. On 26 July he ordered the sum of £70 be disbursed as an 'encouragement of the souldiery in the designe of Rio Nuevo, viz. for the first prisoner, for carry [*sic*] ladders, for flinginge the granadoes and severall other uses'.[54] The *Martin* was then made ready to return to England to carry Barry and news of the English victory.

53 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.110.
54 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.114.

Barry took with him the captured Spanish flags which he presented to the Council of State on his arrival in London in early October.[55]

The defeat was undoubtedly a shattering blow to Ysassi, but he remained characteristically upbeat. In a letter to the King in July he wrote, 'In fine, Sir, on this 26th of June the enemy defeated me with the loss of 300 men', but nevertheless he remained steadfast in his duty and would remain 'until your Majesty reinforce me with your royal fleet for, without it, it is impossible even with the greatest means to restore the island'.[56] After the defeat Ysassi and his officers decided to send most of the men they had been able to regroup back to Cuba and keep only about 50 on the island, which he split into three groups to be better able to feed themselves. These were sufficient 'to make a footing and to know the designs of the enemy in order to report to your Majesty'.[57] The English destroyed all the Spanish supplies that they did not take back with them and so the Spaniards quickly 'were therefore suffering from hunger and the rains in the mountains',[58] while the occasional supplies from Cuba were insufficient for their needs. As such Ysassi and his men increasingly became much more dependent on the communities of African-Caribbeans, perhaps only 200 in total themselves, to supply them with food.[59] Despite these setbacks Ysassi was still able to pose a threat to the English on occasion, at least in the more remote locations that the English had settled. At the end of 1658 Burrough was attacked by the Spanish on his way back from Guanaboa Vale and one of the soldiers was lanced and his own horse killed.[60] However, such attacks were now few and far between and the threat posed by the Spaniards had considerably diminished, though they were still able to regularly spy on the English encampments and send reports back to Spain.[61]

II

Despite the victory Doyley believed that the Spanish would probably try again to send another relief force and so he could not let down his guard. He had heard rumours in July that a Spanish fleet had arrived from Spain, and this would have concerned him immensely for he knew his depleted fleet might not be sufficient to defeat a stronger Spanish one.[62] To gain more intelligence he sent the *Pearl* back to the north side in early August 'to gain intelligence by surprising any boat coming from Cuba, and in case you cannot speedily meete with some you are to ply towards Cuba and either by landinge men and surprisinge a prisoner on that island'. Captain Healinge,

55 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.113; Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 7 (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), p.424.
56 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.78–79.
57 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.79.
58 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.79–80.
59 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.81.
60 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.126.
61 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.80–81.
62 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 7, p.540.

commander of the *Pearl*, was further ordered that if he found out nothing from Cuba he was to make for Cartagena and attempt the same there.[63] As a further precautionary measure he sent 40 cavalry under Lieutenant Robert Nelson to Point Pedro, 'there to endaevour to find out the enemie and to do such upon them as shall be judged requisite'. Most likely this was an attempt to find the remnants of Ysassi's force who might look to find refuge in that far corner of the island. Nelson was instructed 'there to remain for the space of two moneths unless you shall receive further orders'. Hickeringill later claimed this English force found some Spaniards whom they attacked and who were 'attended with no less inauspicious fate' than had befallen their compatriots at Rio Nuevo.[64]

After the *Pearl* had departed Cagway, Doyley was informed that the rumoured Spanish fleet was in Porto Bello and consisted of five galleons which he then believed to be the plate fleet preparing to return to Spain. Sensing an opportunity to finally make an attempt of the elusive plate fleet, on 23 August he ordered Myngs with the *Marston Moor* and the 'private man of war' called the *Hopefull Adventure* under Captain Richard Guy, to prepare to sail and attempt to intercept them. Also to sail with Myngs was the *Hector*, and from 1 October the *Coventry*, and it is possible that some of the other ships, the *Grantham*, *Blackmore* and *Cagway* also accompanied him. Also with Myngs was a detachment of 300 soldiers.[65] He departed Cagway at the end of August and took up a position between Cartagena and Porto Bello in Panama and sent men ashore to seize any Spaniards they could find who might give them information as to the whereabouts of the fleet. He quickly found out that the fleet was actually in Porto Bello 'to attend the plate coming over land'. Myngs then remained at sea for a month waiting for the fleet to make an appearance, but it never did. Then around the middle of October the English spotted two ships coming from Cartagena and heading for Porto Bello, which they immediately chased. Unfortunately the English vessels could not keep up as they were too sluggish in the water due to the build-up of barnacles on their hulls, but they managed to chase them into the small port of Tolū where they were able to catch up and then burn them. While there the English landed and attacked the town, which they also burned and plundered. They then returned to keep a watch on Porto Bello.[66]

On about 20 October the English saw the Spanish fleet emerging from Porto Bello but only the *Marston Moor* and *Hector* were available to attack them as the other vessels had been sent off to fetch water. Myngs did not hesitate, and immediately both vessels gave chase to what turned out to be a fleet of at least 'fifteen galleons and fourteen merchant-men'. With only two vessels of his own all Myngs could do was follow and hope to pick off any stragglers, but was not given the opportunity as the Spanish ships were able to keep together as they headed for the open sea. Frustrated, the *Marston Moor*

63 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.114.

64 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.115–116; Edmund Hickeringill, *Jamaica Viewed* (London: John Williams, 1661), p.46.

65 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 7, p.540; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.116.

66 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 7, p.540.

and *Hector* gave the passing fleet a broadside for good measure and then broke off the chase and returned to Cagway, where they were by 8 November. Doyley was to inform Thurloe he believed the plate fleet contained 'four millions of the king's money'. He added with his own hint of frustration, 'It was a strange tantalizing to us to be on the midst of millions, and not be able to venture for it without manifest indiscretion and ruine.'[67] The Spanish fleet had made for Cartagena, and almost as soon as Myngs had returned to Cagway, Doyley sent the *Cagway* to Cartagena to see if the fleet was still there, but it soon returned and reported that the fleet had already departed, most likely for Havana.[68] Doyley assumed the fleet would wait out the winter there as it was probably too late in the year to attempt to enter the Gulf of Florida and head for Spain. No doubt many of the English were livid that they had come so close to capturing part of the plate fleet only to see it slip through their hands.

III

Back in Europe the Anglo-French alliance was renewed for a further 12 months in March 1658, and as a result the English fleet commenced the blockade of Dunkirk while the joint English–French army began to besiege the city on 15 May. The Spanish army in the Spanish Netherlands was commanded by Don Juan of Austria, the Prince of Condé, and was supported by an English Royalist force commanded by James, Duke of York. Don Juan was determined to lead a relief force against Dunkirk and concentrated his army in Ypres at the end of May. The Spanish army arrived to the east of Dunkirk on 3 June and was immediately faced by the Anglo-French army under the command of Marshal Turenne, whose army included six English regiments sent by Cromwell to Flanders under the command of Sir William Lockhart. The Battle of the Dunes was fought the following day, and after a hard fight the Spanish force was defeated and withdrew to Ypres leaving Dunkirk to its fate. With no possibility of relief the town surrendered on 14 June and was immediately handed over to the English, who had finally gained their cherished foothold in Europe. Elements of the English army continued to serve with the French army for the rest of the year, and fought at both Gravelines and Ypres; they garrisoned Dunkirk until 1662 when the port city was sold to France.[69]

Oliver Cromwell died on 3 September 1658. With him died the English enthusiasm for colonial expansion as his son Richard, his successor as Lord Protector, struggled to establish himself at the head of the government. With more pressing matters closer to home to deal with he had no time to worry about Jamaica or the war with Spain in Europe. When Doyley received the

67 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 7, p.540; Jesuit Archives & Research Center (hereafter JARC), Box Four, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', Undated, f.9.

68 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 7, p.540; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.13.

69 Charles Harding Firth, *The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656–1658*, Vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1909), pp.177–222.

news of Cromwell's death is not known, but certainly by the end December.[70] However it was possibly only in May 1659 that the English on Jamaica were aware that Richard Cromwell had been named Lord Protector, for it was then that Doyley authorised Burrough to issue 'one butt of brandy delivered out by him to the three garrisons and others to be expended that the Lord Protector of England was proclaimed'.[71] English involvement in the war of Oliver Cromwell's making barely extended beyond his demise, and the army in Jamaica was left devoid of instruction and bereft of assistance.

IV

Doyley, with his army numbering barely 2,000 officers and men, knew that he needed to keep the pressure on Ysassi on the north side to keep him away from the coast along which he could receive provisions from Cuba, and not let him settle in one place. In January 1659 he sent Major Wilbraham and a party of infantry in the *Hector* under orders to 'land a party att or near the Chorreras in the north of this island'.[72] How effective Wilbraham was is not recorded but his very presence in the area would have restricted Ysassi's activities greatly and pushed him either further way from the English along the coast or into the mountains. The English had always enjoyed a reasonably successful ability to intercept Spanish shipping from Cuba, so just having a ship plying the coast at all times would have discouraged the sending of provision ships. Once Wilbraham had completed his mission he was collected by Myngs in the *Marston Moor* and accompanied him on yet another attack along the Spanish Main. In July a smaller party under Captain Lieutenant David Morgan was sent out with a sizeable ration supply, but where they went is unclear.[73]

English sources mention barely any contact with the dwindling numbers of Spanish on the island throughout 1659 and it is clear they were not seen as a significant threat, but the fear of external attack was still ever present. In early September Doyley again heard rumour that that a Spanish fleet was bound for Jamaica. Whilst he had heard these rumours on numerous occasions before he had to take them seriously, and so prepared a defence plan. On 3 September he issued 'fifty-five [fire]arms and a barrell of small shott' plus two barrels of powder to Major Wilbraham, then commander of Brayne's former regiment based in Liguanea.[74] Two days later he sent Wilbraham specific orders on what to do 'in case you discover any more than seaven saile of shipps windward'. In that case he was to 'drawe all the souldiers [in Liguanea] and those att porto Morant together as a body ... [and] you are to march them unto the springe in Legoney [Liguanea] there

70 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.22–23.
71 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.115.
72 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.126; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.28, 32.
73 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.120.
74 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.125–126.

send to me for further orders.'[75] In an attempt to ascertain what was truly going on Doyley ordered Captain Lloyd of the *Diamond* to sea at 'the first opportunity' on 10 September, to go 'windward of this harbour and settle your station', and from where if he was to gain 'any intelligence concerninge the invadeing of this island by the enemy to take care itt be speedily sent or brought to this place'. Doyley went on with some contingency instructions so that if Lloyd 'shall heare that the enemy is landed here [Cagway] you are to make [for] Port Morant and send in your boates to know the certainty. And if you find that deserted then to use your utmost endeavour to knowe as much certainty as can be.' Finally Doyley instructed Lloyd that 'if you find the enemy is here with shipps from Spaine to such a number as is improbable to be dealt withall by you or by us here then you are to set saile for England and acquaint the state therewith.'[76] On 12 September Wilbraham received further instructions from Doyley telling him 'to putt the souldiers under your comand att Port Morant by reason of the present alarme in a military position of defence'. He was to use his best judgement about whether or not to recall the soldiers that were at the time out in hunting parties and 'to take upon him the whole management of that affaire and to do therein as he shall [see] fitt both with his souldiers and the planters att Port Morant.'[77]

As it transpired this was just another false alarm, but by the urgency of Doyley's orders it can be seen how serious a threat the Spanish still posed to the English on Jamaica and that the fear of a seaborne invasion was real. But even on land the Spanish were still a threat, for on 11 October it was recorded that a party of 12 men under the command of Lieutenant Fuller had been 'routed by the enemy'. Probably this was an isolated detachment that the Spanish, or maybe even the African-Caribbeans, had attacked.[78] Interestingly Fuller had with him at the time a party of dogs belonging to John Hoys, who had been on Jamaica since at least mid 1656 when he was described as a 'hunter'.[79] Hoys had a pack of 15 dogs which he had purchased in August for 20*l*, most likely for tracking the Spanish and African-Caribbeans in the bush just as Barrington had recommended the English should have back in March 1657. Samuel Long, writing many years later but with significant local knowledge and generally quite accurate in his descriptions, added that 'The English procured some blood-hounds, and hunted these blacks like wild beast.'[80]

Since the arrival of the English on Jamaica they had in fact been fighting two distinct enemies – the Spanish and the African-Caribbeans. When the Spanish themselves had colonised Jamaica they had utilised the local indigenous population in the building of their colony, but through overwork, disease and suicide most of these had rapidly died out which had necessitated

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75 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.126.
76 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.130.
77 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.128–129.
78 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.141.
79 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.63.
80 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.118; *Seventh Report* (Barrington), p.575; Edward Long, *A History of Jamaica: Reflections on Its Situation, Settlements, Inhabitants, Climate, Products, Commerce, Laws, and Government*, Vol. 1 (London: 1774), p.279.

that the Spanish import African slaves to provide the labour they needed throughout their empire. These slaves had undertaken all of the menial and agricultural work on the island and had become an essential component of the economy. In time these original slaves had bred both amongst themselves (and probably also with the remaining indigenous population), whose offspring were referred to as *creole*, and with the Iberian population whose progeny were called *mulattoes*. This created a community of enslaved, freed and semi-free peoples to which new slaves from Africa were added from time to time, all of whom the English simply called *negroes*.[81]

Prior to the English invasion these African-Caribbeans formed communities both in Santiago and on the isolated Spanish plantations spread across the savannah, but they were still enslaved and lacked any personal freedom. Some lucky ones were able to live in quasi-independent communities with a degree of liberty not available to the majority on the island, but they were still bound to the Spanish who allowed them some measure of freedom in return for assistance to be provided as required to supplement the defence of the island and to provide some of the food that the Spanish needed. These small groups consisted of a mixture of semi-free slaves and runaways and subsisted by farming and by killing wild cattle, whose meat and hides they were also able to trade with the Spanish. In time they had developed great skill at both farming and hunting and were an important part of the colonial establishment, as they had also been on Hispaniola where they were also known as 'cow-killers' and contributed significantly to the defeat of the English. The arrival of the English on Jamaica completely destroyed the fabric of Spanish colonial society and with that the bonds that tied the African-Caribbeans to the Spanish. In the chaos that ensued after the English landing the Spanish fled from Santiago and the nearby plantations carrying what possessions they could, and undoubtedly many of their slaves went with them. But as time passed some of the slaves were able to slip away from their owners and no doubt many were simply abandoned as being too difficult to feed and provide for. As the Spanish fled over the mountains to the relative safety of the north side, still more of the slaves would have disappeared, and as the escaping Spaniards found a lack of shipping available to get them to Cuba and the cost of passage was so astronomically high, even more slaves would have been abandoned. Naturally these escaped and abandoned slaves sought refuge in groups, and so coalesced into communities which had to manage their own survival and self-regulate their lives for the first time. Many of the domestic slaves probably lacked the survival skills needed and so it would seem likely that they gravitated to the communities of semi-free African-Caribbeans that inhabited the remoter parts of the island, and had already formed settlements known in Spanish as *palenques*.

81 For a detailed account of the origins of African-Caribbean settlements in Jamaica and how these formed the basis of the Maroon community, and the origins of the Maroon Wars of the eighteenth century, see P.J. Nichols, *'Free Negroes' – The Development of Early English Jamaica and the Birth of Jamaican Maroon Consciousness, 1655–1670* (PhD Thesis, Georgia State University, 2015). See also Francisco Morales Padrón, *Spanish Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1952; reprinted in English 2003).

It cannot be assumed that these communities of now free African-Caribbeans were the natural allies of the English and nor can it be assumed that they felt any significant loyalty to their previous owners. Sensing that society had been remodelled, the African-Caribbeans' overriding desire would be to maintain their freedom and avoid the conflict that was just beginning between two European nations seeking to control the island on which they lived. Not all the African-Caribbeans left the Spanish, however, and throughout the resistance Ysassi was accompanied by a small but diminishing number of loyal slaves. The historical bond between the Spanish and these slaves, as well as a shared language, inevitably led the Spanish to attempt to gain the support of the African-Caribbeans, both militarily and through practical assistance and the provision of food. To a certain extent Ysassi was successful in this but the support was limited by the African-Caribbeans' self-interest and he was never able gain their full support and trust despite his promises of formal emancipation. Nevertheless, the African-Caribbeans on Jamaica were not a homogeneous or single grouping but were scattered communities under separate leadership and with separate aspirations and intentions.

Initially the African-Caribbeans on the island, who probably only numbered some few hundreds in total, were to the English another enemy to be recognised and dealt with. The English realised early on that the African-Caribbeans with whom they fought were separate from, and not necessarily fighting at the behest of, the Spaniards and that they were in fact two separate communities, even though the Spanish force did also include some African-Caribbeans. As early as January 1656 the English believed that the African-Caribbeans were 'at distance with the Spaniards, and live by themselves in several parties', whilst a few months later it was believed 'that they are separated from the Spaniards, and live scattered in parties in the woods and mountains'.[82] English sources frequently interchange the names of their two enemies which sometimes creates some confusion when attempting to understand specifically who they are referring to. As an example of this Sedgwick believed Ysassi's raid of March 1656 on Santiago was carried out by the African-Caribbeans and not the Spanish.[83] By 1659 the English had only settled the land that was reasonably close to Santiago and only ventured into the more remote areas when searching for horses, cattle or the Spanish. The African-Caribbeans, however, had settled in the more remote and inaccessible areas of the island, mostly likely in the mountains, and as such contact between the two mainly occurred when hunting parties clashed on the savannah, such as when Sibada's raiding party clashed with a group on the Pedro Plains in early 1656.[84] The African-Caribbeans do not seem to have conducted any independent military offensives against the English, and whilst they were happy to seek a peaceful coexistence they only became aggressive it they felt threatened. In reality the English knew little about the African-Caribbean communities and perhaps more to the point even

82 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.456, 601.
83 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
84 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4.

where they were located, for it was only in 1660 that for the first time they were able to definitely locate a *palenque*. However they had some success in finding isolated temporary camps, for in April 1656 Doyley was to inform Thurloe that one of their plantations was found, attacked and destroyed;[85] then in early September 1656 a party of English soldiers had been sent to Guatibacoa to attack 'the quarters of ye Negroes', while in December of the same year another party was sent out to Morant to 'the plantation where ye Negroes last were and to fall on their quarters'. The reason for the second attack was to clear the African-Caribbeans from the area so that the settlers from Nevis could settle there without threat. How successful these raids were is not recorded.[86] In September 1656 a captured Spaniard was able to inform the English where some of the African-Caribbeans met,[87] but it is probable that they were constantly moving around in search of food and likely seeking to avoid contact with the English, and so they proved difficult to locate. Nevertheless the English saw them as a natural ally of the Spanish, and through regular though small-scale clashes, a threat to their domination of the island.

The English upon their arrival on Jamaica did attempt to separate the African-Caribbeans from the Spanish. Under the terms of the treaty it had been stipulated that all the slaves were to be 'requir'd by their several masters' to present themselves before Venables 'to receive such favourable concessions as are intended to be made unto them touching their Liberty'.[88] What these liberties were to be was not disclosed, but it seems doubtful that Venables meant full emancipation as the English, having just come from Barbados, knew well the benefits of an enslaved labour force. As the Spanish slipped away from Santiago so to did the African-Caribbeans, many of whom were now able to taste the freedom so long denied them. As early as February 1656 at least some were now living such an independent life that they were prepared to use force to protect it: when Captain Sibada led a raiding party to Parottee Bay on the Pedro Plains he encountered a group of African-Caribbeans who freely admitted that they had nothing to do with the Spaniards but were prepared to fight the English should they attempt to attack their community.[89]

It is certain that Ysassi saw them as a potential threat to his ability to continue the fight against the English. In August 1657 he wrote to Albuquerque that 'all the fugitive negroes are under my obedience. It has been no small success to have reduced them, on account of their knowledge of the island, and, if they wanted to do mischief, could have done us very much harm', and in return for their acquiescence he had offered freedom to all those who 'should distinguish themselves in his [the King's] royal service'. However, knowing full well he had not the authority to grant such emancipation he asked that Albuquerque obtain for him the authority to do

85 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.711.
86 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.88, 108.
87 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.374.
88 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.38.
89 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.543.

so.[90] Similarly almost a year later he wrote to the King himself and echoed these same words when he said 'I have done not a small thing in conserving them, keeping them under my obedience ... I have promised their Chiefs freedom in your Majesty's name but have not given it until I receive an order for it.'[91] Ysassi was always prone to exaggerate his successes and downplay his failures, and in this he was no different when he claimed to have all the African-Caribbeans under his obedience. It would probably be more accurate to state that he had been able to remain on friendly terms with some of them (the promise of emancipation would have helped in this regard) and it would also be true to say that they were not actively obstructing him in his efforts to battle the English, but it is certainly too much to say that he had won them over to his side.

Francisco de Leyba, in the statement he made before the Spanish government in 1659, believed that the African-Caribbeans consisted of three separate *palenques* and 'govern themselves although they are obedient to the Governor who keeps them in this way so that they might not separate themselves from His Majesty's service'. He also believed that they numbered around 250 men and women.[92] In 1660 the English concurred with Leyba's assessment that there were three separate *palenques* but were unable to assess their strength,[93] and exactly where these *palenques* were is harder to establish. The first *palenque* found by the English, in early 1660, was that of Juan de Bolas (Juan Lubolo), believed to have been situated at the western foot of Mount Diablo, somewhere between modern Ewarton and Faiths Pen, and which is marked on John Sellers' 1671 map of Jamaica.[94] Another, led by Juan de Serras, is believed to be the camp overrun by the English in February 1660 and was probably located close to Los Vermejales on the very top of the mountains and on the single trail across them which traversed north–south across the island.[95] Where the third *palenque* was located and who was its chief has not been identified, but it was most likely in the same general vicinity as the other two, in a secluded part of the mountain range. In addition it is probable that there were other isolated groups of African-Caribbeans dotted around the island, some more permanent than others as individuals came and went, but it seems the majority of them lived in and around these three locations.

With the defeat of the second Spanish relief force in 1658 the English were afforded the freedom to seek out the African-Caribbean camps they had hitherto been unable to locate. That the English had no idea where the *palenques* were is easily demonstrated by the fact that in the four years of the occupation and the numerous raids conducted into the fertile lowland areas they had never once happened upon a significant African-Caribbean camp. It followed, then, that they would be in the mountainous areas into which

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90 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.62.
91 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.81.
92 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.90.
93 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.134.
94 D. Buisseret and S.A.G. Taylor, 'Juan De Bolas and His Pelinco', *Caribbean Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2008), p.100.
95 Buisseret and Taylor, 'Juan de Bolas and his Pelinco', p.97.

there is no record that the English attempted to enter. Nor is there any record that the English attempted to find the trail across the mountains, which they certainly knew existed, and nor is there any record that they attempted to explore the mountains to the north of Santiago, although it is possible that hunters like John Hoys had explored these areas. With limited forces at their disposal and a chronic lack of provisions, added to the necessity of ensuring the majority of the army were engaged in farming, the English lacked the resources required to mount an expedition into the mountains. They also probably felt that they did not need to. Despite periodic attacks upon isolated English outposts and stragglers on the St Catherine and Clarendon Plains they must have felt that they were reasonably secure on the south side of the island and that to search the mountains for a small band of Spaniards and African-Caribbeans was probably futile. It made more sense to use the power of their fleet to transport their forces to the north side of the island and to raid Spanish settlements there and to attempt to at least interfere with, if not block entirely, aid and relief coming from Cuba before it could land on the island. It was this strategy that the English implemented reasonably successfully until the end of 1659.

It is tempting to think that the aforementioned attack upon the 12-man party led by Lieutenant Fuller in early October 1659, with the pack of dogs belonging to John Hoys, was the cause for the change of strategy that led to the English actively pursuing the African-Caribbeans into the mountains. After this date, and for the next few months, a lot of activity is recorded regarding English attempts to make contact with them, which culminated in the events of early 1660 that led directly to the final defeat of the Spanish and their evacuation from Jamaica. The English had previously attempted to initiate contact with the African-Caribbeans in an attempt negotiate some form of an agreement or even an alliance with them to help defeat the Spanish, and Ysassi himself admitted that the English had attempted to turn them against the Spanish when they could, including nailing pieces of paper to trees with messages that would lead the African-Caribbeans to believe that the English were willing discuss some form of settlement.[96] The English had always been open to a negotiated settlement that would result in the Spanish evacuating the island. The initial treaty of May 1655 had called for this, and when English raiding parties were dispatched throughout 1656 the commander of each was reminded to attempt to negotiate with the Spaniards if he could.[97] This had proved to be unsuccessful as the Spanish strategy was primarily to wait out events until such time as the King could send a fleet to retake the island. After the Spaniards were defeated in 1657 and 1658 there were so few left on the island, and they were for the most part so remotely hidden, that the English were unable to find them and so there was little opportunity to open any dialogue. No doubt Doyley believed that the Spanish would only be prepared to negotiate after they had been militarily defeated, but this was not necessarily the case for the African-Caribbeans. The later actions of the English in 1660 and 1663, with regards to the status and freedoms given to

96 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.81.

97 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.66.

those African-Caribbeans who submitted themselves to a peace with the English, suggest that the English had correctly guessed that their only aim was to live in peace and freedom and so if this was offered to them by the English then perhaps a negotiated settlement might be achieved with them that would turn them against their previous masters. Chiefs like Serra and Bolas were undoubtedly acutely aware of the dire situation that the Spanish were in. The English, after four years of occupation, were showing no signs of leaving and with the growth of the town and defences of Cagway, as well as the prospering of their farms and plantations, it meant that they now had a reason not to leave and an intention to defend what they had. The Spanish, on the other hand, had dwindled in numbers to be almost insignificant and their two relief attempts had been easily destroyed by the English, while the much-vaunted Spanish fleet that would supposedly arrive to brush the English away showed no signs of arriving. The Spanish resistance was now poorly supported by other Spanish colonies and had become reliant upon the African-Caribbeans for much of its own food, and therefore survival. Both Serras and Bolas must have thought that to continue their support of the Spanish was to be backing the loser in this conflict. With their primary aim being to gain, and maintain, their independence and freedom, they might well have understood that the Spanish were only offering it now that they needed the African-Caribbeans, and it had not been offered before the English arrived and swept away the existing colonial order. Perhaps they thought that they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by turning against their previous imperial masters and embracing the newcomers if they were prepared to offer what they desired the most – freedom and land.

On 5 November 1659 Captain Thomas Morgan seems to have been sent out on what might be called a diplomatic mission to make contact with the African-Caribbeans. Morgan, formerly of Moore's regiment, seems to have been a respected officer who had been operating with Wilbraham on the north side of the island in early 1659 and seems to have been with Myngs during his raid on the Spanish Main that year. He had also commanded a party in July 1659 searching for African-Caribbeans.[98] It is possible that he was related to Henry Morgan the famous privateer, who is believed to have arrived in Jamaica in about 1658. Rather than being issued with weaponry Thomas Morgan was given five pounds of valuable pepper and one thousand pounds of cocoa nuts 'for the use of the party goeinge forth … after the negroes'. His party was also issued 61*l* 6s for shoes and provisions.[99] These seem unusual commodities for soldiers to be carrying if they were undertaking a purely military operation and so it is plausible that Morgan was being sent out by Doyley in an attempt to make contact with one of the groups of African-Caribbeans with the intention of trying to win over their support, and that the pepper and cocoa nuts were meant as gifts to be given over as a sign of goodwill. Certainly in early 1660 when Bolas had in fact agreed to side with the English against the Spanish, he was showered with gifts as a consequence and so Morgan might well have had orders to start

98 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.115.
99 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.145, 148.

negotiations. Unfortunately no record exists of how Morgan's mission was received by the African-Caribbeans, but at the end of the month he was once again sent out and this time provided with powder, shot and dogs, which suggests his first approach at diplomacy was unsuccessful and that a more forceful policy was now to be considered.[100]

It seems likely that towards the end of 1659 some of the groups of African-Caribbeans, most likely at the instigation of Ysassi, had become more aggressive towards the English around Guanaboa Vale. Doyley believed the straightened circumstances of the English throughout 1659 brought on by the almost complete lack of supplies now being sent from England 'had given such heart to the negroes that they have done more mischief than in the past two years, having snatched away a captain, two ensigns, and divers soldiers, and killed others'.[101] This had led to the attack on Fuller in October and to a heightened sense of tension amongst the English, which might account for the accidental shooting and killing of Francis Barrington by a sentry in December. This sense of unease around Guanaboa can be demonstrated when Edward Tyson, who had replaced Barrington as commander of the English forces there, was ordered on 30 December to 'send parties out of their regiment as they see occasion to infest the enemie and secure the quarters'.[102] It seems likely that Morgan had first attempted to defuse the situation through diplomacy which after failing he, and then Tyson, were ordered to take a more belligerent stance towards the African-Caribbeans. In mid January 1660 Doyley decided to send out Tyson in another attempt to confront them, and Tyson duly departed around 19 January. Doyley hints in a letter to the Admiralty on 1 February that as a result of the increased attacks by the African-Caribbeans he had 'necessitated him to set an impost on strong liquors' which had the direct consequence of 'finding out where the negroes have lurked these four years undiscovered'.[103] Quite how this came about is not clear. Possibly it means that by restricting access to alcohol to the soldiers, by making it unaffordable, meant the soldiers were able to focus more on soldiering and which led to the success. Or perhaps he meant that the impost led to issues with providing the liquor to the African-Caribbeans which somehow led to the English finding Bolas' camp.

On 16 January Lieutenant Carmen was rewarded with 20*l* for 'takeinge two negroes'.[104] It would seem likely that these two divulged some information to the English that led them to believe that they might now be able to find the camp of at least one of the African-Caribbean groups. Tyson was immediately dispatched from Guanaboa Vale, and within just a few days he managed to find the *palenque* of Bolas which consisted of a 'town' and '200 acres of provisions'.[105] Tyson, rather than attack the African-Caribbeans, went and talked to them and suggested that they ally themselves

100 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.148, 153.
101 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.133.
102 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.154.
103 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.133.
104 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.164.
105 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.133.

with the English and make their peace. Bolas, whom Samuel Long believed had recently murdered the original leader of this *palenque* and taken control of it for himself,[106] immediately welcomed this suggestion and dispatched three of his trusted men to go to Cagway to discuss terms with Doyley while the majority of Tyson's force remained at the *palenque*. These negotiators arrived in Cagway on or about 31 January and were treated well by Doyley, who immediately ordered that they be given kettles and pans for cooking as well as rugs and clothes.[107] Doyley excitedly wrote to the Admiralty on 1 February that he was in negotiations with the African-Caribbeans and that he 'doubts not a good issue' from the 'unexpectedness of this mercy'.[108] Bolas agreed to side with the English and to lead them to attack the other *palenque* and also lead them to Ysassi's camp. This was a major coup for Doyley and it led directly to the final defeat of the Spanish and their evacuation from Jamaica. As a sign of goodwill Bolas 'proffered their friendship and delivered up twelve hostages to make good their promise'.[109] Quite what Doyley promised Bolas in return for his assistance was not made clear at the time but it was presumably the one thing that the African-Caribbeans wanted – freedom. Doyley must have promised them the freedom to live their lives the way they wanted and to have security of landholding that would provide them with the wherewithal to survive and prosper. In return Bolas provided the English with the use of his skilled men to track down the other bands of African-Caribbeans and the Spanish who relied on them. That Bolas knew of the locations of these camps suggests a significant level of interaction between his group and the others, and the fact that he was prepared to turn against them so easily and quickly implies that relations between them were not great.

With the tables now turned, Cornelius Burrough was to write later, almost gleefully, at this dramatic turn of events, 'The enemy in our bowels, to whom our lives have been a prey, and many men have been subjected to their mercy (I mean the negroes) are now become our bloodhounds, and we are daily making depredations on them, and they are in our behalf more violent and fierce against their fellows than we possibly can be.'[110] Almost immediately Tyson set out with some of Bolas' African-Caribbeans to attack the *palenque* of Juan de Serras at Los Vermejales and the third unknown camp. Both were attacked and overrun; how much damage was inflicted or how many casualties incurred is not recorded, but the English success is beyond doubt.[111]

Ysassi was in Las Chorreras when he received the news of Bolas' defection on or about 12 February [OS]/22 February [NS], and he immediately called a council of war with his remaining officers. With the shattering news that some of the African-Caribbeans were now in alliance with the English came

106 Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.279.
107 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.163, 164, 165.
108 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.133.
109 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.134.
110 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.137.
111 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.134.

the realisation that the Spanish were in no position to resist the English any further. Ysassi relied on the African-Caribbeans to provide him with provisions to supplement the infrequent provisions sent from Cuba. Worse still, he knew how effective the African-Caribbeans could be in tracking and hunting and that it was only a question of time before they came searching for him, and he also knew that Bolas knew his various hideaways. The Spanish officers concluded that it was also now just a question of time before the Spanish themselves were overrun and that they ought to abandon the island. However, before they could undertake such a desperate undertaking they needed to move their current camp for the 'enemy were bound to know all about the place'.[112] The following day the camp was quickly abandoned and moved to another location believed to be close to Shaw Park[113] on the coast, near Las Chorreras, but by now Tyson and Bolas' men, having descended from the mountains and onto the north side of the island, were hot on their trail.

On 16 February [OS]/26 February [NS] Tyson located the new Spanish camp, where the remnants of the Mexican relief force of 1658 were encamped, and immediately attacked 'whereof about 140 [Spaniards were] killed and took about 80 [prisoners]'. Ysassi and the handful of his men who escaped headed east and hid in the forests around modern-day Oracabessa.[114] Unfortunately no detailed report of this final English offensive has survived, though undoubtedly one was sent to England only to be lost during the administrative chaos of the Restoration. Most likely the Mexicans put up a poor show similar to that at Rio Nuevo in 1658, and were quickly defeated. Ysassi, having only arrived at this camp a few days previously, would have had little time to construct any meaningful defences and so most likely the Spanish were unable to mount any significant resistance and were simply overrun. Unlike the battles of 1657 and 1658 there is nothing in *Doyley's Journal* concerning the provision of assistance to English wounded afterwards, and from this it could be inferred that English casualties were minimal. The defeat, however, ended all hopes that Ysassi would be able to continue to hold out against the English. Even though Serras had not agreed any form of alliance with the English he had been pushed further west into the mountains, far from Ysassi, and was now unable to offer any support. The English now controlled the route across the mountains, and had access to the provisions that Bolas and his group were able to provide them whilst Ysassi was hemmed into a small stretch of coastline with barely 100 men under his command. He intended to regroup and await further supplies from Cuba and then decide what to do.

However, once again his plans were thwarted when only a few days after the attack a boat from Cuba carrying essential supplies was captured by the English. Ysassi knew of its imminent arrival and had previously instructed relief vessels to be careful when entering the bays of the north coast in case the English were lurking out of sight. He had informed them that he would

112 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.98.
113 Taylor, *The Western Design*, p.187; Cundall, *Historic Jamaica*, p.289.
114 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.99; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.135.

light fires and wave flags from prominent spots to get the attention of these vessels if it was dangerous to enter the prearranged landing spots.[115] Tyson's force was now swarming all over the north coast and with the *Chestnut*[116] having been sent by Doyley to assist Tyson, it was an unsafe place for poorly armed Spanish transports. About eight days after Ysassi's defeat a single relief boat arrived, most likely off Oracabessa, but despite Ysassi's signals the boat entered the bay only to be captured immediately by the English, who by then knew the exact location it was expected at.[117] This was a final devastating below to the Spanish, who were defeated, dejected, and now without any supplies. Ysassi had no choice but to accept defeat and possibly negotiate a surrender to the English on good terms, if the invader was feeling gracious.

The day after Ysassi's defeat at Shaw Park Tyson sent him a letter asking him to surrender. Tyson wrote that he, Edward Tyson, governor of the English garrison at Guanaboa Vale with his own troops 'accompanied by the negroes of Governor Juan Lubolo [Bolas]' had defeated him the day before and that he offered Ysassi 'good quarter' if he surrendered himself to Tyson within 17 days. Tyson informed Ysassi he would be assured of passage to Cuba 'or to the place you may desire' when he surrendered. He then spelled out the consequences if Ysassi failed to surrender: the English 'will act with all rigour seeking you in the remotest parts of the island accompanied by the negroes [such] as smoky Peter is now doing'. He added that the English were now in possession of all the cassava that Ysassi had stockpiled. He turned the screw further by telling Ysassi that he would be receiving further provisions for himself by sea shortly, 'to maintain himself as long as he may in this locality'. He made it clear that he knew of the imminent arrival of another supply ship and that he aimed 'to capture the launch to further disable you'. He advised Ysassi that he was free to take two slaves 'and all the clothing he may have' and so could his officers, and that the same terms had been offered to the officers that he had just captured.[118]

What happened next is not clearly described in the only sources that have survived, and which recount the last few months of the Spanish on the island. It would seem that around the middle of March Ysassi sent a formal letter to Doyley, carried by one of his officers, Francisco de le Mora, outlining the terms he expected from the English to surrender. Presumably he had contacted Tyson prior to this and had requested permission to send his personal emissary to negotiate with Doyley. Ysassi requested safety for all his men and the right to depart the island with 'arms, muskets loaded, matches lighted and flags flying'; that a ship 'be provided to take his men to Cuba' and to provide them with provisions 'during the whole of the month of April'; that free passage be provided to all who had served Ysassi 'without excepting any person' and 'provided they be not people from a settlement [that is, African-Caribbeans]'. Ysassi also stipulated that all prisoners captured in

115 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.101.
116 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.166.
117 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.101, 99; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.135.
118 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.95.

Tyson's attack also be released and transported on the same boat to Cuba, but he added if this was not acceptable to the English then Mora had the authority to 'strike it out'.[119]

Doyley's reaction to Ysassi's terms have not been recorded but most likely he rejected them, although he did return Mora back to Ysassi with his response. It seems that at some point after Tyson's attack on Serras' camp an English officer called Philip Starkey (spelled Felipe Estuarque in the Spanish sources) had been captured by Serras and murdered. When Doyley heard of this he was naturally outraged, and the returning Mora brought Ysassi a letter in which Doyley blamed Ysassi for Starkey's death. Doyley seemingly knew the names of those he believed responsible for the English officer's death and demanded that they be brought to justice. Ysassi replied that whilst he agreed those responsible ought to be brought to justice he was unable to proceed against them as those concerned 'are the heads of that settlement' and he had no authority over them. To this a further outraged Doyley replied that he would consent to no surrender terms between the two until 'satisfaction was received for the death of Felipe Estuarque'. He added that he held numerous Spanish prisoners on whom he could extract revenge but that he preferred 'that the guilty and not the innocent should receive the punishment deserved'.[120] The Spanish, unable and unwilling to comply with Doyley's demand for justice, broke off negotiations. Ysassi was to later tell the King that Doyley had refused to honour the spirit of the terms that Tyson had offered him. He also claimed that Doyley would only allow him to leave with Spaniards and none of their slaves or African-Caribbean companions. He blamed Doyley for being unjust and unfair, just so that he was forced to 'surrender unconditionally'. With Ysassi's usual melodramatics he declared to the King that he was 'determined to die sooner than abandon or leave the meanest of those who had been with me'.[121]

Without Doyley's account of the proceedings it is impossible to determine exactly what happened and so why a formal surrender could not be concluded at the time. Tyson, despite his boast that he could remain indefinitely, was soon forced to return to Cagway, probably in early April, leaving Ysassi once again alone on the north shore. However this time he and his dwindling band of resistance fighters were defeated and dispirited and soon decided to attempt to embark for Cuba and forsake the island they had for so long attempted to protect from the invaders. Seeing his men 'very dejected and weak from want of food an eaten up with lice' he informed the King he had decided to evacuate the island. With no boats at his disposal he made two canoes which he completed in 15 days, but they were only large enough to accommodate 76 of his men so he was forced to leave behind a further 36 under one of his captains.[122] And so on 30 April 1660 [OS]/9 May 1660 [NS] Don Christoval Ysassi Arnaldo, the last Spanish Governor of Jamaica, quit the island he had valiantly fought to defend for almost five long, hard years. He

119 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.95–96.
120 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.96–97.
121 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.101.
122 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.101–102.

is believed to have departed from what is still called Runaway Bay.[123] He had done his duty and retained the foothold on the island demanded of him by his King but had been let down by the government he had bravely fought for. The soldiers that were sent to help him were of such poor quality as to be almost useless to him. The officers sent with them were racked by petty jealousies, arrogance and incompetence. The provisions he desperately needed were seemingly only grudgingly sent. He was treated with contempt by those in authority in Cuba who were tasked to assist him and who at times seemed to deliberately obstruct him. He was also let down by his King who never sent the promised fleet to save him and who ultimately had greater priorities to attend to than rectifying the lost pride suffered from the fall of this insignificant and relatively unimportant island within his extensive South American empire. With Ysassi's departure the war on Jamaica ended. The English continued to feel threatened and continued to fear a seaborne Spanish attack until a general peace was agreed in the Caribbean in 1670, but nothing materialised over the next decade. With Ysassi gone the English could concentrate on pacifying those African-Caribbeans who had not agreed to recognise English governance and to settle and expand further their hard-won colony.

How and when the English were made aware of Ysassi's departure is unclear. Perhaps those Spaniards he left behind surrendered and gave them the news, certainly nothing further was heard of about those left behind. On 20 June Burrough believed the Spanish had gone when he wrote to the Commissioners of the Navy that 'The Spaniards [are] beaten off, not one left in the island, and no enemy but 30 or 40 negroes who were in rebellion with the Spaniards.'[124] However it seems Doyley was not convinced that the Spanish had actually gone, so at the end of June he sent Tyson, the man who more than any other had brought about the dramatic and rapid defeat of the Spanish, back to the north side 'to see if they can discover any of the enemy'. At the same time Major Wilbraham was sent 'to the eastern most point of this land to make discovery of the enemy'.[125] Presumably both came back with no hint that any Spaniards were still lurking on the island but nonetheless Doyley still took the threat of attack seriously. Having heard a rumour that Spanish shipping was off the north coast Doyley gave Richard Risby, a known privateer, 100 pieces of eight to investigate and bring back intelligence on 9 July.[126] On 1 August Doyley recorded the 'appearance of twenty saile of Spanish shipps upon this coast' and that he had 'good reason to believe the enemy doth intend to invade this island with a great power'.[127] Both incidents proved to be false alarms but again illustrate the level of paranoia that the English continued to live under for some time, and these fears were only dissipated when the islanders received notification from the government of Charles II in February 1661 that a suspension of war between England and

123 Cundall, *Historic Jamaica*, p.290.
124 W. Noel Sainsbury (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 1574–1660*, Vol. 1 (hereafter *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*) (London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1860), p.482.
125 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.200.
126 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.203.
127 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.206.

Spain had been decreed.[128] However even then there were many, no doubt, who refused to believe this was applicable 'beyond the line' in the Caribbean and so all the while the English privateers, who gradually started to increase after the Restoration, continued to indiscriminately prey on Spanish shipping and the very real risk of retaliation was great.[129]

Despite the final defeat of the Spanish and the defection of Bolas the English were still threatened by Serras and other groups of African-Caribbeans. After the attack on Los Vermejales by Tyson and Bolas, Serras was forced further west, probably into the Cave River Valley. How much conflict there was between the African-Caribbeans and the English at this time is unknown, but it seems that Bolas' men were used to track them throughout 1660, including some sent into Yallah looking for 'other negroes'.[130] Serras still posed a sufficient threat in November when Major Thomas Fairfax, accompanied by a group of Bolas' men, were sent to search for him and also in January 1661, when Captain Ballard led a party of 30 men drawn from Fairfax's and Hope's regiments to 'march and doe exercucon [*sic*] upon the enemy'. Ballard was successful and brought in 100 of the African-Caribbeans, although Serras himself had managed to escape.[131] This haul of prisoners caused a dilemma for Doyley as they were brought to Cagway the day after the cessation of hostilities with Spain had been declared. Technically the attack made by Ballard was upon a Spanish ally during the war and as such the African-Caribbeans were a legitimate prize, but now the war was over Doyley needed to consider carefully what was to be done with them. After discussing the matter with his officers they decided not to antagonise the Jamaica settlers any further, aggrieved as they were at the possibility of peace with Spain which would likely cause an end to their lucrative privateering. And so Doyley allowed the soldiers to keep the African-Caribbeans they had captured and dispose of them as they pleased, which would have meant their enslavement and use by the English settlers or possible sale to others.[132] Despite this successful raid the African-Caribbeans of Serras remained a threat to the English for some years to come. Bolas perhaps received his just rewards on 1 November 1663 when he was attacked by a group of Serras' men, who 'cut him to pieces', while in March 1663 attempts had been made to negotiate a settlement with them but these proved unsuccessful.[133] In time Serras' group came to be identified as the Jamaica Maroons, and in the eighteenth century they fought a series of wars against the English on the island. Bolas' band, however, were amalgamated into the English colonial community. In February 1661 Doyley formally recognised those African-Caribbeans who 'submit to live peaceably under

128 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.239.
129 W. Noel Sainsbury (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies 1661-1668*, Vol. 5 (hereafter *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*) (London: 1880), p.21.
130 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.137; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.206.
131 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.225, 231; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.21.
132 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.21.
133 Anon., *Some interesting tracts relating to the island of Jamaica* (Jamaica: Lewis, Lunan and Jones, 1800), p.281.



Map 4 Major engagements between the English and Spanish on Jamaica, 1655–1660.

His Majesty's obedience' while in a report of 1661 they were referred to 'being much our friends, having their freedom as other planters'. In 1663 'Juan lu Bola and all the free Negroes' were granted the right to 'receive thirty acres of improvable land ... to them and their heirs forever.' Bolas was also made colonel of the Black Militia.[134]

With Ysassi's flight from the island and the agreement of most of the African-Caribbeans to live in peace under the English, Cromwell's war with Spain in the West Indies, which had begun with the humiliation on Hispaniola five years earlier, was finally over. The English determination to persevere and survive on Jamaica had overcome the feeble attempts of Ysassi and his brave, stubborn followers to eject them. With the peace that finally came to the island after Ysassi's defeat Jamaica grew into a prosperous colony and soon became the most important British territory in the West Indies. Cromwell's dream of an English empire in the heart of Spanish South America had become a reality.

134 Quoted in Buisseret and Taylor, 'Juan de Bolas', pp.98–100.

Part 2

English Jamaica

4

Jamaica Garrison

I

The command structure of the Jamaica garrison changed little from the arrival of the English army in 1655 until its disbanding in 1662, even though the commanders changed.[1] Robert Venables, by virtue of his commission as commander-in-chief of the army, assumed the role as de facto governor of both the garrison and colony of Jamaica once it was decided that the army would remain on the island. When he believed he was dying he appointed Richard Fortescue to be his replacement as commander of the army.[2] Under both were the regimental commanders over whom the commander-in-chief had direct authority, but neither Venables nor Fortescue had authority over the fleet by virtue of their army commissions. Venables, in his capacity as a commissioner[3] with the others was able to both influence and direct the overall management of the expedition but his authority as a commissioner was never passed on to Fortescue. Likewise Goodsonn was provided with a commission to command the naval forces after William Penn's departure in 1655 but was not appointed a commissioner either, nor did he have any authority over the army. Despite these limitations of authority both Fortescue and Goodsonn were able to establish a good working relationship and worked harmoniously with each other, in stark contrast to their predecessors. With the arrival of Robert Sedgwick in September 1655 this basic structure remained in place as his commission was as a civilian commissioner and not as a soldier. With Fortescue's almost immediate death in October 1655 Edward Doyley became the most senior officer in the army, but as he was then sick Andrew Carter was appointed temporary commander of the army in his stead, pending Doyley's recovery. Doyley quickly recovered, upon which he was given command of the army by agreement of the senior offices but was

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1 See Appendix I for the order of battle of English forces in the Caribbean when Jamaica was occupied in May 1655.

2 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.66.

3 Cromwell had appointed five commissioners – Venables, Penn, Edward Winslow, Gregory Butler and Daniel Searle, Governor of Barbados – to manage the expedition. By late 1655 Winslow had died and Venables, Penn and Butler had returned to England, while Searle never left Barbados. See Sutton, *The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660: War in the West Indies*, p.68–78.

granted no formal commission as Sedgwick lacked the authority to issue one. Doyley, unlike both Venables and Fortescue, was prepared to command the army through the involvement of a council of officers who met on a regular basis from November 1655 to discuss matters concerning the deployment and supply of the army.[4] There seems to have been no fixed schedule for these meetings nor was there a predefined membership, for throughout 1656 numerous officers attended, probably based on availability, from captains to colonels. The council directed the dispositions of the units, responded to Ysassi's raid in March 1656, authorised the issuance of provisions and oversaw the construction of the garrison's defences. This council met throughout Doyley's tenure as army commander and was only dismantled in 1661 when civilian government was established in the colony, although the new civilian Jamaica Council was dominated by the same senior officers who had participated in Doyley's council of officers.

However, this structure was briefly upset when on 6 May 1656 Sedgwick, technically a civilian, received instruction from Cromwell to take over the command of the army. In September 1655 the Lord Protector had been made aware that Fortescue had been appointed commander-in-chief by the departing Venables, when both he and Penn had arrived back in London. The following month Cromwell wrote at length to Fortescue approving the appointment and providing him with detailed instructions on how to manage the army on the island. In it he wrote, 'I do commend, in the midst of others' miscarriages, your constancy and faithfulness to your trust in Remaining where you are' and that he was to be assured that 'it will not be forgotten by me as opportunity shall serve'. He further wrote that the supply of provisions and reinforcements that he sent with Sedgwick in July demonstrated 'that you have not been forgotten here'. He encouraged Fortescue to 'study first your security by fortifying' and 'that this be made your most principal intention. The doing of this will require that you be very careful not to scatter, till you have begun a security in some one place.' He went on to add that he ought to consider 'how to form such a body of good Horse as may, if the Spaniard shall attempt upon you at the next coming into the Indies with his galeons, be in a readiness to march to hinder his landing; who will hardly land upon a body of horse; and if he shall land, be in a posture to keep the provisions of the country from him, or him from his provisions, if he shall endeavour to march towards you.' To this end, 'we shall furnish you with bridles, saddles and horseshoes, and other things necessary for that work … Should it be known that you had five hundred horse well appointed, ready to march upon all occasions in that island, even that alone might deter the Spaniard from attempting anything.' He concluded his letter to Fortescue, as he had with a similar letter to Goodsonn written at the same time, by referring to God's reproach, for 'we have cause to be humbled for the reproof God gave us at St. Domingo, upon the account of our own sins as well as others'. He was disappointed in the reports he had heard of 'the extreme avarice, pride and confidence, disorders and debauchedness, profaneness and wickedness,

4 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.36.

commonly practised in that Army' but hoped through good governance 'that all manner of vice may be thoroughly discountenanced, and severely punished; and that such a frame of government may be exercised that virtue and godliness may receive due encouragement.'[5]

Fortescue was dead even before Cromwell had penned these lines of instruction, as Cromwell was to find out at the end of January 1656 when news of the death reached England.[6] It was important that whoever the commander of the army in Jamaica was, he had a formal appointment from Cromwell providing the authority and credibility to fulfil the role and responsibilities incumbent on him. Cromwell, not knowing who in the army was now alive and who was dead, decided to appoint Sedgwick as commander, believing, perhaps hoping, that he was still alive. Sedgwick received the news that he was to supersede Doyley in a letter on 6 May 1656, but which had been sent in early February,[7] though he lacked the courage and self-confidence to notify Doyley of it immediately. In a meeting between the two after he received his commission Sedgwick made no mention of it to Doyley, but the latter suspected something was amiss for 'his looks shew'd unusual dumpishness and confusion'.[8] Doyley, on 12 May, wrote to Sedgwick asking him to confirm if he was replacing him. Rather than acknowledge his appointment outright Sedgwick lamely replied 'It is true ... that there is a commission sent over by theis shipps concerning the command of the armie', but said he wanted to await Goodsonn's return from his raid on the Spanish Main before he opened his letters from England, and so he 'thought it not soe necessarie to speake of it at your last being heere ... The busines stands soe, that not any thing can be setled, till admirall Goodson come in.'[9] Unable to confront Doyley with the news directly he chose to delay the inevitable until Goodsonn could provide him moral support, though Doyley was made of sterner stuff and was prepared to confront Sedgwick to ascertain the truth. This action, perhaps above all else, demonstrated that Sedgwick lacked the strength of character so needed by the English at the time. Still lacking in confidence he wrote to Doyley that there was 'something troubled in my spirit about it' and that he was 'troubled in my heart and soule as to my present condition, it being soe extreamly contrary to my expectations and desires'. He complained to Aylesbury, his secretary, that 'he was undon ... and that much was expected, but little probablity to have much done.'[10] Perhaps simply overwhelmed by task he had been given 'he fell sick, and in a few days dyed'.[11] It is impossible to know how the army would have reacted to Sedgwick's formal appointment had he lived, but given the unrest that had racked it earlier in the year it is very likely that discontent would have followed and perhaps even outright mutiny. Once again Doyley was left to

5 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, pp.475–478.
6 John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus*, 31 January–7 February 1656, 78:E.492[3].
7 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.96.
8 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.138.
9 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.12.
10 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.138.
11 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.139.

take charge of the army, and as the most senior officer on the island, the colonial government as well.

Cromwell probably realised that the appointment of Sedgwick was likely to be controversial and it was possibly intended to only be a temporary measure until he could select a more suitable commander. Probably around April/May 1656 (certainly no later than 15 May) he appointed William Brayne as 'Commander-in-Chief of the land forces in America'.[12] Brayne had been serving as lieutenant colonel in William Daniel's regiment in Scotland from at least 1651[13] and then as governor of Inverlochy during 1654–1655, from where he had played an influential part in General George Monck's campaign in the Highlands in 1654 and was a crucial liaison between the English and the influential Marquess of Argyll.[14] This had brought him to the attention of senior administrators in Scotland, leading Lord Broghill, President of the Council of Scotland, to write to Thurloe in February 1656 describing him as 'a person of parts, honnesty, affectionate to the government, and one I have found very serviceable heere'.[15] This recommendation was sufficient for him to be offered the Jamaica appointment after a meeting with Cromwell himself in London, probably at the end of April or early May 1656.[16]

Brayne arrived in Jamaica in mid December 1656 after an eventful voyage and immediately took over the command of the army and government from Doyley, but he also replaced Goodsonn as commander of the fleet. Brayne never settled in the role and constantly wrote to Thurloe requesting to be replaced. Like Sedgwick before him he became sick and died in September 1657, leaving Doyley to once again take over the responsibility for commanding the army and the colony. Doyley remained in this role until he was replaced as governor of the island in 1662 but he was never formally appointed commander-in-chief. Cromwell would have become aware of Brayne's death at the end of 1657 but seems to have made no attempt to either appoint another commander or to acknowledge Doyley in his de facto role. By then England had become embroiled in both a land and sea war with Spain in Europe and the Lord Protector had far more pressing matters to deal with. After Cromwell's death in September 1658 Jamaica was all but forgotten about by the succeeding governments in London, and it was only after the Restoration that Doyley received a confirmation, albeit short-lived, of his position as governor and with it command of the military garrison. Doyley probably had every right to feel aggrieved by the lack of recognition he received for his role as commander of the Jamaica forces. Under him the Spanish were defeated and forced to flee the island and his handling of the army at both Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo cannot be faulted, nor can his change of strategy to overcome the African-Caribbeans in 1660. Some would criticise his manner while his brusque, matter-of-fact attitude upset many,

12 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.440.
13 Malcolm Wanklyn, *Reconstructing the New Model Army*. Volume 2, 1649–1663 (Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2015), p.58.
14 F.D. Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland 1651–1660* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1979), pp.124–127.
15 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.500.
16 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.171.

but he was an efficient and competent commander and showed great skill in containing the mutinies of 1656 and 1661. Without him the army would very likely have disintegrated and the English presence on the island would have been eliminated.

II

Given the death and disease prevalent on Jamaica after the English arrived it is not surprising that there was a high turnover of officers throughout the army. Of the unit commanders who landed in May 1655 only Doyley was still living on the island when the army was disbanded in 1662. Venables and Buller had left for England in July 1655; Fortescue and Carter were both dead by the end of the year. Holdip, his regiment disbanded (he took over command of Richard Heane's old regiment), was cashiered in 1656. Henry Jones, who commanded the cavalry, had returned to England in 1656. Nor did the regimental commanders who arrived with reinforcements later fare any better. John Humphrey's and William Moore's continual demands to be sent home eventually wore Doyley down and both were permitted to leave for England, Humphrey in 1656 and Moore in 1658. The commander of the fourth and smallest contingent of reinforcements, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Tyson, was executed in 1660 for his part in Raymond's mutiny. By contrast those officers who took over the command of these units for the most part survived. Philip Ward, who took over Venables' regiment, became a prominent member of the colonial community well into the 1660s, as did Henry Archbould (Carter's regiment) and Henry Lynch (Doyley's second in command). Francis Barrington (Buller's regiment) only died at the end of 1659 when accidentally killed by a sentry, and up to that point had proved to be an efficient plantation manager. Barrington had been with the army since it left England, was a very respected officer and would be sorely missed. In fact he was so well regarded that Doyley had once written to England suggesting that he be appointed commander-in-chief in his place. It was Barrington's major, Thomas Throckmorton, who had led the mutiny of 1656 and Barrington, playing the mediator, had tried in vain to dissuade him from his course of action. Barrington had also gained a reputation as a competent planter and one of the few officers who had been an enthusiastic supporter of settling the soldiers on the land. Samuel Barry, a captain in 1655, went on to command Heane's old regiment and also became a member of the Jamaica Council. Many of the junior officers survived and gained promotion as their peers succumbed to the rigours of life on the island. Richard Wilbraham, formerly a captain in Venables' regiment, was later promoted to major and later still was appointed to the Jamaica Council. John Filkins, captain in Carter's regiment, rose to the rank of major and lived to return to England in 1661. Undoubtedly for those officers who survived the first harrowing months on the island, opportunities later presented themselves for advancement in the army and the chance to gain status and wealth within the new colony.

An additional three regiments of infantry were dispatched from England between 1655 and 1657, as well as a single independent company, as

reinforcements for the English army in the West Indies. On 24 February 1655 the Council of State ordered that 13 vessels be prepared to transport 1,000 'landmen' along with provisions for themselves and the fleet.[17] On 7 March Riccard's committee submitted a long list of supplies it believed ought to be sent out to follow Venables, and which were to be sent with these reinforcements.[18] To pay for these, on 8 March Edward Montagu submitted a report to the Council recommending that 30,000*l* be provided to cover the expenses of the supplies and transporting the reinforcements, and that this sum be taken from 'the sale and disposal of prize goods', which was duly authorised at a meeting of the Council of State on 14 March.[19] Most likely these preparations were interrupted by the failed Royalist uprising of March 1655, because it was only two months later, on 18 May, that the Council decided that of the 1,000 men 'designed for the western expedition' 300 were to be transported 'in the merchant ships taken up to carry provisions thither' along with Robert Sedgwick. They further instructed that weapons for the reinforcements be supplied which were to include '1,000 musketoons, and 2,000 pair of bandoleers', 1,000 snaphaunce muskets, 300 pistols with holsters along with '6 ton of musket shot, and 1/2 a ton of pistol shot' and '6 pair musket, and 2 pair of pistol moulds'. In addition three tons of pig lead and two tons of sheet lead were required as well '6 tons of match'.[20] Interestingly no mention is made of sending pikes to the army. On 5 June it was reported in *Certain Passages* that '[a] regiment was drawn out of the Army, and they are forthwith to be shipt away in the fleet … with provisions, and other necessary supplies for Gen. Pen',[21] while *A Perfect Account* report noted the regiment was 'drawn up neer London 1000 of them at the least'.[22]

This newly raised regiment was commanded by Colonel John Humphrey, who was probably only commissioned around the end of May. He had previously served as a commander of an independent troop of dragoons in Scotland from at least January 1654 until March 1655[23] but was referred to then as a colonel, which implies that he had attained this rank previously and had already commanded a regiment of some sort; it would seem odd if a mere captain of dragoons would have been appointed to command a regiment of foot. It is possible that this is same John Humphrey who served in, and later commanded, John Birch's regiment of foot in Sir William Waller's army and later in Wales but this cannot be established for certain.[24]

17 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1655* (hereafter *CSPD 1655*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1881), p.53.
18 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, pp.203–204.
19 Green, *CSPD 1655*, pp.69, 76.
20 Green, *CSPD 1655*, p.168.
21 Henry Walker, *Certain Passages*, 1 June–8 June 1655, 128:E.842[8], [3], p.22.
22 Bernard Alsop, *A Perfect Account*, 30 May–6 June 1655, 128:E.842[4], p.1840.
23 Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *Scotland and the Protectorate. Letters and papers relating to the military government of Scotland from January 1654 to June 1659* (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1899), pp.25, 260.
24 Laurence Spring, *Waller's Army: The Regiments of Sir William Waller's Southern Association* (Farnham: The Pike and Shot Society, 2007).

The original company commanders were reported[25] as being:

Colonel John Humphrey
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Ennis
Major William Pelham
Captain Nicholas Widmerpool
Captain Fairfax
Captain Desbrow
Captain Rockley
Captain Sudgewick

Ennis had served in the Parliamentarian army since at least 1644. He had raised a troop of '100 horse ... with his own money, hee not receiving either Horse or money from the State towards the raising' and had served under Sir Samuel Luke in the garrison of Newport Pagnell. While serving there he:

> received a wound from ye Enemie, just above the Diafragma [*sic*], & [which] passed through the plura [pleural cavity], & lodged between two of the Ribbs neere the back, which was done with the Shott of a Bl[ ]gg & was cutt out by an Insision, & after that a [ ] of the Ribb was taken out whereby his life was in danger & hardly escaped death. By reason whereof the said Major hath been & still is dissabled.[26]

Somebody who knew Ennis was later to write that 'he very gallantly behaved himself against the Enemy on those dangerous tymes & receiving many wounds even to the perill and hazard of his life. And not only there [Newport Pagnell] but he hath also been since imployed to other places upon service for the Parliament.' Disabled or not, by the autumn of 1645 he was serving under the command of Sydenham Poyntz and fought at the Battle of Rowton Heath (24 September). On 3 November 1645, now a major, he and his troop took part in the storming of Shelford Manor near Newark, when 'The Major himself, with a squadron of his men, for over the works, and let down the bridge.' He later took 'the Troope of Horse and Armes which ... [he] did raise for the service of the Parliament' to Ireland and served under Edward Doyley. At some point, after returning from Ireland – where he must have come into contact with Robert Venables who recommended him as 'person of worth' and 'very well known unto him' – he was employed in some capacity 'under ye Judges at Salters hall' and was recommended for employment by the Speaker of the House of Commons, William Lenthall. This probably would have been during the First Protectorate Parliament (September 1654 to January 1655). At another point he was evidently employed as a guard at the House of Commons when he physically prevented John Theauco and his accomplices from forcefully entering the Parliament door 'with his sword drawn'. After Ennis' death his wife Mary wrote that her husband had 'served

25 Bernard Alsop, *A Perfect Account*, 6–13 June 1655, 128:E.842[17], p.1842; Green, *CSPD 1655*, p.205.
26 TNA, SP18/155, Council of State: Letters and Papers, 1657, ff.18–29.

through the wars, to the loss of blood and fortune, and lost his life in the service at Jamaica'.[27] It is unfortunate that such an experienced officer such as Ennis died almost as soon as he arrived in Jamaica.[28]

William Pelham raised a company of 150 infantry for service in Ireland at the end of 1650 and served in Henry Ireton's regiment, but by 1653 had transferred to the Lord Protector's own regiment and was still in Ireland when the company was disbanded.[29] Pelham was alive in January 1656 but presumably died soon after as no further record of him can be found.[30]

Another of the regiment's company commanders was Thomas Fairfax, son of Sir William Fairfax who had been killed at the Battle of Montgomery (1644) and who was a close relative of Sir Thomas Fairfax. He was born at Steeton Hall, Keighley in 1632. Fairfax had risen to the rank of major by June 1661 and was by then serving on the Council of Jamaica.[31] He is recorded as being a frequent participant of the council of officers and seems to have achieved a significant position of trust with Doyley, who used him as a personal aide. Having survived six years on Jamaica Fairfax was perhaps a little concerned over his personal future after the Restoration, being such a close relative of the victor of the Battle of Naseby. However he prospered under the patronage of the Duke of Ormonde and served in the English army in Ireland after 1664. In January 1694 he was appointed colonel of the 3rd Hussars and in November the same year colonel of the 5th Regiment of Foot (Royal Northumberland Fusiliers). He led the regiment in Flanders in 1695 during the Nine Years' War and was promoted to Brigadier General in 1696, then returned to Ireland and was made major general and Governor of Limerick. He died in 1712 at the age of 80.[32] A tentative connection exists between Fairfax and Thomas Bushell of Carter's regiment. The Bushells, from Bagdale Hall, Whitby, were kin of Lord Fairfax, commander of Parliament's army in the north of England during the Civil War; they were also merchant captains of long standing, and undoubtedly Thomas Fairfax knew the Bushells as he grew up in Yorkshire. Browne Bushell was a turncoat who betrayed Parliament twice before being executed for treason in 1651, tainting the family name, and it is plausible that Thomas Bushell was a member of

27 TNA, SP18/155, Council of State: Letters and Papers, 1657, ff.18–29; Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, pp.366–367.

28 Green, *CSPD 1655*, p.205; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.462.

29 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1650* (hereafter *CSPD 1650*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1876), pp.384, 591; John Patrick Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland* (New York: P.M. Haverty, 1868; first edition), p.134; Wanklyn, *Reconstructing the New Model Army*, Vol. 2, p.205.

30 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.42.

31 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.37.

32 Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the papers of William secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the commanders of the army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol. 1 (London: The Camden Society, 1891), p.727; Clements Robert Markham, *Life of Robert Fairfax of Steeton, vice-admiral, alderman, and member for York A.D. 1666–1725* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1885), pp.25, 200; John Gough Nichols (ed.), *The Herald and Genealogist*, Vol. 6 (London: 1871), pp.613–614; Richard Cannon, *Historical record of the Fifth Regiment of Foot, or Northumberland Fusiliers* (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1838), p.110; Charles Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661–1714*, Vol. IV 1694–1702 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1898), pp.3, 5, 23.

this family and perhaps joined up as a way to salvage the reputation of his family. Thomas Fairfax's nephew Robert became an admiral in the Royal Navy, serving with distinction during the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession; as a youngster his first time at sea was on a merchantman owned by the Bushell family and he married a Bushell daughter.[33] There is another interesting connection relating to Thomas Fairfax, this time between him and the Chaloner family. Thomas' mother was Ursula Chaloner, daughter of James Chaloner, who was a judge at Charles I's trial but did not sign his death warrant. His brother Francis, however, did sign it and was a leading member of the Commonwealth government and later a member of Cromwell's Council of State. Francis also wrote the forward to Thomas Gage's influential book *The English-American his travail by sea and land: or, A new survey of the West-India's.* After Fairfax had left England for the West Indies in 1655, James Chaloner was implicated in the failed Royalist uprising in Yorkshire.[34]

Nothing is known of the other company commanders.

Prior to Humphrey's regiment departing England it was claimed to number between 1,000–1,200 men but this is almost certainly an exaggeration. Humphrey reported on his arrival in Barbados that on the crossing from England he had 'not lost one man' and that the recruits needed to make up his regiment 'were not to be had', so he sent some officers to St Christopher 'to try what might be done there';[35] however a letter sent to England just after the regiment arrived in Jamaica reported 'we got none there'.[36] After leaving St Christopher and needing water, Sedgwick's small fleet was forced to make landfall at Cape Tiburon at the extreme westerly point of Hispaniola and two companies of Humphrey's regiment were landed to provide protection for the sailors as they filled their casks.[37] When the regiment arrived in Jamaica in early October, Sedgwick noted his men to be 'in very good health, lusty, and with the soldiers fitter to fight than when they first came on board'.[38] However the men were soon struck down with the sickness that was rampant throughout the army already on Jamaica. Barely a month after the regiment disembarked Sedgwick sadly noted, 'We landed 831 in col. Humfrey's regiment, lusty, healthful, gallant men, who encouraged the whole army. There are at this day 50 of them dead, whereof two captains, a lieutenant, and two ensigns, the colonel himself very weak, the lieutenant colonel at death's door. I think all the captains sick, not above four commission-officers in that regiment now fit to march, and the men most part of them sick.'[39] At the muster held at end of 1655 the regiment was recorded as having 335 men well

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33 J.K. Laughton and J.D. Davies, *Robert Fairfax (1666–1725)*, ODNB; Markham, *Life of Robert Fairfax of Steeton.*

34 Markham, *Life of Robert Fairfax of Steeton*, pp.9–10; Sir Henry Slingsby, *Original memoirs, written during the great civil war; being the life of Sir Henry Slingsby, and memoirs of Capt. (John) Hodgson* (Edinburgh: Arch. Constable & Co., 1806).

35 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.751.

36 John Cane, *The Publick Intelligencer*, 28 January–4 February 1656, 78:E.492[2], p.293.

37 *The Publick Intelligencer*, 28 January–4 February 1656, p.294.

38 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.152.

39 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.153.

and 455 sick, giving them a total of 790 men. By the New Year the regimental strength had sharply reduced through sickness. On 6 March it had a ration strength of only 344 men which implies a mortality rate of a staggering 58 percent in just five months. In October 1656, by which time the regiment had spent 12 months of the island, its ration strength was only 277.[40]

With the exception of Humphrey and Fairfax nothing is mentioned about the other officers who came with the regiment from England after January 1656, so it can be assumed those that had not died by then did so shortly afterwards. As with the rest of the army this high mortality rate led to a spate of new officer appointments in early 1656. Martin van Alfan, formerly a trooper and then a troop commander in the cavalry, was appointed captain of Pelham's old company in April and in turn appointed Thomas Roberts as his ensign in May. Philip Thompson was made captain lieutenant of Humphrey's own company in April while Thomas Trefforde(?) replaced Sudgewick (Sedgewick). Captain Thomas Watson was presumably promoted prior to March, but soon died as he was replaced by Captain William Fleetwood in July. Fleetwood went on to command the regiment for a short while after Humphrey returned to England. Another new company commander was Captain Randolph Little.[41] Seemingly the regiment consisted of eight companies when it left England, but like the rest of the army had been reduced to six in early 1656 and still had six in October after Humphrey had returned to England, and when it was decided to garrison them on the growing settlement of Cagway rather than disperse them onto land as they had 'allwaies [been] averse to planting'.[42]

William Brayne, appointed army commander in early 1656, also commanded the second regiment to be sent from England. Brayne was to lead a force of 1,200 men in two regiments, drawn from the army in both Scotland and Ireland. He was to command one of the regiments, made up of men from the English army in Scotland, while William Moore was to command the regiment drawn from the English army in Ireland. These two regiments were much later described, by a witness who had been present throughout the early years of the English occupation, as being 'the best men that ever came to Jamaica'.[43] Cromwell had informed Monck, perhaps on account of the recommendations Colonel Buller had brought back to England with him in 1655, that it was essential that the men from Scotland be placed 'under good conduct in respect of officers, and that choice be made of such soldiers as have given good testimony of their courage, resolucion, and obedience', and Monck was requested to ensure that the soldiers chosen 'be such as we may hope (through the mercy and blessing of God) will carry

40 TNA, CO1/32, Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series), Addenda, 1591–1656, f.130; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.112.

41 BL, Add MS 12423.

42 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.93.

43 Anon., *The present state of Jamaica with the life of the great Columbus the first discoverer: to which is added an exact account of Sir Hen. Morgan's voyage to, and famous siege and taking of Panama from the Spaniards* (London:1683), p.34.

themselves well, both in point of courage and fidelitie'.[44] Brayne was given the authority 'to appoint and preferr … such out of the severall regimentes and companyes as shalbe judged fittest for that service.' He was allowed to take whole companies if appropriate. Cromwell further instructed Monck to arrange shipping for Brayne's men from Port Patrick to Carrickfergus in Ireland if he could arrange it quicker and cheaper than it being arranged from England.[45] Separately Cromwell notified Brayne of the same, but added his desire that Major John Brampston be appointed as his lieutenant colonel.[46] Brampston had recently been implicated in Overton's plot and cashiered from the army, but Cromwell, with a change of heart, chose to accept his protestations of innocence and selected him for service in Jamaica.[47] Brayne was instructed to sail to Carrickfergus to join with the Irish regiment and from there sail for Jamaica.[48]

The regiment was raised in early May 1656 and Lord Broghill at the time remarked of them, 'It is almost admirable to see how free a ther is in all our souldiers heer to goe thither [to Jamaica]; soe instead of 500 heer, I thinke, if they could be spared, you might have 5000.'[49] At the end of May, while the regiment was heading for Port Patrick, an altercation occurred in the town of Ayr. As Broghill explained in a letter to Thurloe, 'ther fell out a difference between one of them and one of that garryson, which did grow to such a height, that the garde after haveinge fruitlessly fyred only powder at them, were at last forced to fire bullets too, whereby foure or five were killed, and many dangerously wounded'.[50] It was, however, much more serious than this. Brayne's regiment, commanded by Brampston in his absence, was quartered in Ayr on the night of 30 May. At 11 o'clock the governor of the town, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Sawrey, sent a panicked message to the garrison in Glasgow requesting urgent assistance to put down 'a very sad and dangerous distemper amongst Lieutenant Colonel Bramston's partie' which had necessitated him 'to draw our whole garrison uppon the guard, severall men being already slain in putting thinges into a quiett posture in the towne'. The brawl then spread between the garrison and Brampston's men as the former attempted to restore calm. Brampston, in an attempt to impose order amongst his own men, was able to extricate most of them from the town that night and brought them into a nearby field, but not all of his men followed. The fighting continued throughout the night by the end of which three were dead (two from Brayne's regiment) and around 50 were injured.[51] Another officer of the garrison gave the cause of the altercation as excessive drinking. He blamed Brampston's men for 'in drunken humour haveing a designe in

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44 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.171–172.
45 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.172.
46 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.173.
47 Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.241–242, 251; Charles Harding Firth and Godfrey Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), pp.704–705.
48 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.173.
49 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.19.
50 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.86.
51 Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.323–328.

their heads to beate our men (guards and all) out of the towne'. He added he 'never saw nor heard of the like in all the war in the 3 nacions' and that 'noe man could tell or give any pretence of a ground of the disturbance, and yet it was soe high that all the force we had was little enough to suppress it'.[52] By morning the situation had calmed down and Brampston marched his men to Maybole, nine miles away, leaving behind seven of their comrades wounded and two dead. The senior English officer in the area, Colonel Ashfield of the Glasgow garrison, had immediately raced to Ayr with a detachment of cavalry to take control of the situation. On his arrival he confronted the regiment while they were at Maybole to ascertain the reasons for the fracas. He was reassured by the men who gave him 'no replies but promises of due and faithfull obedience to their officers, and readines in any service they shall be called to, manifesting much willingness as to their present expedicion'. Relieved, Ashfield was able to write to Monck on 4 June, 'All this hath been a very unhappy busines, yet I am confident it will conduce to the good and well ordering of the partye.' He added 'that there was noe discontent amongst them for money or anything relateing to the expedicion, but onely a quarrel begot betwixt some of the garrison and party'.[53]

On 3 June Monck was able to inform Cromwell that Brayne's regiment was by then at Port Patrick but that there was no shipping available to carry them to Ireland. Despite the events in Ayr the men 'go on chearfullie with their officers, and answer the expectations we have of them, for truly they are a stout partie of men (both officers and souldiers) as can goe out of any country'.[54] The strength of the regiment at this time is not known but Monck was to add that 'the number of men will be made upp, for there went many volunteers with them to the water-side, desirous to goe alonge with them'.[55] On 7 June it was reported that the regiment consisted of only four companies.[56] Monck was no doubt anxious about leaving this body of men exposed in Port Patrick indefinitely while waiting for shipping. This was hostile country for the English, and as the nearest garrison, Ayr, was 30 miles distant he 'appointed some horse to bee neere them'. No doubt the horse were instructed to keep a watch on Brayne's men to also ensure there was no repetition of the Ayr incident. Perhaps when the regiment arrived at Port Patrick, not a little bit ashamed, they thought that the worst was behind them. Little did they know that worse, much worse, was to befall them before even leaving the British Isles.[57] The men were still in Port Patrick on 5 August, still waiting for shipping, when Monck wrote to Thurloe, 'Our men lye in a bad country, where they have but ill lodging, and noe market townes, which makes it the more troublesome; butt very forward they are to goe upon the bussinesse, daily expecting the shipping, and think it long till they come; but I hope they will come speedily.'[58] One month later they were still waiting

52 Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.323–328.
53 Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.323–328.
54 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.87.
55 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.87.
56 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.97.
57 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.87.
58 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.277.

for the shipping to arrive, although Brayne had now finally joined his men at Port Patrick.[59] Frustratingly, on 4 October the regiment had still not been shipped. It seemed fortunate that Colonel Thomas Cooper of the English garrison in Carrickfergus, who had just overseen the dispatch of William Moore's regiment, was able to organise some shipping in Ireland that was to sail to Scotland and collect Brayne and his regiment.[60] As such Brayne was finally able to get his men on board the *Grantham*, *Two Brothers*, *Faggon* and another merchantman which he had been forced to hire locally due to lack of space on the others.[61] Due to the rush to get to sea and the inclement weather the ships were all forced to depart separately during the third week of October, and were unable to meet up until Barbados was reached; nor were they even able meet up with Moore's regiment which had departed Carrickfergus at the beginning of October.[62]

Unfortunately for the regiment the *Two Brothers* met with disaster just off the coast of Cork within days of leaving Port Patrick. In 'a violent storm' on 23 October she 'sprung a leake, lost boath there boates and three of their anchors, and were so shattered that they could not beare up against the wind'. Unable to steer, the tide brought the disabled ship into the bay off Timoleague on the night of 28 October but it was too dark for the crew to tell where they actually were. The seas were evidently still rough the following morning when the crew 'fitted a raft, and put theiron fowre men with a letter in a pitch box, signifying what they were and what their condition was'. The men made it 'to shore alive, but soe brused that they were not able to leave the place where they landed', and were spotted by a merchant from a nearby town who alerted the authorities; however, 'the weather was soe darke and the seas soe tempestiouse that it was impossible for any boate from this towne to get to them'. The *Two Brothers* had earlier managed to cast one anchor into the bay, but 'about 6 of the clock theire cable broake, and the vessell was forced on a rock, where it was wrecked'. On board were some officers of the regiment, 241 soldiers, 29 sailors and three women 'whereof one was an Ensignes wife who lay in childebirth'. Of these only around 16 sailors and 40 soldiers survived. Luckily the local populace were pro-English and did what they could to rescue the soldiers as those that managed to save themselves made it to shore. 'The inhabitants carried these poore, bruised, halfe dead men to their howses that night, and provided carefully for them, who probably if they had laine all night on the shoare would have bin deade before morneing.' The regiment lost heavily in this wreck as over 200 of them perished and found a watery grave. The dead included Lieutenant Colonel Brampston, Captain James Dorrell, Captain Lieutenant Moses Reyner (Brayne's company), ensigns William Webley (Brayne's company) and William Brampston, son of the lieutenant colonel (Brampston's company), Quartermaster Craycroft (Dorrell's company), 'Martiall' Hornewell, two sergeants, five corporals and four drummers as well as the captain of the vessel and 11 of his crew. The

59 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.396.
60 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.474.
61 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.494.
62 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.474, 505, 494.

only officers on board who survived were Lieutenant Thomas Petty and Ensign Hugh Norman (both of Dorrell's company).[63] On 10 November it was recorded in *The Public Intelligencer* that some of the survivors had been picked up by a vessel from Padstow and were brought back to the Cornish port, but who they were and what happened to them afterwards is not recorded.[64]

Brayne himself arrived in Barbados on 27 November after riding the same storm that had wrecked the *Two Brothers* and had forced the return of part of Moore's regiment aboard the *Saphire*. At the time he was unaware of the disaster that had befallen his regiment and he wrote to Cromwell on 1 December that he did not know 'how God hath bin pleased to dispose of those soldiers aboard the merchantmen, though I hope they are safe'.[65] was to be some time before he heard of their fate, exactly when is unknown but most likely in February/March 1657 when letters from England arrived. Brayne arrived in Jamaica on 14 December and over the next three weeks three merchantmen arrived with 'about an hundred and sixty of the partie out of Scotland, and about 500 of the party out of Ireland'. On 9 January 1657 he wrote to Cromwell that he was still awaiting two vessels, the *Saphire* 'wherein was col. More with two hundred men' and the *Two Brothers* 'wherein my lieutenant colonel was with two hundred men'.[66]

The exact strength of Brayne's regiment is not difficult to establish as a document exists that identifies most of the officers by name, as well as indicating from which regiments of the army in Scotland they, and the ordinary soldiers, came from.[67] A total of 504 recruits were drawn from the 12 infantry regiments in Scotland at the time, plus 40 officers, and it was organised into four companies. The company commanders at the time were:

Colonel William Brayne
Lieutenant Colonel John Brampston
Captain Edward Browne
Captain James Dorrell

Unlike Venables before him it would seem that Brayne struggled to find officers willing to volunteer. Whilst each of the company commanders were experienced officers, the rest were not. Edward Browne probably served in Tothill/Le Hunt's regiment in Ireland before it was disbanded in 1651; it was noted that in 1656 he 'came out of England & nott in imployment'.[68]

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63 Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol. 3 (London: The Camden Society, 1899), pp.77–80; Firth and Davis, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, p.705; Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.446; Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 26, f.208.

64 John Cane, *The Publick Intelligencer*, 10 November–17 November 1656, 79:E.499[13], p.986.

65 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.668.

66 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.770.

67 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 26, f.208.

68 Wanklyn, *Reconstructing the New Model Army*, pp.206–207; Bodleian Library Rawl. A Vol. 26, f.208.

James Dorrell's previous rank is unknown but he is referred to as 'did ride in Major Knights troop' in George Monck's regiment of horse, which suggests that he was not previously an officer.[69] In Brayne's own company each of the officers and senior non-commissioned officers were all listed as being privates prior to joining him, even the drummers. Brampston was luckier perhaps, as at least his sergeant had previously been a corporal, while one of his corporals held that rank beforehand, whilst the rest were all privates. Browne's lieutenant had previously been a sergeant but his ensign just a private. Dorrell's lieutenant had been a trooper in Monck's horse regiment and his ensign a sergeant in Thomas Talbot's regiment.[70]

Officers known to be serving the regiment in Jamaica included Major Wilbraham (1658)[71], Captain (Sir) Thomas Lynch (1658)[72] and Quartermaster Price (1657),[73] none of whom are listed as having served in the regiment when it was raised.[74] Even though Brayne died in September 1657 his regiment remained in existence under the command of Wilbraham and had not been reduced or merged into Doyley's at that point.[75] The regiment, along with Moore's, was most likely merged into Doyley's sometime between May 1659 and when the army was disbanded in October 1662.[76] On Jamaica Brayne's regiment was sent to garrison the Point Morant area[77] and to provide close protection for the settlers from Nevis, and as such it is doubtful that it was involved with any skirmishing with the Spanish, but it is possible that elements fought at Las Chorreras and Rio Nuevo.

According to one contemporary commentator the command of the Irish regiment that accompanied Brayne was first offered to Lieutenant Colonel Walker, 'an honest man and a good officer'. However when he 'refused to bite at the bait' the command was given to Major William Moore, then serving in Sir Charles Coote's regiment, though on the condition 'that after he had conducted the men to Jamaica, he should have liberty to return, which he did after many difficulties and hazards of his person'.[78] Like Brayne, Moore received orders to raise a regiment for Jamaica in May 1656, though they have not survived. As it was the original intention to embark in June, and be shipped with Brayne's regiment, it is most likely that the selection of the men took place immediately and they probably were in Carrickfergus awaiting shipping at the same time Brayne's men were in Port Patrick. It is clear that on 22 August the men were still not fully equipped and Moore was requesting equipment from Colonel Thomas Cooper, governor of the town. Cooper

69 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 26, f.208.
70 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 26, f.208.
71 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.94.
72 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.87. For more on Lynch's later life as planter and governor see Trevor Burnard, *Sir Thomas Lynch (d. 1684)*, ODNB.
73 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.89.
74 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 26, f.208.
75 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.120.
76 Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.
77 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.770.
78 Charles Harding Firth (ed.), *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, 1647–1649, and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, 1651–1660*, Vol. 2 (London: The Camden Society, 1894), p.2.

informed Lord Henry Cromwell that he needed a further 200 firearms but he only had 80 in his store. Moore also required '450 collers of bandelires, and this store will not afford above 60, and they must be new stringed all of them. There is a necessety of haveing the things sent downe with all speed.'[79] At the time he was hopeful that the shipping would soon arrive. However it was the end of September before it arrived and the regiment embarked. The ships departed Carrickfergus on 3 October 'with a great deale of cheerfulnes' though Moore was forced to dismiss 60 soldiers 'that wear more then the number contracted for, that the shipps wear to take in'.[80] Henry Cromwell, however, informed Thurloe a week later that 'There was some little disorder amongst them, after they were putt one board, which was soon suppressed.'[81]

Moore, aboard the *Saphire* with around 260 of his men, was hit by the same storm that wrecked the *Two Brothers* on 24 October. Moore explained to Henry Cromwell afterwards that their 'shipp did spring a leake' and they were forced to 'bayle al the water shee leaked ... until wee came into the harbour of Corke ... and are stil necessitated to continue bayling to keepe our ship alive in the harbour.' He continued, 'From the day of the storme until wee came into this harbour, wee every moment expected, that wee should bee swallowed in the deepe, our leake was soe great, and our ship soe weakened with the storme.' He added that the storm was so severe that 'In an houre's tyme the wind veered through al the poynts of the compasse. Our seamen have not knowne the like tempest in these northern coasts.' Needless to say much of the provisions were spoiled by seawater and so more were needed.[82] Henry Cromwell, in a letter to his father notifying him of Moore's misadventure, and requesting instruction on what do with the men, advised that all had been 'landed and quartered in the great islande nere Corke, where it's thought convenient that they should remaine, because they may there with ease be kept together, and prevented of running frome their colours, which I am apt to beleive they would attempt, havinge received that discouragement allreadie at sea.' Given the poor condition of the ship, which he described as 'olde and crazie' he added, 'I dare not advise, that they should againe be putt one board this shipp, shee beinge soe defective, and was not able to indure the stress of weather'.[83] Henry Cromwell arranged additional transport for Moore and his men and they seem to have finally departed from Cork at the end of December, but not before a further company of 100 men was raised and added to the regiment and these departed on the *Plain Dealing* early in 1657.[84] The rest of the regiment, unaware of the enforced return to Ireland of their commander, continued on to Barbados where they caught up with Brayne and were then transported on to Jamaica. The rest of the regiment, with Moore, arrived in Jamaica in April 1657.

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79 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.335–336.
80 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.474.
81 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.494.
82 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.571.
83 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.570.
84 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.730; Green, *CSPD 1656–7*.

Little is known of the composition of his regiment when it left Ireland, though it seems to have numbered somewhere in the region of 850 men, as Brayne reported that 500 arrived in Barbados when he was there and an additional 100 were raised around Cork before Moore finally left Ireland.[85] A Captain Chester was reported as being one of the officers who joined the regiment in Ireland and later died in Jamaica.[86] Prior to the regiment departing it received a total of 10,267*l* 17s 4d in pay.[87]

Upon his arrival in Jamaica Moore soon quarrelled with Brayne about returning home. According to Brayne:

> Colonel More, at his arrival here from Ireland, was very earnest to returne back. I tould him it was too soone, he haveing receaved a good advance, and ingadged in the service, he ought not to desert it soe speedily: with that he grew into passion, saying, God had destroyed the former generalls for being cruell, and not sufferring people to goe off the island; and was this his reward for his many considerable services, and for the losse of his blood in the quarrell? and tould me, that if I acted as they had acted, I shold looke for the same judgment.

The argument continued between the two until Moore 'grew soe high as to chardge with blood-guiltines all those that had, or have any hand in the designe. Then I could forbeare noe longer, but told him, that he must answer it at a court-martial, which quietted him imediately.' Brayne then suggested to Cromwell that if he intended to send more men from Ireland 'it will do well to head them with officers from England or Scotland' rather than from Ireland.[88]

Like the other regiments Moore's strength quickly diminished as the men from Ireland died like flies. By 31 October 1657, after only 10 months on the island, there were only 179 persons drawing rations and barely four weeks later just 154.[89] When Doyley sailed to the north coast in mid 1658 to attack the Spanish at Rio Nuevo, Moore, being the most senior officer after Doyley on the island, was left to command Santiago and prepare its defences in case the Spanish attacked from over the mountains or from the sea.[90] With the Spanish defeat this threat diminished and Moore was able to petition, again, to be allowed to return to England. Feeling more secure now, Doyley relented and granted him permission to leave on 6 August 1658.[91] It is not clear who then commanded the regiment, which must have been barely the size of a company after Moore departed. Only two officers' names appear in the historical records: Captain Thomas Morgan and Captain Epenetus Cross.[92]

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85 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.770, 730.
86 Firth, *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 2, p.2.
87 Robert Dunlop, *Ireland Under the Commonwealth: being a selection of documents relating to the government of Ireland from 1651 to 1659*, Vol. 2 (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1913), p.641.
88 Birch, TSP, Vol. 6, p.392.
89 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.85, 87.
90 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107.
91 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.115.
92 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.117, 110.

Most likely the remnants of the regiment were incorporated into Doyley's regiment some time between May 1659 and when the army was disbanded in October 1662.[93]

Moore returned to Ireland in 1658 and the following year some of his soldiers seem to have managed to return as well, and were added to 'Colonel Hewson's company'.[94] This is the only known instance of common soldiers actually returning from Jamaica, other than those who were wounded. Moore himself was later implicated in Colonel Blood's thwarted attempt to seize Dublin Castle in 1663 and afterwards was rumoured to be wandering Ireland in disguise.[95]

A third unit of infantry was also sent to Jamaica in the summer of 1656 when a detachment of 120 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Edward Tyson departed from England. They seem to have concentrated around Plymouth at the end of July with the intention of being shipped up to Port Patrick to join with Brayne's force. As weaponry was issued to them from the Ordnance Office in London at the time it is probable that they actually originated in the London area. These were also drawn out of other regiments, for on 23 July the Council of State ordered that 'The officers of the respective regiments to be required to advance 14 days' pay to such soldiers of their respective regiments as shall offer to go to Jamaica under Lieut.-Col. Tyssen [*sic*]; and at the end of the 14 days, to recruit their respective companies with the like number.' On the same day the Council also ordered that the sum of 1,000*l* be issued 'for Jamaica' and be transported in the *Grantham*, which was ordered to escort the transport ship of the men under the command of Tyson, first to Plymouth and then on to Port Patrick where they were 'to take in Col. Brayne, and to observe his orders'. Prior to their departure from London the Council ordered 'Two drums and 3 halberds to be delivered to Col. Tyssen [*sic*]' as well as 'Forty pikes and 80 firelocks'.[96] This weaponry suggests in Tyson's company the traditional ratio of two musketeers for each pikeman applied. Tyson's men, however, did not set sail with Brayne in October, but sailed on the *Hopewell*, a merchantman leased by Martin Noel and for which transportation he was paid 5*l* per head,[97] and he must have departed directly from England, for Tyson is noted as having taken over the command of Humphrey's regiment by 10 November 1656. His company was referred to as having arrived on 2 November when it was provided with provisions and a supply of 'one hundred and twenty jacquets and as many paire of drawers, shoes and stockins and one hundred and twenty shirts for ye use of ye interior officers and souldiers belonging to ye company under his command'.[98] His company was evidently incorporated immediately into Humphrey's regiment. On 22 October, before his arrival, the regiment had

93 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.120; Long, *A History of Jamaica*, Vol. 1, p.614.
94 Dunlop, *Ireland Under the Commonwealth*, p.699.
95 Firth, *Clarke Papers*, Vol. 1, p.727.
96 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.35.
97 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.252.
98 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.104, 107.

a ration strength of 278 but on 12 November it had 387.[99] Tyson was later to gain infamy for being executed for mutiny in 1660.

III

During the seven years between the arrival of the English army in 1655 and its disbanding in 1662 none of the units ever returned to England, although certainly many officers and some of Moore's soldiers did. During this time the army went through considerable change, both in command and structure. Almost immediately after Venables landed it was decided to disband Richard Holdip's Leeward Islands regiment, with the soldiers being dispersed amongst the other regiments.[100] The original regiments of Fortescue, Carter and Humphrey were all disbanded, probably in April 1657, and their men spread amongst the remaining regiments. At some point after May 1659 the remnants of Moore'

The small company of reformadoes which left England in 1654 had been decimated on Hispaniola but another unit was formed on Jamaica, probably consisting of surplus officers from the various disbanded infantry regiments. In September 1657 they possibly numbered around 40 men when they were issued with 42 gallons of brandy, and this might well be the force led by Major Stevens who attacked Ysassi around the same time.[102] There is no other reference to a unit of reformadoes being in existence on Jamaica, so it was probably only a temporary formation.

The English were continually short of cavalry on Jamaica despite their evident suitability for the terrain and requirements. Upon the English arrival on the island most of the horses in the vicinity of Santiago were killed for food, so the men were forced to range further afield to capture wild horses to be utilised by the cavalry. As early as 26 May 1655 Venables wrote to Edward Montagu informing him that 'We are getting horse to make Troopers and Dragoons.'[103] When Captain Henry Jones, commander of the single troop of cavalry brought from England, finally joined Venables in May (the troop's departure had been delayed and it played no part in the Hispaniola fiasco) he had some horses with him but these were not sufficient for the needs of the English, and they probably soon died anyway. As late as February 1656 the soldiers were still slaughtering horses for food and this prompted the council of officers to issue an order against their killing. The Council noted that 'horses are so scarce to gett up that the troops belonging to the army cannot be compleated be [*sic*] reason there of'. Henceforth soldiers must not 'dare to presume to kill any horse or horses maires or foales under any pretense

99 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.121.

100 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.64.

101 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.120; Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.

102 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.76. Doyley, *A narrative of the great success.*

103 T. Carte (ed.) *A Collection of original letters and papers, concerning the affairs of England, from the year 1641 to 1660: Found among the Duke of Ormonde's papers*, Vol. 2 (London: Society for the Encouragement of Learning, 1739), p.51.

whatsoever, either of being wylde, taken stragling or unmarked, under paine of death.'[104] Cromwell, experienced cavalryman that he was, immediately recognised the importance of having a force of cavalry on the island. In his instructions to Fortescue written around the end of October 1655[105] but which were only received in Jamaica on 15 January 1656[106] he desired him:

> to consider how to form such a body of good Horse as may, if the Spaniard shall attempt upon you at the next coming into the Indies with his galeons, be in a readiness to march to hinder his landing; who will hardly land upon a body of horse; and if he shall land, be in a posture to keep the provisions of the country from him, or him from his provisions, if he shall endeavour to march towards you.[107]

In a response to Cromwell's suggestions both Sedgwick and Goodsonn explained to him in a letter dated 24 January 1656 that they had instructed the army to collect horses, but that:

> we fear the condition of our men, and the difficulty of attaining horse are such, that they will effect little; yet what we can shall be done. The truth is, they have with much difficulty kept so many horses as will draw up their provisions to their quarters; besides the horses in this country feeding upon nothing but like grass, in three days riding are unfit for service, when with much difficulty taken.[108]

Nevertheless, steps were immediately taken to expand what little cavalry the English had when Lieutenant Martin van Alfan, who had been a trooper in Jones' troop when it first mustered in England,[109] formed a separate troop as early as the end of January 1656 and by the middle of February it consisted of 26 men.[110] However it was short-lived and seems to have merged into Jones' by April, possibly due to a lack of horses.[111] In compliance with the Lord Protector's instructions the council of officers, on 14 February, decreed that it was:

> very expedient and necessary that a certaine number of horses should be taken and gott up for the strengthening and defense of ye army against ye ememy by compleating the troop [Jones' understrength troop] and furnishing the field officers of ye severall regiments and ye officers of the severall companies belonging to them with horses if possibly it may be done.

It was therefore ordered that 12 men from every regiment in the army be appointed to go with Captain Jones and his troop 'and goe along with him

104 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.47.
105 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, pp.475–476.
106 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.454, 456.
107 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, p.476.
108 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.456.
109 TNA, CO1/32, f.57.
110 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.44, 48.
111 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.58.

and his party to Guatibacoa to gett up what able horse they can with all speed'.[112] Jones' troop was issued with 25 saddles and cases of pistols on 19 February before departing and on their return were issued with rations for 35 men, and these details hint at how much cavalry was available to the English at the time.[113] The results of Jones' attempt to round up horses can be seen when Sedgwick, in a letter to Thurloe dated 12 March, added as a postscript that:

> since the finishing of this I have had notice, that a party of men sent to the leeward part of the island to take horses, having been about 30 miles up in the country, and out 17 days, are returned, having taken about 40 horses, and did encounter a party of Spaniards, who ran from them into the woods, so that they took only three or four women, whom they have brought prisoners to the town.[114]

Despite Cromwell's exhortations to raise a 'body of good Horse', English efforts to maintain a significant mounted force came to nothing, most likely due to a lack of adequate horses and sufficient fodder for them. The single troop of horse, however, was active throughout 1656 when it accompanied many of the expeditions that Doyley sent out into the interior and where they no doubt proved to be beneficial, but they played no role in any of the significant engagements with the Spanish, who themselves were not mounted. On 27 March 1656 Jones' and Van Alfan's troops had a combined ration strength of 69 men; by 21 April, when both seem to have merged, they numbered 62; by 28 May there were only rations for 53 men provided, while on 11 July, the troop now under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Blunter, it received provisions for 47 men. This number had risen to 51 by 10 September and 53 on 3 December.[115] Whilst caution must be used with these figures, as ration strength does not necessarily equate to the effective strength of a unit, these figures are suggestive of the relative strength of the cavalry throughout 1656 and possibly indicate that it did increase slightly by the end of the year, most likely with drafts from the infantry. In January 1657 the cavalry were still commanded by Lieutenant Blunter and consisted of 54 men when they were issued with provisions and Swedish feathers (wooden stakes). Blunter is never mentioned in any of the extant records after this date and probably died shortly thereafter, while James Butler, in September 1657, is referred to as 'captaine of the troope'. [116] A force of cavalry was still in existence in 1663 when the army was disbanded, when it was commanded by Robert Nelson,[117] probably the same Robert Nelson who was a trooper in the troop when it mustered in England in December 1654 and whose father, William, petitioned for his arrears in 1658.[118] Blunter, Van Alfan and Nelson were all private troopers when they left England and they all became officers

112 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.48.
113 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.48, 51.
114 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.606.
115 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.55, 58, 60, 61, 72, 87, 108.
116 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.65, 67.
117 Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.
118 TNA, CO1/32, f.57; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574-1660*, p.472.

and commanders of troops of cavalry in Jamaica. In the cavalry, at least, opportunity for advancement through the ranks was at least possible.

Whenever supplies from England became available the troop of horse was resupplied. On 19 February 1656 Van Alfan's troop was provided with 'six and twenty shirts and as many paire of shoes and stockings' while Jones received 'five and twenty sadles with the furniture and five and twenty case of pistolls'. On 4 April Jones' troop received 'eighte howses, six bills, two felling-axes, three spades and three pick-axes'. At the end of the month the troop was further issued with 'forty-five paire of drawers and as many paire of shoes and stockins, forty-five shirtts and as many redd coats and hatts or capps'. On 20 June, now under the command of Blunter, it received 'five jarrs of brandy', and the same day it was issued with 'three hatchetts and one axe ... for making penns and poundes for ye getting of horses.' The following month Cornet Wiseman (later killed at Rio Nuevo) and Quartermaster Nelson were issued with 'two swords and two cloth sadles with their furniture' and at the same time they also received 'forty-five pair of spurrs'. A week later they were issued with 'forty-two paire of shoes' while on 26 August they were issued with 'fifty sett of horse-shoes with nailes proportionable'. On 27 September the troop was once again issued with new uniforms, this time 46 sets including 'red coats'. Not to forget the troop's spiritual needs, on 29 September Blunter was provided with 'forty-six bibles for ye use of the troopers belonging to the troope under his command'.[119]

IV

The English garrison suffered an appalling attrition rate on Jamaica, especially in the first few years of the occupation. Venables left England with around 2,500 men but after recruitment in the West Indies his army had grown to about 8,000 when it landed on Hispaniola. After incurring high loses there, and without the Sea Regiment drawn from the fleet, the strength of the army was around 6,000 men when it marched into Santiago in early May 1655. However the army, starving and sick, soon dwindled away as the regiments were decimated by disease and hunger. At a muster around November 1655, which included Humphrey's regiment which had just arrived from England, the reported strength of the army was 4,682 men, women and children; of these 2,316 (almost half the army) were reportedly sick, although this figure seems to exclude the cavalry, train of artillery and staff officers.[120] *Doyley's Journal* for 1656 records periodic ration strengths for the various units which graphically illustrate the massive rate of wastage experienced by the army during its first full year in Jamaica.[121]

119 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.48, 56, 59, 64, 69, 70, 72, 83, 91.

120 TNA, CO1/32, f.123.

121 See Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.112, Appendix 1 for the computation of ration strength as compiled from *Doyley's Journal*.

Date of Ration Issuance	Total Rations Issued
6 March	3,094
27 March	3,021
16 April	2,893
6 May	2,879
28 May	2,887
19 June	2,860
11 July	2,844
30 July	2,732
20 August	2,699
10 September	2,628
1 October	2,535
22 October	2,598
12 November	2,804*
2 December	1,889 (partial)

* Note: the increase in November 1656 was due to the arrival of Tyson's company from England.

These figures relate not to actual army strength but to the number of provisions issued to the army on a given date. Presumably each regiment submitted a request for provisions based on the (declared) number of soldiers and dependents. As these figures could be prone to manipulation to obtain more provisions than a unit was entitled to, care has to be taken when using them to quantify the strength of a particular regiment and the army in general. However, given that any manipulation is most unlikely to result in an underdeclaration of a unit's strength, it is plausible to accept that these figures indicate the top-end strength of the army and that the real, effective strength was actually lower. With this is mind the figures can be used to provide an indication of army strength but also the relative amount of wastage in the army.

The extent of the death rate during the winter of 1655–1656 can clearly be seen. At the November 1655 muster the army consisted of at least 4,682 persons but at the beginning of March 1656 rations for only 3,094 were issued. Assuming that rations for all persons on the island were issued at that time (and the evidence suggests that they were) then the army had lost, from death, over 1,500 persons in less than three months, a staggering 32 percent of its strength. This figure, of course, excludes those who died between the May arrival and the November muster, which amounted to around an additional 2,000 persons. It is not unreasonable to assume that around 3,500 men, women and children had died on the island prior to March 1656.

On 12 March 1656 Sedgwick wrote to the Lord Protector that 'the condition of the army, it is, God be praised, much mended since our last: the soldiers are far more healthful.'[122] From March onwards the letters back to England all acknowledge that the army was no longer suffering the same effects from disease and hunger that had decimated its ranks in the months prior to this, and the veracity of these remarks are borne out by these figures. In the following nine months the ration strength of the army diminished by

122 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.

around 400 persons only, or about 14 percent, of which perhaps as many as one quarter were as result of enemy action (unlike during the winter when confrontation with the Spanish and African-Caribbeans was minimal). This certainly confirms that by the spring of 1656 the army was stronger and better acclimatised as the weakest amongst them had died already and that the strength of the army, whilst still declining, remained reasonably constant.

Unfortunately *Doyley's Journal* from 1657 onward does not provide sufficiently accurate references to the issuance of provisions for this analysis to be continued. The arrival of Brayne's regiment added fewer than 300 men to the strength of the garrison, and by September 1657 it had a ration strength of just 219 men.[123] Moore's regiment, when it finally arrived, added perhaps as many as 850 men but many of these soon died, for by 31 October 1657, after only 10 months on the island, there were just 179 persons drawing rations and barely four weeks later this had dropped to 154.[124] It is likely that despite the overall addition of at least 1,000 men to the garrison in 1657 its strength had, throughout 1657 and 1658, diminished to around 2,000 men in total. On 31 January 1659 the infantry mustered 2,041 officers and men which included four colonels, three lieutenant colonels, four majors, 24 captains, 34 lieutenant and 36 ensigns. There were 87 sergeants, 115 corporals, 31 drummers, 34 gentlemen-at-arms and 1,541 private soldiers; also two chaplains, seven chirurgeons (with eight mates), six quartermasters, five provost marshals, five drum majors and six gunsmiths. There were a total of 18 staff officers, including the Lieutenant General (Doyle), a minister, a major general and an auditor, as well as a commander of the train of artillery and pioneers. The troop of cavalry consisted of eight officers and 62 troopers.[125]

A muster of the army was held in 1662, probably shortly after Lord Windsor's arrival, and this provides a detailed list of the regiments, companies and strength of the English army on the eve of its disbandment. At that time the army mustered just 1,607 officers and men.[126]

Colonel Doyley's Regiment

Colonel Doyley	96
Captain Sanderson	44
Captain Harrington	46
Captain Groves	26
Captain Watson	48
Captain Leverett	33
Captain Wilbraham	35
Captain Lynch	22
Captain Godfrey	12
Total	362

123 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.78.
124 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.85, 87.
125 TNA, CO1/33, Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series), Addenda, 1656, f.53.
126 BL, Egerton MS 2395,Order of the King in Council for the payment of the army in Jamaica, followed by a detailed account of a day's pay, 1662, f.351.

Colonel Barry's Regiment

Colonel Barry	67
Lieutenant Colonel Archbold	50
Major Hope	45
Captain Massie	28
Captain Valet	38
Captain Rivers	29
Captain Pegg	34
Captain Foster	35
Captain Collier	36
Total	362

Colonel Ward's Regiment

Major Fairfax	54
Captain Ballard	29
Captain Thomas Morgan	55
Captain Walrond	28
Captain Fuller	37
Captain Aschough	42
Captain Da Morgan	51
Captain Ashton	56
Captain Skallett	29
Total	381

Colonel Barrington (still referred to by the commander who had died three years previously)

Major Cope	68
Captain Burrough	56
Captain Rudyerd	47
Captain Clees	49
Captain Crosse	24
Captain Freeman	54
Captain Kent	42
Captain Aston	27
Captain Gaywood	47
Total	414

Others

Captain Nelson's troop	64
Staff officers	8
Artillery train	9
Others	7
Total	88
Grand Total	1,607

With the disbanding of the army the defence of the island was transferred to a civilian militia which, when first mustered, consisted of 99 officers and 1,931 soldiers.[127] It is reasonable to suppose that this militia comprised, for the most part, of the demobilised soldiers of the army.

127 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, Vol. 5, pp.113, 117-118.

V

Needless to say the health of the army impacted its strength throughout the time it was garrisoning the island. The diseases the army carried with it from Hispaniola ravaged the army (though not so much the fleet) throughout the rest of 1655 and into the early months of 1656, as did the chronic lack of food. Thousands died during these months, creating both a health hazard, as the dead were not disposed of effectively, and a personnel shortage. Many of those who did not die were weakened to the point where they were incapable of any form of physical exertion. The continual lack of suitable provisions exasperated the problem and a general malaise descended over the English army. The high death rate amongst junior officers reduced the efficiency of the regimental structures as there were now few who had the authority to command the men, and those promoted to fill the vacancies either did not live long themselves or lacked the experience or knowledge to provide effective leadership. The high mortality rate and the corresponding shrinkage in the size of each regiment had necessitated a general reduction of two companies from each of the regiments in January 1656.[128] Upon his arrival Sedgwick, although proving his worth almost immediately as a competent administrator, was able to do little about the health of the army. He wrote that 'the army is at present very sad and sickly; unless God in mercy stay his hand, will all perish, and shall be as water spilled upon the grass, that cannot be gathered up again … The greatest part of them are sick, and which is really true, and those sit down well are pitifully the well.' Humphrey's regiment had only been on the island for a month when he wrote that:

> Soldiers die daily; I believe 140 every week; and so have done ever since I came hither. It is strange to see young lusty men, in appearance well, and in three or four days in the grave, snatch'd away in a moment with fevers, agues, fluxes and dropsies, a confluence of many diseases. The truth is, God is angry, and the plague is begun, and we have none to stand in the gap.[129]

As the year ended the army was still being ravaged by disease. Sedgwick and Goodsonn advised Cromwell in January 1656 that:

> The numbers of the army are much lessened since our last letters; the whole not extending to 3000, many of them sick and weak, the best and soundest much abated of their strength and vigour, and God goes on everyday to shorten and numbers. We die daily not less than fifty every week, which is much considering our small numbers.[130]

Given the high number of mortalities since the English arrived, a major problem encountered would have been the disposal of the corpses. Sedgwick was presumably shocked when he wrote on his arrival in October 1655

128 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.42.
129 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.153–154.
130 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.455.

that he saw 'carcasses lying unburied in the high-ways'.[131] No doubt he soon put into operation a disposal plan as he struggled to create order out of the administrative chaos he found upon his arrival. Most likely the dead were initially left to rot where they had died and this led to further disease spreading throughout the unhygienic surroundings. Possibly mass graves were then dug and the bodies dumped. By mid 1656, with the mortality rate dwindling to only a handful a week, it is possible that then a more ordered, and respectful, process of traditional funerals could be performed for the dead. The only reference to a funeral in the records of 1656 was when Captain Watson was ordered to provide 'twelve pound of powder it beinge for so much expended at ye funerall of Lt. Kirke.'[132]

Despite the horrendous death toll due to the sickness and food shortages there were signs, in early 1656, that conditions were beginning to improve for the English on the island. At the end of January Goodsonn and Sedgwick wrote to Cromwell that 'the numbers of the army are much lessened since our last letters ... Many of them sick and weak, the best and soundest much abated of their strength and vigor, and God goes on every day to shorten and numbers. We die daily not less than 50 every week.'[133] However, in their next letter dated 12 March, they were pleased to be able to advise the Lord Protector 'the condition of the army, it is, God be praised, much mended since our last: the soldiers are far more healthful, and as they are put upon it, may we hope prove more apt for action.'[134] At the same time Doyley happily informed Thurloe that 'at this present, condition as to health is very good, considering where we are, and that our private soldiers drink nothing but water'.[135] There were a few reasons that contributed to this improvement. Upon Sedgwick's arrival in October 1655 he brought with him enough provisions for five or six months which allowed for a daily allowance for each soldier of 'half a pound of bread a day' with an additional 'pint of oatmeal, or a pint of peas, or a pound of flower per day' for every four men. Despite this being a 'short allowance' it was more than they had been receiving prior to that.[136] In early November Doyley, now commander of the army, set up a survey board to record, manage and then fairly distribute provisions to the army on a regular basis. After his initial survey it was ordered, on 26 November, that the army was to 'receive double allowance of all things they received formerly except bread'. These provisions would be distributed to the regiments every three weeks so that each man received 'fifteen pounds three quarters of bread, three pounds and a half of flower, three pintes and a halfe of pease, one pinte three quartes of oatemeale'.[137] In addition to this the army was able to obtain beef locally when cattle could be caught by organised hunting parties, while all the remaining sheep around Santiago were rounded up and distributed

131 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.153.
132 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.91.
133 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.455.
134 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
135 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.602.
136 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.153.
137 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.39.

amongst the regiments at the end of November.[138] Throughout the winter the records clearly show that the men were provided with their rations on time, as well as receiving other provisions from time to time such as sack, salt and fish, while coal was also issued for cooking.[139] Furthermore, throughout 1656 the frequency of the arrival of State-supplied provision increased, as did the arrival of private merchants who had other necessities that could be bought or bartered. Undoubtedly this more frequent supply and the more equitable distribution of provisions allowed those men who had survived to grow stronger and healthier throughout the first few months of 1656.

The weather had also played its part in the army's recovery. In Jamaica the rainy season runs from September through to November when around 30 cm (12 in) of rain can fall in what is now the Kingston region. For the sick, hungry and now sodden English, this was sufficient to make their lives even more unbearable and miserable as 1655 ended. Not only was flooding and being constantly wet an issue, but the hollows collected run-off water which would have stagnated, making the area a haven for mosquitoes leading to the spread of malaria and other disease – weakening the English even further and causing yet more suffering and death. Life in the New Year would have become slightly more bearable with the end of the rains and an increase in the available provisions. In addition it was also, perhaps, a case that the strongest had indeed survived and those still alive had become acclimatised and resilient to living in the tropics. Seemingly those that were still sick in the early months of 1656 were the men from Humphrey's unacclimatised regiment who had only arrived from England in November of the previous year, and who were to receive additional provisions in an attempt to help them survive.[140] The English were never able to remain healthy in Jamaica, even when locally produced food and supplies from England were more abundant. The soldiers who came with Brayne from Ireland and Scotland were equally as prone to succumbing to disease, as had the rest of the army when it first arrived. Nor were the supposedly more acclimatised settlers from Nevis any luckier when they arrived at the end of 1656, for their numbers were also quickly decimated. Disease was to affect all English attempts at colonisation across North America and the West Indies from its first inception in the early seventeenth century, however whilst colonial armies stationed in the Caribbean were to suffer from the various tropical sicknesses the soldiers came into contact with well into the twentieth century, this was not a new phenomenon being faced in Jamaica. The northern European human body had little immunity to local disease and new arrivals to the colony would be affected by this until the relatively recently invented medicines were able to control the more virulent strains. Senior officers such as Fortescue and Carter died quickly, as did a host of junior officers as can be exemplified by the numerous petitions from widows in 1656 and 1657 claiming pay arrears for the deceased officers. The roll of promotions for junior officers recorded in *Doyley's Journal* for the early months of 1656 is a testament to

138 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.38.
139 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.39, 42, 43, 48.
140 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.43, 48, 49.

this as well. Not all the English perished, of course, as many were able to survive the first waves of disease and their bodies were able to develop some immunity which allowed them to ultimately live relatively healthy lives in Jamaica. Edward Doyley is perhaps the most prominent of them. In late 1655 he became sick and almost died but he was able to recover; luck and perhaps a stout constitution playing a significant part in this and seemingly he went on to live a healthy, if not prosperous life on the island until he left in 1661. The same could probably also be said about the other officers who became prominent members of the colonial administration or plantation owners. Although there is less evidence for private soldiers, undoubtedly many of them also survived, a case in point being Robert Nelson who rose from being a trooper in 1654 to commander of the garrison cavalry in 1662.

VI

In early June 1655 the decision was made to disperse the army from its current quarters in and immediately around Santiago and allocate land in the hinterland on which the men could grow their own crops to provide independent sustenance. It was a pressing practical necessity for the army to become self-sufficient for its food, but it also had the benefit of removing the men from the overcrowded and unhygienic town into the more healthy regional areas which would hopefully reduce the spread of disease by minimising contact between the different units. It also had the added advantage making it harder for dissent to spread throughout the army by the disgruntled majority. During 1656 some of the regiments seem to have been moved around numerous times, whether in their entirety or not is unclear, but by October the locations of the regiments had been settled and were to remain unchanged until the disbandment of the army in 1662. Philip Ward, commanding Venables' old regiment, was quartered just to the north of Santiago around Angels (Los Angeles). Richard Wells, with the remainder of Fortescue's regiment, was quartered across the Guanaboa district, while Samuel Barry with Richard Holdip's old regiment had settled on the Liguanea Plain to the east of Santiago and in the general area of modern-day Kingston. Henry Archbould, with John Carter's regiment, was west of Santiago in what later became St Elizabeth Parish. Doyley's regiment was split, with one part sent to settle in the Yallah area and another part remaining in Santiago. Francis Barrington, with what was left of Anthony Buller's old regiment, had settled between Santiago and Passage Fort, which was garrisoned by one company commanded by Captain Harrington.[141] John Humphrey's regiment, which in particular had shown no inclination to plant, was sent to garrison the fort and the growing settlement at Point Cagway in January, and it was decided to keep them there rather than attempt to settle them on the land in October.[142] Brayne's regiment was on arrival sent immediately to Point

141 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.95–98.
142 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.42, 93, 98.



Map 5 Regimental settlement on land 1655–1657.



Novissima et Accuratissima Insulae Jamaicae Descriptio, c.1675. Johannem Sellerum (John Sellers). (The Huntington Library, Art Museum and Botanical Gardens, California 164287). Plate H.

Morant while there is no evidence that places William Moore's regiment at any specific location before it too was disbanded.[143]

With the disbanding of Fortescue's, Carter's and Humphrey's regiments after April 1657 the remaining soldiers were spread amongst the other regiments, though this does not necessarily mean the men moved from the land they were planting to new plots, and as such the soldiers became perhaps more dispersed than originally intended. In 1662 Barry was still quartered on the Liguanea Plain, while Doyley's old regiment (by then commanded by Thomas Lynch) was spread around Port Royal, Morant and Ayala. Barrington's old regiment, commanded by Cornelius Burrough, was now centred around the Guanaboa Vale while Thomas Ballard's regiment, formerly that of Philip Ward, was quartered in Spanish Town, Angels, Passage Fort, Old Harbour and 'parts adjacent'.[144] Interestingly there is no evidence to suggest that any of the regiments at any time attempted to permanently settle on land in the Clarendon Plains or the further afield Pedro Plains. Nor, despite the evacuation of the Spanish, were any men ever settled on the north side of the island.

143 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.78.
144 Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.



Map 6 Regimental settlement on land 1662.

A 1675 a map of Jamaica by John Sellers lists the locations of some of the landowners' properties, and from this the specific locations for at least some of the soldiers' plantations can be identified. Colonel Thomas Ballard had a plantation just north of Santiago on the banks of the river where he grew cocoa, sugar and cotton. Captain Robert Nelson, formerly of the cavalry, had a plantation in the foothills of the mountains along the banks of the same river where he was growing cacao and sugar. Henry Archbould, of Barry's regiment, had a sugar plantation on the Liguanea Plain. In each case these plantations were located in the general geographical location that their regiments had been dispersed to, illustrating that their roots were sufficiently established that they chose not to relocate once the army was disbanded.

VII

Soldiers of course expect to be paid for their service, but it has ever been their lot not to receive their due and the English army in Jamaica was no different.

On 29 August 1654 the Council of State ordered that a formal establishment for Venables' proposed army be drafted, which would have stated what units it was to contain, their strengths and the rates of pay for each soldier. Though this establishment was produced no copy of it now exists, but it assumed a monthly pay bill of 6,514*l* 13s 4d.[145] Most likely it related just to the forces raised in England prior to departure and excluded those forces expected to be raised in Barbados.[146] On 16 November it further instructed that all soldiers who enlisted into the new army were to have their arrears paid them from their current regiments on 20 November, while 10 days later it was agreed that these old soldiers were all to receive one month's advance pay issued the day they embarked onto the awaiting fleet in Portsmouth.[147] The Council further instructed the same day that one quarter of the soldier's pay was to be settled every four months in England to whomever they had assigned to collect iton their behalf, and that the remainder of their pay would be settled to them on their return to England.[148] Whether those arrears owed prior to joining Venables' army were ever paid is unclear, but certainly at least some of those who enlisted into Venables' army did get a month's advance pay in December 1654; for most of the army this was the only pay they were ever to receive.[149] For the reinforcements sent out later Tyson's company was provided with 14 days' advance pay when it left England in 1656 whilst Moore's regiment was paid 10,267*l* 17s 4d at the same time, but as with Venables' army this was all most of them were to get.[150] No records of pay issued to Humphrey's and Brayne's regiments before they left exist, but presumably they received something. Understandably this lack of pay angered the soldiers in Jamaica

145 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1654* (hereafter *CSPD 1654*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1880), p.339.
146 Green, *CSPD 1654*, p.376.
147 Green, *CSPD 1654*, pp.397, 404.
148 Green, *CSPD 1654*, p.404.
149 TNA, CO1/32, f.56.
150 Green, *CSPD 1656-7*, p.35; Dunlop, *Ireland Under the Commonwealth*, p.641.

and it was an underlying cause that led to Throckmorton's mutiny in 1656, but this was, perhaps surprisingly, the only recorded example of it leading to a show of discontent by the army.

For a while at least the government in England made good on its promise to pay the 'fourths', but only, it seems, if those who held assignments from the soldier were able to petition for it in London, which inevitably meant the ordinary soldier was disadvantaged. A committee was established in May 1656 for the 'consideration of the arrears of the pay to the forces in America' but a chronic lack of funds meant the government was unable to do much to settle the mounting arrears.[151] Mary Fortescue was able to obtain 346*l* of her husband's arrears in October 1656, as did similarly nine other widows, but only because they were in a position to petition for it. William Hayes, a wounded trooper, was one of the few common soldiers able to receive part of his arrears when he was granted 20*l* 3s 10d at the same time.[152] Those officers able to leave Jamaica were better placed to get their money, such as when Holdip, having been cashiered in Jamaica, was able to receive the sum of 500*l* in April 1658.[153] In December 1657 the Council of State ordered that 4,000*l* be set aside from money collected under the newly promulgated Buildings Act for settlement of the arrears, but whilst this might have led to some arrears being paid in England there is no evidence that it was ever sent to Jamaica to pay the army.[154]

The government papers for the years 1656 to 1658 are littered with petitions from the families of deceased soldiers claiming their arrears, but again, without the ability of the family to petition for them in England there was no systematic process of settlement; it seems that those able to shout the loudest received something and the rest received nothing.[155] Another option that worked to obtain arrears, certainly for officers, was for the wife to claim them if she applied for permission to travel to Jamaica to join her husband.[156]

There is certainly no record of any sum of money being dispatched from England as pay for the army, indeed the only record of any money being sent to Jamaica was in 1657 and it was specifically mentioned that it was only to be used for the construction of defences on the island. With the Jamaica garrison chronically short of funds it never had sufficient cash available to pay the soldiers, but Doyley found ways to pay at least some of them. During the construction of the fortifications in 1657–1658 payments of cash for wages were paid to the men labouring on them and presumably these were all soldiers (they being the only manpower available on the island) so some at least received money. Doyley was also able to distribute cacao nuts to the army in 1658 in lieu of pay, which were convertible into either cash or kind,

151 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1655-6* (hereafter *CSPD 1655-6*) (London: Longmans & Co., 1882), p.325.
152 Green, *CSPD 1656-7*, p.137.
153 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1657-8* (hereafter *CSPD 1657-8*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1884), p.371.
154 Green, *CSPD 1657-8*, p.209.
155 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574-1660*, pp.454-455, 462, 472.
156 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574-1660*, p.466.

but the records only show this happening on a few occasions, although the officers seem to have been able to benefit from it more regularly.[157]

At the Restoration the new government clearly had no intention of accepting the liability of settling the army arrears and so provided a donative in lieu of arrears which was distributed in cash and kind when the army was disbanded in 1662. Whilst a significant amount, it was barely a fraction of what was owed to the soldiers who presumably gladly took what was offered knowing full well they would never see the full amount they were owed. It was calculated that the army, which by then consisted of 1,607 officers and men, was due 110*l* 11s 10d per day in pay. The government sent goods valued at 11,596*l* 16s which were to be sold and this equated to 155½ days pay for the army. In addition to these goods were shipped African slaves valued at around 9,000*l*, the proceeds of whose sale were also to be added to the donative. In total it was estimated that the value of the goods and slaves would provide 186 days pay for the army.[158] However it would seem that only 12,274*l* 0s 2d was actually distributed to the army on 17 October 1662, leaving many to believe that Lord Windsor had kept the balance.[159] If this were so it only added further grievance to the already shoddily treated common soldiers who received very little for all their efforts and risk.

VIII

A constant supply of clothing was essential for the garrison, for many of the soldiers would eat, sleep and live in a single set of clothes which would soon become worn out and unserviceable, but certainly in the first couple of years of the occupation the army was able to provide some new clothes. Back in England it was normal for the soldiers to be issued with a new set of clothes each year, which they paid for by deduction from their wages,[160] but there is no record of clothing being issued before this army left, so it is unclear how the men were dressed when they first arrived in the West Indies. Most likely they were still wearing what they wore when they enlisted, so after months at sea and then service on Hispaniola it is probable that by the time it reached Jamaica the army was quite ragged in appearance. The first evidence that new clothing was issued is to be found on 20 March 1656 when the infantry regiments were issued with a new set of clothes which consisted of a 'paire of drawers', 'shoes and stockins' plus a 'jacquet' with 'hatts or capps' all for the 'use of the inferior officers and souldiers' of the army. A total of 2,095 sets were issued.[161] No shirts were issued to the infantry at this time, but a month later, on 28 April, the cavalry were issued with 45 shirts. At the same time Jones' troop were also issued with the same number of 'redd coats',

157 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.122, 126–127, 136, 144, 152, 146.
158 BL, Egerton MS 2395, f.351.
159 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, pp.269–270; Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.
160 Charles Harding Firth, *Cromwell's Army: A history of the English soldier during the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate* (London: Methuen & Co, 1902), p.235.
161 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.53.

this being perhaps the first reference to English soldiers serving overseas wearing the redcoats for which they would soon become famous.[162] More red coats, as well as shirts, stockings, shoes and hats were issued on 12 May to the provost marshal 'for ye use of his fower men',[163] while on 21 April the 'thirteen artificers belonging to the traine' were issued with shoes, stockings, jackets and hats, but no shirts.[164] That these clothes lasted barely six months is demonstrated by the fact that further sets of clothing, consisting of shirts, shoes, drawers and stockings but no hats, were issued to the infantry on 18 September. The red coats were obviously in short supply as only 20 were issued per regiment while 'jacquets' were issued to the rest of the men. A total of 2,221 sets were issued in September.[165] Two days later the 'workmen of ye trayne', now only 12 strong, received another pair of shoes and stockings plus a new shirt and red coat.[166] On 27 September the troop was issued with another 46 sets of shirts, drawers, shoes, stockings and red coats.[167] Upon Tyson's arrival in Jamaica in November 1656 his company was immediately issued with 120 sets new clothes, but only 'jacquets' and not red coats.[168]

Exactly what the 'jacquet' was is not clear from the sources but on one occasion in 1656 they are described as being made of canvas.[169] The quantities issued are such that they were probably made of cloth while the canvas version, being perhaps waterproof, possibly came from the navy supplies, rather than the army. In the later accounts there are numerous instances of 'canvas suits' being issued, such as the 20 given to Captain Penkevell on 19 February 1658, the eight provided to the wounded from Las Chorreras in October 1657 and the 'twenty suites of canvas for the use of the men wounded at Rio Nuevo' in August 1658. These were most likely also from navy stores.[170]

Unfortunately *Doyley's Journal*, the source for the above detail, was not updated during most of 1657 so we have no evidence to show whether clothing continued to be supplied that year. Despite the frequent supply issued in 1656 Goodsonn was to note on his arrival back in England the following year that when he left Jamaica 'The People first sent, [were] being in want of more clothing'. *Doyley's Journal* continues from September 1657 but after that until the Restoration there is only one further mention of clothes being issued to an entire unit, and these were to the cavalry who received 'seaventy-two shirts, drawers and jacketts' on 21 August 1658.[171] Dependent as the army was on clothes being sent from England it is very likely that this lack of evidence of new clothes being issued to the army indicates that actually none were available. In February 1657 Doyley wrote to the Council

162 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.53.
163 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.61.
164 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.58.
165 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.89–90.
166 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.90.
167 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.91.
168 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.107.
169 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.90.
170 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.95, 83, 115.
171 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.115.

of State bemoaning his general lack of supplies, in particular shoes.[172] On 31 October 1657 Doyley ordered two naval officers to 'survey a certaine quantity of clothes pretended to be altogether unserviceable still remaininge in the hands of Mr Cornelius Burrough'.
convinced they were in fact unserviceable and that he suspected fraud, but it also suggests that the quantity of clothing was not large. In May of the following year Doyley was to comment that 'the army is wholly destitute of shoes'.[173] The impression is certainly that during this period little, if any, clothing was received from England and so once again the army would have been of a shabby appearance.

The lack of shoes for the army was a constant problem. In March and September 1656 when it had been issued with new clothes the men received a new pair of shoes as well. In addition to these, on 8 July 1656 a total of 2,926 pairs were issued to the infantry regiments, as well as 42 pairs more issued to the cavalry.[174] But despite three pairs being issued to each soldier during 1656, in February 1657 Doyley wrote to the Council of State notifying them that the chronic shortage of shoes would inhibit the army's ability to engage with the Spanish as they were unable to march without them. He sarcastically wrote that the Spanish 'will come to our quarters, for we cannot go to them' due to this lack of shoes.[175] Before a small force could be sent out in December 1657 it was necessary to issue them with 36 pairs of shoes, while in March 1658 when Major Stevens was sent to the north side of the island to seek out the Spanish, his force was also provided with new footwear.[176] The army was in no better state in May 1658 when Doyley was preparing to dispatch a large force to the north of the island and wrote 'that the army is wholly destitute of shoes', but it was rumoured that an English merchantman in Cagway harbour under the command of a certain Mr Prince had a cargo of shoes aboard; on 21 May Doyley ordered Captain Van Alfan to search the vessel and take what was needed, 'for which the state shall give satisfaction'. It is not known how many shoes were acquired but on 2 June the treasurer, Peter Pugh, was ordered to pay John Goslinge, purser of the *Marston Moor*, the sum of 8*l* 16s 'being for shoes'.[177] In July 1659 there were still none available in the army stores so Lieutenant David Morgan was given the sum of 16*l* 10s 6d to purchase shoes 'for the use of the party gone out under his command after the Negroes'.[178] The same thing happened in November when he was given the very large sum of 61*l* 6s to purchase more shoes before going forth once again. However, this seems a very large expense to purchase shoes for the soldiers and it is possible these were intended as gifts to entice the African-Caribbeans to side with the English.[179]

172 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.833.
173 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.80, 105.
174 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.71, 72.
175 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.833.
176 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.89, 97.
177 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.105, 107.
178 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.115.
179 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.145.

With no way to acquire clothing locally the soldiers were dependent on being issued with clothes by the army, and with them in such short supply it is not surprising that a black market in clothing soon flourished, based upon embezzled army stores. That this was a serious, and ongoing problem, is evidenced by Doyley's attempts to eliminate this illicit trade. In April 1656 the sutler George Evans, who was based at Passage Fort and was one of the few boat owners allowed to ferry military personnel to and from the fleet anchored at Cagway, was reminded by Doyley that it was not permitted for him to carry aboard his ferry any 'prohibited goods as souldiers clothes, under penalty of forfeiting his boate'. Then on 22 October 1656 Doyley issued instructions to Captain Jonathan Harrington of Barrington's regiment, who was also the governor of Passage Fort where the main army supply depot was situated. He was instructed 'to be carefull in making of search, or otherwaies that no prohibited goods viz. souldiers' clothes as coats, shirts, shoes and stockings, drawers be conveyed away and that no boats belonging either to ye fleete or army receave any goods whatsoever elsewhere than at the usual place or passage where the bridge [quay] is'.[180] Items of clothing were valuable commodities and prone to being stolen with a correspondingly high sentence imposed if the thief was apprehended, as in the case of Thomas Betts, a soldier in Doyley's own regiment who was convicted of stealing 5s 6d and 'a new paire of shoes' from Thomas Philipson, of the same regiment. Betts was forced to work as an unpaid servant on Philipson's plantation for a period of two months as a punishment.[181]

Ironically it was Charles II who was to ensure that Cromwell's army in Jamaica was once again sufficiently clothed. In early June 1661 the *Rosebush* and *Diamond* arrived at Cagway with supplies from England, including new clothes for the soldiers. The newly established 'Comittee to Consider of the Businesse of Jamaica' in London had recommended in October 1660 that clothing, amongst other things, be sent immediately to Jamaica for the army. The committee recommended sending 1,000 'suits of ffustian', 2,000 shirts, 1,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 pairs of 'ffootmens Pumps' and 2,000 pairs of 'Linnen Stockings'.[182] As generous as this seems, when the clothing arrived there must have been significantly more than this shipped as much more than this quantity was issued to the army. On 21 June Lieutenant Mark Fowler of the cavalry troop was issued with 'thirty-five suites of clothes, fower score paire of shoes, fower paire of stockins and fower score shirts[?]'. Doyley's regiment was provided with 198 sets of clothes, 416 pairs of stockings and probably a similar amount of shoes and shirts. Barry's regiment was given 185 'suites of clothes' and drawers, 391 pairs of shoes, 391 stockings 'and the like quantity of shirts'. Major Hope received for his men 220 suites, 466 pairs of shoes, stockings and shirts. Fairfax for his men was issued with 193 suites, 406 pairs of shoes with an equal amount of stockings and shirts. This time general officers, all 16 of them, were issued with a new set of clothes,

180 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.59, 102.
181 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.112.
182 W.L. Grant, J. Munro and A.W. Fitzroy (eds), *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series 1613–1680*, Vol. 1 (Hereford: 1908), p.300.

two pairs of shoes and stockings plus a new shirt, as were the 20 men of the 'trayne'.[183] Probably for the first time ever the Jamaican army looked respectable and the soldiers were well shod with not one, but two pairs of shoes each. Furthermore, there was a seeming abundance of uniforms left over, for in December Harrington was able to obtain a dozen pairs of shoes, stockings and shirts for his men while in January 1662 Archbould was able to draw a further 50 suits of clothes, shoes and shirts. In fact there were now so many shoes on the island that at the end of January 1662 there we still over three hundred pairs still in the storehouse.[184]

Unlike food and clothing there does not seem to have been any shortage of arms and ammunition in the Jamaica garrison, although this might be more as a consequence of the sporadic nature of the war against the Spanish than a concerted effort by the authorities in England to ensure a constant supply being sent. Venables had constantly complained that the quality of the armaments he had been given was poor, but it is interesting to note that very few replacement arms were given to the army during the occupation. This is partly because as the size of the army shrank with so many soldiers dying in 1655 and 1656 that a surplus of weapons became available, with those who had survived being able to acquire their choice of serviceable weapons from their dead comrades. There is nothing in the extant records that suggests the English lacked the weapons for offensive action when they were needed. When Doyley rushed to fit out a force of around 750 men (almost a third of the army) in the summer of 1658 his primary concerns were not finding adequate numbers of functioning weapons but procuring shoes and sufficient shipping. Again, when he sent out of parties into the interior in 1658 and 1659 he was forced into providing the men with new shoes and not new weapons. Even when the English constructed a fort at Cagway they encountered no problem mounting sufficient artillery, as they used captured Spanish guns from Santa Marta.

Whilst it is clear that there was sufficient weaponry, this does not mean those weapons were all in good condition. Numerous English sources back up Venables' complaints that many of the arms he carried with him from England were defective, and Doyley, when he became commander of the army, recognised this when in mid February 1656 he ordered that 'the captains of the severall companies take care to see that the souldiers' armes be well fixed and that those that be very bad be changed'.[185] As a result of this, on 19 February 1656 Buller's regiment was provided with 98 new pikes and 147 'fyre-armes', while on 6 March Carter's and Fortescue's regiments were provided with 70 new pikes each. On 18 March Doyley's regiment was issued with 80 new firearms and one week later Holdip's regiment was given 'seaventy-fyve [fire]armes and nynety-six pikes'.[186] That so few pikes and muskets were subsequently issued demonstrates further that the army had ample, and serviceable, arms at this time. Perhaps further proof of plenty

183 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.251–253.
184 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.258, 260, 261.
185 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.48.
186 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.49, 51, 55.

is shown when on 19 February each regiment was issued with eight saddles and eight cases of pistols 'for the use of the field officers and captains', while in March 'two hundred swords, one hundred to be broad the other to bee narrow for the use of the regiment belonging unto Coll Holdipp' with a further 'one hundred and fiftye narrow swords' were issued to Doyley's regiment.[187] That ample weapons were still available to the army in September 1657 is suggested in Doyley's lengthy letter to England in which he presented the current state of the garrison and provided an equally lengthy list of their needs. He desired regular provisions, money, paper, chirurgeons' chests and brandy, but his only stated requirement for weaponry was his wish to have sent 'more horse-armes and furniture; the last were dragoons' saddles and very bade'.[188]

It was only in 1659 that the records again start to show an increasing number of weapons being issued to the infantry, but still in relatively small quantities. Doyley's regiment received 10 new muskets in March, in April Van Alfan's company were issued 25 firearms and in June Harrington was sent 'six fire armes, one bundell of match and bandileers' for the garrison at Passage Fort. In July Doyley's regiment received a further 99 muskets while in August Barry's regiment was issued with 60, Ward was given 65 and in September Brayne's old regiment were sent 55.[189] It is noticeable that this resupply to the regiments in 1659 consisted only of firearms and no pikes. While the latter ought to remain serviceable longer and required no maintenance, so would need replacing less often, they were also virtually useless in Jamaica. Designed to be deployed en masse on an open battlefield against opposing pikes, they were unsuitable for the dense forests and mountainous terrain on the island. It was firepower that the English needed and this is clearly reflected in the type of weapons issued.

If the garrison needed little replenishment of weapons this was certainly not the case with the consumable ammunition. The expedition, before it left England, was provided with at least five tons of match, 10 tons of musket balls and 1,000 barrels of gunpowder.[190] How much of this had been consumed by the time Penn returned to England is unknown but certainly all that remained would have been left with Goodsonn and the army, less what the fleet needed for its return voyage. In May 1655 Venables was writing hopefully to England that the army might make its own gunpowder, for:

> some men amongst us, that were powder-men in London, do affirm may be had as good and as plentifully as in any place in the world; and after three years they will undertake to serve England at an easier rate than ever; wood and rivers for mills, with carriage, being easy here, with choice of place to erect mills at for powder and petre, which I desire we may be enabled for to make. For Christophers will furnish us with brimstone; materials are here in abundance, save workmen.[191]

187 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.54.
188 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.68.
189 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.33, 49, 46, 53, 118, 121, 125.
190 TNA WO49/87, Ordnance Office: Debenture Books, 1654–1655, f.53.
191 Carte, *A Collection of original letters and papers*, p.51.

Despite the General's optimistic hope there is no evidence that the English were able to manufacture their own gunpowder at this time and so they were totally reliant on external supplies. However there is some evidence that suggests the English did have the raw ingredients of gunpowder available to them, such as when the fire-master, Nicholas Keeyne, was able to make crude hand grenades from the 20 lb of saltpetre and 10 lb of brimstone that were delivered to him on 26 May 1658;[192] nine pounds of brimstone were given to Major Fairfax in November 1660 and an additional 10 given to him in the April of the following year.[193]

The only existing record of powder being received from England is from March 1658 when the *White Roach* and the *Mary*, both merchantmen from London, called at Cagway and amongst the supplies they carried for the garrison they each offloaded 50 barrels of gunpowder, while the *White Roach* also brought 50 barrels of musket shot.[194] Undoubtedly other supply ships would have brought powder with them, as of course would the warships that accompanied them. The Spanish were another source of gunpowder for the English garrison. In April 1656 when Goodsonn stormed the Spanish fort at Santa Marta he captured four large pieces of ordnance which were returned to Cagway and later placed within the new English fort guarding the entrance to the harbour.[195] Whilst the English sources make no mention of capturing any gunpowder there must have been some with these guns which certainly would not have been left behind. After the battle at Las Chorreras Doyley claims to have captured 33 barrels of powder, and the following year at Rio Nuevo he seized 'Ten double Barrels of Pouder'.[196] As a measure of how much powder this actually was, in 1656 (the only year for which sufficiently extensive records exist) a total of 40 barrels of gunpowder was issued to the entire army for the whole year and when raiding parties were sent into the interior in 1656 and 1657, with a strength rarely exceeding 100 men, they were only provided with one, or at most two barrels of powder.[197] When Doyley sailed for Rio Nuevo in 1658 he took with him for his force of 750 men, almost a third of the army, only 20 barrels of powder.[198] From these examples it is apparent that the English had no shortage of gunpowder throughout the period of hostilities with the Spanish on the island. Further evidence of this surplus can be seen by the willingness of Doyley to sell powder to ships that called at Cagway and were in need of resupply. In May 1658 Abraham Langford, commander of the *Ginster*[?] 'declareinge his great want and necessity for powder' was sold a barrel of gunpowder for the sum of 'five pounds sterlinge unto the publique treasury of this island'. In November 1659 three barrels were sold to Captain Conyle 'commander of a French man of warre' and the following month a barrel was sold to the Danish pirate and slaver Captain Petersen, while another barrel was sold to the master of

192 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.104.
193 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.227, 247.
194 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.98, 99.
195 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.151.
196 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*; Doyley, *A brief relation*, p.7.
197 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One'.
198 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107.

the *Neptune* in February 1660. The going rate was still 5*l* a barrel in August 1660 when Lieutenant Colonel William Smith purchased two for his own use.[199] Not only was gunpowder a source of income to the island but on at least one occasion it was traded in settlement of a debt incurred by the State. In September 1657 the State ship *Paul*, commanded by Captain John Wentworth, was being made ready to sail to various of the English colonies in the West Indies, including Bermuda. Once there Wentworth was instructed to repay a debt previously incurred by him on behalf of the State and this debt he was 'to pay in powder'.[200]

Naturally the storage of all this gunpowder needed to be managed carefully and safely. It seems that initially the ammunition, and other stores, was loaded onto several of the prize ships and kept afloat in the harbour, where Goodsonn was instructed by Penn to keep them until such time as a suitable facility was constructed ashore.[201] According to Don Francisco de Leyba, when he was interviewed by the Council of the Indies in 1659, he informed them that the English continued to store munitions on a vessel in the harbour and that the ship 'does not leave for any action whatever as it is a store for all these fortifications'.[202] It is possible that he was in fact referring to the *Convertine* which seems to have fulfilled this role at that time. In 1656, when Ysassi was able to get close enough to spy on the English base at Santiago, he noted that at Cagway there was 'no powder house, the powder is underground in a thatched hut'. Nor was there a magazine 'for war material', he noted.[203] At Passage Fort, however, he observed that there were three warehouses that did store ammunition[204] and it would seem that this became the primary store until the fort at Cagway was finished. Even then the English, sensibly, kept the ammunition dispersed, for in September 1659 Captain Harrington was ordered to keep the large amount of 20 barrels of powder in Passage Fort[205] while the even larger quantity of 100 barrels was to be stored aboard the *Convertine* in April 1658, which seems to have been given the role of a floating store ship at this time.[206] There is no evidence of any serious accidents caused by the handling and storage of gunpowder in Jamaica, but in June 1656 when Goodsonn was cruising off Cuba a fire started on the *Arms of Holland* which caused the powder aboard to explode, sinking the ship and killing all but five of the crew, giving the English fair warning of the dangers inherent in handling such combustible materials.[207]

A less hazardous danger was the risk that the gunpowder would either spoil or get wet. Venables had already informed the Council of State from Barbados in early 1655 that he had been informed that 'English Powder will

199 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.144, 153, 166, 204.
200 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.74–75.
201 Penn, *Memorials*, p.117.
202 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.84.
203 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.31.
204 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.57–58.
205 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.128.
206 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.102.
207 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.425.

not keep above Nine Months, and at that time we must receive constant Supplies',
suggested that the uncompounded ingredients for gunpowder be sent to him instead, along with 'Men to make Poweder',[208] however there is no evidence to suggest his recommendation was acted upon. But although gunpowder certainly did spoil, even affected powder could still be used. Goodsonn commented in 1657 that 'the Powder first sent is found to bee much decayed' and he requested that new powder be sent as a replacement.[209] In April 1660 Captain Engelfield, whose company was then stationed in Cagway, was issued with 'one barrell of powder of the worst sort', while in December 1661 Commissary Richard Povey was instructed to dispose of spoiled powder by issuing 'each regiment two barrells of the worst powder' in store.[210] Aboard the *Bear* in April 1661, 30 barrels of powder had decayed so much as to be unusable and so Commissary Bispham was instructed to replace them with 30 good barrels.[211] When powder got wet it could still be salvaged, however. In May 1660 fire-master Nicholas Keeyne was paid 32*l* 15s to reimburse the expenses he laid out 'about [the] newe caskinge and dryeinge the powder'. Perhaps in an attempt to prevent powder getting wet again, the following month 12 hides were purchased for 6*l* 'to cover the powder in Fort Cromwell'.[212] Similar efforts had been made in 1658 when Doyley sailed for Rio Nuevo and two leather hides were loaded aboard the *Mary* to 'keep the powder dry'.[213]

IX

The risk of English soldiers being captured by the Spanish was very real, especially before 1658. The first recorded prisoner to be seized by the Spanish was George Payne, who was captured in the days immediately after the English invasion. Castilla describes him as young, speaking Spanish and that he had been recruited in Barbados as in interpreter. He seems to have willingly informed his captors of the English defeat on Hispaniola and gave them an accurate description of the state of the English army at the time of his capture in May 1655. He was still being held on the island until at least October 1655, after which he was sent to Cuba.[214] Incredibly part of Payne's story can be corroborated from English sources. According to his later testimony he was detained for 10 months in Jamaica, after which he was transported first to Santiago de Cuba and from there to Havana. From here he was put aboard a Spanish vessel and sent to the Canary Islands 'where he made his escape', most likely when Blake attacked Santa Cruz on 20 April 1657, and he then returned to England. Payne successfully petitioned the Council of

208 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.9.
209 TNA, CO1/33, f.63.
210 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.180, 259.
211 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.245.
212 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.186, 193.
213 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.110.
214 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.11, 21.

State for relief and was awarded 95*l* 10s for his troubles.[215] Payne was not the only prisoner who managed to escape from the Spanish, however. In August 1656 William Paxton, a soldier in Captain Baker's company of Archbould's regiment who had been 'taken long since by ye enemy' managed to escape and he needed to be completely reclothed on his return.[216] In January 1660 six new suits of clothing were issued to the prisoners who had 'escaped from the enemy att St. Jago in Cuba'. How they had managed to get away from Cuba and back to Jamaica was not recorded.[217] On 5 July 1660 Martin and Robert Bradshawe also managed to escape and made it back to the English garrison, but by this time Ysassi had fled the island and so it is unclear if these two had been held captive by him and had escaped or if they had also returned from Cuba.[218] Even as late as November 1660 there is evidence to show that English prisoners were able to escape from their Spanish captors and make it back to Santiago.[219]

If some of the Spanish sources are to be believed there were occasions when the Spanish killed some of the English who fell into their hands rather than imprisoning them. Castilla recounts the capture in March 1656 of an


tierra de Cuba por la parte del sur
Rio a cidrones
C. de Cruz
Isla Ladrones
C. negro
Isla Xamaica
Punta negrillo
Punta Alga
Rio grande
Cabo morante
Los baxos y Islettes de tortugas
Ranas
escala de 70 leguas Proporcion desta Planta dela Isla xamaica y de Vna parte dela Isla de Cuba Jerardo Coen Cosmografo de su Mag.d

Planta de la isla de Xama[i]ca y de un parta [sic] de la isla de Cuba, c.1656. Jerardo Coen. (Plate C)

215 TNA, SP25/78, Council of State: Letters and Papers, 1658, f.683.
216 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.83.
217 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.233.
218 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.201.
219 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.226.

JAMAICA GARRISON



Above: *Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica, c.*1657. Ricardo Carr. (Archivo General de Indias. MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 56)
Below: *Planta de la fortificación que tiene echa el enemigo en la marina y puerto de la isla de Xamaica, sacada por un prisionero que se izo en dicha isla, c.*1657. Ricardo Carr. (Plate D)

Probably all drawn based on information provided by an English prisoner, Richard Carr.

English convoy, after which they 'lightened the cartman's soul of his body'.[220] In January 1656 Sedgwick and Goodsonn wrote to Cromwell of their disgust at how some of their soldiers had been lanced by the African-Caribbeans when hunting for food, after which their bodies were 'striped, and [left] naked'.[221] In March Sedgwick informed Thurloe that the African-Caribbeans, openly hostile to the English, give 'no quarter. I am sure they give none to us, but destroy our men.'[222] In a letter from Ysassi to Zapata of June 1656 Ysassi claimed that 'Many [of the English] come over to me and on account of the paucity of troops I have put them to the sword.'[223] It was certainly commonly believed by the English that many of their comrades had been summarily killed when they fell into the hands of the Spanish, but despite this Doyley was determined to be merciful in his dealings with the prisoners that he caught. After the victory at Las Chorreras the English chased the Spanish survivors over the rocks along the coast and 'though we had received barbarous usage from them … we could not kill in cold blood.' Despite this assertion it would seem not all the English were as compassionate, for when Proenza was captured at Las Chorreras he was only saved from certain death by the intercession of an English prisoner who accompanied the Spaniard and asked for quarter for the elderly man.[224] Captain Edward Starkie was captured in early 1660 and was murdered by his captors, who were in fact African-Caribbeans and not Ysassi's men, but the English were unwilling to appreciate the semantics of this and demanded his killers be brought to account. When Ysassi informed Doyley he was unable to comply with his demand as he had no authority over the African-Caribbeans, an infuriated Doyley broke off the ongoing negotiations with the Spaniard for an end to hostilities on the island.[225]

The English prisoners proved a useful source of intelligence for the Spanish. The interpreter George Payne seems to have provided much information regarding the background of the expedition as well as events on Hispaniola. In July 1657 in a long letter to Albuquerque, Ysassi was able to provide the Viceroy with a detailed description of the English defences which he had obtained from prisoners he had captured over the past year. He also sent the Viceroy an English sergeant captured in March of that year and that 'Through him your Excellency will find proof of the truth of what I state here.'[226] In February 1658 the governor of Cartagena wrote to the King stating that he had an English engineer in his possession who had provided sufficient detail regarding the English defences at Santiago and Cagway, and that a plan of the fortifications had been produced with a copy enclosed for the King.[227] This unknown engineer, possibly called Richard Carr, was most likely the source of the two plans of the English settlement still extant in

220 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.25.
221 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.456.
222 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.605.
223 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.21.
224 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*, p.4.
225 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.96–97.
226 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.57–59.
227 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.70.

the *Archivo General de Indias*.[228] In August 1658 Ysassi himself sent a letter to the King which included the lengthy testimony of a captured Dutchman employed by the English, and he had provided much detail regarding the English forces on the island, from which a map of the south side of Jamaica was prepared.[229]

Prisoners from both sides were able to provide useful tactical intelligence as well. On numerous occasions in 1656 Doyley needed to remind the army that they were 'to bring home to ye Headquarters all such prisoners as shall be taken and not dispose of them till further order'.[230] The ominous comment that the prisoners should not be disposed of suggests that some might have been summarily killed before they could be interrogated, and in addition to the barbarity of such an act it also meant vital intelligence could not be obtained, intelligence, as Doyley explained to the Jamaica Committee in London in September 1657, 'being a great want' there.[231] Both Doyley and Ysassi had good reason to appreciate the value of interrogation. In the last months of 1655 numerous Spanish prisoners were captured on the north side of the island from whom much valuable intelligence was gained about the numbers of Spanish on the island, how they were escaping to Cuba and where they were living. The English learned of the hardship the Spanish were enduring from the lack of food and of the rift between the Spaniards and the groups of free African-Caribbeans.[232] It was from prisoners captured during Sibada's raid in March 1656 that the English learned that an organised Spanish resistance had been formed on the island, that it had been supplied from Cartagena and that many Spaniards had died from disease since the English had arrived.[233] Doyley had also learned of the landing of the first Spanish relief force from a Spanish prisoner in 1657, while it was from an English ensign who had been captured by Ysassi in November that the Spaniard found out that Reyes had been defeated at Las Chorreras the month before.[234]

In fact the English were positively encouraged to capture prisoners. In February 1658 Doyley sent the *Martin* and the *Cagway* to the north side of the island and specifically instructed their commanders 'to use your best care and endeavour to gaine further intelligence by endeavouringe to surprise prisoners on some part of the sea coast of Cuba or otherwise', from whom they were to gain intelligence of any relief force being sent to Jamaica. The *Blackmore* was sent out the following month with similar instructions, as was

228 Archivo General de Indias, Sevile (hereafter AGI), *Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica que tiene el enemigo*, 1657, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 58; AGI, *Planta de la fortificación que tiene echa el enemigo en la marina y puerto de la isla de Xamaica, sacada por un prisionero que se izo en dicha isla*, 1657, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 57.

229 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.80–82; AGI, *Costa del sur de la ysla de Santiago de Jamayca desde la punta de Morante hasta el río de Manatinese con todos sus cayos o ysletas, bajos y arreçifes*, c.1656, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 55.

230 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.80, 88.

231 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.67.

232 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 26, ff.75–77.

233 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.543; Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 39, ff.218–219.

234 Doyley, *A narrative of the great success*; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.67; Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.64.

the *Pearl* in August.[235] Later, in November 1658, the *Cagway* was sent to ply off Cartagena to ascertain the whereabouts of the plate fleet and the captain was encouraged to 'surprise any boat or prisoner' to obtain this valuable intelligence.[236] Even in 1659, a year after the defeat at Rio Nuevo, the English were still concerned that a third relief attempt was to be launched from Cuba and so the *Chestnut* was dispatched there with orders to land a party ashore 'to catch a prisoner who may informe me of the preparations or other intelligence att St. Jago'.[237] In June 1660 Edward Tyson with a party of infantry was once again sent to the north side of the island specifically to try to catch some prisoners and ascertain Spanish intentions now it was known that Ysassi had fled Jamaica.[238] Rewards for capturing prisoners were also given, as in the case of the reward given by an elated Doyley to the soldier who returned the first prisoner captured at Rio Nuevo in July 1658.[239] William Crane, a trooper in the cavalry, was gifted 3*l* for the 'takeing [of] a Negro' in September 1657, while Lieutenant Carmen received 20*l* in January 1660 for capturing two African-Caribbeans.[240]

The first Spanish prisoners were in fact Ramirez and the other hostages who had pledged themselves as surety for Spanish compliance to the terms of the surrender. Once it was clear that the Spanish were not going to comply, the English managed to capture some others who were attempting to flee in early June 1655.[241] The following month an English officer wrote that recently 'there came into us voluntarily 50 of the enemie, greate and small' who had evidently chosen to surrender rather than face the uncertainty of flight. This same officer believed at that time that 'wee have about 70 of the enemie among us, who have equal freedome and victuals with us'.[242] Spanish prisoners were disposed of in a variety of ways. In 1655, with the English short of provisions, Ramirez and these first prisoners had become an unnecessary burden the English could do without so in September it was decided to repatriate them all to Mexico, with Ramirez dying on the voyage.[243] As most prisoners were of little value to the English they were for the most part simply transported away from the island and released. In November 1658 the captain of the *Cagway* was instructed to seek intelligence from Cartagena while at the same time he was ordered to 'sett each prisoner on shore with respect to our owne and companie safety and otherwise nott'. Perhaps the *Cagway* was unable to do this, for the following month she was again dispatched, this time to ply off the Cuban coast and there she was instructed to 'land such Spanish prisoners as you have on board the vessell'.[244] The *Chestnut* was sent to Cuba in September

235 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.96, 100, 114.
236 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.12.
237 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.129.
238 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.200.
239 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.114.
240 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.71; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.164.
241 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.47.
242 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.141.
243 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.22 n.1.
244 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.13, 21.

1659 with instructions 'to putt the prisoners that are on board you on shore att any convenient place that is inhabited on Cuba'.[245] In an attempt to trade prisoners in May 1659 the *Hound* was sent to Santiago de Cuba to arrange a prisoner swap. Captain Povey was instructed to keep out of danger and once off the city to send ashore a friar called Antonio, with the female captives and 'two very old men'. The friar was to carry a letter from Doyley to the governor of the city requesting his agreement to swap the remaining prisoners with six English prisoners held there. Povey was also to enquire as to the fate of the *Pearl* and her crew, who it was believed had been captured by the Spanish. If he was to learn that the English prisoners had been transferred to Havana, or elsewhere, he was not to release the remaining Spanish prisoners but to remind the Governor of his responsibility to provide provisions for the English captives.[246] Unfortunately there is no record as to the outcome of Povey's mission, but Spanish sources confirm that just prior to this episode some of their prisoners had been returned, including women and children, by the English. One of them, Captain Don Juan de Figueredo y Fuentes, had been captured at Oristan and then spent five months in captivity at Point Cagway, presumably in Fort Cromwell. On his return he was able to provide a detailed description of the English defences there.[247] Less orthodox methods were also employed to remove the growing number of Spanish prisoners on the island in 1659. In November the French privateer Captain Francis Cayie was given a pass to 'transport five Spanish prisoners from this island to the maine or some of the islands of the King of Spaine'. The following month the Danish pirate Jan Petersen was also given a pass to remove six prisoners from the island.[248] Some prisoners were sent to England, most likely either those of substance or officers who it was felt were too important to release and who were to join the growing number of prisoners at home as a result of the war in Europe. In June 1659 14 were sent aboard the *Marston Moor*.[249]

Of course any Spaniards in English captivity needed to be fed, which though a problem in the first couple of years of the English occupation, became less so as a surplus of food became available. In January 1658 'twenty-fower pounds of bread, twenty pints of pease' were provided for two Spanish prisoners for a single month's provisions.[250] The following month a further 40 lb of bread plus 'tenne pieces of beife' were provided for an undisclosed number of prisoners.[251] The sum of 12 pounds was provided from funds held by the Prize Office to pay for provisions for six Spanish prisoners when they were returned to England aboard the *Marston Moor* in June 1659.[252] Whilst these first Spanish prisoners seem to have had freedom of movement about the English settlement, that was not the case with later captives. So free were some of the earlier prisoners that in early 1656 some of the African-

245 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.129.
246 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.35.
247 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.82.
248 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.144, 154.
249 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.43.
250 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.83.
251 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.95.
252 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three',

Caribbeans managed to escape, as did two Irishmen who had also been living with Spaniards on the island. These escapes forced the English into shackling those who remained to prevent them fleeing and informing the Spanish of the dire conditions that the English were living in.[253]

X

The English sources provide very little insight into how the army was disciplined in Jamaica. Undoubtedly regimental justice was imposed by the senior officers for minor infractions while more serious cases would have been handled by Doyley and the main council of officers, but there is scant evidence of such proceedings. The army initially gained a reputation as being ill-disciplined, and Penn summed up this feeling when he wrote on Hispaniola that 'there is no discipline at all, but every one doth what he lists, and officers as bad as the rest'.[254] Venables himself acknowledged that the officers were to blame: when he was in the Tower of London in 1655 he informed Fleetwood that 'The Officers were so far from assisting that they rather endulged the Soldiers, never punishing Swearing nor drunkenness, but admonishing [only].'[255] Without doubt the lack of control that the officers had over their men contributed to the poor performance of the army on Hispaniola, but this lack of military discipline in the face of the enemy does not imply that the army was uncontrollable elsewhere. On the contrary, as Venables rightly pointed out on his return to England, there were no recorded instances that his soldiers were involved with any 'rapes, murthers, Plunderings &c. either in England or Barbadoes, tho' I know few armies where such Offences are not Committed, yet I never heard of any in either of these places that I remember, and I am Certain none that I heard of escaped unpunish'd'.[256]

On Jamaica Venables was forced very early in the occupation to prohibit hunting of the wild cattle upon pain of death; whilst severe, this was more a reaction to the reality of the situation than an affirmation that the army had a discipline problem, although there was without doubt indiscriminate killing of cattle. With the soldiers starving it was merely self-preservation that led them to hunt where they could with the unintended consequence of scattering the herds of cattle, making them harder to catch. This was perhaps not quite the case in early 1656 when Doyley was forced to prohibit the killing of army horses 'upon paine of death'. Despite a regular, albeit insufficient supply of provisions being issued to the army, there were still instances of horses being killed for food, to the detriment of the army. This was a serious matter as the horses were vital for the security of the garrison so Doyley's reaction was a necessary and unavoidable response to check

253 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.456.
254 Penn, *Memorials*, p.90.
255 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.84.
256 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.91.

what was probably a surge in killings.[257] However, it must not have had the desired effect, for Doyley was forced to reissue this prohibition in October as the killings continued, though this time instead of the punishment being death, the offender would be forced to work as a form of indentured servant for the owner of the animal for a term of up to three years.[258] There is no record of any soldiers being executed for either hunting cattle or killing horses, and in fact Daniel How categorically confirms that none were while Venables remained in Jamaica, but some soldiers were certainly punished for breaking this law. How recorded that 'some were made prisoners, and those who were eminently guilty, and some rid the Wooden Horse, and two who were notorious swearers were whipt, and burnt through the Tongue, for that and other misdemeanors'.[259] So again, though these were extreme rules with an equally extreme punishment they are not in themselves evidence that there was a discipline problem with the army during the early occupation of Jamaica.

It was common practice that when an army was formed the commanding officer would proclaim some form of military code, known in the seventeenth century as articles of war, for the better managing and disciplining of the army.[260] Whilst there is no evidence that Venables issued something similar (though he probably did), either in England or elsewhere, it is clear that some form of structure to enforce discipline was in place when the army left England. Included amongst Venables' staff officers was a judge advocate, who was responsible for drawing up charges against accused soldiers and to ensure that legal formalities were complied with,[261] a marshal general, who was responsible for discipline throughout the army, and at least two provost marshals who had the responsibility of holding prisoners in custody and for carrying out punishments. [262] Traditionally each regiment had one or two provost marshals for imposing punishment within the regimental ranks and Venables' own regiment had at least one when it left England,[263] and so presumably did the others, but there is no evidence that confirms these roles remained within the regimental structure once the army settled into its duties on Jamaica. It would seem logical that somebody within each regiment was appointed to this role, in deed if not in name, but there are no references to it in any of the extant sources. Certainly in September and December 1660 two of the remaining infantry regiments were granted the power of court martial, but it is not clear whether the regiments had always had this power or if it was newly bestowed.[264]

With Jamaica under military jurisdiction until the transition to civilian government in 1662, Doyley, as commander-in-chief of the army, was the

257 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.47.
258 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.100.
259 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.45.
260 Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, pp.282–283. See also pp.409–422 for a 1643 copy of *The Articles of War* instituted by the Earl of Essex.
261 Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, p.284.
262 Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, pp.284, 285.
263 TNA, CO1/32, f.55.
264 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.216, 229.

final arbiter of justice and punishment. From him in his capacity as president of the council of officers were promulgated all legal notices, and through the council and their appointed officers, justice was served. It is likely that out of necessity a more truncated version of the articles of war was imposed on the army in Jamaica, enforced by a more *ad hoc* organisational structure than in the armies at home. According to William Beeston, who only arrived in Jamaica in April 1661, Doyley dispensed justice through a court martial held in Santiago once a month, and there is no reason to suppose that justice was conducted any other way prior to Beeston's arrival.[265] Throughout the garrison period discipline and any resulting punishments were administered by the 'provost marshall of the army' appointed by the commander-in-chief, and who in May 1656 was Captain Howley.[266] By January 1658 he had been replaced by Ensign Weblinge who was still fulfilling this role in January 1661 and possibly as late as January 1662.[267] The provost marshal, at least in May 1656, was assisted by four deputies who were all issued with the scarce red coats to differentiate them from the regular soldiers and provide them with a more distinctive appearance.[268] Howley, as befitting his status, was mounted.[269]

The extant English records throw very little light upon proceedings of law and order within the army during these first years of the English occupation, but it is perhaps safe to assume that this English army suffered the same array of petty crime and ill-discipline that all armies have experienced since time immemorial: for example theft, fighting, drunkenness and general insubordination. Virtually none of these minor transgressions have left any trace with the exception of the case of Thomas Betts who in June 1658 was convicted of stealing money and new shoes from another soldier, Thomas Philipson. Betts was forced to work as a servant of Philipson for three months as a punishment.[270] There is no other evidence to gauge how extensive this petty ill-discipline was, but the fact that as early as July 1656 there was already a prison constructed is telling.[271]

Less petty, however, was the seemingly rampant embezzlement of State stores, which was probably the most consequential and longest running of crimes committed by the soldiery, certainly in the first few years of the occupation. Upon Sedgwick's arrival in September 1655 he found no system in place to secure provisions and supplies as they were offloaded from the fleet and as a consequence theft was commonplace. This was partially rectified when Doyley established a commissariat under Michael Bland and Richard Povey in November 1655, who together instituted a better system of control to prevent such theft though it was never entirely eradicated.[272] Theft of clothing from the stores was rampant, leading to orders being issued in

265 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, p.272.
266 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.60.
267 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.83; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.230, 260.
268 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.61.
269 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.60.
270 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.112.
271 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.73.
272 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.36.

April 1656, and also in the following October, prohibiting contraband being carried on the local ferries and authorising Captain Harrington to search all boats plying to and from Passage Fort in search of stolen clothes.[273] Also in October of that year Harrington was further instructed 'to take special care to preserve ye State's stores and if any disorder or theft or is committed there to use ye utmost endeavour for ye detecting and apprehending such persons that soe exemplary punishment may be inflicted upon them'.[274]

The extent of the embezzlement of State stores is demonstrated by a fascinating certificate drawn up on 16 January 1657 and signed by Doyley and 11 other senior army officers, and which is now held by the Huntington Library in California. The certificate was produced to protect Richard Povey, the commissary of the expedition since leaving England, against any future claim of negligence or malfeasance relating to his handling and loss of State stores on Jamaica. Written within a month of William Brayne's arrival on the island, it might have been prepared as part of an explanation to the new commissioner as to why there were significant errors in the control and auditing of State stores over the previous 18 months, and that Povey was not thought to be at fault by the senior officers of the army that signed it. Amongst other explanations given for the irregularities in managing of the stores it was noted that 'Divers Souldiers have Beene punished by Sentance of A Court Marshall, & at the Storehouse by the Capt of the Guard ffor Breaking into the storehouse & Conveying whole Caske of goods into the Woods.' The statement continued with the remarkable affirmation that some of the sentinels at the storehouse had colluded with other soldiers and 'forced the Storekeepers to Stand back whilst the Said Sentinalls have Imployed others to Breake Up Caske & Steale the Goods & provisions Away'. It was further remarked that the guards even threatened to kill the storekeepers if they interfered.[275] The stealing of stores has always been commonplace in armies and so it was not an unexpected consequence given the general dearth of supplies on the island during the early years of occupation, but the threats of violence illustrate the desperation of the soldiers at the time and such losses probably did not dissipate until the soldiers became self-sufficient in food, probably some time after 1658.

There were times when the State stores were full of all sorts of provisions, though the quantities would have varied depending on the arrival of supply ships from England. An inventory of supplies issued in early 1660 provides a glimpse of the sort of provisions the English needed during these first few years in Jamaica. These included biscuits, beef, pork, pease, preserved mackerel, stockfish, tortoise, cheese, flour and butter. Also being stored was a variety of different oil, vinegar, salt and brandy. The storehouse at the time also contained stools, platters, spoons, candles, pumps, lamps, casks and iron hoops.[276]

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273 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.59, 102.

274 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.102.

275 The Huntington Museum California, BL 312, A Certificate (in Relation to our Stores Committed to Commissarie Povey's Charge), William Blathwayt Papers, 1657.

276 TNA, CO1/33, ff.194–195.

Later on, as the economy of the island grew and soldiers attempted to participate in the resultant trade, debt and the consequences of it became an issue for some of the army and needed to be dealt with. In June 1656 Weblinge, the provost marshal, was instructed to seize all money and goods in the hands of Bernard Baker in satisfaction of a debt he owed to the State.[277] In 1660 petty debt amongst the soldiers had grown significantly as they attempted to borrow money or kind to finance either planting or some other commercial activity, so much so that in at least two regiments the officers were granted the authority to investigate and settle disputes amongst the soldiers up to the value of 40 shillings.[278] Again, the surviving evidence is not extensive and so the extent of the indebtedness of the soldiers cannot be determined, but as money became more available and as opportunities were created for the soldiers to participate in the economy it is likely that it became easier to borrow money, with corresponding consequences once debt was unable to be repaid.

What little evidence there is suggests that the discipline of the army was reasonably good throughout the occupation, with petty crime and theft being the main instances reported. There is no evidence of the more serious occurrences of widespread desertion amongst the general soldiery, despite Ysassi's claim that some English deserted to him in 1656. As bad as the English conditions were in the first year or so of the occupation it is unlikely that many of them believed it would be any better with the Spanish. With the island under martial law any English soldier caught deserting was likely to be executed, and with no way of getting aboard an English vessel without a permit, the opportunities to escape were minimal anyway. It had been reported that some deserters did manage to get off the island, but if this was true they would have been very few. However, if the certificate drawn up in January 1657 in defence of Thomas Povey is to be believed, the two commissary assistants of Povey had both 'deserted this Island' before the document had been drawn up.[279] The only known example of a soldier deserting was Francis Hildersham. He seems to have been dismissed by the army for drunkenness and made his way to Tortuga, presumably to join the growing privateer presence there, but was returned to Jamaica by the English governor of the island in December 1658. On Tortuga it was claimed that he spoken treasonous words against Cromwell and was sent to Jamaica for trial. He was duly found guilty for this, but Doyley felt he lacked the authority to execute him and so instead he was delivered into the care of Lieutenant Colonel Tyson, to undertake manual labour until such time as Doyley received instructions from England on how to punish Hildersham.[280]

However this is not to say that the army was settled and content with their lot, as officers and soldiers alike were far from happy with their conditions and treatment, especially during the first couple of years, and there was always the fear that the disgruntled soldiers would cause unrest. All army

277 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107.
278 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.216, 229.
279 Huntington Museum, Certificate.
280 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.22–23.



Plate A

Ysla de Xamaica *c.*1656, Anon. (Archivo General de Indias MP-SANTO-DOMINGO,53)



Plate B

Plano del Puerto de Santa Ana (Jamaica), *c.* 1658, Unknown. (Archivo General de Indias MP-SANTO_DOMINGO,59)



Plate C

Planta de la Isla de Xama[i]ca y de un parta (sic) de la isla de Cuba, *c.*1656, Jerardo Coen. (Archivo General de Indias MP-SANTO_DOMINGO,54)

Canal Del sur
Canal. Del Sur
Lamar
La A. es la fuerca de S. Catalina
La B. fuerca del embarcadero
La C. el Castillo q se llama
La D. el Cerro fuerte de Almo
La E. rrio de caymanes
La F. del embarcadero de Leguan
La G. Una estancia de Ingleses
La H. Rio de Sanfaca
La I. costa de la orama
La K. una caña de flamenco
La L. Casas de cayo carena
La M. Morro con su garita
La N. punta del embarcadero
La O. Son cayos de fuera
Los numeros son fondos de braca
nal Con sus Letreros = Los numeros
fondo de braças en la Canal
La Artillera de la fuerca de cayo Carena es
una pieca bala de 56 libras otra de 48 dos de 36 dos de 32 dos
De Santa Maria de bronce Una de 24 Dotra de 18 Sardemas de 8
10 Ynmas 2 Morteros de bronce quatro arroba 300 Bala y el otro
200 Pedros Carimon para echar dentro de Nauio. O Castillo toda esta
Artillera tiene cayo de carena —
La artillera de la fuerca del desembarcadero tiene 5 pieas de bronce de
=3 libras 4 de a 12 quatro de a 5 Otras 5 tiran bala de a 3 Son el lugar
Hay una Pieca de Bronce de 3 libras de Bala

Plate D

Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica, *c.* 1657, Ricardo Carr. (Archivo General de Indias MP-SANTO_DOMINGO,56)



Plate E

Planta de la fortificación que tiene echa el enemigo en la marina y puerto de la isla de Xamaica, sacada por un prisionero que se izo en dicha isla, *c.* 1657, Ricardo Carr.
(Archivo General de Indias MP-SANTO_DOMINGO,57)


la A; entrada donde estala fuerza de cay o cañ.
la B; cerca y albarca que cubre embarcanal de leña
que se gasta en la dotacion
la C; cuerpo de guardia principal
la D; la poblacion que tiene en contorno Plaza
grande con la Iglesia donde
la E; almacen donde tienen las municiones
la F; Arsenal de cay manes
la G; Arsenal del pueblo
la H; canal de entrada
la I; la calleta

Plate F

Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica que tiene el enemigo, *c.* 1657, Unknown. (Archivo General de Indias, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO,58)

Punta de la Yema
Rio de Guadalcavar
Cayo de Cabras
Cayo de Alcatraces
Cayo de Palomas
Cayo de Lobos
Rio de Guadalcavar
Rio de Guadalcavar
Rio de Guadalcavar



Plate H

Novissima et Accuratissima Insulae Jamaicae Descriptio, c.1675. Johannem Sellerum (John Sellers). The Huntingdon Library, Art Museum and Botanical Gardens, California, 164287.

commanders, especially those who lead unpaid troops, fear mutiny, and so it is no surprise that despite the general calm throughout the army it would not take much for open revolt to explode, as it did in the first months of 1656.

Abandoned by their senior commanders and seemingly left in Jamaica to rot with but few provisions, it is not surprising that disaffection amongst the army was rife during the early months of the occupation. The army had shown no inclination to plant the land, which was of necessity if the men were to feed themselves, the soldiers having enlisted to fight for their country rather than become farmers. The massive death toll since the English arrival, which had carried away officers as well as common soldiers without respect for rank, had decimated the officer corps and this would have further affected its ability to maintain discipline, even if there is no evidence to support any claim that the army was racked by ill-discipline. Adding to this was the unrest created by the lack of pay, as the soldiers had not been paid since they left England. Many of those officers who had survived the first cruel winter had selfishly petitioned Doyley in January 1656 to be allowed to leave so that they 'be serviceable to his highness the lord protector' elsewhere.[281] These malcontents, who included Major Samuel Barry of Holdip's regiment, John Filkins of Carter's and consummate complainer Colonel John Humphrey, did not get their wish as Doyley brushed their grumbling aside. Despite this there were still those amongst the officer corps who resented being forced to remain on Jamaica. The disaffection had spread to the common soldiers as well. Sedgwick and Goodsonn let Cromwell know of this dissatisfaction in March 1656 when they wrote that the army had:

> generally an aversness to this place, which is rather fomented, then endeavoured to be removed, by the officers, who it is apparent, in the most part, missing the mountains of treasure they aimed at, do nothing but compelled by necessity; for upon the ships going home, and upon all or any like occasions, they express fond desires to return to England, without regarding either the honour of the nation, publick interest, or the vast expense your highness hath made in the acquisition of this remote island.[282]

The first sign of trouble occurred in April 1656 when a party of 25–30 soldiers ran away from their colours after refusing to plant, 'but most of them were retaken and three of the ringleaders hanged'.[283]

This discontent was probably exasperated by the rumour, in early May, that Doyley was to be replaced by Sedgwick as commander of the army. Doyley had been elected as commander of the army, crucially by the army itself, and so held his position by the army's will since the death of Fortescue in October 1655. Sedgwick, though a competent administrator and experienced colonialist (the very attributes the English needed), was not an army officer and as such did not have the respect of the senior officers, or indeed the rank and file. He was also from New England and so was seen by many as

281 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.391.
282 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.601–602.
283 Sainsbury, *CSPD Colonial 1675–1676*, p.109.

an outsider who had sat out the Civil War from the safety of America. As the rumours about Sedgwick's appointment spread – which turned out to be true – many men no doubt began to further question the wisdom of even remaining in Jamaica with few provisions, no pay, little chance of gaining plunder and an insistence of the government that they become farmers, making them even more tied to the island they must have hated.

A more serious disturbance occurred the month after Sedgwick died on 24 May, before he formally became the army commander, leaving Doyley, as the most senior officer, to become in his own words 'commander in chiefe, commissioner, judge advocate, and treasurer'.[284] Of this time of uncertainty one observer was to later remark that 'in this time the condition of the Army, if it was possible, grew yet more lamentable; those that were not sick were discontented and Mutinous, ready to have rune to the *Spaniards*, if they had known where to have found them.'[285] Though he was to prove himself a competent administrator and a good officer, Doyley seems to have upset many of the army's senior officers, not least by his consistent refusal to allow discontented officers to return to England and insisting that army follow its orders and begin cultivating crops for its own existence. With no formal authority to govern after Sedgwick's death it did not take long for some of the disgruntled officers to challenge Doyley's authority. Doyley felt that some of the 'officers have attributed much severity unto me' by his imposing the will of the government in England upon the army.[286] This challenge came in the shape of Major Thomas Throckmorton, son of Sir Baynham Throckmorton, of Buller's old regiment. According to Doyley, Throckmorton approached him and clearly told him that if he was not allowed to return to England he 'would make a mutinye'. Doyley, aware that he lacked the formal authority from the government in England, but realising that he was the only person on the island senior enough to govern, could not allow Throckmorton to undermine him in such a manner. Throckmorton's request was refused and the disgruntled officer began fomenting rebellion amongst the army. How he did this has not been recorded, or indeed how successful he was in his sedition, but he certainly split the army.

Throckmorton believed he had the authority of his fellow officers to speak for them, who according to one of his supporters had appointed him their spokesman to the army regarding their pay arrears as well as their requests to return home. According to this supporter Doyley betrayed him by denying Throckmorton had any authority to act for the army and by so doing making his words and deeds mutinous. Throckmorton then publicly accused Doyley of betrayal.[287] Whether this is true or not it is now impossible to tell but certainly there was, as Goodsonn described to Thurloe, a great dissatisfaction amongst some of the officers who had some 'il favoured actings among them, which have concealed ends; and those late troubles stirred by major Throgmorton [*sic*], were, I doubt not, at first countenanced by the most eminent amongst

284 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.139.
285 Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.32.
286 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.139.
287 Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.33.

them, to raise commotions against major generall Sedgwicke should take command of the army'.[288] Doyley, with his authority being openly challenged, took a tough stance and Throckmorton was arrested and tried for his mutiny. Throckmorton claimed Doyley had no authority to try him, further alienating him from the moderates in the army, but he was tried and then found guilty of attempting to arouse mutiny and was sentenced to death. The officer corps was divided in their support for Throckmorton, as they were in their support for Doyley, but they realised that to pardon him would create further division within the army and completely undermine Doyley's position and authority. Apparently a showdown between Doyley and Throckmorton occurred the night before his execution. Barrington, his commanding officer, and William Aylesbury attempted to intercede 'to prevent his blood' but to no avail. When Barrington finally sided with Doyley Throckmorton's fate was sealed. Despite having much support in the army, many of whom had no wish but to be gone from Jamaica, 'the officers could not see any hopes of future peace if he were spared, which led all jointly to sign and seal the warrant for his execution'. Barrington was to claim 'altho' there was an ugly face put upon the business and a great deal of clamour about it, yet the business was so foul and there was so much in it that he could not be spared with safety'.[289]

To many Throckmorton was a hero who had challenged Doyley on their behalf against the unreasonable conditions and lack of pay under which the army was forced to serve. The army had never agreed to become farmers. They wanted to serve and fight. If they could not do that in Jamaica then they felt justified in demanding to return home where they could continue to serve. Whether Throckmorton had the support of the common soldiers is not clear, but he certainly expressed the desires of many of the officers. In many ways Doyley had no alternative but to make an example of him when he challenged his authority so openly. Doyley was well aware of his weak position without formal authority to govern, but he also knew that the colony was doomed unless strong governance was provided. When news of the incident reached England it created a big stir and it was even reported in 1658 that duels had been fought between those for and against Throckmorton.[290] Indeed, even as late as 1683 the anonymous author of an early book on the history of Jamaica was to passionately write of the unreasonableness of Throckmorton's sentence and to lament that 'the most unhappy, most ingenious and hansom man that ever was on *Jamaica*, was shot to death'.[291]

In the unsettled days of 1656 Throckmorton was not the only officer to be purged from the army. In June Richard Holdip was cashiered, supposedly for 'detaining the dues of the regiment' on charges brought against him by his lieutenant colonel, Samuel Barry. Holdip was an experienced planter and knew how to get things done, and his plantation was regarded by some as the best on the island; he was described as 'the best and most forward planter' who, had he remained, 'might have been brought [his plantation] to

288 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.152–153.
289 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.124.
290 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.124.
291 Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.33.

good perfection'. Unfortunately he was not allowed 'to enjoy his plantation' and was sent back to England.[292] He was not well liked within the army (though clearly trusted by Venables), perhaps because he was not a soldier of experience and had owed his rapid promotion to his knowledge of the West Indies rather than his military prowess. When rumour reached Jamaica in 1657 that Holdip had been pardoned and would shortly return to Jamaica, William Brayne, then governor of the island, felt it necessary to advise Thurloe that it would be a mistake, for in his opinion Holdip would 'breed great disturbance' on the island should he return. He was 'soe extreamly hated for his cruelties and oppression, which they say he hath executed in the Indies'.[293]

Another officer to get into trouble during these heady days of discontent was Henry Archbould, and this time the fleet was worryingly implicated. According to Captain John Colbourne, at a meeting in a house in Santiago on 15 May 1656 between the two of them and Major John Filkins (all officers in the former regiment of Colonel Carter and now commanded by Archbould), Archbould had expressed his dissatisfaction as to the state of affairs in Jamaica and England. According to Colbourne he had said 'my lord protector was worse than his word; and that they should or were like to have noe more pay then what they had already.' He then allegedly declared that if the army was run by him he would 'take a course to pay themselves'. He is then purported to have said that 'by seizing on the fleet' they could go and serve 'the Venetian, who would be glad to entetaine them into their pay'. Colbourne is then said to have responded that 'it would be impossible to effect any thinge of that nature, for the fleet was not under their commande'. Archbould then, according to Colbourne, responded by stating that 'it could be donne by a complyance with the fleet, whoe were as much discontented as they; and that he could make sure of two shippes, if not fower; and that if every one would use his interest in like manner, their busines might be donne.'[294]

When Colbourne reported this alleged conversation to Doyley is unclear but he seems to only have provided his formal statement on 9 June. Undoubtedly this accusation would have proved worrying to Doyley and particularly to Goodsonn to hear talk of mutiny amongst the fleet. A court martial was duly arranged to investigate the matter further on 17 June but Archbould was acquitted due to a lack of evidence. The Court undertook a 'serious and solemne debate of the matter' for the charge was 'tending to seditione and of a dangerous consequence'. They took into consideration 'the person, demeanour, and integrity of the partie accus'd, eminently knowne to them' who had served the 'commonwealth these many years past'. Under examination Colbourne admitted that there was 'an old grudge' between the two of them which did much to discredit his accusations. Filkins is recorded to have supported the accused by stating 'that hee veryly thought the lieut. coll. had noe such designe, nor intended, as hee spoake'. After the Court

292 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.152.
293 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.391.
294 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.102.

could find no evidence that Archbould 'had any such discourse with any of the fleete nor army about any such thing' and nor did they believe that such a scheme was 'feasable in itself' they decided they could not find him guilty and deferred judgement to the Lord Protector himself. The Court requested that Goodsonn investigate with his own officers 'whether they apprehend any danger to themselves of this supposed conspiracy'. With that Archbould was released and no further action seems to have been taken.[295] Goodsonn and his officers did in fact investigate further these claims only to report that 'they apprehend no danger of any such attempt, nor never heard any such discourse in the fleete'.[296] Doyley was to add he believed Archbould to be 'a sober, godly, and faithfull man, and there being few such in the armie, to our shame be it spoken'.[297] Colbourne's charge seems to have been spurious, but it, and the reaction of the authorities, demonstrate the environment of fear that the English were living under at this time. The accusation did little to hinder Archbould's progress to the higher levels of colonial administration, however.

With the execution of Throckmorton much of the army dissent gradually dissipated. Barrington was to write 'Thanks be to God we have now no differences amongst us, but are all at peace.'[298] Whilst this was not entirely true, for certain of the officers continued to request permission to leave throughout 1656 and 1657, the threat of mutiny had subsided, at least until 1660 when it reared its ugly head again once more but for different reasons. Despite the defeats inflicted upon the Spanish in 1657 and 1658 Jamaica was racked by uncertainty at the end of the decade. The English were receiving little reliable news from home, and even less instruction from the government in England since the death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658. They duly proclaimed Richard as his successor, but by mid 1659 they learned that he had been deposed and Parliament had been restored, only to then learn in early 1660 that it had been replaced by a Committee of Safety.[299] With this news had come the rumours that Charles Stuart might even be restored to the throne, but with this came yet more rumour that he had enlisted the help of Spain to achieve this and as a consequence Jamaica would be returned to Spain. With so much uncertainty it was no wonder that the English on Jamaica were concerned as to what would happen to them, and if all their trials and tribulations had been for nothing. Added to this was the sense that Jamaica was neither a garrison nor a colony and was governed without a duly constituted government. Cromwell had promised civilian government to the settlers he hoped would flock there, but this had so far failed to materialise as army and civilians alike were governed by martial law. Whilst the army was still the largest, and most important, group on the island there was a growing merchant and civilian settler class who were beginning to feel marginalised with no say in how they were being governed.

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295 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.127–128.
296 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.139.
297 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.139.
298 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.124.
299 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.130.

Doyley was executive, legislative and judiciary all in one and he relied on Thomas Fairfax and Cornelius Burrough to help in managing this enormous burden. Inevitably he became isolated from both the common soldiery and many of the officers, who began to feel he was not protecting their interests sufficiently. This was fuelled by the perennial problem of no pay, with most of soldiers not having received any pay since they left England, although for a time some of the married soldiers were able get part of their arrears paid to them back in England. To many it seemed that the only way they would ever get paid was if they returned to England to claim it. This was an unlikely scenario when the soldiers had no choice but to remain in the service of the State, which itself fuelled further resentment. For many of the soldiers, who had by now invested much time and effort in developing their smallholdings, there was a growing sense of commitment to the land and a desire to reap the rewards of their labour. Many now felt frustrated that their army obligations restricted their ability to focus their efforts on farming, or even privateering, from which they felt that they could now make a reasonable living. Without being paid by the army for the service they were obliged to provide, many of the soldiers felt that they would be better off leaving the army to live a life free from army discipline. The time when these soldiers needed the army and the State to provide for their food and other wants had now passed, and many now just wanted to be rid of the shackles that the army forced on them. Much of this discontent had been contained while there was still an enemy to fight, but once the Spaniards were finally defeated and left the island in 1660 the English were free to vent their frustrations. Into this cauldron of discontent and anger stepped the hitherto unheard of Lieutenant Colonel John Raymond, who in a very short space of time managed, like Throckmorton, to divide the army and to commit mutiny.

Raymond's origins are obscure and he does not seem to have held a formal rank within the army in Jamaica. He might have been an original reformado, but he could also have arrived any time after 1655. A John Reymond was lieutenant colonel in John Birch's regiment in Sir William Waller's army in 1644 and this might be the same person, or he might be the lieutenant colonel in Thomas Tyrell's regiment in 1644 who had served in the regiment since 1642. There was also a Lieutenant Colonel John Raymond from Dorset who received land in Winterborne Whitechurch that had been sequestered from a local Royalist.[300] Also in Birch's regiment at the same time was Major John Humphrey, who might be the same person who commanded the regiment of reinforcements sent to Jamaica in 1656, so Raymond might well have been brought out then or later at the instigation of Humphrey – but this is speculation. It is also not known if he really was a colonel or not. He had certainly arrived in Jamaica before December 1658,[301] and must have been of some substance as he had a house with 20 acres of land in Santiago[302]

300 Spring, *Waller's Army*, p.28; TNA SP16/539 Part 2, State Papers Domestic, Charles I Addenda, f.190; Charles Herbert Mayo (ed.), *The Minute Books of the Dorset Standing Committee, 23rd Sept., 1646, to 8th May, 1650* (Exeter: William Pollard & Co. Ltd., 1902), p.312.

301 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.22.

302 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.22.

and land in Guanaboa Vale, and he was certainly not lacking in character and persuasion judging by how quickly he was to turn events and gain support from elements of the army. The men of the Guanaboa regiment, formerly under the command of Barrington but now commanded by Edward Tyson, would have known Raymond well as he had a plantation close by and was a close friend of Tyson. The regiment had taken part in Throckmorton's mutiny of 1656 but that does not mean to say that it was a particularly radical unit or that it was any more susceptible to being led astray than any other malcontent regiment in the army. What caused Raymond to begin to spread sedition amongst the regiment, or how he managed to convince the otherwise competent and capable Tyson to support him, is unknown. Nor is it known when Raymond started. Most likely, over time he had various conversations with the officers and men of the regiment and felt strongly enough to publicly state his discontent with the way the army was treating him and his fellow soldiers, and that he felt they would all be better off if they were no longer in the army but were civilians who did not have to labour under the threat of martial law.

Matters came to a head on 1 August 1660 when Doyley, fearing an invasion from the Spanish, and in conjunction with his senior officers, issued a series of directives and orders he believed were necessary 'for the preservacon [*sic*] of the English lyeing in these parts'. Doyley was shocked when 'instead of a cheerfull compliance and obedience to these orders' he received from some individuals and officers an 'obstinate contempt of those orders' and with them a presumption that 'they are nott under the military power' that he, the commander-in-chief, manifested. Doyley added that these individuals, which he did not at this point name, had 'trayterously [*sic*] and seditiosly dared to infuse into these souldiers principles of liberty and freedom from my power and authority because they have nott their pay'.[303] This was not the first time that Doyley's authority had been challenged and he was not about to let it happen again. He immediately constituted a military committee comprising his most senior officers and chaired by Henry Archbould, who were given the authority to 'consult and advise me about the defence and security of this island [and] the English interest therein'. He gave this committee the sweeping powers to 'proceed against all manner of persons that are disobedient and refractory … accordinge to the rule and discipline of warre.' To the shock of many this power extended over civilians as well as the army but Doyley also gave the committee the power to condemn any person accused of a crime and who refused to appear to defend themselves or were alleged to be in contempt, 'as though they had confest the fact for which they are accused'. This was a staggering deprivation of due process for Englishmen who had always felt that they had been born with the right to be deemed innocent until proved guilty and to have a fair trial.[304]

Only one source recounts what happened next, a journal written many years later by (Sir) William Beeston, future governor of Jamaica.[305] Beeston

303 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.206–207.
304 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.208.
305 Reprinted in Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, pp.271–300.

had only arrived in Jamaica in April 1660 and as a civilian he was no admirer of Doyley's authoritarian style of military governance. He noted the general air of despondency amongst the soldiers, who had received no pay, and which 'made the soldiers deem themselves neglected' while there was a general expectation 'that all would be called off, and the island deserted'. Beeston blamed Raymond, whom he described as 'a discontented reformed officer', for stirring up mutinous feelings amongst the men of the Guanaboa regiment. The crisis came to a head on 2 August, the day after Doyley had effectively suspended any semblance of the rule of law on the island, when Raymond was able to convince the regiment, and Edward Tyson, to 'live no more as an army' when they declared 'they would have the island settled in colonies, and make constables and civil officers'.[306] This was a rejection of the entire order of governance on the island with the demand to disband the army, cease military rule and establish civilian government. This, Raymond no doubt encouraged the soldiers, was the only way they would attain their personal freedom and be allowed to make their own choices as to how and where they would live and maintain themselves. Under the circumstances at the time on Jamaica this was a revolutionary statement of intent which threatened both the authority of the colonial administration but by extension the authority of the State as well. The support that the soldiers gave to Raymond's demand for the overthrow of the existing order might well have been linked to a liberal flow of wine belonging to Lieutenant Morris that was taken from him during the mutiny.[307] The extent to which Tyson encouraged his men is not known, but it is clear he did little to discourage them and history has painted him as the willing dupe of Raymond who had the authority and opportunity to quell the mutiny but chose not to.

Initially Doyley attempted dialogue with Raymond and Tyson to peacefully settle the dispute, but this achieved nothing as the two ringleaders, sensing they held the advantage, refused to compromise. If Beeston is to be believed Doyley was unsure as to how widespread the sedition had spread throughout the army, and if indeed he could even rely on the army to follow his orders to quell the insurrection if needed. So concerned was Doyley for his personal safety, again according to the hostile Beeston, that he had the *Mary*, a merchantman from Bristol, made ready for his escape if it proved necessary. Doyley was, however, as decisive as ever in a crisis. Unsure if he could rely upon the loyalty of the regiments quartered around Santiago, who were in a closer proximity to Guanaboa Vale and perhaps more susceptible to being influenced by the sedition Raymond was spreading, he ordered Major Hope of the Liguanea regiment to occupy Santiago. He then sent Hope, whom he obviously felt he could trust, to Guanaboa to talk to the rebels and attempt to convince the soldiers to stand down.[308] This was a dangerous task for Hope, for in such a volatile situation as this emotions run high and a sudden movement or the wrong word spoken could lead to disastrous consequences and perhaps also his own death. Doyley seems to have realised that there was

306 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, p.273.
307 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.52.
308 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, p.273.

no negotiating with Raymond and Tyson, so Hope was to attempt to talk to the soldiers directly and attempt to split them from the two officers by clearly telling 'them the danger if they persisted', and convincing the men themselves to turn against the two instigators. Hope offered the soldiers a pardon if they 'promised the next morning to deliver up their officers'. This was a bold move by Doyley and Hope, attempting to convince the ordinary soldiers of the errors of their ways after they had already been led into insurrection by the officers. If this gambit failed Doyley would have no choice but to use force against the Guanaboa regiment to disperse them and reassert his authority, but he was unsure if he could even rely on the army to carry out his orders; even if it did, the situation could easily and quickly escalate and turn into a bloodbath, leaving him in an even more precarious position.

However Doyley's judgement in this, as in many situations, was good. Hope did his job well and was able to convince the ordinary soldiers not to continue with their mutiny. Overnight the calmer heads in the regiment prevailed, presumably led by the other officers, and both Raymond and Tyson were arrested by their own men. The following morning the regiment handed them both over to Doyley, who immediately instigated a court martial. He needed to quickly reassert his authority and to be seen to be in control. Not surprisingly the court martial 'adjudged them worthy of death' and they were immediately 'shot to death' in front of the army, according to tradition under a large tamarind tree in Mulberry Garden, behind the current YMCA and YWCA in Spanish Town.[309] Undoubtedly many of the soldiers resented this extreme sentence, and in many ways it only proved the point of the ringleaders that it was time for the army to relinquish control and let civilian government and due process be installed on the island. After the executions Doyley ordered the army to disperse to their quarters, but there was such a murmuring of dissent and many had 'grown so insolent' that he was again required to defuse the situation. As always he grasped the reality of the situation and in this case he knew what would placate the common soldier: he immediately gave the order that the soldiers could plunder the houses of both Tyson and Raymond in Santiago. This was a dangerous and bold move by Doyley and one that could easily spiral out of control, but he needed to give the soldiers something in return, otherwise the dissent would fester and spread. So he gave them what soldiers have always wanted – the chance to plunder. Both houses were soon ransacked, as were others nearby, but it had the effect of venting the soldiers' frustrations, and eventually Doyley and his other officers were able to round them up and send them back to their quarters.[310]

Who else was involved in the mutiny, apart from Raymond and Tyson, is unclear; what role the other officers of the regiment played in inciting the mutiny is also not known. Lieutenant Morris claimed Abraham Langford, one of the navy administrators and a merchant, supported the mutiny and called him a traitor and accused him of incitement. There was at least some violence committed during the episode for Morris claims he was 'wounded

309 Cundall, *Historic Jamaica*, p.88.
310 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, p.273.

in the defence of the Governor'.[311] In the aftermath of the mutiny Doyley was good to his word and none of the other participants were punished. He did reward those soldiers who had supported him in quelling the unrest by issuing 88*l* 8s on 5 August 'for the maintenance of the officers and souldiers lately attendinge the service of this Parliament in order to the reducent [*sic*] of the regiment of Guanaboa beinge in rebellion under comand of Lt. Collonell Tyson'.[312] In addition to this 4,600 lb of turtle meat 'from the store att Legoney' was sent to Santiago 'for the use of the party there in order to the suppressinge of the mutineers'.[313] As a sad footnote to this episode, on 11 May 1660 the Council of State had permitted Mary Tyson, wife of Edward, with her two maids and a manservant 'to repair to her husband Lieut.-Col. Edward Tyson, in Jamaica, in the ship Bear now bound thither'. The *Bear* arrived in Jamaica on 17 August with Mary Tyson, barely two weeks after her husband had been executed for mutiny.[314]

XI

Within a month of the English arrival on Jamaica the army was dispersed between the main settlement at Santiago, the landing area at Passage Fort, the growing naval base at Cagway and across the plains of the interior, and this dispersal brought with it the problem of how best the English could defend themselves from an attack by the Spanish. As the Spanish only had some insignificant breastworks at the landing ground and along the road to Santiago it was quickly apparent to the English that these were insufficient to protect such a large army, and that they would quickly need to construct more adequate defences. Cromwell, in his instructions to the Commissioners issued in March 1656, exhorted they 'make some defensible fortifications thereupon ... at the states charge.'[315] However, no money was immediately forthcoming from England and so the army was necessitated to do what it could with the limited resources available. In September 1657 Doyley wrote to the Committee of Officers and Merchants to request the sum of 3,000*l*[316] be sent to enable him to complete the construction of the fortifications that Sedgwick had started, but it was only in February 1658 that 2,572*l* was actually received in Jamaica when it was delivered by Christopher Myngs.[317]

The landing area was the key to the English defences when they first arrived, dependent as they were on receiving supplies from the fleet, even though it was little more than a jetty protruding into the shallows of Hunts Bay. As soon as the army landed Penn sent ashore materials to fortify the rickety Spanish buildings which occupied the area, but even this was

311 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.52.
312 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.214.
313 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.216.
314 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.136; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.208.
315 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.634–635, 500.
316 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.68.
317 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.95.



Map 7 English defences on Jamaica, 1655–1660.

insufficient.[318] It is not clear what construction was started here prior to Sedgwick's arrival, but he quickly initiated the building of a more significant fortified blockhouse which later became known as Passage Fort. Sedgwick described this in November 1655 as 'being a hundred foot in length, and 25 foot broad' and built by sailors from the fleet 'with little or no help from the army'.[319] According to Sedgwick this only took about one week to construct, but in February 1656 further construction of fortifications was being undertaken at the site when 11 men from each of four regiments were sent there to assist.[320] This was probably the defensive structure that had been 'raised about the magazine provisions at the common landing place, by soldiers of other regiments; but it is not yet finished', when the Commissioner wrote to England in March 1656.[321] A Spanish map, dated 1657, depicts a landing pier protruding from an encircling fortification within which are store houses, and this was likely to be an accurate description of the fort at the time.[322] The fort soon became the most important warehouse for English supplies as they were offloaded from the fleet, and it was vital that it was well defended (see Plates D, E and F).

By October 1656 a permanent garrison had been established in Passage Fort under Captain John Harrington of Barrington's regiment.[323] Harrington was provided with a detailed list of instructions issued by the council of officers on 31 October, which included to 'keepe and observe good orders and government in the place where you are' as well as to 'keepe in good order the inhabitants there and especially such as keepe tippleing-houses and see that no disorderly houses be kept nor immoderate drinking and to prevent all miscarriages of that nature', which suggests that a settlement of sorts had grown up around the fort by this stage. He was to 'take special care to preserve ye State's stores' that were in storage in the fort. The garrison formed an essential conduit as information and messages flowed through it between the government in Santiago and the fleet at Cagway. Harrington was also to keep a special watch out for the arrival of the anticipated Spanish fleet, and 'to give notice of any approach of ye enemie by messengers if you can to ye Headquarters, if not, by the firing of three guns that soe you may receave timely reliefe from us'. He was further given powers to search for and seize any embezzled stores and clothing amongst the population and specifically on board any of the numerous small ferries that frequently landed at the jetty. He was also ordered to 'apply yourselfe to make some more defensible fortifications than now are there and strictly to keepe watches and guards and sentries to prevent an incursion or attempt of the enemie, and to see that their [the garrison's] arms be always well fixed, and ye souldiers kept within their quarters and the great guns there in order, to give an effectual opposition to ye enemie if case require'.[324]

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318 Penn, *Memorials*, Vol. 2, p.101.
319 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.153.
320 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.46.
321 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
322 AGI, *Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica*, *c.*1657, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 56.
323 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.100.
324 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.102.


la A; el agua donde estala fuerza de cay o cañe.
la D; cay o fuerte que cubre toda en la canal de los
gualte, y mira a la Ciudad Sur
la C; el dique embaxo cerro del agua o principal
la D; la poblacion que tiene en el cay o Ciudad
grande en la de la parte donde
la E; el muro donde estan las municiones
la F; el Muro de gantaco
la G; Muro de cay manes
la H; Muro del gualte
la I; la canal de todo gualte
la L; la calleta
f
g
12
21
y
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12
B.

Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica que tiene el enemigo, c.1657. (Plate F)



Costa del sur de la ysla de Santiago de Jamayca desde la punta de Morante hasta el río de Manatinese con todos sus cayos o ysletas, bajos y arreçifes, c.1656. (Plate G)

Passage Fort was constantly being extended and repaired throughout the garrison period. On 25 November 1656 'tenn pickaxes, tenn spades, tenn shovells, tenn axes, two broad-axes, six hatchets, tenn bitts, one whipsawe, one cross-cut sawe, three hand-saws, two sledges, and one line for ye use and for fortifying ye garrison at Passage' were issued, as on the same day were 'three drumcords to make a line to lay out worke for ye use of ye garrison'.[325] On 9 September 1657 Harrington was ordered to clear the land between the fort and the Half Way Tree (half way along the track to Santiago) to make the route more accessible. In January 1658 yet more construction work was being undertaken at the fort, and the following month he was provided with 'furniture' for his cart horse as well as a selection of carpenter's tools and 'one hundred foote of deale board and three hundred of spikes'. In March, with seemingly sufficient money now available with cash having been brought from England aboard the *Marston Moor*, Harrington was issued with 40*l* on two separate occasions with which to pay the labourers working on the construction. A third payment was made to workers at the end of April as well, plus a further 60*l* in June and 80*l* in July. More wood was issued to the garrison in August. Whatever the extent of the construction at Passage Fort it seems to not have continued beyond August 1658 as no further mention is made of it in the existing sources.[326]

Also in April 1658 the garrison of the fort was provided with a shallop from the *Indian* for its own use, although this was loaned back to the fleet in June when Doyley needed it for the expedition to Rio Nuevo.[327] The garrison was well supplied with ammunition throughout 1657 and 1658, and issued with an extra 'two barrells of powder, match and small shott proportionable, and one hundred and sixty round shott' for the fort's great guns on 31 May 1658 as Doyley frantically made his preparations to attack the Spanish on the north side; he needed to ensure the garrison on the south side was sufficiently supplied should a Spanish invasion eventuate while he was away.[328] However, this garrison was never large. In November 1656 it consisted of just 58 men, in December 1657 there were 53, in July 1658 there were 52, but by October only 29 under Harrington's command, though by July 1659 it had risen to 41. Harrington was still commanding the garrison in May 1662 when his company consisted of 46 officers and men.[329] There is no English description of Passage Fort but it was described in some detail in a letter from the Spaniard Domingo Rodriguez de Vera to the Duke of Albuquerque in 1657. He described it then as:

> an enclosure of entrenchments of fascine and earth, eight feet thick with a few loopholes and two redoubts for clearing the outlying country. It has eighteen

325 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.107.
326 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.72, 93, 94, 96, 102, 104, 106, 114, 115.
327 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.104, 109.
328 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.107.
329 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.104; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.89,113; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.7,54,264; BL, Egerton MS 2395.

> pieces [of artillery], five field ones of bronze and the rest of iron, their calibre from 6 to 12 pounds of ball. In the middle of this fortification there are three stores. When there are provisions and munitions in them, a guard of 90 men goes into this port.[330]

Evidently there was a bridge of sorts at the fort (or possibly a drawbridge which might indicate it was moated) for in September 1659 nails were issued to effect repairs upon it.[331] However in 1662 the fort was described as having 'fallen to decay' but still had 18 guns mounted in it.[332]

Not only did Passage Fort protect the vital landing site but it also guarded the track that led from there to Santiago de la Vega, the island's most important settlement and also the main English garrison and the seat of governance. The town the English occupied in May 1655 was completely open and had no defences whatsoever. With only wood available the English could do little but build a wooden palisade around the town to provide a rudimentary defence, but it seems that even this was not built immediately. Writing in April 1656 Goodsonn informed Thurloe that the army spent 'five months about setting up pallisadoes about the town, which 500 men would have done in one day; and as yet hardly accomplished', which implies that construction only began towards the end of 1655, most likely just after the arrival of Sedgwick.[333] In 1657 the Spaniard Vera described the defences:

> Within the city the whole of the square is surrounded with another entrenchment of fascines and palisades. In the middle is the Church and houses of the Governor, where is the principal corps of guards which usually comprises 200 infantrymen. The entrenchment has two sally ports, and within the square a bronze piece of three pounds of ball which is fired to gather the troops when there is a call to arms. The distance from this fortification to the one where the stores are [Passage Fort], which is the one of the quay, is two leagues.[334]

Vera's description implies that it was only the central part of the town that was fortified, which would explain why it was so easy for Ysassi to enter the outskirts of the town in March 1656 and cause such mayhem. This fortification, by May 1658 known as Fort Henry after the Lord Protector's fourth son, was described as 'buylt of stokadoes, and circumfrence with a dry trench'.[335] Most likely the site of Fort Henry is the current Emancipation Square in Spanish Town.

In September 1657 Major Thomas Fairfax was appointed 'from time to time to look to the security of the said towne and appoint and look after the guards' in Doyley's absence. In March 1658 he was referred to as the commander 'att St. Jago fort' where he had 259 'persons under his command'

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330 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, pp.57–58.
331 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.128, 140.
332 BL, Add MS 11410, Collection of Papers relating to English affairs in the West Indies, and chiefly in Jamaica, 1654–1682.
333 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.695.
334 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.58.
335 TNA, CO1/14, America and West Indies, colonial papers, 1660, f.128.

whilst in July 1659 he was referred to as the commander of Fort Henry, and so was evidently the commander of English forces within the town and fort.[336] Fort Henry also benefited from the money sent from England to expand the island's fortifications in 1658. On 22 March Fairfax was provided with 30*l* 'for use of St. Jago fortifications' along with two felling axes and two broad axes and a further 60*l* in April and more axes. Evidently the wooden palisade was being strengthened and possibly extended with newly felled trees when in May Fairfax was issued 'eight hundred of tenne-penny nailes and eight thousand of six-penny nailes', as well has hatchets and bills and yet more money throughout the summer, mostly likely to pay labourers working on the fortifications. On 19 August two hundredweight of iron was delivered to the fort, while on 24 August Fairfax was given 50*l* 'out of monie appointed for fortifications' with a further 50*l* being issued in mid September. This intense refortification of Fort Henry seems to have been completed by the end of 1658 but even as late as December 1659 Fairfax was being reimbursed with small sums of money previously 'disbursed by him about the fortifieinge [*sic*] of Fort Henry'.[337]

The English also fortified a few other locations on the island proper as well. To the west of Santiago runs the small Black River, across which the track from the town to Old Harbour Bay runs. At the time of the English occupation a small bridge crossed the river, and it was here that the two sides met during the initial discussions regarding the treaty, and here that Castilla dramatised the encounter between Buller and the Spaniards in June 1655.[338] Being the only route into the town from the west this was a strategically important location where, according to Castilla in July 1656, the English were 'building a masonry fort commanding the road to the port of Esquivel'.[339] It is plausible that the English did in fact fortify, or at the very least guard, this bridge, but it is unlikely they were able to construct it out of stone at this time. No other reference has been found relating to this fortification. According to Spanish sources the English had also fortified the landing area on the Liguanea Plain, possibly in the vicinity of modern-day Bournemouth Gardens, next to the river known to the Spaniards as the Rio Zautaco. Vera describes these fortifications as being 'some pallisadoes after the fashion of a camp where they [the English settlers] go for change'. He also reported that most of the English in that area were 'quartered in the ranches and sugar mills of that vicinity in companies of 100 to 150 men, with orders to hold their post as a reserve until they are ordered to move'.[340] Whilst there is no evidence in English sources to corroborate this, it would have made sense for the landing area to be protected, most likely by a simple palisade. In anticipation of the arrival of the Nevis settlers towards the end of

336 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.77, 101; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.56.

337 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.102, 103, 104, 105, 115, 117; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.5, 154.

338 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.13–14.

339 Wright, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.29.

340 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.58; AGI, *Costa del sur de la ysla de Santiago de Jamayca desde la punta de Morante hasta el rio de Manatinese con todos sus cayos o ysletas, bajos y arreçifes, c.*1656, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 55.

1656 Brayne ordered that a fort be constructed at what is now Port Morant, although this might only have been started in 1657 after Goodsonn had departed, for his later report recommends a fort be constructed there.[341] Its location was mostly likely at the site still locally known as Fort, on the western side of Bowden Harbour. In a letter to the Lord Protector in January 1657 Brayne stated he had 'designed [a] fortification in this place, which offers itselfe naturally fitt for defence, there being but a small neck of land that can probably be assaulted. An able engineere is very much wanting for that work, I not being skilfull in that arte',[342] while in another letter in March he referred to it as a 'small fortification' into which he had 'mounted thereon 10 whole calverins, which doth secure the harbour'.[343] Part of Brayne's and all of Moore's regiment when they arrived in early 1657 were sent to settle around Port Morant and so the garrison of the fort would have consisted of men from these regiments, which by 1659 were under the command of Major Wilbraham.[344] Goodsonn recommended a small fort be constructed at Port Antonio on the north side and a garrison be placed there, but this never materialised prior to 1662.[345]

By far the largest and most important fortifications built by the English at this time were at Cagway. As the naval facilities at Careening Point grew during 1655 it soon became obvious that a fort was needed at the tip of Cagway to protect them and the entrance into the harbour beyond. Venables had noted the importance of fortifying Cagway as early as June 1655 in a letter to Thurloe, and seemingly construction had begun before he left Jamaica. The hitherto unheard of Simon de Casseres was evidently an engineer, and when he returned to England with Venables he submitted a list of items required for the construction of defences on the island. He made some sensible observations when he commented that, 'The fortification of the harber cannott bee strong, without it bee made of stone; or bricke' and that experienced artificers, masons and bricklayers should be sent to work under orders of 'captaine Hewes [Thomas Hughes], whoe is a mathematicion, and sufficient in fortification'. He noted that there was 'greate store of stone and lyme; which may easely bee made within two miles', most likely he was referring to the lime kilns and quarry at Port Henderson on the mainland. Certainly the later construction of Cagway Fort suggests that Casseres' suggestions were followed, but there is no evidence to suggest that men with experience of constructing fortifications were ever sent.[346] Casseres mentioned that when he left Jamaica (mid July 1655) Hughes was already working on the fortifications at Cagway which were initially completed by January 1656, when the place was referred to as 'Captain Hughe's fort'; in September it was called 'the forte of Carreening Poynte' and by November it was known as Fort Cromwell.[347] After the Restoration its name changed once

341 TNA, CO1/33, f.63.
342 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.770.
343 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.110.
344 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.128.
345 TNA, CO1/33, f.63.
346 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.61–62.
347 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.42, 85, 98.

again, this time to Fort Charles, and it was this fort that was destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami of 1692. However, it took time to build. In January Goodsonn commented that, 'We have been at work about building a fort for the securing the harbour; when it is built mean, and as yet but half built; however, we are resolved to set to it heart and hand to finish it if possible', but by 12 March he commented that it was 'now near completed with 21 pieces of ordnance already mounted therein, among which are those battering pieces of brass sent over by the first fleet'.[348]

The first garrison consisted of men from Humphrey's regiment who were sent there in January 1656 to assist in its construction.[349] However both Sedgwick and Goodsonn were particularly unimpressed with the assistance the regiment provided. They notified Cromwell on 12 March that they had:

> appointed col. Humfry's regiment to be drawn thither to help on the work, to man the fort, and to keep watches and guards in necessary and eminent places at the mouth of the harbour, they prove altogether, notwithstanding any encouragement we could give them, useless; and then sending them back to quarters, we carried on that work only by the help of the seamen.[350]

In March Ysassi noted, in a letter to Proenza, that there were 'about eighteen houses on the point of Cayo de Carena [Point Cagway] and on the inner harbour seven thatched huts'.[351] In another letter to his brother he described Cagway in more detail. He implied that the English had dug trenches in a north–south direction across the tombolo to impede any access from the east side of harbour, and said there was 'no powder house, the powder is underground in a thatched hut', nor was there a magazine 'for war material'. He added that there were 300 men along the stretch of the tombolo (Humphrey's regiment) and that they were 'girt with trenches and seven pieces mounted at the place where there are nine houses'. At Point Cagway he noted there was 'powder and other war material'. He went on to note, almost disdainfully, that 'They say there was a little fort on the Point to carry artillery. I did not see it because it must be low.'[352] In 1657 Vera described Cagway in greater detail. He related that 'the fortification called Cayo de Carena [Point Cagway]' was being the 'principal and strongest' of the English forts on the island. It contained '30 pieces [of artillery] with 6 of bronze, among which is one that discharged 52 pounds of ball', other guns that shot 48 lb and 36 lb cannonballs, 'and two that they brought from Santa Marta [by Goodsonn's raid of August 1655]', as well as two mortars and some smaller calibre guns. He described the layout of the fort as 'that of a star of stone and mortar. It has an area of 120 feet in width and as many in length with eight look outs that face in all directions. In the middle there is a high redoubt of stone with six pieces. It has two sally ports without gates.' This intelligence

348 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.452; Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.374.
349 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.42.
350 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.
351 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.24.
352 Pietersz et al., 'Two Spanish Documents of 1656', p.31.

had been obtained by Ysassi, most likely from English prisoners (see Plates D, E and F).[353]

There was continuous construction activity at Fort Cromwell until the Restoration as it was initially built, then modified and repaired.[354] The first fort was constructed of wood but as early as January 1656 lime was being transported across to Cagway for use in the fabrication of the walls.[355] In 1657 Goodsonn recounted that the first fort was made from 'timber and planks filled up with Gravell or shingle'.[356] By December 1658 and into January of the following year stone was being transported to Cagway and in May 1659 lime was again being used; the fort now had its own small fleet of shallops to carry lime over from the mainland in August and September.[357] This suggests that stone walls were being constructed at the fort with the lime being used to create a crude form of mortar to hold them together. Brayne had informed Cromwell that 'fortifications needed to be made of lyme and stone (no mud work being capable of standing here)',[358] and so it was necessary to establish a complex supply chain to transport lime, presumably obtained from near the lime kilns on Fort Henderson Hill, with casks being constructed in Santiago for carrying it and stones brought from the mainland (there being none on the tombolo itself).[359] Unfortunately no contemporary English description of Fort Cromwell has been found, but in 1661 Hickeringill was to write that the cannon in the fort were as good 'as the Tower of London would afford'.[360] In 1662 Lord Windsor stated that its foundation 'is upon a Rock', on which in the centre 'standeth an Tower with 8 gunns mounted thereon, 3 of them brasse, and in ye Fort is about 26 Gunnes more, 4 of them brasse, viz two whole Cannon and two demy Cannon there is likewise 2 Mortar pieces of a considerable bigness, but useless'.[361]

The English fortifications, simple as they were at this time, were never tested as the Spanish were unable to muster sufficient strength to pose any threat to the English dominance around Cagway harbour. They were, however, the genesis of a more complex and extensive group of fortifications which eventually ringed the entire island in the later colonial period.

XII

Immediately after the return of Charles II to England he wrote on 2 June 1660 to Luis Mendez de Haro, a leading figure in the Spanish government, proposing a cessation of hostilities in the war initiated between the two

353 Cundall and Pietersz, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, p.58.
354 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', *passim*; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', *passim*.
355 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.50.
356 TNA, CO1/33, f.63.
357 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.64, 65, 116, 122–123, 130.
358 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.771.
359 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.50. 59, 61; Hickeringill, *Jamaica Viewed*, p.38.
360 Hickeringill, *Jamaica Viewed*, p.37.
361 BL, Add MS 11410.

countries by Oliver Cromwell;[362] a peace agreement between the two nations was agreed in early September.[363] Doyley received notification of the general peace in February 1661 in a letter from the Spanish governor of Santiago de Cuba,[364] and whilst the consensus of opinion upon the island was that the peace did not include the West Indies it was only a matter of time before the government in England sought to reduce its military liability in Jamaica. With the appointment of Lord Windsor as governor of Jamaica, he was instructed on 21 March 1662 to form a militia on the island and on 23 April to formally disband the army on his arrival.[365]

Windsor's arrival brought to an end the military occupation of Jamaica, when he disbanded the English army that had been raised some nine years before and which had, at that time, held the high hopes of the Lord Protector that it would smash Spanish dominance in the Americas and forge a new English, and Protestant, empire. But the army Windsor disbanded was just a shadow of the one that left Portsmouth in December 1654. Further recruited in Barbados and St Christopher it had been badly equipped and poorly trained. Defeated and humiliated on Hispaniola it had then been decimated by sickness, disease and hunger on Jamaica. Deserted by its commander when Venables fled home in July 1655 rather than endure the hardships experienced by his men, most of the original officers were dead by 1656, as were many of the common soldiers. New regiments and commanders were dispatched from England, Scotland and Ireland but most of these suffered the same fate and many found an early grave in Jamaica. With insufficient food and supplies sent from home the army had been forced to plant to survive, but was neither equipped for such activities nor inclined to undertake them. Elements of the army had mutinied twice, and for much of its existence it lacked even shoes to wear when sent to fight the Spanish guerrillas and their African-Caribbean auxiliaries. When forced to fight a pitched battle in 1657 Doyley was not even sure the army would even fight, such was the low morale and despondency that permeated its much-diminished ranks. But fight it did, and the men stormed Spanish fortifications on three separate occasions to win significant victories that ultimately forced the Spanish off Jamaica. This English army was far from being the most successful that the English nation had sent abroad at the bidding of the government. It had endured indescribable hardship and extremity but through perseverance and sheer determination it had survived, against the odds, and by 1662 had pacified Jamaica and helped lay the foundations of arguably England's most important colony in the West Indies. But it was now time to disband it and let the soldiers choose what they did next, for they, through their very survival, had earned that right.

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362 TNA, SP94/44, Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Spain, 1660, f.318; Agnes Whitson, *Constitutional Development Of Jamaica - 1660 to 1729*, Historical Series No.LII (Manchester: The University of Manchester, 1929), p.9.

363 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1660-61* (hereafter *CSPD 1660-61*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1860), p.269.

364 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, Vol. 5, p.21.

365 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, Vol. 5, pp.81, 88.

Windsor brought with him a donative from Charles II, in lieu of wages, with which to pay off the soldiers. The army was now just four regiments strong plus a single troop of horse, and mustered a total of around 1,600 men[366] who were each given a share of this 12,274*l* 0s 2d on 17 October 1662 and the army formerly disbanded. At that time Samuel Barry was commanding the Liguanea regiment and it received 2,652*l* 5s 7d. Thomas Lynch was in command of Doyley's old regiment, which was quartered in the newly named Port Royal (Cagway), Morant and Yallah, and received 2,582*l* 4s 1d. After Tyson's execution his regiment was given to Cornelius Burrough, and this was still at Guanaboa and surrounding areas when it was disbanded and received 2,840*l* 12s 6d. Philip Ward had commanded Venables' regiment, which since 1655 was now under Thomas Ballard and was spread between Spanish Town (Santiago), Angels, Passage Fort and Old Harbour when it received 2,671*l* 3s. The solitary troop of horse was now commanded by Captain Robert Nelson and received 1,527*l* 15s.[367]

To provide for the defence of the island a citizen militia was formed in October 1662 'under the command of the soberest men that could be found', and which was organised into five regiments:

Colonel the Lord Windsor
Major Povey
Captain Man
Captain Fuller
Captain Burrough
Strength 15 officers and 327 soldiers

Colonel Lyttelton
Captain Lyttelton
Captain Walrond
Captain Ashton
Strength 12 officers and 256 soldiers

Colonel Mitchell
Major Cope
Captain Clee
Captain Freeman
Captain Guy
Captain Collier
Captain Evans
Captain Morgan
Strength 24 officers and 452 soldiers

Colonel Barry
Lieutenant Colonel Archbould
Major Hope

366 BL, Egerton MS 2395, f.351.
367 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, pp.269–270; Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.

Captain Massie
Captain Valett
Captain Rivers
Captain Cooper
Captain Thorne
Captain Johnson
Strength 24 officers and 540 soldiers

Lieutenant Colonel Lynch
Major Sanderson
Captain Groves
Captain Lloyd
Captain Freeman
Captain Atkins
Captain Englesfield
Captain Browne
Strength 24 officers and 356 soldiers

The total strength of the militia at the end of 1662 was 99 officers and 1,931 soldiers.[368] Many of these officers had already played an notable role during the early years of the colony, while some of the others were soon to play their part. Assuming that these regiments were based in the same areas that their officers held land, it can be suggested that Barry's regiment was from the Liguanea district, Mitchell was based around Guanaboa district, and Lynch around Morant. Windsor's regiment was most likely centred on the seat of government at Santiago and Cagway while Lyttleton's was possibly on the Clarendon Plain, though there is no evidence for this other than it being the only area of occupation at that time that did not have a regiment seemingly assigned to it. With the disbanding of the army, Jamaica completed its transition from military garrison to civilian colony.

368 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, pp.113, 117-118.

5

Jamaica Maritime

I

The role of the navy in the expedition changed dramatically once Jamaica was reached. Prior to that, the role of Penn's fleet had primarily been one of transporting troops and supplies, taking Venables and the army where they chose to go and providing a measure of close support once they arrived. The army was the main element in the war against the Spanish with the fleet acting as a support. However with the virtual disintegration of the army on Jamaica it had no need for transport as the army was no longer in any position to either undertake offensive actions nor take the lead in plotting strategy. As such it was the fleet which now became the primary weapon in continuing the war with Spain across the broad front that was the West Indies. Goodsonn's vessels provided defence for the army and a deterrent against any Spanish counter-attack, and secure storage for much of the materiel that the army needed, and the navy provided labour to build the blockhouses that the army was incapable of erecting themselves. The fleet obtained intelligence for the army and transported the men around the island. It blockaded the channel between Jamaica and Cuba, intercepting and plundering fleeing Spaniards, and for the most part prevented Spanish supplies and relief from entering the island. The competent William Goodsonn orchestrated all of this and was able to attack isolated Spanish settlements on the Main in 1655 and 1656 as well as posting a strong watch on both Cartagena and Havana in an attempt to intercept the Spanish plate fleet. The navy kept communications with England and her colonies in the Americas open, and ensured the safe, albeit infrequent, delivery of essential supplies and food to the struggling colony. Despite a shortage of resources and political turmoil at home the navy provided a constant though diminishing presence in the West Indies and Jamaica well into the 1660s, and undoubtedly was the key to maintaining the English presence on the island and so helped established the base from which Jamaica was later to grow.

However the fleet struggled to remain effective during the overly long deployment of vessels in the Caribbean. When Goodsonn returned to England in 1657 he wrote a lengthy report to the Admiralty which provided suggestions on how to maintain the fleet in the hostile environment that it

then had to serve in, and it provides an interesting insight into the difficulties and challenges it faced in the West Indies.[1] The greatest problem the fleet faced when operating in the Caribbean was the damage caused to both the hulls and sails of its ships. In warm tropical waters barnacles quickly form on soft wooden hulls, damaging them and causing leakage and also impeding their speed and handling at sea. Furthermore worms can easily bore into the wood, which quickly rots and needs to be replaced. Careening a vessel's hull allowed the barnacles to be physically scraped off, but the damage they caused was not easily fixed without a proper shipyard. By 1656 the fleet was in dire need of a shipyard to conduct such repairs, and this necessitated Goodsonn to send many of the vessels back to England before they became irreparably damaged. To reduce these problems he suggested that all vessels sent in future have their hulls covered in tougher spruce deal board and copper, and the nails be covered with thick tar to make the connections more waterproof.[2]

The strong winds in the West Indies could easily rip sails to shreds, so Goodsonn suggested that all vessels should carry three full sets with them when they left England, as well as substantially more cable and twine than would be issued to vessels serving in home waters. Boatswain's and carpenter's stores were needed in much larger quantities than normally provided to vessels, especially nails. He also suggested that a small naval depot be established in Cagway with suitably qualified dockyard hands who could help maintain the vessels stationed there. This yard could also provide maintenance for the privateers and other English merchant vessels in the region, which is certainly what happened, though whether any qualified personnel were sent from England specifically to work there is not known.[3]

Goodsonn recommended that only new gunpowder, 'better than Tower proofe', be sent and that ways be found to keep it dry while in transit with the vessels' powder rooms being 'extraordinary well sealed and dryed'. The muskets for the fleet needed to be firelocks with leather flaps to 'secure their Lockes from the dewes and Raines' and instead of bandoleers the powder be carried in 'Cattooch boxes'. The reason for this was that when used inland the 'Baneleeres are not fitting to march through woods, being apt to loose their powder and to bee pulled away by every Bush'.[4] There is no evidence that this eminently sensible recommendation was also suggested by the army, who had more need of such equipment than the fleet.

As the constant heat also affected the food provisions, Goodsonn had much to say on how these could be better preserved. They needed to be of a good quality 'as for the East Indies' with meat first boiled 'to prevent stinking'. Flour and oatmeal needed to be well dried and packed into dry casks while a little salt should be added to oatmeal 'which prevents the Weevell, and mite'. He thought that all casks for carrying liquid should be made of three-quarter

1 TNA, CO1/33, Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series), Addenda., 1656, ff.60–64.
2 TNA, CO1/33, f.60.
3 TNA, CO1/33, ff.60, 63.
4 TNA, CO1/33, f.60.

inch wood with double the usual number of hoops and well sealed 'to keepe the dry wormes out'. Biscuits were to be made of good corn, while pease were to be thoroughly dried before packing and not stored on the ground beforehand, to prevent them mouldering during the voyage from England.[5] However, despite Goodsonn's best intentions there is no evidence to suggest that his recommendations led to any change in the quality and quantity of stores and provisions provided to the fleet.

Not only did the fleet provide security for the infant colony, it also brought with it the capacity to project English law into the region and administer maritime justice, as the English recognised it. When Admiral Ayscue was sent to the Caribbean in 1651 to reduce Barbados and other errant colonies he also brought with him the ability to enforce English laws, in particular the Navigation Act which restricted foreign trade with English possessions, albeit temporarily. Penn's fleet had this same capability but this time with the permanent presence that was established in the West Indies it could be enforced more actively whilst allowing for the establishment of other Admiralty judicial functions as well. The enforcement of the law of England and the authority of the Admiralty was realised immediately when in January 1655 the fleet sailed into Carlisle Bay, Barbados, and seized some Dutch vessels and the due process of prize condemnation and disposal began.

Traditionally the proceeds from the disposal of prize goods captured by the navy had always been split between the officers and men of the capturing vessel and the State, with one tenth reserved for the Lord High Admiral. This arrangement had been codified in an Act of Parliament dated 22 February 1649, in which it was stipulated that after enemy warships and merchant vessels had been condemned as prize and sold, the prize money was to be distributed with the tenth reserved for the Lord High Admiral being instead used to provide medals, gratuities and rewards for the navy while the crew of the vessel that captured the prize was to receive half of the proceeds and the remaining one half was remitted to the State for the use of maimed and sick sailors and their dependents.[6] The rules regarding seizure of prizes were further clarified in December 1652 when Parliament issued the 'Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea', later reissued in 1659 and so valid for almost the entire period of the English occupation.[7] The 1652 ordinance stipulated that all papers, charter documents, bills of lading and passports found on board a captured vessel were to be 'duly preserved, and not torn nor made away, but the very Originals sent up entirely and without fraud to the Admiralty Court … upon loss of all the shares of the Takers, and such further punishment … as the quality of their offence and misdemeanors shall be found to deserve.'

5 TNA, CO1/33, f.61.

6 Charles Harding Firth and Robert Sangster Rait (eds), *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, Vol. 2 (London: 1911), pp.9–13; Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648–1660* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.58.

7 *Laws of war and ordinances of the sea, ordained and established by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England*, 1652, 105:E.684[9]; *Laws of war and ordinances of the sea. Ordained and established by the Parliament of the Common wealth of England; For the regulating and better government of the navies, fleets, and ships of war, and armies by sea of the Common wealth of England*, 1659.

It further stipulated that 'none shall take out of any Prize or Ship, or Goods ... any Money, Plate, Goods, Lading or Tackle, before Judgement first thereof pass in the Admiralty Court' and that the entire cargo be brought in 'without Imbezilment' and 'without fraud' upon 'punishment as shall be found by a Councel of War or the Court of Admiralty'. The only exception to this was that it 'be lawful for all Captains, Sea-men, Soldiers and others ... to take and to have to themselves as pillage ... All such Goods and Merchandizes (other then Arms, Ammunition, Tackle, Furniture or Stores of such ship) as shall be found by them ... upon or above the Gun-deck of the said ship, and not otherwise.' It was also decreed that none of the captured ships' equipment or armaments were to be removed 'upon pain of death.'[8] As will be seen it was to prove very hard to fully implement these directives, especially when the seized vessels belonged to a nation not at war with England, but still in breach of English law. Also, given Cromwell's instructions that all plunder and spoils were to be retained by the State for the financing of the expedition, this would necessarily rankle many who would feel that they would be losing their traditional dues.

The seizure of the Dutch vessels as prize, that were trading with Barbados in contravention of the Navigation Act in 1655, was the first act in England's determination to dominate trade and the seas around the West Indies, which was to play out for the next two decades mainly from the English base on Jamaica. But the English also brought with them the necessity of establishing a mechanism whereby vessels either conducting illicit trade, or belonging to the enemy, could be inventoried, assessed, judged, condemned if appropriate and disposed of. This was traditionally the role of the High Court of the Admiralty, which sat in London and comprised naval officers specifically appointed to judge cases of maritime law and process the administration of prizes. Until 1655 the English had no permanent naval facilities outside England, and as such all maritime activity necessarily involved the parties concerned returning to England for due process to be followed there. But with the expectation that the English would establish multiple bases in the West Indies it would be expedient to create an administrative structure detached from the High Court in England to settle matters quickly and locally, without needing to wait on decisions being made at home without all the pertinent facts being available.

Despite the obvious necessity of some form of local judiciary there was nothing specific in the commissions for the original commissioners, nor in their accompanying instructions, that granted them the power and authority to create such organs of State, although their commission did mention that their instructions were to include 'such others as you shall from time to time receive from us on that behalfe' and so it is possible that separate instructions were issued in that regard that no longer exist.[9] Penn's commission as commander of the fleet gave him the authority to command and manage his force 'according to the general customs and laws of the sea';[10] whilst his

8 *Laws of War.*
9 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.109–110.
10 Penn, *Memorials*, p.22

instructions gave him explicit permission to seize any property belonging to the King of Spain (and of France), he was not granted the authority to dispose of them, instead he was instructed that they 'be preserved without embezzlement, and delivered to the commissioners, that so they may come in account to the State'.[11] Penn's directives are somewhat contradictory. Under the 'general customs and laws of the sea' it was an Admiralty function to administer maritime law and justice and yet the commissioners, to which he was to deliver any such spoils, were in effect civilians or at least not commissioned officers of the Admiralty. The reasoning behind this decision by Cromwell to circumvent the navy's traditional role of disposal of prizes was his insistence that all spoils be disposed of for the good of the expedition, rather than the more random tradition of whoever gained the plunder benefiting from it. This contradiction was to lead to dispute both in Barbados and Jamaica.

After Admiral Ayscue had reduced Barbados in 1652 a large consignment of sugar was seized which had been traded on the island in contravention to laws passed previously, that precluded trade with the rebellious island. Declared prize, the sugar remained on the island when Ayscue departed soon afterwards, and it was optimistically assumed that the sugar would still be there and that the expedition could sell it on arrival to provide much-needed money. Not surprisingly, when the commissioners enquired as to its whereabouts 'we found not a penny in readyness but abroade in such hands, as were not well affected for nothing; having had the use of large sums for these three yeares, and have upon that foundation raised fine estates, which they are so loath to part withall.'[12] The commissioners had quickly seen how easily the benefits of prize could easily evaporate.

By virtue of the commissioners' instructions from Cromwell to be responsible for the disposal of prizes, on 1–2 March 1655 Venables, Penn and Winslow issued a series of instructions constituting a Prize Office in Barbados, comprised of local civilians led by Thomas Modyford, for administering the assessment and disposal of the Dutch vessels seized trading in contravention of the Navigation Act, and for future prize matters.[13] Intended only for the implementation of maritime justice on Barbados, the office does not seem to have outlasted the departure of the commissioners by many months. In a broader sense this was an attempt by the government in London to establish greater control over the previously wayward colony, but these efforts were much resented on the island, whose inhabitants preferred, and had become used to, managing their own affairs.[14] However the limitations of this contradictory arrangement between the civilians and the fleet of the expedition soon became apparent, proving that as a model for further creations it was flawed. It was the fleet which seized the Dutch

11 Penn, *Memorials*, p.25.

12 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.250.

13 J.W. Fortescue (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies 1685-1688 and Addenda 1653-1687* (hereafter *CSP Colonial 1685-1688*), Vol. 12 (London: 1899), p.628.

14 BL, Add MS 18986, Thomas Modyford, and others, Prize Commissioners at Barbados to the Admiralty, 9 August 1655.

traders and Penn, as was the tradition in the navy, appointed one of his fellow officers to inventory the cargoes. According to Venables this then led to an ongoing dispute between himself and Penn as to the honesty and accuracy of the records.

Venables was later to claim that the handling of these prizes was conducted by Penn and his officers in an unscrupulous manner and was one of the issues that led to the mistrust between them, as it seemed to Venables, and the army, that the fleet was abusing its position to gain benefit from the seizures at the expense of the army. Venables claimed Penn appointed his nephew:

> one Mr. Pool, to take the Invoyces and Bills of Lading. Mr. Winslow and my self urgd that he should not act but by commission from us, and that we would put a cheque upon him; he told us he had power of himself to commission him, refused ours, and would not admit of a cheque, nor suffer us to see Original Invoyces; only one I saw which was convey'd away immediately, and the number of Elephants Teeth in it, which I remember exactly to be one Hundred and Ninety one, were in the Copy of it made but a hundred and Fifty. I urg'd the falshood of the Copy, and desir'd the Original: at last they brought in a hundred eighty and one, and urg'd the other Ten were my mistake, but I had taken the number into my memorial, and could not mistake it. However this one Act (if the rest of the Invoyces, as I have ground to believe, were curtail'd accordingly,) will shew the Seamens proceedings. Mr. Winslow and myself considered how to remedy this, but finding the Seamen our Enemies, and at least to scorn us and adhere to their General, and Coll. Searl to comply with him, we were constrained to be Patient per force, and commit the thing to private remembrance when time servyd to vindicate ourselves; and Mr. Winsloe said he would certifie Secretary Thurloe of it, which I believe he did.[15]

The seeds of mistrust between the army and the navy were beginning to be sown. So outraged was the army by this apparent abuse that at an army council of war held by senior officers on 18 March, including Venables, Heane and Fortescue, they resolved to demand copies of the paperwork from Pool. 'After long delay one was deliver'd, and Immediately by Pool Borrowed from Mr [Henry] Cary [secretary to the Commissioners], and would never be redelivered till the Day we left Barbados. [We] were forced to leave it with the commissioners for the Prize Office there.'[16]

Venables later, when in Jamaica, claimed that Penn had requested he sign a commission appointing Pool as one of the prize commissioners and backdate it to the English arrival in Barbados. This occurred as Penn was making his arrangements to return to England, and he was taking Pool with him and needed to complete the accounts of the financial transactions relating to the cargoes seized, their values and disposal. This Venables refused to do as he knew there had been no oversight of Pool's activities, as he had worked without the involvement of the other prize officers. Nor had the accounts been verified as correct by an impartial auditor. Furthermore, when Penn

15 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.10–11.
16 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.11–12.

had initially chosen Pool to act in this capacity both Venables and Winslow had offered to provide him with a commission, if he acted in accordance with their instructions, but Pool 'slighted their proffer' according to Venables. Penn then had Gregory Butler sign the backdated commission and he then approved Pool's financial accounts 'without scruple'.[17] All of this was done in the presence of Henry Cary, who though dangerously sick in Jamaica was able to produce written testimony to this effect and declare 'this is the whole truth, and nothing but the Truth, as I hope to see the face of God'.[18]

Penn's side of the story is unknown, but the incident illustrates the mistrust between the two senior officers and also the lack of understanding Venables had with regard to navy life. However, Penn's instructions with regard to prizes were very clear when he was issued them before leaving England. He was informed that they were to 'be preserved without embezzlement, and delivered to the commissioners, that so they may come in account to the State.'[19] Prize money, the proceeds from the sale of seized merchandise and vessels, was traditionally split between the State, the senior officers of the navy and the ordinary seamen. Historically this had always been a process open to fraud and embezzlement, but this had always been seen, at least by senior officers, as a lucrative 'right' of theirs. Undoubtedly senior officers responsible for the capture and administration of prizes had mechanisms in place from which they were able to obtain an unofficial beneficial gain, most likely by manipulating the values or quantity of seized cargoes, through their resale proceeds or through outright theft. This was commonplace in the English navy, and whilst not allowed it was certainly known to go on and little attempt was made to stop it as all levels of the officer hierarchy benefited. If Venables' account is true, and he mentions it only to cast aspersions on Penn's character in an attempt to distract blame for the failure of the expedition away from him and so it might not be an accurate portrayal of events, then it shows his lack of understanding of the realities of life for senior officers in the navy. Even though Cromwell had explicitly decreed that all proceeds from the disposal of seized goods on the campaign were to be disposed of entirely to help fund the expedition, it would be naive to assume that some officers, who saw it as their right to gain benefit personally from the disposal, would not seek to circumvent this ruling. Penn must take the blame here for not adhering to his instructions, which were unambiguous in this regard and that he did so could only have been through deliberate choice.

It is also clear that some of the navy officers took it upon themselves to plunder some of these Dutch vessels for their own gain. On 26 February, while still in Barbados, Penn admonished one of his own officers, Captain Robert Saunders of the *Dover*, for allowing his men to commit 'many unhandsome and unwarrantable acts' against two vessels that had just been seized. Saunders' crew had broken open 'the men's chests, plundering, and carrying away divers sorts of goods, and tearing the men's shirts from their

17 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.55–56.
18 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.56.
19 Penn, *Memorials*, p.25.

backs, to the great scandal and dishonour of the fleet'. He further chastised him when he stated:

> I wonder not at these insolences in your men, since yourself having given them such encouragement by your own examples, in taking out the Negroes, goats, &c. On what ground you should presume to do these extravagancies, I know not; sure I am, they are beyond any commission, warrant, or instruction you have received. I had hoped better things from you.[20]

The indiscriminate plundering of Dutch vessels was obviously an ongoing problem, for on 7 March Penn circulated instructions originating from the commissioners themselves, prohibiting captains of all English vessels from loading any cargo on board whatsoever 'until they have made oath before William Vassall Esq. [one of the prize commissioners], that, to the best of their knowledge, none of such goods as they are to lade [load], belong, in any manner whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, to any of the Dutch nation'. They were also required to take this oath for any cargo laden 'before this oath could be intimated unto them'.[21] The value of the seized contraband was not inconsiderable. Much of the cargo on the Dutch ships at anchor when the English fleet arrived had already been sold, and all Venables' attempts to ascertain to whom were stonewalled by the islanders, although the vessels themselves had a value. During the two months the fleet stayed in Barbados more Dutch vessels were apprehended, which further antagonised the islanders and infuriated Venables. In March 16 vessels were seized which were assessed at a value of 3,203*l* 14s.[22] A Dutch vessel was later seized carrying a cargo of 244 slaves from Africa, whom the prize officers had no compunction about seizing and then selling themselves for 5,162*l*. Another vessel was also seized with a cargo of asses valued at 2,200*l*. Others were 'carrying brandy wine (a strong liquor much useful in these hot climate) and good store of sugar, and some horses'.[23] This was a considerable trade, and when it was curtailed, albeit temporarily, it fuelled the disaffection felt by the islanders to the newly arrived military force but also created conflict and mistrust between the army and the fleet.

After the fleet arrived in Jamaica thoughts of plunder turned to those of survival, and for the first year there was little need for a mechanism to arbitrate in the disposal of prize goods. As Goodsonn became more aggressive in his forays out of Cagway the fleet began to seize Spanish vessels, especially on the north side, but it seems they were simply plundered without any thought to the niceties of maritime law. When Penn delegated his command to Goodsonn in June 1655 he authorised him to conduct himself by the 'general and known customs of the sea ... in full and ample manner as if I myself were present.'[24] However, learning from the conflict

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20 Penn, *Memorials*, p.69.
21 Penn, *Memorials*, p.70.
22 Fortescue, *CSP Colonial 1685–1688*, pp.628–629.
23 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.8; *Seventh Report* (Barrington), p.572.
24 Penn, *Memorials*, p.113.

that had arisen in Barbados, Penn gave Goodsonn additional instructions that he himself had not received, that even though he was to hand over all prizes to the commissioners at the place 'where the commissioners appointed by his highness are', he was to 'desire the said commissioners to appoint some able, trusty person, or persons, to join with the like which *you shall choose* [author's italics] and that the said persons do set a due valuation and appraisement of ship and goods ... that the seamen may be satisfied in how much they may expect shares from the state.'[25] In essence he was to ensure that the fleet, irrespective of Penn's initial instructions from Cromwell that disposal of prize was at the sole discretion of the commissioners, was to play a leading and influential part in the disposal, as was its traditional role.

In October 1655 and in response to the unauthorised return of Penn, Venables and Butler, Cromwell sent additional instructions to the commanders he believed were still alive in the West Indies, namely Fortescue, Goodsonn, Sedgwick, Searle and Luke Stokes (governor of the Nevis colony) in which he reaffirmed the policy that 'All prizes to be preserved for the public service, a perfect account kept, and to be disposed of for carrying on the present service.' He went on to add, in a lengthy set of instructions governing different aspects of the government for Jamaica, that accurate inventory be made of all prizes and prize goods and for the first time made it clear that the prizes could be sold locally by the commissioners and that the 'moneys so raised to be put to account for the use of his Highness and this Commonwealth, with power to expend the same for the better carrying on the affairs in which they are employed'. He concluded by instructing that all accounts be subsequently submitted to the Court of Admiralty, presumably in England, for audit.[26] Whether more detailed instructions were issued at the time with specific directives on establishing a court in Jamaica, or the mechanism whereby prizes were to administered, condemned and sold, is unclear. Most likely they were not and the English were left in this matter of governance, as in many others, to find a workable solution by themselves. From these brief instructions no distinction was made between Spanish vessels seized as a result of the war or Dutch vessels trading in contravention of the Navigation Act, nor was any mention made of any indemnity for those passing judgement should the rightful owners contest the disposal of their vessels and cargo. Furthermore no mention was made of the other aspects of maritime law that the Admiralty traditionally administered, such as piracy or more practical considerations such as surveying damaged ships or cargo that would inevitably arise. No records survive on how these vague instructions were actually implemented in 1656 or early 1657, but most likely any Spanish ships seized would have been stripped of everything of value and if not sold then certainly used by the English. At this early stage of the occupation necessity and practicality was more important than administrative procedure.

Nonetheless, thought was being given to the formal establishment of a court of admiralty by the authorities in England. Even though Brayne's instructions when they were issued in June 1656 provided no specific intent

25 Penn, *Memorials*, p.115.

26 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–76*, pp.100, 101.

to establish a court in Jamaica, although he was granted the powers to issue letters of marque against Spanish shipping, it is clear that by July 1657 such an instruction had been issued in England and received by Brayne.[27] Unfortunately these instructions do not now exist and so is impossible to know the extent of the court's jurisdiction, but it was most likely the precursor of the juryless vice admiralty courts that were later established in English colonies which had the authority to settle maritime disputes, perform salvage and to hear prize goods cases and which also had the power to condemn and dispose of prizes. In February 1656 an extensive set of instructions were issued to the commissioners for prize goods in London which were to form the basis for appraising prizes in England, and it would seem natural that a copy of these were also sent to Jamaica.[28] The Jamaica court also had the authority to grant letters of marque. At that time Brayne complained to Thurloe that his instructions were 'of noe use to us' for they provided no security or 'other niceties in it'. They also provided no indemnity for himself if he acted on his own on in the absence or death of the other commissioners, and because of this he said he acted 'in a perpetuall feare, least I ruine my self in endervouring to serve his highnes and the publique faithfully'.[29] After Brayne's death, Doyley, who had some legal background, also complained of the insufficient instruction they had received on establishing the court and the limitations they imposed. He informed the Council of State in February 1658 that the orders received had required that a court was to be established by any three of five named officers but he was now the only one of them alive and so was unable to legally constitute and preside over it. He also bemoaned the vague wording of the instructions sent under the Great Seal which only mentioned the seizure of Spanish prizes and not Dutch vessels that were contravening the Navigation Act. He also requested an indemnity for acting alone, for without one it 'hath made me forbear further meddling herein'. Doyley knew full well the consequences of acting without proper authority, for 'actions (though well intended) irregularly done, do find approbation and indemnity' while 'though a thing be lawful to be done, yet it must be done lawfully, durst not adventure to subject myself to the merchants lash, and be a perpetual prisoner for doing what I cannot justify'.[30] Interestingly after Brayne's death in September 1657 when Doyley wrote a summary of the needs of the colony he made no mention of wanting a clarification of powers of the court or his own indemnity.[31] In fact Doyley never received any indemnity from the Protectorate governments and it was only in 1664 that Charles II issued him with one for all the actions he undertook whilst in Jamaica.[32]

Despite Doyley's reservations as to the legality of his instructions, and his own concerns of being later accused of acting improperly, he did his best to

27 TNA, SP25/77, Council of State: Order Books, 1656–1657, ff.881–883; Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.391.
28 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1655–6* (hereafter *CSPD 1655–6*) (London: Longmans & Co., 1882), pp.183–186.
29 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.391.
30 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.834.
31 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.66–69.
32 TNA, SP38/22, Signet Office: Docquets, 1664–1665, f.47.

make the administration of prizes work as best he could. With Brayne's death Doyley once again became de facto governor and commander-in-chief of English forces in America by default, and with this came the responsibility of convening the admiralty court and establishing a naval administration in the colony. It is not clear when the first prize ships were captured and disposed of, though certainly in the summer of 1657 one vessel had been sold in Cagway that had been captured by Captain John Clarke of the *Selby*, so there was a system in place at least by then.[33] With no formal court structure existing, Doyley turned to his trusty assistants, Cornelius Burrough, Peter Pugh and Richard Povey along with other senior naval officers who were available in Cagway when needed to help him with these new responsibilities.[34]

In early 1658 Doyley faced a serious challenge to his oversight of the court in the shape of Captain Christopher Myngs, who, on his second tour in the Caribbean, had seized five (possibly six) Dutch vessels in Barbados on his way back from England which he claimed were trading illegally in contravention of the Navigation Act. The vessels, the *Mary*, *Three Cranes*, *John Baptista*, *Hopewell* and *Charity* were brought, with their crew and cargo of Spanish wine, raisins, spices and linen to Jamaica, where Myngs claimed them as legitimate prizes and expected that the Admiralty administration would concur with him and award him the prize money once they had been disposed of.[35] In Jamaica the cargoes were inspected on 24 February by Abraham Langford, who declared that the cargoes of four of them to be 'not of the growth or manufacture of Holland'.[36] Under the terms of the Navigation Act only English-owned vessels were able to carry on trade in English ports, and foreign-owned vessels were prohibited from carrying cargo not of their own country, and any vessel found contravening this law was subject to seizure. Therefore Myngs believed he was entitled to the prize award and this belief was reinforced when Doyley co-opted Barrington, Moore and Barry to judge if they were genuine prizes, and they agreed that they were and that Myngs had the right to seize them. However the officers, much to Myngs' rage, then declared that they could not proceed to condemn the vessels, a precursor to their sale, because the ships were Dutch and they did not have sufficient instruction to guide them on how to proceed in that case and that they would leave the case for the Admiralty in England to rule on; a process that could, and indeed did, take many months to get a resolution.[37] Myngs was furious, and immediately wrote to the Admiralty commissioners in England criticising the officers for failing in their duty after legitimately declaring the ships as prize. He lambasted them for the missed opportunity for the State to obtain the use of these vessels that were more suitable for transporting materials and settlers to the island than any of the State's vessels. He also made it clear that there were ready buyers for the vessels in Jamaica but that

33 TNA, CO1/33, f.364.
34 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.78.
35 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.121; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1658–9* (hereafter *CSPD 1658–9*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1885), p.112; TNA, CO1/33, f.97.
36 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.120.
37 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.120.

the delays would now mean the vessels and their cargoes would now lie idle until the matter was resolved. He added that 'the worm will eat, ships will decay, decks will leak, and goods be damnified' all as a result of the failure of the officers in Jamaica to follow due process.[38]

On the face of it Myngs seemed to have a valid point; if an admiralty court, duly constituted, had found the seizures lawful then they ought to be condemned and sold and he, with his crew, be given his share of the prize money. But Doyley's dilemma, regardless of how the officers decided, was that he knew that the Jamaica court was *not* duly constituted and that he, personally, had no formal authority to act as either commissioner, commander-in-chief nor head of the court. Nor did he have clear instruction of how to dispose of Dutch vessels. His prior legal experience told him that in matters like this he would be personally liable should the decisions he made in this regard, no matter how honest his motives, prove to be wrong. If he agreed to dispose of these Dutch vessels, and the Dutch of course were not at war with England and so were in theory at least a friendly nation, and then a counter-claim was made against him personally by the vessel owners, or perhaps even the Dutch State, he could be in serious trouble and possibly even prosecuted and ruined. Doyley was far too cautious a man to make such a decision lightly, and so despite Myngs' tantrum he referred the matter to the High Court of Admiralty in London to consider and pass judgement. As events turned out Doyley was right to do just that, for the Admiralty in August 1658, having information that he did not have, concluded that the *Charity* was owned by a group of English merchants living in Amsterdam and the *John Baptista* was also an English vessel and that both had passes from the English government allowing them to trade between the Dutch Republic and English Caribbean possessions.[39] The *Three Cranes* was later claimed as being owned by a Jew in London and its status could not easily be confirmed, and the *Mary* was declared as not trading contrary to the Navigation Act. Therefore it was eventually decided that only the *Hopewell* was condemned as a prize, but only in 1659.[40] The owners of the *John Baptista* were no doubt glad of Doyley's caution but felt the need to petition the Council of State, in December 1658, for a separate pass to allow them to send the *George* from Holland to Jamaica with 'new sails, cables, and men' with which to sail their ship home. They also requested some 'recompense for our losses by unjust seizure'.[41]

Less complicated for Doyley to judge were vessels seized directly from the Spanish, even if they were Dutch, and he had no qualms about condemning them immediately. Upon Myngs' return from a raid on the Spanish Main in April 1659 he brought with him three Spanish prizes. The *Angell Gabriel* was recorded as 'a good shipp and cannott be sold here for her worth' and therefore, upon advice from some of the sea captains, Doyley decided to

38 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, pp.121–122.

39 Green, *CSPD 1658–9*, pp.56, 112.

40 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1659–60* (hereafter *CSPD 1659–60*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1886), p.291.

41 Green, *CSPD 1658–9*, p.226.

retain her 'in his Highnes' service' and delivered it into the possession of Captain Povey and renamed it the *Hound*. Concerning the *New Garden* of Flushing, another Dutch vessel, Doyley had no qualms declaring it prize and sold it to a Frenchman named Lepene for 300*l*. Another Spanish prize brought in by Myngs was sold to Maurice Williams at auction for 120*l*. In each case the vessels were captured directly from the Spanish, even though they were under lease from the Dutch, and this was sufficient to demonstrate they were legitimate prizes and could be disposed of through due process.[42] There are other examples of the speedy disposal of prizes as well, so it is clear that Doyley was prepared to act swiftly when he was sure of ownership. When Captain Aylett of the *Coventry* seized Diego Momline's bark in June 1660 it was sold to Samuel Speed for 'twenty pounds sterlinge' shortly afterwards.[43] In July 1660 the State paid the captain of the *Coventry* 30*l* for a prize it had recently captured, as well as 10*l* for the recapture of the State ship the *Pearl*.[44]

It was not just the ships that were condemned as prize but their cargoes as well. Many of the Spanish vessels seized carried cargo useful to the English administration in Jamaica. In May 1659 the treasury had insufficient cash to pay for the ongoing costs of the fortifications that were constantly being strengthened and so it was decided that as there was an 'extraordinary prize given for brandy' Burrough was to sell 'some parts of the brandy remayneinge in your store house' and hand over the money received to Pugh, the treasurer, to help pay for the costs of the fortifications.[45] The Frenchman Lepene who purchased the *New Garden* also purchased 110 hides that she was carrying, for 10s apiece.[46] In January 1660 Burrough was ordered to sell 'five tonne of cocoa nutts prize nutts in his custody' and to handover the proceeds to the treasurer for his use whilst a further 12 tons were sold in March 1660 'for the victuallinge of the Coventry and ketch there beinge noe provisions in the state's storehouse'.[47] Cash seized on board prizes was also used to finance the government by providing contingency money to help pay for the day-to-day expenses of maintaining the fleet, as was the case when 'one hundred and fifty Mexico pieces' were spent to provide provisions for a ketch in May 1660.[48] By August 1660 the treasury reportedly had no cash left and was forced to sell a bar of silver that had been obtained from some Spanish prize, but as there was a 'scarcity of money' it would 'yield a very inconsiderable price'. As such, Doyley himself exchanged the silver for 'one hundred pounds sterlinge' of his own money but as this was below its true value he 'would be accountable to the state' for the balance.[49] The prize money was not only used for provisions however. In July 1660 Richard Risby was paid 100 pieces of eight that had previously been taken from the

42 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.75, 209.
43 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.196.
44 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.203.
45 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.116.
46 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.132.
47 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.165, 173.
48 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.185.
49 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.214–215.

Spanish for 'goeing to gaine intelligence on the north side the Spanish fleete havinge made appearance here'.[50]

The cargo carried by prizes that had been seized also had to be dealt with in accordance with the rules of the Admiralty. Vessels were to be sealed upon arrival in Cagway and it was forbidden to remove anything off a seized vessel until after it had been inventoried, assessed and the judgement of the court made known. Pilferage was a major problem as the English had seen from their experiences in Barbados. Doyley had notified the Admiralty in June 1659 of his suspicions that the Dutch vessels Myngs had seized the previous year had been 'notorously plundered' and that he had heard that it was 'customary to plunder and break holds'.[51] It was most likely for this reason that Doyley ordered whatever was still on board the vessels Myngs had seized in 1658 be offloaded and placed in the 'state storehouse' for safety in August of that year.[52] In fact pilferage was so common that Doyley needed to appoint somebody he had 'special trust and confidence in' to take possession of all prizes and make an accurate inventory of 'the ladeinge and all other appurtenances thereunto belonginge', and so on 30 April 1659 he appointed the ever-efficient Cornelius Burrough to administer them on his behalf.[53] That this did not solve the problem is demonstrated by the necessity of the council of officers issuing a declaration on 1 June 1659 which stated that 'noe person att their will shall presume to goe on board any shipp that shall come into this harbour before the marshall shall hath been first there'.[54] Not surprisingly it was the swashbuckling Myngs who was in the thick of all the allegations of pilferage that were swirling around Cagway in the summer of 1659, and which had led to this serious proclamation issued by the council of officers.

On 18 January 1659 Myngs was ordered by Doyley to sail with the *Marston Moor*, the *Cagway* (this was a prize ship) and one smaller vessel to the north side of Jamaica to Las Chorreras and to rendezvous with the *Hector* which was already there. On board the *Hector* was a party of soldiers, perhaps as many as 300, under the command of Major Wilbraham and captains Morgan and Lynch. Wilbraham evidently had orders to conduct some 'designe' on the northern shore of Jamaica, most likely searching for signs of any significant Spanish activity or the landing of another relief force, but once he had completed this mission Myngs was to re-embark the entire force and then to 'ply to the Windward towards the maine'. From here he was to 'take, seize or … burne and destroy all such shipps and vessells as belonge to the Kinge of Spaine.' He was authorised 'if he thought advantageous to the service … to land any men on the maine land as shall be requisite for the affectinge any designe ashore.' Doyley, now well aware of Myngs' reputation and temperament, further clearly instructed him 'to take care that in case you take or seize any shipps or vessell that the same be nott imbeazelled butt

50 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.203.
51 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.128.
52 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.1.
53 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.35–36.
54 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.38–39.

provided with all manner and care and diligence' and that any such ships be brought to Cagway 'by such trusty persons as maybe lyable to give an account thereof'.[55]

Myngs this time showed more imagination in where he chose to raid than Goodsonn had previously done, deciding to go further east along the modern Venezuelan coast where the English had not been before. According to one anonymous letter later printed in two English broadsheets he first attacked Cumana, which was described as 'a very large well built Town', which he burned to the ground after plundering all he could find. He then led his squadron along to coast to Puerto Cabello 'where they burnt a Spanish vessel, and spik'd up their guns'. Sailing further west he then attacked Coro, which was 'defended by a Brest work awhile, which we took with the loss of two Ensigns of Foot, and one Souldier'. After plundering the town Myngs led his men after the fleeing Spaniards into some woods and it was here that the English dreams of serious plunder finally came true when they stumbled upon 'Twenty two chests of the Kings money, being Four hundred pounds in a chest, [with] much other plate'. In all Myngs believed at the time that the haul captured in Coro amounted to 'at least at Forty thousand pounds'. In a second letter, printed in England at the same time as the first, that writer computed the total value of the plunder acquired at Cumana and Coro to be worth 'two hundred thousand pounds and better' while Myngs is said to have boasted that he had captured 'Fifty thousand pounds in coyned money, besides Plate, Rings and Jewels'.[56] A later account, written in 1683 within living memory of the events it described and generally a reasonably accurate source, claimed Myngs had captured '30 or 40 Chests of the King's Money' and returned to Jamaica 'with more Plunder in Money, Plate and Jewels than ever was brought thither before by the *English*'. Burrough was to notify the Admiralty that the value of the plunder was around 300,000*l*, but that Myngs himself had later asserted it to be 500,000*l*.[57]

Myngs returned to Cagway on 23 April 1659 with his plunder and two captured Dutch vessels that had been hired and manned by the Spanish. However he had seemingly learned his lesson from the previous year as to how slow and unreliable the Court of Admiralty was in dealing with prizes and distributing the proceeds to those who had captured them. This time he seems to colluded with the crew, and between them they had distributed most, if not all, of the money that they had captured and on his arrival he was to claim that it had all been plundered by the crew. The official explanation was that 'The Seamen broke into the Hold of one of the Prizes' and then fought amongst themselves before taking 'ten or fifteen thousand pounds' for themselves.[58] Naturally Doyley was furious. He had specifically ordered Myngs to secure any plunder he acquired and therefore accused

55 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.28, 32; Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.35.

56 John Cane, *The Publick Intelligencer*, 27 June–4 July 1659, 117:E.766[9]; Richard Collings, *The Weekly Intelligencer*, 28 June–5 July 1659, 147:E.988[20].

57 Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.36; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.128.

58 *The Weekly Intelligencer*, 28 June–5 July 1659; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.127.

him of 'disobeying his orders and plundering the hold of one of the prizes'.[59] Burrough, whose responsibility it was to secure and inventory all prizes, had evidently conducted an investigation as to what had happened and had concluded that Myngs was involved with the theft; Myngs, no doubt protesting his innocence, blamed Burrough as 'the principal author and abettor of his misfortune'. Myngs caused a scene when he publicly called Burrough a 'rogue and rascal' for accusing him of such a dereliction of duty and protested his innocence.[60] Burrough complained to the council of officers about Myngs' outburst and demanded an apology. Myngs, when he faced the council, offered an apology for his rash outburst which Burrough was pleased to accept.[61]

Nevertheless Doyley suspended Myngs from his command and arranged to send him back to England to answer for his actions, declaring 'This carriage too unhandsome and contradictory, and too distasteful to the other officers of the fleet that he thought not fit to try him here.' In his letter to the Admiralty Doyley accused him of countenancing the actions of his fellow officers and crew in allowing the Barbados ships he had seized the year before to be plundered, while 'There has been a constant market aboard the Marston Moor without any control' and that he 'stood by and saw [the plunder] divided, having a chest delivered to him and the Major [Stevens?], and not any preserved for the State'.[62] It is extremely likely that the value of the plunder was greatly exaggerated and was nowhere near the amounts claimed by Burrough and Myngs. It was, however, a considerable amount and an amount never before seen in Jamaica. Before the truth of the theft had been realised Burrough excitedly wrote that 'These affaires will contribute abundantly to the advance of this island, and enable many officers who have planted beyond their ability to go through.'[63] He believed that 'about 300 of the army on board have got plentiful' of the plunder and later thought that 'a great deal of the money was scattered amongst' the settlers, and that 'Not a man on the island but can say he hath reaped a benefit by that action.'[64]

At the time of the Restoration in May 1660 the legality of the Jamaica court was still unclear. Not fully and clearly constituted by law, it was presided over by Doyley who held no formal commission or appointment by the English government for anything he did in Jamaica and yet he was prepared to manage the affairs of the island and to make the decisions that needed to be made for the good of the colony. However, the situation gradually changed under the government of Charles II. With the change in government James, Duke of York was appointed Lord High Admiral of England in May 1660 and in the following year Lord High Admiral over England's overseas possessions, including Jamaica.[65] As de facto commander-in-chief of English forces Doyley was also

59 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.128.
60 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, pp.128, 129.
61 Green, *CSPD 1658–9*, p.364; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.80–81.
62 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.128.
63 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.127.
64 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, pp.127, 128.
65 Helen Josephine Crump, *Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Seventeenth Century* (PhD Thesis, University of London, 1930), pp.216–217.

the senior naval officer in Jamaica, and as such now reported to James and was to follow his instructions regarding both the fleet and the administration of maritime justice. In February 1661 he was sent lengthy instructions regarding the administration of the colony, including the clause that he was 'To settle Judicatories for civil affairs and admiralty, all Judges and Officers taking the oaths of allegiance.'[66] Details of how he was to achieve this have not survived, but in any event in March 1661 Lord Windsor was appointed governor in Doyley's place and he was granted the power 'To grant commissions and erect Courts of Admiralty'.[67] Windsor's patent as governor no longer exists, but Modyford's patent of 1663 is recorded as being the same as Windsor's and in this he was given the power to establish an admiralty court, issue commissions and letters of marque, and empower and fill the roles of judge, advocate, proctor, registrar and marshal of the court which provided the legal basis to judge and condemn prizes in Jamaica. He also had the authority to collect the tenth share of all prizes on behalf of the Lord High Admiral.[68] Finally the correct legal formalities were in place, and upon Windsor's arrival a fully constituted vice admiralty court was able to function in Jamaica. This was of course too late for Doyley, who had struggled through for many years without the correct authority and who never had the legal protection that his successors had.

With the correctly established court came an administrative mechanism to record the proceeds of its deliberations and judgements, and from these an insight of how the prize condemnation process worked can be seen. At the beginning of October 1662 Myngs, once more back in Jamaica, attacked Santiago de Cuba on the orders of Lord Windsor with a joint force of naval ships and privateers during which he captured seven Spanish merchant vessels in the harbour, after which he subsequently sailed to Jamaica to declare them as prize. Myngs was back in Cagway by 24 October and on 29 October a court of admiralty was convened under William Michell Esq., 'Doctor of ye Civill Law and Judge of the same Court', to hear the prize case brought between Myngs, Captain Swart of the *Griffin* and the other officers of the 'united expedicon up St Iago de Cuba' versus 'the Seven shipps and Barkes taken there their Tackle and Furniture Goods, wares and merchandize etc.'[69] Myngs and his fellow plaintiffs submitted several petitions to the court which claimed the vessels in their possession were to be considered as prize, to which the court found cause that their petitions be accepted for consideration at the next session of the court. Michell then ordered an investigation to establish 'ye true matter of ffact touching ye Prizes' and Myngs was ordered to appear before the court at its next session 'to satisfy the Court of his proceedings therein touching the Prizes'. The judge concluded the session by declaring that the proprietors, owners, victuallers, masters 'or others Concerned in ye s[ai]d Vessells' also appear at the next hearing so that their case may also be heard.[70]

66 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.6.
67 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.81–82.
68 Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', pp.221–222.
69 TNA, HCA49/59, HCA Vice-Admiralty Proceedings, 1662, ff.14–18. See transcription in Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.
70 TNA, HCA45/59, Vice Admiralty Proceedings, Jamaica ff.15–18. See transcription in Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.

At the next hearing, held on 3 November, Mr. Charles Hardres representing the Crown appealed that the court pass judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and declare the vessels, all still at anchor in Cagway harbour, as prize. Not surprisingly the Spanish owners of the vessels had no representation at the court and their failure to appear was duly noted. Myngs then recounted to the court that in his capacity as commander of the expedition he had agreed before the attack that the crews of the King's ships and the privateers 'should have Equall benefits of all such Prizes as should be taken of shippes wth their Ladeing'. The court then appointed Myngs, John Man, Epenetus Cross, John Lovinge and Edward Pinborne prize commissioners to review the various claims of the privateers and to report that afternoon as to 'ye truth of ye matter of ffact'. Michell also instructed Captain Lacy of the frigate *Centurion* to affirm on oath that 'the sd vessells were taken in ye Port and harbour of St Iago de Cuba and that ye marriners of ye same did Escape by boates and swimming', which he duly did. The judge then proclaimed thrice in open court that if anybody could show good cause as to why sentence could not be passed they were to appear before the court now and present their case. Without the owners being present to mount a challenge Michell decreed later that day, in the name of the Lord High Admiral James, Duke of York, that the seven vessels were lawful prize, seized as a result of a lawful act of war by the English for which they had just cause to act upon. He continued that the court was legally constituted under the authority of Lord Windsor in his capacity as vice admiral, and that due process had been followed and all the facts of the case had been considered and duly recorded. He noted that it had been proved that the vessels were the property of the King of Spain, and that they had been 'lawfully surprized by force' and the vessels were then formally condemned as prize. He concluded by stating that the tenth be first taken out once they had been disposed of, and 'pad to ye use of his royall Highnesse ye Duke of Yorke ye Ld High admirall'. With that the vessels could be legally disposed of by a body of commissioners for prizes previously registered with the court.[71]

With the judgement out of the way the prize commissioners were able to start the disposal process. Myngs had already agreed that the proceeds were to be shared between all involved, and the subsequent court documents show that the proceeds were to be distributed 'ratably and proportionately to ye Tunnage of each ship', meaning the larger the English vessel that participated in the attack the larger the share it received. This amount was then shared amongst the crew depending on the individual's rating, with the captain receiving the largest share with the amounts decreasing down to the lowest-ranked man aboard, who received the least. First the commissioners took a 'true and perfect Inventory of all Tacklings Gunnes and other materialls as alsoe of all goodes and merchandize laden in them'. The vessels and all their equipment would be sold separately from their cargoes which, in the case of the seven vessels, only amounted to 98 chests of unrefined sugar and 34 chests of white, refined sugar plus 103 jars of molasses. In all the sugar was

71 TNA, HCA49/59, ff.14–18. See transcription in Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.

sold for 304*l* 17s 6d at fixed rates to the general public. Six of the vessels were sold by auction 'by ye Candle' and these raised 392*l* 10s. One vessel, rechristened the *Virgin* by the English, was purchased by Judge Michell himself for 155*l*, while William James, a well-known privateer, purchased the *Westerhound* for 50*l*. It is very likely that all the purchasers bought them to use in privateering operations.[72]

With the disposal of the vessels the court still needed to issue paperwork to the new owners proving they were now the legal owners, to avoid later accusations that they had illegally obtained them. On 13 December the court issued a certificate to Richard Richardson, Edward Pinhorne and William Beeston who had jointly purchased the Spanish vessel renamed the *Three Brothers*, declaring them to be the legal owners of the vessel after it had been condemned and sold. Attached to the certificate was a copy of the decree condemning the vessel and affixed 'the Publick Seale of his Maties Principall Court of Admiralty' as proof of legitimacy.[73] With this the entire process was completed and the new owners could legally claim ownership anywhere that English law prevailed. The Spanish owners of course received no compensation.

Despite the formal establishment of the court and due process being carried out, the prize process was still open to abuse. The court records do not state that the vessels were specifically sealed upon their arrival in Cagway but they undoubtedly were, it being common practice to do so. This would have been done under supervision of the Court, for which the sum of 6s 8d was charged against the plaintiffs. It would have been reasonably easy to quarantine these vessels in the harbour and place them under guard to ensure no embezzlement occurred once they had been brought in, but there was nothing the court could do to prevent any abuse before the vessels arrived in Jamaica. Myngs had been accused twice before of orchestrating the theft of prize goods at sea before they were formally declared, and was unlikely to have changed his habits after Santiago. The majority of crews that sailed with him were privateers who certainly could not be relied upon to act scrupulously where plunder and booty was concerned. It is suspicious that none of the seven vessels captured carried anything of value expect sugar, for that is all that was declared as being on board when they arrived in Cagway. What the crews had helped themselves to cannot be ascertained, but it seems inconceivable that they had not plundered the ships before arriving in Jamaica. The 1652 Ordinance of the Sea gave seamen the right to plunder anything they found above the gun-deck and it can only be assumed that in this case all those involved exercised this right. The seamen of the fleet were not permitted to plunder anything below decks (though it would be naive to assume they conducted themselves according to these directives), but the privateers were not necessarily bound by such formality. William James, a known privateer who purchased one of the seized vessels, certainly allowed

72 TNA, HCA49/59, ff.14–18. See transcription in Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.

73 TNA, HCA49/59, ff.14–18. See transcription in Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.

his crew in 1658 the right to plunder 'upon deckes or under deckes ... And likewise all gold and silver found in what place soever.'[74] Whilst there is no evidence that James took part in the attack, given his long-standing residency in Jamaica it seems unlikely that he would have missed out on it, or that his rules in 1658 did not still apply in 1662; it is probable that all privateers would have accepted the same terms and so it is safe to assume that these vessels were well plundered before they arrived in Jamaica. Given Myngs' history of blatant disregard for Admiralty directives where prizes were concerned, it is probable that he would have done little to prevent it. There is certainly evidence that shows some embezzlement did in fact occur. The court records note that in addition to the amount received for the disposal of the vessel and sugar an additional sum of 32*l* was received by order of the court from an individual called May 'for goods by him Embezled out of ye Prize'.[75]

Whilst no evidence survives as to how Doyley conducted his sessions of the Admiralty Court prior to 1662, he was a lawyer by training and would most likely have followed these same basic processes as much as was practical, for his letters amply demonstrate he was fully aware of the consequences of flawed legal procedure and his personal legal liability should any of his later decisions be challenged. There is no evidence to suggest that any share Doyley received on behalf of the State was ever sent to England, his dire financial straits would have precluded that, but he certainly ensured that the State received its fair share from the disposal. In 1658 William James prepared an agreement of terms for his crew of privateers in which he stipulated how any proceeds would be disposed of. Whilst not specifying an amount, the first item on the agreement stated 'That the Commissions parte be taken out of all merchants goodes whatsoeuer', which must mean the State's share.[76] On 27 October 1660 Doyley issued a privateers commission to Captain Richard Risby of the *Betty* in which he stated that the captain was 'answerable to mee in this place for the tenth parte of such prize and prizes which shalbe by you soe taken for the use of His Majestie'.[77]

How much income the English derived from the disposal of these prizes is impossible to gauge, or indeed how many prize ships were even disposed of and not retained to use, such was the shortage of vessels once Goodsonn departed. In early 1657 Brayne purchased a Spanish prize of 60 tons for the use of the fleet, which was renamed the *Cagway* and was still being used in 1659. [78] In May 1658 there two other Spanish prizes in the harbour, the *Mary* and the *Galliot*, both of which had been sealed, which suggests even at this early stage there was due process being followed even if the final outcomes remain unknown.[79] The amusingly named *Stump Nose* was another prize that

74 Sir John Henry Lefroy, *Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas Or Somers Islands, 1515–1687*, Vol. 1, 1515–1652 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1877), p.719.

75 TNA, HCA49/59, ff.14–18. See transcription in Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.

76 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.719.

77 R.G. Marsden (ed.), *Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea*, Vol. 2 (London: The Navy Records Society, 1916), p.39; TNA, HCA 1/9, 1661, f.5.

78 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.110; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.49.

79 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.105, 106.

seems to have been retained rather than sold when a new pump was taken on board from the State store in March 1659.[80]

By 1659 it would seem that the number of prizes being brought was starting to rise and that Doyley lacked the staff to administer them and so handled each prize on an ad hoc basis. In February he instructed Burrough to empty a Spanish barque laden with cacao nuts, which the *Pearl* had brought in, and to inventory the prize cargo. Then in April he commented that as he had 'no commissioners or prize officers here established in pay to attend' for the processing of prizes he appointed Captain Povey to take into his custody all the prizes currently in the harbour and to ensure accurate records of all cargo aboard be made. He also instructed him to 'make strict inquiry after the tenths of all such prizes as shall be brought in hither by private shipps of warre by virtue of commissions granted either in England or here in his highness name'. In August he utilised two of his sea captains to survey the *St. Diego de Sivilla* which had just been brought in.[81]

The first recorded sale of a prize ship was the Spanish vessel the *Raba Bispa*[?] which was captured by the frigate *Diamond* and sold on 2 May 1659 to Captain Maurice Williams for 120*l* 'by inch of candle'. William renamed it the *Jamaica*.[82] In January 1660 and again the following month Doyley instructed that some of the prize goods the State had on hand be sold to provide provisions for the *Hector* and for the army. These seem to have been his unilateral decisions made as a consequence of the shortage of money at his disposal but there is no evidence to suggest that their disposal was undertaken by following the due processes of law which the court would have provided.[83] It would seem Doyley was happy to dispose of prize goods in such a casual manner but not the prize vessels themselves. In May 1660 Captain Richard Guy had brought in a prize which was condemned and sold, with the tenth being paid to the State.[84] It is not clear if it was a different prize belonging to Guy, or the same one, that was sold in July and raised 10*l* for the State. In July the *Coventry* brought in a prize which was sold and the State's share was 30*l* 20s while the *Pearl*, previously captured by the Spanish but recaptured by the English, was also sold as prize and this raised a further 10*l*.[85] Further prize vessels were sold in November 1660 as well.[86]

Whilst prize money could be a major source of income to the State and the seamen, in time of war this was never certain. During the Dutch War of 1652–1654 a total of 208,658*l* 3s 11d was raised as the State's share of prize money in England but in 1655–1656 its share amounted to only 2,900*l*, in 1657–1658 3,779*l* and between 1658 and 1659 just 1,277*l*. For the year 1656-1657 the prize money receipts were a massive 249,599*l* but most of this came from Steyner's capture of one of the plate fleet's ships in just one engagement

80 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.49.
81 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.65, 36, 127.
82 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.37, 46.
83 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.160, 165.
84 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.186, 191.
85 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.202, 203.
86 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.226.

at Santa Cruz.[87] So even back in England where due process was followed and accurate records made, the proceeds from the sale of prizes during the war were not considerable. The prize money collected in Jamaica prior to 1662 was not remitted to England and so does not appear in these figures. Whilst the amounts raised for the State through the tenth share of the proceeds in Jamaica were not massive, probably only some hundreds of pounds per year, they were a welcome addition to the local coffers. It was only after 1662, but more particularly after Modyford became governor in 1664, that both privateering and the sale of prizes reached their zenith at Jamaica. In 4 May 1666 a vessel arrived in Plymouth from Jamaica carrying 50,000*l* worth of 'gold and plate for the tenths and fifteenths of prizes taken about those islands'.[88] Evidently the Court of Admiralty was significantly busier then than it had been in the first few years of the English occupation.

For the State to gain its tenth of the proceeds from a prize sale the vessels needed to be disposed of in Jamaica where due process could be followed, but inevitably there were some that attempted to dispose of their prizes elsewhere, away from the gaze of the Admiralty. That this was a common and ongoing problem for Doyley is evidenced by his dispatch of Captain Lloyd of the *Diamond* in July 1659 on a policing mission. Doyley informed the captain that he had 'receaved severall complaints' that 'divers rovers and private men of warre' holding English commissions 'daily comitt insolences on the bodies and goods of the allies and confederates of our nation'. He added that they then carry 'their prizes to some private port where there is no Court of Admiralty' to dispose of them. Lloyd was instructed to 'examine all private men of warre that you shall meet' to establish by whose commission they operate and if they be English to notify them to comply with all terms of their commissions, which would specify that all prizes must be disposed of through the Court of Admiralty. Lloyd was to further advise the captains of these vessels that if they failed to abide by the terms of their commissions 'they shall be looked upon as pirates and robbers ... and dealt with accordingly.'[89] Possibly Doyley was referring to Tortuga, which was beginning to become an alternative and lawless hub for privateers and pirates. It is doubtful that Lloyd was particularly successful in his mission as the problem remained for decades to come.

In addition to administering prizes through the Court of Admiralty, Doyley was also required to oversee other aspects of maritime law in Cagway as well. Initially, however, it seems that Goodsonn took on the responsibility of administering the law, until the court was established. In January 1656 he was involved in a case brought to his attention by the master of the *Hunter*, who sought redress from William James for non-payment of a sum owed him.[90] By the summer of 1657 Doyley was acting in the capacity of judge of

87 Maurice Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate* (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1962), pp.84–85.

88 TNA, SP29/155, Secretaries of State; State Papers Domestic, Charles II: Letters and Papers, 1666, f.57.

89 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.58.

90 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 295, ff.77–78.

the Court of Admiralty, though it is likely that this mechanism was in place prior to that, possibly as early as mid 1656. One example of his involvement was the case of the *Plymouth*, a frigate under the command of Captain John Browne. She had been at anchor off St Christopher on 5 August 1657 when 'by the extremity of weather' she was driven out to sea. That night the weather turned for the worse and the winds were so ferocious that much of the ship's sailing equipment was damaged and it lost the ability to steer properly, while the 'sea having soe much power of us by reason of a hurrycane were all carried away with the violence thereof'. After surviving the hurricane, and once the weather settled down, the *Plymouth* was found to be severely damaged 'haveing neither masts, sales nor boate', and though she was unable to ply windward back to St Christopher 'by God's mercy and our owne endeavour [we] forced down to the island of Jamaica where we arrived this first day of September'. After almost a terrifying month at sea Jamaica proved a safe haven for the vessel and its crew but it also afforded the captain opportunity to perform the age-old sea law of the 'protest of the sea', an important legal formality to indemnify the officers and crew against loss and damage to a ship. Therefore, as required by law, the captain, the mate, bosun and gunner all presented themselves at the port office immediately upon their arrival 'for and in behalfe of ourselves and owners hereby protest and declare against the sea and weather for all damages that may or shall arise or accrue by means aforesaid, anything to the contrary notwithstanding'. This declaration was then sworn before Doyley three days later.[91] That the damage to the *Plymouth* was extensive is shown by the amount of stores that were issued so that the crew could make good the repairs. These included 'two top-masts, one maine- and fore-yard, one maine and fore-topsayle yard, one missen yard, maine and fore shrouds … a parcell of old blocks … two halfe-worne canvas for a maine-sayle, one small anchor … one fore-mast, five hundred nayles.'[92] The *Plymouth* was repaired and was back in England by December 1657.[93]

Another instance of maritime justice being dispensed occurred on 27 September 1657, when a court of inquiry appointed by Doyley was held in Cagway to investigate the events that took place upon the merchantman *Suzanna* of London. The court found that the vessel, under the command of Captain William Swanley, had just left Barbados and was bound for Surinam when the mate, Richard Boyle, 'through violence and mutinous carriage' led a mutiny by 'nott suffering the said Captain William Swanlay to act and to performe the charge of commander in the said shipp'. The court found the acts of 'Boyle and company to be absolute rebellion against the master contrary to the lawes and customes of the sea'. This investigation was necessary so that the appropriate reports could be filed regarding liability, but Doyley lacked the legal mechanism, or authority, to prosecute such crimes.[94] In early August 1658 both Povey and Pugh were ordered by Doyley to board a small vessel

91 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.70–71.
92 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.70.
93 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1657–8* (hereafter *CSPD 1657–8*) (London: Longmans & Co, 1884), p.211.
94 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.78–79.

that had just entered the harbour. Doyley had received information that it had been stolen from its rightful owner in Barbados and that 'the persons in her are runne away with her'. They were to 'appraise the said vessell and goods in her and … to putt to sale'. Presumably it was thought the goods on board were the illicit gains of the pirate crew and therefore a legitimate seizure, but it is not clear why the vessel was to be sold and not returned to its rightful owner in Barbados.[95]

In addition to certifying damage to ships and cargo caused by tempests at sea, Doyley was also required to survey goods damaged in transit on merchantmen so that the owners had an independent account of what had transpired. In January 1660 the *Providence* entered Cagway harbour with a consignment of wine owned by a merchant called Kinge. The wine had suffered damage while at sea, so Doyley sent John Blackbeath and Robert Avis aboard to survey and report their findings. The two surveyors were unable to ascertain the amount of wine lost but they were able to confirm that the wine was lost 'by reason of defect of caske and nott through ill storage'. This finding was important to the ship owner as it absolved him of blame for poor stowage so he was not financially liable for the damage caused which was due to faulty storage containers. Before the widespread use of insurance to protect all parties involved with transporting of goods, it was necessary to apportion blame for any loss, so that a petition or claim could be laid by the owner against the culpable party, so these surveys were an important part of the commercial redress process.[96] The naval authorities were also sometimes required to intercede in commercial disputes, such as in the quarrel between a merchant by the name of Bird and a Captain James, most likely William James the privateer, in April 1660. The reason for the dispute is not clear but it seems the two had a form of partnership which possibly entailed Bird commissioning James to undertake some commercial activities on his behalf (most liking a privateering voyage). The vessel concerned was probably James' the *American*. Upon James' return to Cagway it seems Bird had refused to cover the charges of the sailors' wages and claimed they were not his responsibility, even though he had taken two thirds of the cargo the vessel carried. Two inspectors employed by the State were tasked with ascertaining the details of the partnership with a view to apportioning responsibility to cover the costs of the voyage. Presumably the dispute had arisen as the voyage had not been particularly successful and both parties were refusing to bear their share of the costs. The inspectors, Allen Jose and William Sheere (himself an occasional privateer), concluded that Bird had a two-thirds interest in the vessel and so he ought to pay two thirds of the men's wages, as well as 'two thirds charge in the fittinge and settinge out of the frigott in her next voyage', which seems to have been only a few weeks later.[97]

95 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.118.
96 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.158.
97 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.178–179, 185.

II

Acts of piracy at sea were altogether harder for the English in Jamaica to deal with. The contemporary definition of a pirate is a person who attacks and robs ships at sea, but in the seventeenth century a clear definition was less simple to make. The Spanish, who declared the entire Americas as their own, also declared anybody not Spanish who entered the region to be *piratas*. The Europeans, who refused to accept Spanish domination and who either attempted to establish colonies or undertook trade there, would certainly not have considered themselves pirates, even if the Spanish did. Raids by the likes of Drake, Raleigh and Jackson were intended to force the Spanish to accept foreign trade, even if the end results were acts of theft, and those involved also did not look upon themselves as pirates. That Spain treated them as such and frequently punished interlopers as pirates just added to the sense of grievance that the English already felt towards the Spanish. To the English, attacks upon Spanish ships and trade were not acts of piracy but retaliation for the countless acts of aggression the Spanish had perpetuated on English merchants and colonists in the West Indies. With the outbreak of war with Spain in 1655 attacks on Spanish shipping became legitimate acts of war, but to the Spanish they were still acts of piracy. The English, post–1655, entered into a form of economic warfare with Spain in the West Indies by attacking their trade at sea and raiding settlements on land. After 1658 the English were forced to maintain fewer naval assets in the region and so increasingly turned to privateers to assist the State in keeping up the constant harassing of the Spanish. To the English these privateers were a logical extension of State power, acting nominally under State control through the issuance of commissions, letters of marque or certificates of reprisal. They were bound to follow the terms of their commissions and were required to dispose of their prizes according to the English custom at sea, meaning through the Court of Admiralty, which was able to ensure the State gained its share of the prize through the tenths that the court retained. As open to abuse as the entire privateering system was, to the English it was legitimate because it was sanctioned by English law and overseen by organs of the State even though the Spanish deemed them pirates. To the English, pirates were individuals who operated outside of the privateering system, without commissions from the State and who attacked shipping indiscriminately regardless of nationality. To put it more crudely, pirates were individuals whose actions against an enemy brought no material benefit to the State.[98]

Traditionally the pirates who operated in the Caribbean have also erroneously been called buccaneers, but the origins of this term are very different from piracy. The French word *boucanes*, from which the noun buccaneers derives, means a person who produces smoked meat or jerky. For some time in the mid seventeenth century, Tortuga, an island off the north shore of Hispaniola, was home to a group of *boucanes* who hunted the wild cattle there and across the water in the remoter parts of Hispaniola. It

98 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.58.

is likely that when the occasion presented itself they would attack and rob passing vessels but they were not primarily pirates or privateers but hunters. It was some of these specialists Doyley asked to come to Jamaica to help hunt cattle to feed the army in 1657.[99] Some historians have confused Doyley's invitation to the *boucanes* to come and hunt on Jamaica as meaning Doyley invited buccaneers to come to Jamaica to help him fight his war against the Spanish, but this was not true and this myth has been convincingly debunked by one recent historian.[100] At the time of the English occupation of Jamaica there was no permanent community of pirates or privateers based in the Caribbean. A decade later there was, but their appearance was a direct result of the English occupation of Jamaica when, after 1664, Governor Modyford actively encouraged pirates and privateers to use Port Royal as a base for their barely legal attacks on Spanish trade across the West Indies.

In fact prior to Doyley's departure in 1662 there is little mention of what the English deemed acts of piracy in the historical record at all. That it was being perpetuated is clear by Doyley's instructions to Captain Lloyd previously mentioned in July 1659, but rarely was he able to do much about it. In January 1660 he did issue an arrest warrant for Peter Swayne. It was believed that Swayne, from Barbados, had encountered 'a shallopp att sea' which he 'did felonously robb and plunder ... and hath disposed and converted the goods thereout taken to his owne use.'[101] In May 1660 Captain Grove of the *Elizabeth* was accused of having 'robbed and plundered a certain subject of the King of France belongeing to the island of Tortudoes'; a ship was even sent to St Christopher where Grove was believed to be, to apprehend him, but whether he was found is unknown.[102] To Doyley both acts were clear acts of piracy, though whether either man was apprehended is not recorded.

Even on the rare occasion that Doyley was able to apprehend those he believed to be pirates, he was unable to prosecute them. Ever since Henry VIII's reign piracy in England was to be tried under common law through a specially constituted commission and in a vice admiralty jurisdiction the trial was to be heard by the Admiralty judge.[103] With piracy being a capital offence Doyley was cautious when in January 1661 he apprehended five men who had been accused of 'robbery and piracy' against the *St Peter*. Knowing he did not have clear authority to try them in Jamaica he shipped them in chains aboard the *Convertine* for England, giving the ship's captain instruction that 'att whatsover port you arrive at first you are to acquaint the cheife magistrate of the place with your having the prisoners aboard' and for them to be placed into custody 'untill his Majestie's pleasure ... be made knowne.'[104] Eventually the group were tried in England and acquitted due to a lack of evidence.[105]

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99 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.69.
100 Carla Gardina Pestana, 'Early English Jamaica without Pirates', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No. 3, 2014.
101 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.58, 15.
102 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.186–187.
103 Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', p.233.
104 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.234.
105 Pestana, 'Early English Jamaica without Pirates', p.338, n.31.

Undoubtedly acts of piracy as the English viewed them were committed on numerous occasions, but it is unlikely that the perpetrators would have seen themselves as pirates, nor is there evidence that any were convicted of such crimes in Jamaica prior to the end of military rule in 1662. More likely they would have considered themselves as either privateers or merchants who saw an opportunity for personal gain outside of the law and took it.

Privateers had been operating from England since at least the Middle Ages. For cash-strapped monarchs, granting permission to private individuals to equip vessels at their own expense to attack the nation's enemies at sea was a convenient expedient to project national power abroad, and soon the English Channel became a battleground between the English, the French and later the Spanish. In times of conflict, such as during the wars between England and Spain in the sixteenth century, the Crown was seemingly happy to grant commissions to anybody who requested them and soon the focus shifted to the West Indies where sea rovers such as Drake, Hawkins and Frobisher hoped to attack and capture Spanish galleons laden with gold and silver. In the seventeenth century new English proprietary colonies in the Caribbean such as the Somers and Provident Isles for a time provided safe havens in which English privateers could find refuge and assistance. As the English and Spanish clashed more frequently any losses or reverses suffered by one side led to a greater desire for revenge and reprisal by the other, leading to yet more privateers being granted commissions. During times of peace between the two neither side should have had cause to provoke the other, but as the potential rewards were so high for the English to attack the Spanish in the Caribbean, raids by privateers continued, with Jackson's voyages of the early 1640s being the most notorious example. After the Spanish capture of the Providence Island colony and the humiliation that brought, not to mention the loss of the grandees' investment which established the company that controlled the territory, calls for reprisals grew louder and the outbreak of war with Spain in 1655 provided the opportunity many had long hoped for to seek revenge. Traditionally the English Crown issued letters of marque or reprisal (also called a commission) to merchants who had suffered specific perceived losses at the hands of the Spanish, frequently from many years prior, and the commission gave them the legal authority to seek reprisal or compensation by attacking any Spanish shipping they happened upon. On 1 November 1655, in response to Spain declaring an embargo on all English shipping in retaliation for the English attacks on Hispaniola and Jamaica, the Council of State declared its own embargo on Spanish shipping and called for 'universal reprisals against the subjects of Spain, Flanders … at sea or in port'. The declaration concluded that such reprisals were to 'be brought to judgement in the Admiralty Court, and condemned according to the law of nations and usages of that Court'.[106] With this a privateering war was declared, which was to play out across the West Indies for the next several decades.

The first record of an individual reprisal commission being granted by the Admiralty Court in London was that to Captain John Cramp on 8 November

106 Green, *CSPD 1655–6*, pp.2–3.

1655. Cramp claimed to have lost the *Consort*, valued at 8,000*l* with its cargo, off Cartagena when it was seized and condemned by the Spanish in 1642. The Council of State ordered that letters of reprisal be granted to Cramp and his co-owners 'against the King of Spain's subjects, for recovery and damages, on the usual security'.[107] Over the next few weeks and months a slew of other reprisals were issued as merchants sought licence to revenge their losses. Even former commissioner Gregory Butler and his associate William James were granted letters of marque in August 1656.[108] Individuals requesting a commission in England petitioned the Council of State, who considered the matter and then ordered the Admiralty Court to proceed with its issuance. Some of these petitioners, like Butler and James, were prepared to fit out a ship with the sole intention of it being a privateer. Others, such as the merchants who jointly owned the *Tankerville* and who were preparing to dispatch the vessel to the West Indies in May 1656 on a trading voyage, petitioned for a commission simply to allow them to defend themselves should any Spanish ship attempt to molest theirs. Martin Noel provided a character reference for the master of the *Tankerville* and the Council immediately approved the petition.[109]

Such commissions to privateers have come in different forms throughout their history and have been modified to suit the time and place where they were issued. The commission issued to two London merchants, George Payne and Nathaniel Hawes, on 10 March 1656, was perhaps typical of those issued during the Anglo-Spanish War. It was quite lengthy, aiming first to justify the current hostilities with Spain and the legal basis for granting the reprisal. It then described the historical loss sustained by the applicant and the value of such loss. In this case the two claimed to have lost the *Elizabeth* back in 1637 with a cargo worth 12,000*l* on its way to Virginia. The commission then granted the applicants 'letters of reprizall' under the Great Seal of the High Court of the Admiralty giving them the right to:

> apprehend, seize, and take the shipps, vessells, merchandizes and goods of the said King of Spayne, or any of his subjects, untill they be fully satisfied for all the said wrongs, damadges, and injuries soe by them susteyned, together with the interest, costs, and damadges by them to be susteyned and expended for such apprehension, seizing, and taking, and prosecution of the same to adjudication.

However, these seizures were only allowed on the open seas and not in any port or harbour. The commission then described the vessel to which the commission was issued, stating the name, burden, guns and the name of the captain, in this case the *Katherine*. The commission then confirmed that a bond had been given that the said vessel would not harm 'any the good people of this commonwealth theire friends or allyes' nor would the crew embezzle any of a seized vessels cargo 'before the same shall be adjudged in our said high court of Admiralty for lawfull prize'. The commission also instructed that they were required to present 'three or more of the chief

107 Green, *CSPD 1655-6*, p.9.
108 Green, *CSPD 1656-7*, pp.33, 50.
109 Green, *CSPD 1655-6*, p.311.

officers of every such shipp' before the court to be examined to help prove they were legitimate seizures. The privateers were further instructed to do nothing that would contravene the peace treaty signed between England and France dated 3 November 1655. All such vessels captured were to be brought into some 'part of this commonwealth of England, and thereof an inventory taken and appraisement had and judgment given in our said high court of Admiralty'. The commission decreed that once due process had been followed the applicants had the right to dispose of the cargo as they thought fit, and that they could raise crews for such expedition without hindrance.[110] Interestingly the commission makes no mention of any share of the proceeds to be shared with the State, only that judgement was to made in the Court of Admiralty. However a set of instructions dated 15 February 1656 and issued to the Commissioners for Prize Goods in London clearly stated that they were to 'receive, either in value or in kind, the tenths of all prizes brought into any road, port, creek, or haven by any private man-of-war, condemned in the Admiralty Court as lawful prize'.[111] This commission also makes no mention of the amount that the good behaviour bond was set at, and there seems to have been no set calculation for this, other than each approval from the Council of State stipulated it being issued upon sufficient security. In the case of Hawes and Payne this security was set at 4,000*l* for which four other merchants acted as guarantor.[112] Certainly in this case it seems the bond related to ensuring no attacks upon French shipping was made by the privateers, but nevertheless the Admiralty Judges were concerned that there was no fixed schedule of security to be applied which left them exposed if insufficient security was obtained for any wrongs done.[113] Perhaps not surprisingly, multiple commissions were issued to the same aggrieved merchants who claimed to have suffered loss from the Spaniards. Nathaniel Hawes received a commission for the loss of the *Elizabeth* when he fitted out the *Katherine* mentioned above, and at the same time he received a commission for the *Endeavour*. Then in July 1657 he received another for the *Endeavour* and one for the *Hopewell*.[114]

It would seem that in Jamaica the English government under Doyley was aware of the basic requirements and processes by which commissions could be granted to privateers but their implementation was a lot more casual. The only extant commission issued by Doyley was that to Captain Risby of the *Betty* in October 1660. This was a much simpler document with no preamble nor justification. Doyley authorised Risby 'to fight, kill, and take both by sea and land any of the King of Spaine's subjects, and take their ships and goods, and to appropriate the same to your own and the ships companies use, being answerable to mee in this place for the tenth parte of such prize and prizes which shalbe by you soe taken'.[115] Doyley, short of time and resources,

110 TNA, HCA 25/227, Letters of Reprizall granted against the Spaniards since the first of November 1655 ff. 8–11; Marsden, *Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea*, pp.25–28.
111 Green, *CSPD 1655–6*, p.184.
112 Green, *CSPD 1655–6*, p.56.
113 Green, *CSPD 1655–6*, p.147.
114 TNA, HCA 25/227, ff.5, 8, 41, 43.
115 Marsden, *Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea*, p.39; TNA, HCA 1/9, f.5.

seems to have taken a much simpler approach to issuing commissions. Undoubtedly he was not concerned about the niceties of justifying his actions or investigating if a wrong had previously been committed, and was content to grant a licence as long as the tenth was paid over. To him the privateers were a military expedient that assisted his efforts to confront Spain and establish English dominance at sea, at little or no cost to him. In return they provided a measure of security, income and employment for the growing population of the island.

However it was Brayne and not Doyley who first established the English privateers in Jamaica. Brayne had initially purchased one Spanish prize of 60 tons and fitted it out as a private man-of-war in early 1657, for the use of the State. Undoubtedly the reason for this was a lack of suitable shipping available to him from the State fleet and he did this with the sole intention to 'send her out to seek for prise and intelligence'.[116] Though not technically a privateer, as it was a State-controlled ship, this illustrates that Brayne's need to secure locally acquired shipping pushed him into relying upon individuals, not employed by the State, to assist in the defence of the colony, and was the first move towards the State employing private enterprise to continue its war with Spain. Indeed Brayne positively encouraged the utilising of privateers by the State, through his encouragement of officers to fit out vessels at their own expense which could be used by the State.[117]

In August 1658 Doyley hired the *Hopefull Adventure*, a private vessel under the command of Captain Richard Guy, 'for the state service for two moneths' and placed him under the direct authority of Captain Christopher Myngs for his forthcoming raid on the Spanish Main. Doyley's orders to Myngs are very specific and leave no doubt that he was commissioning the *Hopefull Adventure* as a privateer. Myngs was ordered to take the vessel 'under your charge and under your command' and then to 'seize, surprise or attaque the fleete or ship belonginge to the King of Spaine'. He was further instructed that an inventory of all goods seised was to be made 'without imbeazlement' and to return them to Cagway 'to be desposed of accordinge to further order'. Doyley's orders to Myngs concluded with the instruction to dismiss Guy after two months unless he saw further 'occasion to use him for the advantage of the designe, and if you doe your are impowered to make any further contract with him for the service of the state'.[118] Doyley even provided Guy[119] with gunpowder from the State store.[120] This is a clear and early example of the State employing private merchantmen (albeit in conjunction with traditional military forces and for a limited duration and objective) to carry the war to the Spanish in the Caribbean, brought about by the diminished State naval capacity in the area. These first limited arrangements conducted between

116 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.110.

117 Florence E. Dyer, 'Captain Christopher Myngs in the West Indies', *The Mariner's Mirror*, Vol. 18, No. 2,1932, p.180.

118 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.116.

119 Guy was still a privateer as late as March 1664 when he brought into Jamaica a Spanish ship he had seized, which when sold after being condemned as prize was valued at over 570*l*. TNA, HCA45/59, ff.58–64.

120 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.117.

Doyley and freelancers with their own ships, guns and crew, from the safe haven of Cagway, were the genesis of the privateer and pirate culture that was to be the scourge of the Caribbean just a few years later. In Europe by marked contrast the privateers were free to undertake their own voyages in a manner that suited them, but these first privateers commissioned in the West Indies were very much working to the agenda of the State, and with direct State assistance.

As in England, Doyley demanded some form of security before he issued a commission to a privateer, most likely this was an arbitrary amount either paid in the form of a cash bond or in the form of a surety provided by other individuals, or perhaps a combination of both. When Captain Jones, the commander of Abraham Langford's vessel, lost the ship 'cominge into this harbour' in October 1660, Langford was required to appear before Doyley 'from whom he receaved his Commission' and he then duly formally renounced it. Although the wording of this entry in *Doyley's Journal* is unclear, it seems to suggest that Langton's bond was returned to him but there was also some form of surety provided by some other people, who at this point seemed to be 'refusinge also to stand longer bound for him'.[121] When in May 1660 Captain Groves was accused of plundering French shipping in Tortuga contrary to his commission, Doyley 'haveinge taken security for the said Groves his good behaviour at sea' notified his intent to use 'the security I have taken to the said [ ] for their [that is, the plundered French shipping owners] and others satisfaccon [*sic*] therein concerned'. This certainly implies that his security at least was in the form of cash or some other easily convertible asset.[122] When Richard Risby obtained a commission from Doyley in October 1660 he and his associates were required to pay a bond of 200*l*.[123]

Doyley clearly offered direct State support to these privateers, for in June 1659 he provided 20*l* 7s 4d worth of ammunition for 'the use of the Jamaica friggott a private man of warre comanded by Captaine Maurice Williams'. Williams was also granted 'a lett passe for himselfe and shipp … to goe out of this harbour about their voyage'. The purpose of the voyage is not specified, but he was instructed that if he encountered 'a punt stole away and run away with from Carlile Bay in Barbados to bringe or send her with her company hither'. If nothing else Williams was being required to perform a policing role on behalf of the colonial government in Jamaica. However, the amount of ammunition provided, which included three barrels of gunpowder, 'Muskett shott 1000 weight', 'Match 1000 weight' along with 60 three pound cannonballs and 40 'Crosse barre shott' would suggest that the newly named *Jamaica* was intended for a more sinister role, a fact only reinforced by the knowledge that Williams later became a renowned privateer in his own right.[124] The fleet assisted Williams to help prepare what Doyley openly called 'a privateer'. To help crew the *Jamaica*, Doyley declared that any seamen aboard the *Marston*

121 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.222.
122 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.187.
123 TNA, HCA 1/9, f.7.
124 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.47.

Moor, currently being prepared for its return voyage to England, were free to join the crew of the *Jamaica* and could serve Williams 'att their pleasure'. At least 42 of the men seem to have agreed to leave the *Marston Moor* to serve with Williams, which implies there was already a significant enthusiasm for a privateering culture within the colony.[125] However, Doyley also made it clear in a separate order that 'none of the private men of warre fitted out here att Jamaica' were permitted to recruit locally (unless specifically permitted) and the penalty for so doing was 'haveinge their owne shipp made prize'.[126] The *Aime*, a 'private man of warre' commanded by Captain Grigge, purchased 'two barrells of powder' directly from the State store on 27 September 1659, as well as 'fower skaynes of match' in another example of direct support given by the government to the growing band of privateers on the island.[127] Not only did Grigge obtain materials of war directly from the State but he was also permitted to openly recruit his men from within the fleet. When the *Cagway* was sold in September 1659 he was able to obtain the services of the gunner and boatswaine who had 'received a discharge out of the state's service' and were granted a 'lett passe' to leave Jamaica with 'Captaine Grigge a privateer', while Edmond Collier, of the State ship the *Hound*, was granted leave and permission 'to goe with Captaine Grigge private man of warre'.[128]

Despite the privateers not being in the pay of the State, they were not free to come and go as they liked from Jamaica. When they wanted to leave the island they were required to obtain a pass from Doyley granting them a permit, which illustrates further that they were allowed to conduct their activities under the supervision and approval of the colonial authorities. Captains Grigge, Carrol and Guy, all described as privateers, were each granted a 'lett passe' to leave the island in September 1659.[129]

It was not just English privateers who were given support in Jamaica, their French allies were as well. The French had been sending privateers into the West Indies probably longer than the English and they found ready havens in the handful of French-controlled islands, but Jamaica offered a safer and more practical port for resupply. Isolated Tortuga was becoming a base for French privateers with a small population of *boucanes* from which they could trade meat for whatever cargo they carried. Trade between the English and French on Tortuga probably began after Doyley employed some *boucanes* to hunt cattle on Jamaica in 1657 and provide a part of their catch to the English. By 1660 this had developed further with the English actually purchasing meat from them in kind, such as with the payment Burrough made of 6,000 lb of cocoa nuts to an unnamed Frenchman 'in lieu of soe much jerkt meat bought of him for the use of the state'.[130] With the establishment of these trading links the French became welcome visitors to Jamaica seeking shelter, provisions and no doubt the enjoyment of the numerous taverns in

125 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.37, 78.
126 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.46.
127 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.137, 138.
128 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.138, 139.
129 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.138.
130 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.69; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.156.

Cagway. In November 1659 a French captain called Cayie (or Conyle) was provided with powder which he purchased directly from the English store.[131] In the same month Captain John Bonrdett [*sic*] was provided a pass to leave Jamaica 'for himself, shallop and company of Frenchmen', as was Captain Bequell and his boat on 3 December.[132] Not only did these armed French vessels act as a further deterrent to possible Spanish attack, they could also be used for more practical matters. Captain Cayie, 'a Frenchman of warre' was allowed to 'transport five Spanish prisoners from this island to the maine or some of the islands of the King of Spaine'.[133] No doubt the English were glad to be relieved of the burden of feeding these prisoners but it is doubtful if they provided any oversight as to what became of them or the conditions they were kept in once in French possession. In fact Jamaica welcomed privateers of any nationality. In December 1659 another privateer, Captain Peterson (Pietersen), a Dane, was allowed to purchase a barrel of gunpowder from the State store as well as 'one hundred pounds of muskett shott'. He was then granted a pass to remove six Spanish prisoners from Jamaica.[134] As Peterson was essentially an entrepreneur, it is not clear if he was paid to dispose of the prisoners or whether he hoped to be able to ransom them for his personal gain. Or perhaps it was simply an unwritten rule that in return for State support and encouragement, the privateers were required to assist in the disposal of prisoners – one way or another.

The privateers who used Cagway as a base came from a variety of backgrounds. William Smith, who was allowed to go on a 'cruiseinge voyage' in February 1660, was possibly the Captain William Smith who had come from England and served in Fortescue's regiment.[135] Richard Guy, one of the more successful of the privateers, is believed to have been living in Barbados when he joined Venables' army in 1655.[136] Jon Petersen, who was in Cagway in December 1659, was in fact Danish[137] while Jacque Lepene was French, as was Cayie (or Conyle).[138] At various times both Brayne and Doyley encouraged serving officers of the army to set themselves up as privateers, which had the benefit of potentially reducing the liability of the State to provide their sustenance if they were successful, as well as keeping them occupied. Smith and Guy were both serving officers, as was Ensign Freeman who had a boat called the *Adventure* in 1659. Henry Archbould acquired his own vessel called the *Henry* which, in 1659, he sent to the Cayman Islands[139] in search of turtles and was probably also a privateer, at least if the occasion arose. Such expeditions were occasional and so it is perhaps more accurate

131 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.144.
132 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.149, 150.
133 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.144.
134 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.153, 154.
135 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.167; Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.125.
136 D. Marley, *Pirates of the Americas*, Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2010), p.164.
137 Marley, *Pirates*, Vol. 1, pp.315–316.
138 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.144.
139 See Appendix III for the important role the Cayman Islands played in the development of the Jamaica colony.

Jacht op zeeschildpadden (sea turtle hunting), c.1612–1652. (The Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-2007-727)

to describe many of the privateers on the island as part-time, as was the case of Jeffery Bowers and Ensign Matthew Gowen who were given a pass to 'goe with Captaine Speed comander of the Speedwere' on 21 May 1660. Only days before, Gowen had been granted a block of land in Liguanea and so perhaps he was hoping that a successful privateering trip would help set himself up on his new land. However Gowen might have had a change of heart, for just eight days later both he and Ensign Hosking (Hoskin) were granted a permission to sail with a different privateer, Captain Richard Guy. Major Fairfax also acquired a boat that was active in 1661 and was used to catch turtles off the Cayman Islands, but was probably also a privateer.[140] Not surprisingly the army provided a ready supply of recruits for the privateers to draw from. William Wheeler was a sergeant in Barrington's regiment at the end of 1659 when he also served aboard the *Pearl*, an unlicensed privateer under the command of George Freeman, and helped to plunder the *St Peter*, a Dutch vessel, off the coast of Cuba.[141] On 17 January 1661 Doyley publicly named 25 serving soldiers who had also been involved with the plundering of the *St Peter*. Doyley felt unable to try these men for piracy and so forced them to wear neck irons and to work on the plantations of some of the officers until such time as he received instruction from England on how to deal with the miscreants.[142]

It has already been shown that crews for the privateers came from a variety of sources. Transient vessels that came in from Europe were already crewed, but extra crew could be found in Jamaica. Privateers such as William James probably recruited a new crew for each voyage and so would have needed to pick up seamen when needed. When recruiting a new crew it was necessary to establish with them the rules by which the ship was to be commanded and more particularly how the spoils were to be distributed. An agreement made by James and his crew in Jamaica in 1658 still exists and is probably typical of the compacts made by privateer captains. James was recruiting his crew under the eye of the English authorities and perhaps this is why the very first clause of his agreement stated that the prize commissioners' tenth part was always to be deducted from captured goods. However, James was known to

140 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.168, 53, 185, 190, 246.
141 TNA, HCA 1/9, f.9.
142 TNA, HCA 1/9, f.17.

circumvent such restrictions when it suited him. The agreement continued by stating 'That all chists and hampers under locke and key upon deckes or under deckes be free plunder whether there be gold silver or whatelse soever in them. And likewise all gold and silver found in what place soever.' He added that anything 'fetcht by canoa or Boat from the shoare or out of any vessell or shipp wch the man of warr cannot come to comand be free plunder'. All goods seized were to be 'devided into 4 fower equall parts, one to be for the ship, one for the shares and two for plunder [for the crew]' whilst whoever spotted a ship at sea 'shall have double shares and double pillage'. Any of the crew who were wounded or maimed would have 'five hundred pieces of eight, or 3 negros as soone as may be conveniently done'. This is an early example of the sort of compensation schedule for which privateers and pirates were later to become more famous. Lastly it was noted that the captain was to have 'the seaventh of all pillage or plunder'.[143]

Unfortunately the extant historical record sheds very little light on the daily activities of the privateers who frequented Jamaica at this time. However the stories of two can be pieced together and make fascinating reading. The origins of the colourful William James are unknown but he seems to have been an associate of Gregory Butler and had more than a passing association with Bermuda. He was the English governor of Association Island (Tortuga) in 1640, under a commission of the Earl of Warwick, which was at that time an outpost of the Providence Island Company and a known base for English privateers.[144] In about September 1655 a ship owned by James was wrecked off the Cayman Islands and was then described as being a private man-of-war. It is unclear if James was with the ship at the time though he probably was. The crew were rescued by a passing English vessel which was promised 500*l* per head to transport the crew to safety, but whilst the crew were taken off the island the agreed fee was never paid to the rescuers.[145] Back in England he was sufficiently well connected to convince the Council of State to agree to loan him '10 minions with 300 balls' from the Tower of London in July 1656, presumably for the privateer he and Butler were preparing 'to surprise Spanish ships … in the Indies'. As if these armaments were not enough, on 1 August the Council agreed to loan a further 'Six iron sacres and 4 iron minions' while on the same day letters of marque were approved for the pair.[146] James, probably like most of the privateers, was also a trader. In the summer of 1657 Brayne had agreed with James that he could provide 'as much salt turtle as his ship could bring', most likely from the Cayman Islands. In this instance he acquired some 50,603 lb of it for which he claimed 632*l* 10s 3d, but as Brayne lacked the funds to pay for it he wrote to Richard Hutchinson, Treasurer of the Navy in England, and requested he pay James instead.[147] In May 1658 James was in Jamaica when he made an agreement between himself and his crew regarding the distribution of any future plunder.

143 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.719.
144 TNA, SP94/47, 1664; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.313.
145 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 295.
146 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, pp.5, 33–34, 50.
147 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.119.

In August 1658 James sailed to Bermuda in his ship the *James* with a prize carrying a cargo of sugar, but evidently this was a French vessel and not Spanish. He seems to have renamed it the *Hopefull Adventurer*, a name that was quite apt considering his escapades. In October he paid the sum of 18*l* to the wife of William Sayle in 'full satisfaction ... for all the provisions or other damage taken or done to my husband at Eluthera by Captn James or any that was then with him.' Sayle had established a Protestant community on the small island of Eleuthera in the Bahamas in 1649, possibly accompanied by Gregory Butler. Sayle, originally from Bermuda, returned there in March 1657 so the wrong done by James was presumably before then. Seemingly he had taken some of the settlers' provisions during a visit to Eleuthera, and possibly even harmed them. On 2 November the owner of the French vessel seized by James lodged a formal protest to the authorities in Bermuda but it is likely that he was not afforded a sympathetic hearing. On the same day John Ballenger and Nicholas Tuppeth provided some testimony that gives insight into what the privateers were able to capture from the Spanish if luck was on their side. The two claimed that James had seized the *Holycross* of Campeche, and from it he plundered 4,800 pieces of eight plus two chests of silver which he 'sould at the highest price'. He also took a cargo of sugar, flour, 'compeach', hides, candles, glasses, incense, cacao and pitch. Where the plundered items were disposed of is not recorded, but it seems not in Jamaica and not according to the due process which his commission would have demanded.[148]

Possibly he was the same Captain James who agreed to transport a group of soldiers' wives from England to Jamaica in September 1659 for 6*l* 10s per head.[149] It would also seem that James was again in Bermuda in early 1660 when he was able procure some contraband tobacco which he then exported without paying the required export duty by the Somers Island Company which had the monopoly of all exports from the colony.[150] He then almost immediately returned to Cagway, for in April 1660 he was involved in a dispute with a merchant named Bird over some deal that went wrong and required mediation from the authorities to calm the situation down. Now sailing a frigate called the *American*, he was granted a pass to leave Jamaica on 16 May but was back in Cagway in August when he imported a cargo of wine and brandy which had experienced significant leakage. Doyley sent a cooper by the name of John Hill who took a 'serious viewe' of the casks that they had been transported in to ascertain the cause of the leakage, and subsequent loss. He concluded that the loss was due to 'the weakness of the caske and the extraordinary laboureing of the ship ... noe way accasionded by bad storage.'[151]

James is next heard of in October 1662 when he purchased the prize ship *Westerhound*, which Myngs had captured in Cuba, for 50*l* by auction in Port

148 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, , pp.719, 727, 728, 719, 726, 720.
149 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574-1660*, p.476.
150 Sir John Henry Lefroy, *Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas Or Somers Islands, 1515-1687*, Vol. 2, 1650-1687 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1879), p.134.
151 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.178-179, 185, 177.

Royal.[152] On 24 October he received a commission valid for 12 months for his ship the *Seafare* allowing him to attack Spanish shipping. He was required to pay 1,000*l* surety to the government to ensure his compliance with the terms of their commission.[153] In an undated letter from 1663 he was noted as being captain of one the 11 privateers in Jamaica, when he was in command of the *American* frigate, with a large crew of 70 men and six guns.[154] It is known that he accompanied Myngs when he left Port Royal in January 1663 to attack Campeche, but at the end of February it was reported that James' vessel had sunk off Campeche with the loss of most of the crew. As James disappears from the historical record after this it can be assumed that he also perished, along with his crew.[155] However, despite having died, William James continued to play a prominent role in Jamaican privateering for the next few months. On 9 May the *Sevilliana* sailed into Port Royal harbour having previously been captured off Campeche by Myngs and James. The vessel was immediately impounded, and the crew declared that when they captured her she was empty but for the tackle and furniture. A court was called and the process of condemning her began with James being named along with Myngs as the parties that seized her. If anybody believed the vessel had previously been plundered by the crew then nothing is recorded in the court proceedings, and it was duly condemned on 23 May and sold for 80*l*.[156] Then on 23 May, another court was held to judge the case of five other vessels captured off Campeche with James once again named, some of which had been plundered by the crew prior to arrival in Jamaica, and these were subsequently disposed of.[157] Having received none of the profits of any of these prizes William James vanishes from history, just as his body had done in the seas off the Mexico coast some months earlier.

Jan Pietersen was a Danish privateer/pirate from Coldingen (Kolden) who was active in the Caribbean in 1659, and despite the Dutch being nominal allies of the Danes in Europe, Pietersen saw nothing wrong with preying upon them in the West Indies. In March 1659 Adriaen Blaes van der Veer, skipper of the Dutch West Indies Company vessel the *St Jan*, was ordered to obtain slaves from West Africa and from there sail to the Dutch colony of Curaçao, just off the Venezuelan coast, to dispose of them. After a lengthy spell acquiring both slaves and provisions for them, Blaes left the west coast of Africa in September with a cargo of over 200 slaves 'large and small'. The *St Jan* crossed the Atlantic with its human cargo and sighted the island of Tobago at the end of October, by which time over half the slaves had died 'from deprivation and disease'. On the night of 31 October the *St Jan* ran aground on a reef off the island of Los Roques. In order to save himself and the crew, Blaes left the slaves on board and in the ship's small sailing boat headed to Curaçao via the island of Bonaire, where he left some of this

152 Crump, 'Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction', Appendix IV.
153 TNA, HCA45/59, f.89.
154 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.177; Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 295, f.33.
155 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, p.278.
156 TNA, HCA45/59, ff.35–38,44.
157 TNA, HCA45/59, ff.38–41.

crew. Upon making his report to the authorities in Curaçao he set out on 7 November to return to his own ship aboard the *Den Johgen Vogelstruys*, commanded by Hans Marcussen Stuyve, to pick up the slaves he had left on board. With him went a second West Indies Company ship called *De Jonge Bontecoe*. However on 8 November, while still en route between Curaçao and Bonaire, Stuyve's vessel was intercepted by Pietersen who was cruising the area looking for prizes in his own ship the *Casteel Ferget*, which Blaes described as being 'an English privateer' and whose crew were reportedly English, French and German.[158]

After a brief chase the *Den Johgen Vogelstruys* was caught and Pietersen boarded her and immediately searched for 'pieces of eight' but found none. Jan van Gaelen, a West Indies Company employee who came with the boat from Curaçao, told Pietersen they were bound for Bonaire but mentioned nothing about their intention to salvage the slaves aboard the *St Jan*. Pietersen left some of his own crew aboard the *Den Johgen Vogelstruys* and let it continue on its way to Bonaire, while he followed a couple of hours behind in the *Casteel Ferget*. Once the *De Jonge Bontecoe* arrived in Bonaire harbour somebody ashore called out if Blaes was aboard and asked if he had already picked up the slaves from the stricken *St Jan*. Those crew that Pietersen had put aboard were obviously Dutch speakers and they naturally heard this exchange. Once Pietersen arrived his crew informed him of what they had heard and they cried 'Captain, we have a good prize!' Pietersen then questioned Blaes more fully and got the entire story and immediately sent the *Den Johgen Vogelstruys* to the small island of Klein Curaçao to fetch his lieutenant, who was there 'watching the Company's [Dutch West Indies Company] vessels in a *pirogue*, which they had taken from the Spaniards.' Once these had returned the two ships set sail for the reef that was the island of Los Roques. An argument then ensued between the privateers and Dutchmen who protested against their detention and the use of 'force and violence' against them. Stuyve even showed Pietersen his sea certificate that was proof that his vessel was both Dutch and going about its lawful business, but this had no effect, and despite their protests the Dutch were forced 'to make sail with the aforesaid privateer'. On their journey they spotted a Spanish ship 'carrying six guns' and a *pirogue*, both of which were run aground.[159]

Pietersen then left his lieutenant in the *Den Johgen Vogelstruys* to make for the *St Jan* with orders, according to the deposition later given by Gaelen, to 'seize the slaves as a good prize upon arrival, even if the bark named *De Jonge Bontecoe* ... might have them on board.'[160] By now it was 16 November; upon their arrival at the stricken *St Jan* they found that the *De Jonge Bontecoe*, commanded by Jan Rijckertsen, had already arrived and attempted to rescue the *St Jan*'s cargo, but was unable to do much more than secure a cable aboard it due to a strong wind and their lack of manpower. He therefore decided to wait for the help that Blaes had gone off to fetch. Pietersen's men,

158 Charles T. Gehring (ed.), *Curaçao Papers 1640–1665* (Interlaken, New York: New Netherland Research Center and the New Netherland Institute, 2011), pp.158–159, 163.

159 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, pp.158–162, 163.

160 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, p.153.

under the command of his unnamed lieutenant, then boarded this bark 'in a hostile manner', thinking they had already removed all of the slaves only to find out that just two had been transferred. The privateers then informed Rijckertsen he was 'to remain in their service as long as they wished'. Even though Rijckertsen refused and showed his sea certificate 'he and his crew were forced to submit and they took away his boat by force'.[161] Pietersen's men then boarded the *St Jan* and removed all of the remaining slaves, a total of 84 and '2 nursing children', whom they put aboard Rijckertsen's bark along with papers and documents they had found aboard the *St Jan*, and then rejoined the *Casteel Ferget* off the Islas de Aves, where Pietersen was waiting for them. They were then joined by Stuyve's vessel which carried two of the slaves plus 'about 70 pounds of elephant's tusks, as well as some flags, compasses and other triffles' taken from the *St Jan*. Pietersen then loaded everything aboard the *Casteel Ferget* 'in spite of every protest and request to the contrary' from the Dutchmen to which the Dane replied 'that everything belonged to him'. Perhaps in an attempt to legitimise his actions Pietersen then offered to pay the Dutch for the use of their vessels and for their labour but Stuyve refused stating 'he would accept nothing, answering that they had been sent out not for their service but on the Company's service … and that force and violence had been used against them.' Pietersen then made Stuyve sign a document in English 'without knowing its contents' for he did not 'understand the English language'.[162] Pietersen then, with a show of the later Hollywood bravado of the stereotypical pirate, reportedly told the Dutchman that if he wanted to keep all the vessels he would and 'in addition to everything coming and going to Curaçao belonging to the Company'. He then told them he had no use for *De Jonge Bontecoe* and so they could board it but 'don't mouth off too much or you shall all leave naked'.[163] With that Pietersen sailed away with his own ship plus Stuyve's boat which he told the owner he needed, leaving all of the Dutch aboard the *De Jonge Bontecoe*, and instructed them to not set sail for Curaçao until after he had left. It was by now 23 November, over three weeks since the grounding of the *St Jan*.[164] According to Matthias Beck, the Dutch governor of Curaçao, Pietersen was a known pirate for he and his men 'have committed similar acts before this under improper commission and persists therein now as a public pirate with the taking of the Company's vessels and Negroes, which he threatens to continue to do'. Beck then proclaimed on 5 December 1656 that all Dutch nationals in the Caribbean should 'be on guard against the aforesaid pirates and privateers' and should they be encountered they were to be seized and brought to Curaçao.[165]

Less then two weeks after Beck let it be known that Pietersen was wanted for piracy, he was in the safety of Cagway harbour.[166] No doubt he would be trying to sell the slaves as soon as possible so as to not bear the cost of feeding

161 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, p.154.
162 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, p.156.
163 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, p.153.
164 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, pp.160–162.
165 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, pp.163–164.
166 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.153.

them and running the risk of more of them dying. Perhaps he thought Jamaica was a safe harbour to head for, away from any likely Dutch retaliation. If he had some English crew he might well have been there previously though perhaps that was unlikely on this voyage as that would have entailed a long voyage into the prevailing wind which would have been time-consuming and very damaging to his vessels. Probably he had entered the Caribbean, as the *St Jan* had done, through the Lesser Antilles and spent some time watching, and perhaps attacking, Dutch and Spanish vessels before happening upon the stricken slaver. He might then have headed towards Jamaica to offload his cargo before either cruising off the Spanish Main or heading for America or back to Europe. However there is no evidence that he actually attempted to sell the slaves in Jamaica – probably few people there could afford slaves – but he was certainly there immediately after this blatant act of piracy and under the protection of the English. Not only had he been allowed into Cagway, but Doyley authorised the sale of ammunition to him, as well as granting him a 'lett pass' after being there almost two weeks. Furthermore, he even arranged for Pietersen to take six Spanish prisoners with him.[167] On 31 December Doyley issued a 'lett pass' to Pietersen and 'Captain Jacques bark', possibly the *Den Johgen Vogelstruys*, and if it was, then it is also possible that Pietersen might have attempted to recruit more crew locally in Cagway as well. This is the only recorded time that Pietersen passed through Cagway and so he was possibly like the other foreign privateers who called at Cagway for supplies, recruitment, rest and safety from the Spanish (and Dutch) and then moved on to try their luck elsewhere or just go home.

Some of the privateers who frequented Cagway were lucky enough to capture rich prizes, but they were the exception rather than the rule. Myngs' experience of early 1659 had illustrated how much wealth could be seized from the Spanish and for a relatively small investment, and no doubt did much to encourage others to try. In May 1660 Richard Guy, who had sailed with Myngs during his raid in 1659 and who had presumably benefited from the lost plunder, had managed to seize a treasure that he declared as being an incredible 14,775 pieces of eight on a voyage of his own ship, the *Hopewell*. Doyley's tenth share that was paid to him on 2 June 1660 was 295*l* 10s, meaning Guy had pocketed at least 2,950*l* from this single seizure, probably more if he chose to hide some of it from Doyley.[168] Perhaps this is why Matthew Gowen had seemingly changed his mind and chose to sail with the lucky Guy instead of Speed at this same time. And only the following month the fortuitous Guy seems to have scored yet another prize, this time laden with 1,300 lb of silver.[169] James had gained large in 1658 with the capture of the *Holycross* and was evidently still wealthy in 1662 when he was able to purchase the *Westerhound*. In January 1661 a Spanish prize was taken by Captain Huyin that was carrying wood and the tenth was valued at 1,635*l*, and this was to be one valuable prize once the wood was sold off.[170]

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167 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.153–154.
168 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.191.
169 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.203.
170 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.235.

Not all the plunder was so valuable, of course. An unknown privateer on 29 May 1660 paid over to Doyley for his tenth share just 'eight pieces of kentinge and eight pieces of made plate small and greate weighing together about fifteen pounds'.[171] Captain Guy on 7 July 1660 handed over to the State store his tenth part share of some 'canvas and cordage' from a Spanish prize he had captured. In November 1660 Captain [ ]uyand captured a prize that contained hides, of which the customary tenth share was handed over to the State store which then allowed Major Fairfax and Commissary Povey to purchase 'five skins each'.[172] More prize cargo seized by Captain Guy was distributed in November 1660 when from the State's tenth 'all thing exceptinge only wood and skins' was ordered by Doyle to be handed over to Juan de Bola and his officers, as well as for 'the English prisoners runne away from the enemy to us'.[173]

It is difficult to ascertain an accurate number of the privateers who were using Cagway as a base during this time. This is partly due to the temporary and transient nature of their activities as many, as has already been shown, were only part-time. Of the English privateers of the time only Richard Guy is mentioned on multiple occasions during 1659 and 1660 as being in Cagway, and he was still active in 1663 as were James and William Maurice.[174] The others are mentioned once or twice and then disappear from the historical record. That does not mean they ceased their activities, only that their activities were not recorded in the sources that have survived the ravages of time. Privateering is essentially a speculative operation which may, or may not, reap a reward. Most likely some men gathered together money, either singularly or in some form of a partnership, and either purchased or hired a boat and then put together a temporary crew on terms agreed amongst themselves, for the duration of a single voyage, originating in Jamaica or even England. For the most part these voyages do not seem to have been particularly successful and reaped few rewards, and possibly led to arguments and disagreements between the parties involved, as was the case between William James and his partner Bird in April 1660.[175]

Perhaps only a dozen or so captains of privateers who spent some time in Cagway before the end of the war in 1660 are mentioned in the extant sources. Their vessels were probably reasonably small and nimble and so needed relatively few crew. Pietersen's vessel the *Casteel Ferget* had a crew of only 30 men,[176] while when the *Jamaica* was fitted out in May 1659 around 42 of its crew were discharged sailors from the *Marston Moor*.[177] Most likely all of the privateer vessels had crews of between 20–50 depending on their size. This would imply that at any one time there were only a few hundred men in Cagway who might reasonably be identified as privateers, and not all of these were necessarily English or would feel that they were normally

171 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.191.
172 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.226.
173 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.226.
174 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.177.
175 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.178–179.
176 Gehring, *Curaçao Papers*, p.152.
177 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.37, 78.

resident there. It should also be borne in mind that European ships quickly deteriorated due to the brutal Caribbean winds, which shredded sails, and the clams that fixed themselves to the wooden hulls and then burrowed into the timber causing enormous damage which could only be repaired back in Europe. As such these vessels were only able to spend limited periods of time in the Caribbean before returning to Europe or being disposed of locally. It was not surprising, then, that privateers frequently kept the ships they captured if they were in better condition than their own and thereby extended the amount of time they could be active in the West Indies.

In 1663 it was reported that Jamaica had a privateer fleet of 11 frigates carrying 740 men with 81 guns manned by English, Dutch and West Indian crews. In addition there were three smaller ships carrying '100 Jamaicans' and 12 guns in Tortuga.[178] The following year Thomas Lynch estimated that there 'may be above 1,500 of them in about 12 vessels' while another letter of that date noted there were 20 privateers in Jamaica at the time.[179] It was from the mid 1660s onwards that Jamaica entered its golden age of piracy when Modyford and Henry Morgan directed and led a fleet of privateers that became the scourge of the Caribbean. Prior to this, however, the numbers were significantly less and it is most likely that between 1659 and 1660 only a handful of active privateers and their crew were operating on a regular basis out of Cagway harbour and many, perhaps most, were transient ships that only passed through to take advantage of the colonial administration's lax attitude towards piracy.

III

The sea was the only conduit for communications and supply from England, but due to the distance there were frustrating delays in receiving both. When the original expedition sailed from England in 1654 it took four weeks continuous sailing to reach Barbados, which due to the prevailing winds was the most practical entrance for ships from Europe into the Caribbean and a convenient stopover for water and provisions. From there it would still take another two to three weeks to reach Jamaica, so the quickest that letters from England could arrive in Jamaica was around two months, and longer if the ship hit contrary winds. It took Penn a similar amount of time to return to England that year, though Venables made the crossing in only six weeks. With such a long transit time, delays in providing instructions to changing circumstances from England were inevitable and frustrating. Despite Penn leaving Jamaica towards the end of June 1655 with news of the Hispaniola disaster, Cromwell only found out at the end of August; it was early September before he received Venables' news that there were now no commissioners alive in Jamaica and nobody in authority to govern since mid July. It took Cromwell some time to formulate a response, and further instructions to

178 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, p.177.

179 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, p.211, 241; Pestana, 'Early English Jamaica without Pirates', p.357, n.67.

Fortescue – the most senior officer believed to be still alive – were issued in early October but only received in early 1656 – almost six months after Penn and Venables fled their commands. Unbeknown to Cromwell Fortescue was dead even before he wrote the instructions to him. News critical to the well-being of the colony also took time to arrive. It was probably only in early January 1659 that the English received news of the death of Oliver Cromwell at the beginning of the previous September, and they only became aware of the Restoration on 15 August 1660, almost three months after the event when a Royal frigate arrived. News of the cessation of hostilities with Spain, announced in September 1660, was only received in Jamaica on 6 February 1661, and even then it came from a Spanish ship and not an English one.[180]

When Sedgwick departed England in the summer of 1655 he had no idea of where the army was and what operations had been conducted since its arrival earlier in the year. Upon his arrival in Barbados in August, after a voyage from England of almost seven weeks, Searle was not able to give him any more specific information other than that Venables had departed for Hispaniola at the end of March, as all he had received since were unsubstantiated rumours of defeat. Sedgwick had no choice but to follow Venables to St Christopher to see if they had any news, and then cautiously approached San Domingo to see if it was held by the Spanish or the English. With no form of instant communication available to the English they had to rely on sending out vessels to watch for other expected shipping to provide more updated instructions. When Penn sailed the fleet away from Hispaniola in early May he left some ships to wait off San Domingo for four or five weeks in case the store ships arrived so they could be redirected to Jamaica, which is what happened. So it was very important that the commanders provided a number of contingency plans for vessels to follow depending on the circumstances they faced.

Despite these inevitable delays the English had no choice but to write to England for specific instructions and wait for a response, regardless of how long it took. Doyley in particular had a keen grasp of what needed to be done on Jamaica and was able, and prepared, to exercise significant amounts of initiative; however as a relatively junior part of the larger State apparatus he was unable to formulate policy on behalf of the government, all he could do was implement it. Without leadership from Venables in the summer of 1655 the senior army officers wrote to Cromwell requesting guidance on how to manage affairs on the island, but it was almost six months before they received the Lord Protector's reply. Lack of existing records means it is not possible to know if responses were even received for the seemingly trivial questions that the English sought guidance on. For example when the island was visited by Quakers, Doyley had no idea if he ought to see them as threat or embrace them, not knowing what the government policy was towards them, while Goodsonn was not sure what the policy for treating captured African-Caribbeans was to be. In both cases Doyley and Goodsonn wrote to England

180 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.22–23, 208; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.21.

for guidance but there is no evidence of any response.[181] Undoubtedly there were numerous other occasions where guidance was sought and probably never received, and the tone of Doyley's letters from 1658 onwards suggests this to be the case. Unlike the English garrison in Dunkirk, which could send an envoy to London in a few days to seek, and perhaps even force responses, the English in Jamaica had little option but to sit and await responses and instructions that might, or might not, arrive.

It was not just communication that was delayed because of the distance but reinforcements and provisions as well. Lack of resources in England and the slow processes of government played a considerable part in delaying supplies, but there were other more logistical problems that were encountered. Brayne was supposed to depart Scotland in the summer of 1656 with reinforcements and supplies but no suitable shipping was available to carry them. Despite England having the largest navy in the world, and a large merchant fleet, it was always stretched thin with its fleet commitments in Jamaica, Blake's blockade of Cadiz, the necessity of protecting the home waters and the need to retain ships in harbour for maintenance. As a result Brayne waited almost four months for shipping from London to arrive, but even then it never came and he was forced to make his own arrangements with some ships in Ireland to carry his force. Tyson had a similar problem at the same time on the south coast of England and eventually Martin Noel chartered his own vessels, at a cost to the State, to send them to Jamaica.

Two examples from 1657 are suffice to illustrate the logistical challenges that had to be faced just to get ships on their way to Jamaica. At the end of the year William Watts, owner of a merchantman called the *William*, was hired by the English government to transport around 300 tonnes provisions to Jamaica, at a rate of 4*l* 10s a tonne. These provisions were loaded at one of the wharves close by the Tower of London. According to Watts the navy was to provide an escort vessel, the *Bristol*, to protect the *William* as she passed through the English Channel and into the comparative safety of the Atlantic Ocean, and to prevent attack from the Dunkirk privateers which now infested the Channel since the outbreak of formal hostilities with Spain. However, after waiting five weeks for the *Bristol* to appear the navy decided to use the *Fagon* instead, which was an armed merchantman that herself had just returned from Jamaica. In early February 1657 the two ships left London and entered the Channel. The day the two entered the Channel they 'fell foul of a man of war' at night but managed to evade it. The following day, just '80 leagues from the Land's End' the *Fagon* left the *William* and headed for home. Barely two hours later 'a Dunkirker came up, and although they resisted until the next day, the William was overcome and carried to Dunkirk'. The crew were imprisoned, the vessel seized, but more importantly the entire cargo was taken by the privateers and lost to the desperate soldiers in Jamaica.[182]

Around the time that the *William* was seized two other merchantmen, the *Golden Parrot* and *Hopewell* were being loaded, again along the Thames, with provisions for Jamaica. On 16 February the Victualling

181 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.834, and Vol. 5, p.153.
182 Everett Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.543.

Office notified the Admiralty commissioners that these two vessels were unable to load all the provisions allotted to them and so '100 tons of biscuit and cheese' were left behind. These provisions were part of an order for supplies for 3,000 men for four months that the navy had previously placed. The following day the Admiralty gave order for another merchantman to be chartered to carry the remainder and also to carry 'boatswain and carpenters' stores for the ships there, in lieu of those lost in the William'.[183] On 27 February the *Exchange of London* was hired to carry these stores from Deptford and the balance not shipped by the other two merchantmen, but as it was a larger vessel it still had the capacity to carry a further 100 tonnes of provisions.[184] So it was decided that some iron hoops were to be sent out as well 'they being much needed there' even though the Admiralty was 'not certain that any of the smiths who went with the fleet are now surviving, and there may be need for employing the iron in the stores there for other uses'. All of which helped to delay the departure of the shipping and the arrival in Jamaica.[185]

The English in Jamaica had little option but to wait for the established process of resupply to run its course. In England orders for provisions had to be made through the offices of the navy in London, and contracts were awarded to local suppliers who had to source the necessary supplies and prepare them for transportation. The provisions were transported to central navy warehousing, mainly along the River Thames, where they were then loaded onto shipping destined for Jamaica. The shipping was then required to run the gauntlet of Dunkirk-based privateers in the English Channel before heading into the Atlantic on what could be up to a two-month voyage to Jamaica. En route the provisions could be lost, either through enemy action in the case of attack by privateers, as in the case of the *William* in February 1657, or as a result of inclement weather, as in the case of the *Saphire* and *Two Brothers* in October 1656. Embezzlement of supplies was also a serious problem for the navy in general and it was not uncommon for much less than the audited, and paid for, supplies to arrive at the destination, as was alluded by Cornelius Burrough in his letter to the Admiralty in March 1657. Delays in dispatching the vessels from England were common and compounded the supply problems. The *Exchange of London* was hired to carry provisions on 27 February 1657, but despite most of her cargo already being available she was still docked in Blackwall on 7 April. On 14 April she was supposed to meet the *Princess Maria* off Margate to be conveyed around to the convoy marshalling area in the Downs, but the *Exchange* was not there. She eventually appeared and both ships arrived in the Downs on 16 April; they left on 23 April but only as far as Plymouth Sound, where they arrived 25 April. By 1 May both vessels had only made it as far as Falmouth due to contrary winds, when the captain of the *Princess Maria* commented that the *Exchange* was 'a very sluggish sailer and hardly able to keep the sea in foul weather'. It seems the

183 Everett Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.518.
184 Everett Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.521.
185 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, pp.526, 527.

Exchange then joined a convoy of other merchantmen in Falmouth bound for Barbados.[186] Despite the complexities of supply and the inherent delays of the resupply process, the colonists upon Jamaica were almost completely dependent on England for their survival as the garrison and settlers on the island knew only too well.

186 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, pp.521, 535, 540, 541, 550, 555.

6

Jamaica Colony

I

It had always been Cromwell's intention that civilian settlers would be encouraged to populate the newly established colonies in South America, but the government constantly struggled to find anybody willing to go there during the occupation period, partly because of the ongoing war but more particularly because of the harsh conditions on the island and the reputation it soon gained as a graveyard. Virtually as soon as news was received in England at the end of August 1655 that Jamaica had been occupied, the Lord Protector issued a proclamation encouraging settlement of the island. The proclamation promised 'the constituting and settling of a civil government, by such good laws and customs, as are and have been exercised in colonies and places of the like nature', exemption of all excise or duty on any items shipped from England for the use of settlement of the island for a period of seven years while any goods 'which shall be the produce and native growth of that island' and which are exported from the colony would also be free of excise or duty for 10 years. The proclamation added, 'We have also given our speciall orders and directions, that no imbargo or other hinderance, upon any pretence whatsoever, be laid upon any ships, seamen, or other passengers or adventurers, which shall appear to be engaged and bound for the said island.'[1] Whilst these terms were generous, no direct financial assistance was offered and so any individual who chose to relocate there had to carry the entire financial burden and risk themselves, so it was not surprising that very few volunteered to settle there, although merchants were quick to take advantage of the trading benefits afforded them.

A second proclamation was issued on 10 October, perhaps as a result of the less than enthusiastic reception that greeted the first. In this one Cromwell tellingly emphasised the safety of Jamaica with over 6,000 soldiers on the island to provide security for the new settlers, who would be 'under the immediate protection of this State, and so eased both of the danger and charge which other plantations are subject to'. He further decreed that

1 Birch, *TSP*, p.753.



Map 8 English Jamaica, *c.*1662.

each settler who transported themselves to Jamaica before 29 September 1658 'shall have twenty acres of land, besides lakes and rivers, for every male twelve years old and upwards, and ten acres for every other male or female, to be set forth to them after six weeks notice of their remove'. The settlers would be permitted liberty for seven years to hunt all wild horses and cattle in the island for their own benefit 'subject to certain rules'. They and their heirs would have the rights to hold their land 'in free and common soccage for seven years', meaning they would pay no rent or be liable for any obligations related to their landholding, and afterwards they were obliged to pay a nominal rent of one penny per acre per year with 'no other rent, tenure, or service whatsoever' which rights were to be 'confirmed by Letters Patent unto them, their heirs and assigns'. The settlers were free to keep the proceeds of any mine on their land, except gold or silver, and they were exempt from military service 'unless in case of invasion or rebellion and for defence of the island', while 'All born within said island to be accounted free denizens of England, and to enjoy all the privileges as any natives of England.'[2] Again, despite the generous terms England failed to provide the anticipated colonists, while the only record of land being granted to somebody in England at this time was the 20,000 acres patented to Martin Noel in October 1655. He did send out some colonists at his own expense who probably arrived around September 1657 and were based at Morant, but half soon died, although the plantation they established was in existence until at least April 1659. When Noel died in 1665 there is no mention in his will of any property in Jamaica, so presumably he had disposed of it prior to his death.[3]

These attempts to encourage settlers to migrate from England were not entirely unsuccessful however. In July 1656 a small group of settlers travelled with Lieutenant Colonel Tyson and his company when they left for Jamaica;[4] between 1655 and 1663 12 indentured servants left Bristol bound for Jamaica, while some belonging to the Earl of Carlisle had arrived by 1662, but indentured servants were very different to the free settlers the government was hoping to recruit.[5] Not a few wives of soldiers were desirous to join their husbands in the new colony, and up to 1660 there was steady, if small, stream of them who petitioned to be allowed to travel to Jamaica. As early as 19 December 1655 the newly formed Jamaica Committee was instructed 'to report upon the most convenient way of transporting those wives desirous to go to their husbands in Jamaica'.[6] One of the first to volunteer was Mary Ramsey, wife of Henry Ramsey who had enlisted in Barbados, and she petitioned for, and was granted, free passage for her and her family on 11 January 1656.[7] Mary Hope, the wife of Major Richard Hope of Holdip's regiment was also granted

2 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.98.
3 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.101; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.66, 68, 78; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.114; TNA, PROB 11/318/84, Will of Sir Martin Noell of London, 1665.
4 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.445.
5 Pestana, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, p.336 n.30; BL, Add MS 11410.
6 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.434.
7 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.435.

free passage in July 1656.[8] Originally it was intended that Mrs Hope would travel on the *Grantham* and her baggage was stowed accordingly, but then it was decided that she, along with the reinforcements led by Tyson, would be shipped on a merchantman leased from Martin Noel instead, leaving Mary in great distress without her luggage.[9] In December 1657 the State granted the sum of 6*l* 10s per person to cover the transport and provisions for the wives of 14 officers and soldiers who wanted to join their husbands.[10] In April 1658 20*l* was provided for Elizabeth Archbould and her family to travel to Jamaica to join her husband, but she did not survive long and had died before 1668, when Henry remarried.[11] Wives agreeing to join their husbands in Jamaica was one way to get part of the husbands' pay arrears settled as well. On 15 June 1658 the Council of State agreed to pay the arrears for Archbould, Henry Hilliard 'trooper and surgeon', Captain Lieutenant Henry Rudyerd, Edmond Williot and John Yorke when their wives were 'willing to go to their husbands in Jamaica'.[12] In September 1659 Mary Ryder, Paulina Pindar, Anne Cadaway and Alice Leverett, with several others, all petitioned for free passage to join their husbands, which was granted and Captain James of an unnamed merchantman was paid 6*l* 10s per head to transport them.[13] One of the last wives to relocate was Mary Tyson, who arrived on 17 August 1661 only a fortnight after her husband had been executed for mutiny.[14] Even though the government was prepared to transport soldiers' wives and families from England for free, and in some instances promised payment of the husbands' arrears as an inducement to go, still only a small number of families were convinced to make the long voyage.

Consideration was also given to sending undesirables from England to Jamaica, which would solve two problems at once. On 3 October 1655 the Council of State discussed sending '1000 Irish girls, and the like number of youths, of 14 years or under'.[15] There is little evidence to suggest that convicts or prisoners of war were transported from England to boost the island's numbers as had initially been discussed prior to the expedition departing, but certainly in April 1662 15 prisoners incarcerated in Newgate were pardoned and then sent to Jamaica.[16]

The English colonies on the east coast of North America had long been suppliers of the material needs of the English Caribbean colonies, and it was expected that colonists there should be encouraged to migrate to Jamaica. Cromwell had received encouragement from some of the Puritan ministers of New England to attack the West Indies, as they believed it was prophesied

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8 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.445.
9 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.446.
10 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.461.
11 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.465; Vere Langford Oliver (ed.) *Caribbeana: being miscellaneous papers relating to the history, genealogy, topography, and antiquities of the British West Indies* (London: Mitchell, Hughes and Clarke, 1912), p.47.
12 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.466.
13 Sainsbury, *CSP, Colonial 1574–1660*, p.476.
14 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.136; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.208.
15 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, pp.430, 431.
16 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.88–89.

in scripture, and they further led the Lord Protector to believe numerous of the colonists would be happy to follow the army there. To this end, in September 1655 Daniel Gookin, a prominent Virginian and Massachusetts settler, was sent back from London to New England 'with instructions to make propositions to those who may be inclined to remove to Jamaica to cause agreements to be made with those people willing to transplant themselves, and certified by said Gookin, and all other encouragements to be given to them'.[17] However Gookin was no more successful at persuading New Englanders to remove themselves to Jamaica as the authorities had been in England. As he explained to Thurloe in August 1656:

> As soon as the weather was travellable, I visited all the united colonies of the English, which are four in number, and a good distance from each other, and in all of them endeavoured the promotion of his highnes desires and offers of transplantation to Jamaica. Indeed I found sundry considerable persons, who have had much motion uppon their harts to gratifie the cordiall offers of his highness; but discouradgments from the great mortalitie of the English upon the place, the prophaneness of the generalitie of the souldiery, the continuall hazard of mens lives by the sculking Negroes and Spaniards, all which and sundry other matters were and are strongly reported here, which doth (for the present) cause many to suspend their resolves, and desire to wait longer.

He was then able to report that a group of some 300 settlers had agreed to go the following year, but they had sent a delegation of three to Jamaica to see for themselves the conditions on the island before committing themselves to relocate.[18] Gookin certainly tried his best to gain support and recruits to move to Jamaica, for he wrote numerous letters to men of influence as well as printing and distributing advertisements across all of the colonies.[19] However in June 1657 he was almost embarrassed to have to inform Thurloe that the delegation had returned from Jamaica, and after seeing first-hand the awful conditions there and in particular the 'mortalitie amongst the Nevis planters' they now refused to transport themselves there.[20]

Despite Gookin's inability to persuade settlers to come from New England, and the poor reputation Jamaica had gained, there was still some interest from some quarters for settlers to relocate. In June 1658, in response to enquiries that had been made to him, Doyley sent instructions and words of encouragement with a returning Virginian vessel to attempt to convince settlers there to come to Jamaica. He emphasised that they could select their own land, they would receive the protection of the army, they would not be conscripted into the army and he reaffirmed the other generous terms offered to any settler who came. Interestingly he did not offer free transportation.[21]

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17 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, pp.97, 101.
18 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.148.
19 Daniel Gookin, *To all persons whom these may concern, in the several townes, and plantations of the United Colonies in New-England* (1656).
20 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.362.
21 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.111.

In August 1656 a proposal of James Grover, one-time governor of the small English colony of Gravesend, on Long Island (modern-day Brooklyn) proposed a scheme that was considered by the Council of State to send settlers from there.[22] However in both cases nothing eventuated.

Better luck was had convincing settlers on Nevis to move to Jamaica, however. The island of Nevis had been occupied by the English since 1628 when settlers from St Christopher had arrived and soon established successful sugar production on the island. The English governor, Luke Stokes, had been on the island since at least 1647 and was one of the individuals suggested by Riccard's committee in 1654 who might be of use to the English once they arrived in the Caribbean. In fact there is some evidence to suggest that Cromwell did in fact appoint Stokes as a commissioner in late 1655 to make up the numbers as only Searle remained of the original appointees.[23] Stokes was sent the proclamations regarding the settlement of Jamaica in late 1655, and on 12 March 1656 he excitedly wrote to Sedgwick informing him that 'I find in this island the greatest part of the inhabitants, with their wives, children and servants, are willing and ready to accept his highnes termes, laid downe in his highnes proclamation. There is onely wanting transportation for them and theires.' He believed their number to be 'neere to one thousand, besides women, children and slaves', including himself and his family.[24] Stokes, having received no instruction regarding their transportation from Nevis by 22 May, wrote again to Sedgwick and sent his letter to Jamaica with four representatives from the island, including his son, to make arrangements for shipping to come for them. A week later he wrote to Cromwell notifying him of the success that he had had in persuading 'the greatest part of the island to come in upon that design with a great deal of readiness', however they 'being most part of them poor (several of the rich not willing to stir)' and had not the money arrange shipping for themselves, and so he requested Cromwell's help in arranging transport.[25]

Upon the arrival of the four Nevis gentlemen, who arrived just days after Sedgwick had died, Goodsonn arranged that three of the State's ships (*Marmaduke*, *Adam & Eve* and the *Mary* flyboat) should be prepared for transporting the settlers, and these sailed for Nevis on 25 June while the four representatives remained on the island to select where the Nevis colonists would be settled.[26] Goodsonn himself sailed for Nevis after his fruitless attempts at capturing the Spanish plate fleet that summer, arriving on 9 October only to fi

as there was insufficient space aboard the three ships previously sent. Goodsonn noted, 'The number of people from hence and Christophers will be about 1400 men, women, children, and servants, and of them men able to bear arms 800. They carry with them of dry provisions, as Cassava, pease,

22 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.440; TNA, SP25/77, Council of State: Order Books, 1656–1657, f.340.
23 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, pp.473–474; Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.634–637.
24 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.603.
25 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.48, 66.
26 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.77, 152.

bonanas, and such like'; he aimed to embark the rest on his own ships, which he did, and they all departed Nevis on 22 October and arrived at Jamaica on 4 November, a month before Brayne's arrival.[27]

With the army being settled on most of the good land around Santiago and the land to the west being frequently raided by Ysassi or the African-Caribbeans, the only practical location for the Nevis settlers to establish themselves was to the west, around the isolated Point Morant. In anticipation of their arrival, on 10 October the army decided to redeploy part of Doyley's regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mercer, to the Ayala area (now Yallahs Bay). Cromwell's declaration of October 1655 had promised the use of the army to assist settlers establishing themselves, and as such Mercer was instructed 'to assist the said planters with your utmost endeavour against any enemie that shall infest them, and also against any souldiers or seamen shall spoil or robb any of their plantation would do them any prejudice whatsoever'.[28] Prior to this there had been no record of any Spanish or African-Caribbean activity around Ayala or Morant, but in December it was thought fit to dispatch a force under the command of Adjutant James Butler to:

> [march] to the plantation where ye Negroes last were and to fall on their quarters there or in any other place where they are removed, and to use your best skill and dilligence to find out what waies [*sic*] or plantations or thereabouts, eyther directing to the north parte of ye island or toward Morant and to find out by intelligence, track or any other waies where any of the quarters or habitations of the enemy, and to use your utmost to infest or disturb them not exceeding above tenn miles where ye Negroes quarters were, and to have special care that by excess raines ye party be not surprised unawares.[29]

Whether some unrecorded attacks had taken place in the area prior to this is not known; perhaps Doyley was just being overly cautious to remove any potential threats to the settlers. However there were no recorded instances of resistance attacks in this area from the arrival of the settlers until the departure of the Spanish from Jamaica in 1660, which suggests that this raid, at least, was effective in removing or deterring any unwanted enemy from the area. No doubt Doyley was also concerned that raiders might come down from the mountains along tracks unknown to the English, but again there is no evidence that this happened. To further secure the area, and to provide additional assistance, Brayne also quartered his and Moore's regiments around Morant so that – as he informed the Lord Protector – 'they might be a gard for the planters that came with colonel Stoakes; for shold they receave any battle by the enemy, it would discouradge others from adventuring hither upon the like accompt'.[30]

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27 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.500, 771, 770.
28 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.94.
29 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.108.
30 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.770.

Unfortunately the settlers, despite being acclimatised after many years on Nevis, suffered just as badly as all the other new arrivals had on Jamaica. Stokes had brought with him 'myselfe, wife, children, and family ... with several inhabitants of that island, and the neighbouring adjacent places, to the number of sixteen hundred people, men, women, and children.'[31] They arrived at Morant in mid December right at the end of the rainy season and so, as Goodsonn explained to Thurloe, 'there fell very much rain, which did impair the healthes of a great many, nothwithstanding we gave them all assistance in the help of our men, by setting tentes for them, and such like'.[32] Despite the attempts to isolate the newcomers from the rest of the English occupants, and by placing them on virgin land, they soon became sick and many died. By early January 1657 Goodsonn estimated that over 300 were already dead.[33] By mid March both Stokes and his wife had died, leaving their three sons to fend for themselves, as had 'about two thirds of the planters that came along with him; the rest in a very sickly condition, and in danger of starving ... but they are so weake, that they are neither able to gather the old, nor to plant againe'.[34] By September Doyley noted that of the Nevis settlers that arrived nine months previously 'there are not 400 left'.[35] Doyley believed that in 1662 when he left Jamaica barely 80 of the Nevis settlers were still alive on the island.[36]

In December 1656 the Council of State in London discussed the plight of religious Independents on the small island of Eleuthera in the Bahamas, and subsequently wrote to Sedgwick suggesting that he invite them to Jamaica.[37] This group, led by William Sayle, had been expelled from Bermuda in 1649 when the colony declared allegiance to Charles II, and made the dangerous journey to the Bahamas where they struggled to eke out an existence. It is possible that Gregory Butler had been one of these first settlers. Sayle and some of his followers did in fact return to Bermuda by themselves in March 1657 and after his return there is no further mention of the Eleuthera settlers being removed to Jamaica.[38] However, Luke Stokes had written to the authorities in Bermuda as early as May 1656, and acting on Cromwell's instructions, informed them of the plans for Jamaica and encouraged them to recruit settlers who could be transplanted there.[39] In June the Council in Bermuda wrote to Jamaica notifying them of the interest that some of the settlers had to resettle there,[40] and shortly afterwards three of Goodsonn's vessels en route to Nevis called into Bermuda and no doubt provided more information as to the conditions in Jamaica.[41] In April 1657 one of Goodsonn's

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31 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.769.
32 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.771.
33 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.771.
34 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.110.
35 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.68.
36 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 347, f.39.
37 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.453.
38 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.726.
39 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.66.
40 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.51–52.
41 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.726.

vessels, the galley *Martin*, commanded by Bermudan native Captain John Wentworth, called into Bermuda and stayed there for at least two months during which time he was able to convince around 200 settlers to make the move to Jamaica, saying he would return later in the year with shipping for them.[42] However, Wentworth did encounter some opposition on the island in the form of a certain William Phillips who was brought before the island's council in May 1657 charged with obstructing Wentworth's attempts to recruit settlers. Phillips, who seems to have been serving with Wentworth and so might also have been a Bermudan resident himself, told two other local settlers of the conditions on Jamaica and that 'It was very sickly and many had died there.' Phillips was later to tell Marye Boyfield that:

> yt was not a place he could sitt downe in himselfe, neither would he wish any ffriend of his, or any tending to him. God was pleased to cutt off from the place most of the Godly people And his thoughts were that God did intend further destruction vpon yt, and none but the scumme of the Indias was there And was without Government.

Phillips was found guilty of obstructing Wentworth's attempts at recruiting and 'imprisoned 3 daies in Irons because he hath depraved the Government of Jamaica'.[43]

Stokes had informed Cromwell in 1656 of his concern that the petty debts of would-be settlers might retard the English attempts to colonise Jamaica, as many of the poorer settlers across the Caribbean owed money to creditors where they currently lived and these creditors could attempt to block them from leaving if these debts had not been paid off.[44] A similar situation had been encountered in Barbados in 1655, when the army was recruiting there and many settlers saw it as an opportunity to escape their debts, much to the anger of their creditors, and it seems this became an issue in Bermuda as well. In September 1657 when Doyley was making his preparations for the shipping to transport the settlers he warned his two sea captains, Wentworth (now commanding the *Paul*) and Benjamin Fermais of the *Golden Falcon* of the possibility that some of the settlers might be prevented from leaving by some on the island 'under the pretence of debt'. He instructed them that if this were to happen they were to inform the governor and to 'take the debt into your consideration and examine the same, the quantity owinge and the means whence it became due and to doe justice to the creditor … soe as the debtor may nott be interrupted if the debt be small or nott certaine.' He was to arrange for the debtors to 'give bills to pay as he shall be able' and 'nott stopped upon malice or designe and His Highnes' designe retarded'.[45]

Whether Wentworth and Fermais were required to mediate between the departing settlers and their creditors when they arrived 24 October is not recorded, but despite these potential obstacles they were able to leave

42 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.110; Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.727.
43 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1879), pp.99–100.
44 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.66.
45 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.75.

Bermuda on 1 January 1658 with around 200 settlers aboard.[46] A list of who these settlers were still exists and makes interesting reading. Twenty-one single people were transported, including two woman. There were 32 family units, mainly husbands and wives with children, but also Phillip Wright with just his son. Samuel Newell was accompanied by his wife, his two children and his father. Francis Cawdall left with just her six sons and daughters. Some of these family units were large: John Biggs and his wife had five children and Thomas Cokoe with his wife had six children, while both Thomas Board and George Jackson each had seven children plus their wives. At least 61 children are identified, but there were many more as some settlers were only recorded as being accompanied by their family without specifying the number of children, such as Thomas Bonham and William Ford. At least 27 adult females and 52 adult males are separately indicated as leaving Bermuda, so at least two thirds, or perhaps as many as three-quarters of these new settlers were dependents which would have created a drain on the island's meagre supplies once they arrived. Given the concerns that Doyley had for their debt it is likely that most of them, like those from Nevis, were poor and were unlikely to inject much capital into the island's economy on their arrival. However, not all were poor. Anthony Peniston evidently was not, for he sailed his own vessel known as the *Jamaica* with his fellow settlers, while Benjamin Downeinge perhaps also had his own boat but certainly took eight seamen with him.[47]

There is no record of where the Bermudan migrants settled, but it would seem likely that they also went initially to Morant. Most of the Nevis settlers had died by the time these new arrivals landed, so there would have been both vacant land and untended farms available to them there. It is also likely that many of these new arrivals would have died, though perhaps not at the same rate as before as by 1658 there was certainly more food available on the island plus greater opportunities for occasional paid employment. Unlike the Nevis settlers, the names of many of the Bermudans have survived and from these it is possible to track some of their descendants through the extant parish records, though very few for the latter half of the seventeenth century survive. Isaac Aderley – most likely the son of Abraham – survived, and after marrying Thomasin they had a daughter, Rebecca, who was baptised in the old parish church of Clarendon, which was previously the Spanish White Cross church a few miles to the west of Santiago. Robert and Hannah Macham also survived and had another son, Thomas, who was baptised in 1673 in the parish church of St Catherine in Santiago. There are Matchams still living on Jamaica who might be descended from Robert and Hannah.[48]

Only three of the Bermudan settlers are recorded as holding land in 1670: William Bun (64 acres), Francis Powell (17) and Frances Russell (53), so if those of the Bermuda group were hoping for a fresh start and the opportunity to own their own land, the vast majority would no doubt have been bitterly

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46 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, pp.727, 718.

47 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.718.

48 Ancestry.com, Jamaica, Church of England Parish Register Transcripts, 1664–1879. [Internet] Available from <www.ancestry.com> [Accessed 4 August 2020].

disappointed at how their lives turned out.[49] It is significant to reiterate that it was not the rich settlers who elected to come from Nevis or Bermuda but the poorer ones, who had less capital to invest and less money to support themselves upon their arrival. The message was clear: during the early occupation Jamaica was not an attractive proposition for anybody but the lowest stratas of English colonial society.

The above references all relate State attempts to populate Jamaica, but there were also private initiatives as well. Martin Noel sent a group of settlers, probably from England but maybe also from his estates in Barbados, to establish a plantation at Morant. Most likely these were indentured servants who were bound to him for a period of time and whose transportation he personally paid for, and also their food once they arrived. How many came is unknown but most likely not many, maybe fewer than 50. With merchant ships calling at Jamaica from England, New England and other Caribbean islands on a regular basis there was ample opportunity for individuals to find their own passage if they chose to come without relying on the State to make the arrangements. Perhaps this was a trickle to start off with but as the conditions settled, food became more abundant and greater commercial opportunities were available it is likely that the prospect of residing in Jamaica became more appealing than it had once been. In June 1660 a ship carrying 50 men, women and children from St Christopher was reportedly seized by the Spanish on its way to Jamaica so it seems there were other settlers who did come from the other islands by private means.[50] As commerce began to flourish merchants began to reside in Jamaica, or to at least employ proxies to be there for them, so the need for experienced traders and a whole host of activities that either supported or fed off them also grew, which would have created employment opportunities that could be filled by new arrivals, as the soldiers themselves were not free to undertake other employment.

Another source of settlers that came to Jamaica was France. In Lord Windsor's 1663 account of Jamaica he noted that the Liguanea area was inhabited by about 400 settlers, both English and French,[51] but where the French came from is not entirely clear. The French had colonised the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe from 1635 and had shared St Christopher with the English since 1625, so had a significant presence in the region, although their colonies were all reasonably small. Isolated groups of French hunters had inhabited the remote island of Tortuga since about 1625 and hunted wild cattle on nearby Hispaniola, and sold the smoked meat and hides they produced to passing ships. Most likely the first French came from here to Jamaica in 1657 when Doyley invited some to come and hunt wild cattle for the English, and there were French hunters on the island until at least September 1659, and probably later.[52] By 1659 French privateers were

49 W. Noel Sainsbury (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 1669–1674* (hereafter *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*) (London: Longman and Co, 1889), pp.101, 99, 100.
50 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.194.
51 BL, Add MS 11410.
52 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.69, 134.

being welcomed in Cagway by the English.[53] At least two Frenchmen were permitted to return to Europe aboard English vessels, at no charge, while others were granted passes to leave Jamaica when they chose.[54] There must have been significant numbers of French on the island in 1662 for it to be mentioned in the census statement of that year.[55] The French settlers were obviously well respected and afforded privileges that demonstrate the importance Doyley attached to them, and he also felt the need to protect them when needed. In May 1660 an unknown French captain, most likely a privateer who frequented Tortuga, claimed he had been robbed at sea by a certain Captain Groves, who was believed to be hiding out in St Christopher. Such was Doyley's desire to remain on good terms with the French that he sent Captain Martin van Alfan to St Christopher in an attempt to apprehend Groves.[56] Interestingly in the 1670 census, which lists landholders by name across the island, only three have very obviously French surnames and all of them held land in St Andrew's Parish, which encompassed the Liguanea Plain.[57] Furthermore, the parish baptism registers for St Andrew's of the 1660s and 1670s have numerous entries of parishioners with French sounding surnames, meaning that there were females as well as males amongst this community, which suggests that these families had placed roots there and had probably been there for a while.[58]

At the end of 1660 a report on the state of Jamaica noted that there were around 2,200 soldiers on the island with equally as many 'planters, merchants, and others'.[59] Probably fewer than 2,000 new settlers had arrived in Jamaica between 1655 and 1658 as a result of State-sponsored initiatives and perhaps as many as three-quarters of those had died within some few months of arriving. That the civilian population was over 2,000 in 1660 implies that significant numbers of settlers had arrived, and survived, through private channels. An estimate of Jamaica's population in December 1661 gave it as 2,458 men (including soldiers), 454 women, 448 children and 514 African-Caribbeans.[60] The army was certainly below 2,000 strong by then, so it would seem that the 1660 estimate of civilians was perhaps exaggerated. However, another estimate dated October 1662, which was much more detailed, gives the entire population of the island to be 5,728 of which slightly over 4,200 were civilians (including women, children and African-Caribbeans).[61] These figures suggest that after the end of the fighting with the Spanish in 1658 and the Restoration of 1660 a mini population boom occurred on the island, and as there were no State initiatives at this time to transport settlers (excepting a few army wives) these must have come through the consequence of private enterprise.

53 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.45.
54 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.42, 45, 134.
55 *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Statistics*, Vol. 1 (Jamaica: Alexander Aikman, 1811), p.20.
56 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.187.
57 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, pp.99–101.
58 Ancestry.com, *Jamaica Parish Register*.
59 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.492.
60 TNA, CO 1/15, America and West Indies, colonial papers, 1661, f.193.
61 *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Statistics*, p.20; BL, Add MS 11410.

Women did play their part in the early occupation of Jamaica, but their mentions in the sources are limited. It was common for women and children to follow English armies during the Civil War as they moved about the country but there is no direct evidence that suggests any families were allowed to follow the army to the West Indies in 1654. With limited space aboard the ships and a shortage of provisions it would seem likely that they were not actively encouraged. Venables certainly took his wife with him, however, and Francis Barrington implies in one of his early letters home that his family was with him, but there are no other references to women coming from England at this early stage. On Hispaniola one English witness mentions that there were upwards of 100 women with the army, many of whom were dressed as men, but it cannot be known if these came from England or Barbados.

The only estimate for the numbers of camp followers with the army dates from the muster of around November 1655, when it was recorded that there were a total of just 172 present attached to six of the regiments, approximately four percent of the population at the time. Interestingly there were none recorded for Humphrey's regiment, which had arrived from England just the month before, which suggests none were transported with the regiment, or there were very few, who had subsequently died.[62] If the reason that this regiment had no camp followers was that they were not allowed to be shipped from England it would imply that those with the army would have come from Barbados or St Christopher, which is a plausible scenario. Families could easily be left in England for those soldiers recruited there but it would have been much harsher to leave the families of the West Indian recruits on an island where perhaps they had no other family to support them. However it is known that when Brayne's regiment departed Scotland in 1656 there were families with them, because at least three women drowned when their transport ship sank, including one who was pregnant. It is therefore not clear whether or not it was official policy to discourage women and children to follow their menfolk when the army was transported.[63] As seen above, the government did encourage wives of soldiers to come to Jamaica as early as December 1655 when a committee was established to assist those desirous of travelling there.[64] Most likely the women and children suffered the same high mortality rate that their men suffered.

Women make few appearances in the surviving sources in the years prior to 1663. It is recorded that the women attached to a regiment were to receive the same provisions as the soldiers in July 1656, a policy that was agreed to be continued in September 1657.[65] Christian Rust, the wife of Ensign Thomas Rust, was granted a sutlers' licence to trade inside Santiago in May 1656[66] while Judith Harper was granted a licence to marry John Peacock in

62 TNA, CO1/32, Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series), Addenda, 1591–1656, f.123.
63 Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, p.446.
64 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.434.
65 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.74 and 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.76.
66 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.58.

September 1657.[67] There is no direct reference to prostitution on the island at this time but the various comments made regarding the debauchery of the inhabitants suggest that it was widespread. What cruel twists of fate led the women into such activities are unknown, but no doubt many were forced into it by the premature deaths of their partners during the first brutal years of the occupation. From the extant list of the Bermuda settlers it is clear that some women journeyed to Jamaica either alone or with just their children. Frances Jordan and Frances Russell both seem to have been single, or at least they travelled on their own whilst Frances Cawdall arrived with only her six children. A total of 27 adult females came from Bermuda.[68] No records exist that mention the number of women who came from Nevis, but it is probable that a high percentage of the settlers were married and so they might have included some 100 women and children.

Life on Jamaica would have been anything but easy and what became of these women is unknown, but despite this their numbers continued to grow. In 1661 there were 454 women (13 percent of the total population) and 448 (13 percent) children while the following year this had increased by 190 to 645 women, but their overall percentage of the population had shrunk to only 11 percent. In that same year the male population had grown by some 1,665, illustrating graphically that significantly more men than women had migrated to Jamaica at that time. However the number of children had jumped by 364 to 408, a total of seven percent of the population, which implies a mini baby boom was occurring.[69] Unfortunately the next census in 1670 only identifies the number of families on the island (717), the total population (15,198) and the size of each family landholding, but not gender. The census does name the head of each household, however, and from this it can be seen that at least 23 women were recorded as such, including eight referred to as widows. Interestingly most of these women would have been considered quite prosperous if size of landholding defined prosperity. The average landholding for these 23 women was 187 acres, with Widow Lane having the smallest of just five acres in St Andrew's Parish (Liguanea) and the largest held by Elizabeth Reid with 927 acres in St John's (Guanaboa).[70] Two of the women had holdings of 600 acres each on the Clarendon Plain, while another had 385 in St Catherine's (Santiago), and three others held 200+ acres here and on the Clarendon Plain. Certainly these women held significant amounts of fertile land in convenient locations. At the other extreme five women held under 20 acres, and they would almost certainly have struggled to make a living from these small lots.[71] Most certainly the women in Jamaica would have had a difficult life, with few of them able to support themselves, and they would have depended on the assistance of men for sustenance, shelter and protection.

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67 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.72.
68 Lefroy, *Memorials*, Vol. 1, p.718.
69 TNA, CO 1/15, f.193; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Statistics*, p.20; BL, Add MS 11410.
70 Her plantation is clearly marked on the map by Sellers.
71 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669-1674*, pp.99-101.

The 1662 estimate also provides a distribution of where islanders were living. The largest concentration was in rural Liguanea (1,181), followed by 1,040 in urban Cagway. In the east there were 511 at Port Morant, 281 in Morant and a further 394 in Yallahs, and so a total of around 2,367 (41 percent) of the population was residing in the eastern part of the island (of these only 567 were soldiers). The estimate also includes the amount of land that had been planted, so of the 2,908 acres planted on the entire island 1,408 (51 percent) was in this region as well. At the time Santiago had a population of 454, Angels to the north had 236, Old Harbour 359, the extensive Clarendon Plain had 545 whilst the fertile Guanaboa district had 727 residents. While the population was not equally split between the eastern and western districts, the land under crop was, and while there was still a large amount of land suitable for cultivation to the west, much of the good land to the east was already taken. No mention is made of any residents on the north side or in the Pedro or Westmoreland Plains in 1662, however Windsor's report of 1663 indicates that land belonging to the Earl of Carlisle was being developed at Point Antonio on the north-east side of the island and that indentured servants were already living there.[72] A cursory look at Sellers' 1671 map of Jamaica shows how much development had taken place in the nine years since this last estimate (see Plate H). There were now isolated farms scattered along the north side of the island and the Clarendon Plain was much more developed, while the first development had taken place in both the Pedro and Santa Cruz plains but as yet little activity had commenced further west around Point Negril. This growth also indicates a continuation of the growth of the population since 1660, as well as the upsurge in confidence that came with the stability of the Restoration and from the island's ability to be self-sufficient in food production. The census of 1670 estimated the population of the island to be 15,198 souls in at least 717 families. The census shows the population by parish with the most populous St Catherine's (the area around Santiago but excluding the town itself), followed by St Andrew (Liguanea), Clarendon, St John's (Guanaboa), St David's (Yallah) and St Thomas' (Morant). By this time it was estimated that around 1,500 people now lived on the north side, and there were 3,300 living in the towns of Port Royal and Santiago plus a further 2,500 privateers, hunters and other transitory people.[73] The population of the island had tripled in barely eight years. It should also be mentioned that the years between the 1662 and 1670 censuses saw a massive increase in privateer and pirate activity that was centred on Jamaica. This resulted in an unprecedented influx of cash into the Jamaican economy, which spurred investment in sugar plantations in particular which effectively kick-started the economy, and which created the wealth and prosperity it was later to enjoy. Certainly the experience of the settlers arriving after 1660 was significantly more enjoyable and rewarding than those from Nevis, Bermuda and England prior to that.

72 *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Statistics*, p.20; BL, Add MS 11410.
73 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, pp.99–101.

II

As the population grew so too did the English settlements in which they lived. Upon the English arrival it was an obvious choice to make Santiago the centre of governance on the island, it being the main Spanish settlement on it already, and it had an infrastructure of housing and roads in place that the English could co-opt for their own use. It was also strategically located to shield what became Passage Fort and the vital supply line to the fleet and all the provisions and materiel that it contained. It was the gateway to the open plains to the west which contained the wild cattle and Spanish plantations the English needed to provide food for their huge army, and which in the short term became the battleground between the invaders and the Spanish and their African-Caribbean allies. It also effectively blocked Spanish access to the fertile lands to the east of Santiago, which quickly became the most agriculturally productive area for the English. The town itself and surrounding areas were large enough to accommodate the English army, despite the immediate destruction the army inflicted upon it, and it was to remain the headquarters of the garrison until the disbanding of the army in 1662. The plains around Santiago were fertile, and in 1663 were reported as well stocked with cattle, sheep, horses and goats, while the river that flowed past the city was well stocked with fish. Nearby were numerous orchards where lemons and oranges were grown in abundance.[74]

The Spanish had established Santiago on a grid system of three roads which ran roughly north–south in a bend in the Rio Cobre, and these were connected by half a dozen or so east–west roads. The English did nothing to change this layout upon their arrival, and in fact this road pattern can still clearly been seen today and provides perhaps the most tangible link of continuity between the Spanish colony, the English conquest and the contemporary era on the island. At the southern end of the grid sat the Dominican friary which was converted by the English into a Protestant place of worship which they called Red Church. This church, destroyed in 1712 by a hurricane, was subsequently rebuilt and is now the Anglican Cathedral of St Jago de la Vega. Whilst nothing material remains of the first English church, the current nave sits atop its foundations while some memorial stones from the 1660s can still be found within the cathedral precinct. When the English arrived, a small square was to be found behind this friary which served as the town's main market. The first of the three roads that led from the friary northwards, closest to the river, is today known as Monk Street and led to a Franciscan friary the English called the White Church, which they quickly destroyed. The middle road was called Red Church Street and the third, the most westerly of the three, Whitechurch Street. Halfway along this last road sat the Spanish governor's residence fronting another square which today is known as Emancipation Square. Another road led east off Monk Street towards the river and the ford, along which were clustered more houses as well as tanning factories. West from the governor's residence the town soon

74 BL, Add MS 11410.

gave way to the open fields of the St Catherine Plain and it was here that the English army drew up to receive the Spanish delegation led by the governor when it came to surrender in May 1655.[75]

Santiago, or Spanish Town as it is now called, remained the seat of government on the island until 1871, when it moved to Kingston, but despite this the English needs quickly changed and this led to the growth of other settlements which ultimately eclipsed Santiago in importance. A community soon developed around Passage Fort which provided labour for the fort and the commercial activities that supported the small garrison there. In 1660 it was noted that it contained about 50 houses.[76] It was a distribution hub for the supplies from the fleet and a vital conduit to get on and off the island, but it always remained small, wedged as it as between Santiago and Cagway.

When the English arrived, the tombolo that protruded across the bay in front of Santiago was uninhabited save for the crews of the occasional vessel that careened on its protected landward side. The westernmost point of the tombolo is a rough triangle with the apex directly pointing towards Henderson Hill, with a hook protruding from the left angle, on which was later built the fort. Within days of the arrival of the fleet Penn had appreciated the value of the safe and vast anchorage nature had created, and he soon had some of his ships careened on its beach. This necessitated the offloading of some of the vessels' supplies into makeshift depots on the sand, and it was from these temporary camps that the settlement of Cagway was to spring. It was apparent that the army was in no fit state to leave Jamaica anytime soon, and fearing a Spanish counter-attack the English set about defending what they had so recently seized with the construction of a primitive fort to guard the entrance of the harbour. Venables informed Thurloe on 13 June 1655 of the necessity to construct some blockhouses here also.[77] In early 1656 Humphrey's regiment was dispatched to Cagway to provide labour to construct the fort and a garrison to man it, and a settlement of tents soon bloomed on the western end of the tombolo.[78] Specialist builders were also sent to work on the fort, and these needed to be accommodated and fed where they worked and so the beginnings of a town sprang up around them. The tents soon gave way to wooden buildings and therefore storage was required for lumber and the space to cut up wooden planks before the buildings could be constructed, plus a forge at which the blacksmiths could ply their trade, smelting or modifying the wrought iron needed in the buildings. As vessels began to arrive from England throughout 1656, the supplies and goods they carried were offloaded initially at Cagway before being sent on smaller craft to Passage Fort, and these needed to be stored in basic warehouses, increasing the demand for yet more substantial buildings and accommodation for those working in them. When Ysassi spied upon the English from Henderson Hill in March 1655 he was able to note that the extent of the settlement at that

75 James Robertson, *Gone is the Ancient Glory: Spanish Town Jamaica 1543–2000* (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005), pp.1, 24–30.
76 TNA, CO 1/14, America and West Indies, colonial papers, 1660, f.128.
77 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.545.
78 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.42.

time was 'about eighteen houses on the point of Cayo de Carena and on the inner harbour seven thatched huts'.[79]

Santiago might have been the logical location for the army headquarters, but it certainly was not for the fleet which was anchored around Cagway, and so inevitably the navy began to erect buildings to serve their own needs such as jetties, warehouses and administrative blocks. Cagway grew quickly between 1656 and 1658 and it was not long before it was of such a size and importance that it was demanding more and more time to administer. Brayne had clearly recognised the future importance of Cagway when he wrote to Thurloe in July 1657, 'There is the faire beginning of a towne upon the poynt of this harbour ... there I intend all our stoare-houses and trade shall be, which will soone make it a flourishing place.'[80] It was by his instruction that the construction of a residence for him, and other administrative buildings were begun but he did not live long enough to put them to use.[81] By September 1657 in fact Doyley was so often absent from Santiago dealing with administrative issues of government elsewhere, in particular in Cagway, that he felt obliged to formally appoint Major Thomas Fairfax to deputise for him in Santiago while he was away, and which further illustrates the growing importance of Cagway.[82]

The initial development on Cagway was State sponsored, but by 1657 records appear of land being granted to individuals who presumably subsequently constructed their own buildings, at their own expense. The first recorded land grant in Cagway was to Nicholas Alexander for a frontage of 20 feet on the north side of the shore on 5 September 1657. This was only days after Brayne had died and was recorded by Doyley, and was most likely not the first grant in Cagway, but there are no surviving records of grants issued under Brayne's authority.[83] From this time until 1660 there were numerous grants of land to the various government employees, merchants and sea captains who frequented the port. The prime real estate was along the northern shore, running from the apex of the triangle to the right-hand angle and by 1660 this was completely developed. The State storehouse was at the top, followed by properties belonging to the likes of Arthur Towne, Abraham Langford, Richard Povey, Peter Pugh, Jeffery Dare and Cornelius Burrough; finally there was Doyley's own residence, next door to the church.[84] By August 1658 there were at least three rows of properties along the shoreline.[85] The road that ran along the shoreline here later became known as Thames Street whilst a second which ran parallel to it was later called the High Street. From a point where this latter road reached the church another road ran from there towards the fort and this road became known as Church Street,

79 Don Christoval de Leiva Yssasi, letter to Don Francisco de Proenza, 3 April 1656, *Jamaican Historical Review*, Vol. 2, Issue 2, pp.23–25.
80 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.391.
81 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.90–91.
82 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.77.
83 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.71.
84 M. Pawson and D. Buisseret, *Port Royal, Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2000), p.15.
85 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.117.

while Fisher's Row headed from the fort to the State storehouse, completing the triangle. Within this network of roads was contained the small settlement of Cagway, which was no larger than 60 acres.[86] To the east of the settlement at a narrow part of the tombolo a defensive trench was constructed by early 1656, to which was later added a palisade of angled wooden stakes to provide a defensive barrier and to regulate access within by a gate, but by 1659 Cagway had grown outwards beyond this barrier as the demand for land grew.[87] This point is still called the Palisades today. A print from before 1693 in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, by Edwin Barlow of Port Royal, graphically illustrates the growth pressure on the settlement prior to the earthquake.[88]

Thomas Lynch wrote a description of Cagway in 1660, and in it he noted that it was:

> seated on the extreme end of the pointe, containing in itt about 200 houses, all buylt by the English, with some publique houses, and that wherein the lieutenant generall [Doyley] constantly dwells, and the houses where all stores for fleete and army were kept. This is the place where all merchants, strangers and saylers reside as being the seate of trade and the most healthy place in the island, whither resort all the men of warre that frequent the pointe, which makes houses soe deare that an ordinary house in the towne is worth 40*l* or 60*l* per annum.[89]

In 1662 it was recorded that there were some 400 houses there which had been built, in part at least, from materials from dismantled buildings in Santiago.[90]

The commander-in-chief's residence provides a good illustration of how buildings in Cagway were constructed when it was erected in 1657, at the narrow part of the tombolo, possibly where the current Foreshore Road now dissects the Norman Manley Highway.[91] This was quite an imposing structure, most likely the largest in Cagway at the time, and consisted of three separate buildings, all made from wood but with some brickwork facade. The main 'dwelling-house' was some 28 feet long and 20 feet broad, whilst the two outhouses were 20 feet long and 14 feet wide each. The roofs were clad with shingles 'made out of old staves belonging to severall ships'. The property was fenced with 12 palisades, with two separate gate entrances, which had been carried into place by a work party from the fleet, who received 18 gallons of brandy for their efforts. The fleet also provided the labour for 'fetching the lumber from the other side of the water' that was used in the construction of the building, and they also received brandy 'for their paines in their ladeing and unladinge'. A carpenter by the name of Brock was paid 31*l* for his services

86 Pawson and Buisseret, *Port Royal*, pp.109, 111.
87 Pawson and Buisseret, *Port Royal*, p.13; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.155, 223, 257.
88 NMM, JOD/4, Journal of Edward Barlow, 1659–1703.
89 TNA, CO1/14, f.128.
90 BL, Add MS 11410.
91 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.79; Pawson and Buisseret, *Port Royal*, p.15.

for boarding and flooring the three buildings as well as for 'makinge of doors and windows, settinge on of locks'.[92] Obviously the other buildings in the settlement at the time were less imposing, smaller and less expensive, but for the most part all the buildings would have been constructed in a similar manner and almost certainly all of wood. Despite the construction boom and the seeming sturdiness of the buildings, very few were to survive the earthquake of 1692. The tombolo was made of sand and the buildings were constructed without foundations, so when the earth shook at approximately 11.43 a.m. on 7 June, much of the sand collapsed into the sea, destroying almost half the town.[93]

III

Outside the urban centres of Santiago and Cagway the English settlement was primarily on plantations, although there were very small communities clustered around the Liguanea jetty[94] and Morant fort. In 1663 the Liguanea plantations were noted as being some six miles inland from the sea and stretched for some 20 miles in an east–west direction, and were described as 'a good hopefull place, well watered and stocked with Cattle'. At the same time in the Morant area were recorded many plantations 'of Stock as Hoggs, Fowle, Corne and such like' while the remainder of the Nevis settlers were commended for their 'many good Plantations'.[95]

The initial development of plantations on the island was undertaken somewhat reluctantly by the army and then from 1657 onwards by civilian planters. In June 1655 plans were developed by Fortescue and Venables to disperse the army in an arc around Santiago with each regiment being quartered in a specific location, with the expectation that the regiments would start to cultivate the land in their area to produce food for their own needs. Most likely they would have taken over Spanish plantations if they existed in that area, or would have had to clear the bush themselves and plant crops from scratch. This was problematic for many reasons, not the least of which was that they were soldiers and not farmers and so there was a reluctance to embrace with any enthusiasm their orders to start planting the land. There was also a lack of the seed and tools needed to begin farming, but they also lacked the local knowledge of where the most productive and fertile land was. The army's first efforts met with disaster, as Goodsonn explained to Thurloe in January 1656:

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92 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.90–92.

93 For a contemporary account of the earthquake and its aftermath see Captain Crocket, *A true and perfect relation of that most sad and terrible earthquake, at Port-Royal in Jamaica, which happened on Tuesday the 7th. of June, 1692* (Harvard University Library).

94 For more on the history of English settlement on the Liguanea Plain see W.A. Claypole, 'The settlement of the Liguanea Plain between 1655 and 1673', *The Jamaican Historical Review*, Vol. X, 1973, pp.7–15.

95 BL, Add MS 11410.

> They did once set themselves to plant some food, but of that little, what was not burnt up with the sun, was the most part spoiled for want of weeding: and they at this time will not be persuaded to do anything towards their bellies or security, except fetch it from the magazine; so that if the magazine fail, they must invariably perish.[96]

The soldiers themselves proved to be poor farmers. Sedgwick and Goodsonn in a letter to Cromwell at the same time believed the island was:

> [capable of] rendering as comfortable supply as any island in the Indies; yet such is our army's condition as they neither can, or have made any, or very little improvement thereof. We have as much as in us lay endeavoured to persuade, and encouraged to planting of such provisions as the most natural of these parts. Formally some small thing was done that way; but the unseasonable nurse of the weather, and the men so much falling sick, as not being able to weed what was planted, it was most ruinated, and it is generally thought, though all that was planted had been preserved, it had not been three days provision for the whole army.[97]

Many of the soldiers starved during that first appalling winter on the island, while anger and frustration mounted as the soldiers were forced to work the land but saw little return for their efforts.

In early January 1656 Doyley and Sedgwick attempted to explain to the soldiers, and in particular the officers, the necessity of planting and to provide them with incentives for their labour. To encourage the soldiers to actually begin cultivating they proposed to allow all soldiers that had previously been allocated land to retain it and to give assurances that they would be able to keep this land in the future. They also agreed that the State would provide as much seed corn as was available. They also made it known that should the army be removed from Jamaica at some point in the future then the soldiers would be compensated for their efforts in labour 'for the provision so planted, and that any payments taken that may be recompensed to the full'. The two also promised they would provide 'any incouragements that you can propound, and that is in our power to grant, to incourage the settlement of people in this country, to the comfortable well-being'.[98] To set an example even the fleet established a plantation of their own.[99] But the disgruntled army was in no mood to listen and mutiny soon spread, which culminated in the execution of Throckmorton in April 1656. After the failed mutiny the army began to accept that they were staying in Jamaica and that if they wanted to survive they needed to make more effort in making the plantations a success. In time the officers were able develop their own plantations, using their soldiers as labour, and some became successful while

96 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.453.
97 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.456.
98 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.389–390.
99 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.601.

the soldiers, unable to disobey their officers as they were living under martial law, had little choice but to make the best of the situation.

Despite Doyley, Sedgwick and Brayne continually commenting on the lack of enthusiasm of the soldiers to cultivate the land and attempt to make the island productive, by 1657 it was apparent that some enterprising individuals had taken up the challenge of cultivation and that they were beginning to see rewards for their efforts. Henry Archbould, who in 1656 had narrowly escaped a court martial, had proved himself adept as a farmer when Brayne, needing to reduce two of the regiments, was forced to transfer Archbould from his plantation which he described as 'one of the best ... in the island' and which he believed was worth around 100*l*. To compensate him for this loss Brayne allowed Archbould to transport 30 tonnes of fustick (a bright yellow dye) at no charge to himself to England to sell for his own profit. He was still a successful plantation owner in the 1670s in St Andrews Parish but had moved (as many had by then) into sugar.[100] Richard Holdip, an experienced planter anyway, quickly took to the task in Jamaica but soon got into trouble for withholding provisions from his men and working them too hard; he was cashiered in 1656, but at the time he was described as 'the best and most forward planter' whose plantation, had he remained, 'might have been brought to good perfection'.[101] However it was Francis Barrington who, by 1657, seemed to be excelling the most at his change of occupation. Doyley, when recommending him to Cromwell as his replacement as commander-in-chief, wrote that he had a 'great mind to continue in this place, and his genius much inclined to the way of plantation.'[102] Barrington was enthusiastic about planting from his first arrival in Jamaica when he wrote in July 1655 that he hoped to make the land he had been allocated upon the English arrival, after a few years, 'worth unto me 1,000*l* sterling per annum. The island is a gallant island, and I am confident very healthy, great store of good fruit it beareth, and many other good commodities naturally; it will produce as good a trade as any island in America.'[103] However, in October 1656 he was more sanguine when he wrote that without receiving any pay he had no money 'to buy clothes and other necessaries ... This island is very promising, and great estates may be raised by such as have good stocks to begin with.' By July 1657, after being forced to move locations a few times, he wrote to his father he was now more settled and was then 'seated in a pleasant and I hope fruitful place'. He was glad to be notified by his cousin that Cromwell had allowed him some servants, most likely indentured, to be sent out from England. [104] At the same time he wrote to his cousin John Barrington, who was actually 'one of the gentlemen of the protector's bed-chamber', and notified him about his prospects, after thanking him for his intervention with Cromwell to get him some servants. He stated he would soon harvest around 'two thousand weight of tobacco'. He was also intending to start growing sugar

100 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.235–236.
101 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.152.
102 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.512.
103 *Seventh Report* (Barrington), p.575.
104 *Seventh Report* (Barrington), p.575.

cane 'which is the most profitable commoditie the Indies affordeth'. He also had a 'very good stock of cattle I now am master of, which conduces much thereunto, and above thirty sheep and lambs raysed from the bodyes of five or six at most; which stocks, were it in Barbados, would yeeld the best part of 1,000*l* sterling, and did not here cost me 30*l*. sterling'.[105] With a keen eye for maximising his profit, he asked his cousin to 'enquyre out some merchant able and honest in London' to whom he could consign the tobacco that he was planing to export from Jamaica the following year. They would then sell it and remit unto him the proceeds, less their 'usuall rate per cent'. He did not want to sell it locally in Jamaica to the merchants that were happy to buy tobacco, as this 'will be much to my disadvantage' given that he was entitled to import commodities from Jamaica 'custom and excise free' into England. He also wished that this agent would be able to advise him 'what commoditie goeth off best at home' while at the same time he could notify the agent 'what commodities are most vendable' in Jamaica which he could then import, for 'without this I shall pay an intollerable rate for commodities of the merchants here'.[106] As an indication of his success as a planter, in 1660 Lynch singled out Guanaboa where Barrington was settled as containing 'very many Excellent plantations of Sugar, cocao and provisions'.[107]

While the army officers had a greater opportunity to develop their plantations, using the virtually free labour of their soldiers and access to State supplies, in some cases the common soldiers were also able to establish smallholdings of their own, although the extent to which they were able to participate in the growth of the plantations of the island cannot be easily established, especially in the first few years of the occupation. It is likely that the common soldiers were allocated smallholdings when the regiments were given their quarters, and on which they would have been able to grow cassava and other fruit and vegetables for their own use, and possibly also tobacco which they were later able sell, most likely to their officers. In June 1659 Thomas Seares, a soldier in 'the company of Captaine Ryley' was granted 10 acres of land 'lyinge on the other side the river att Towne betweene the land there of Doctor Hilliard and Wm. Davis'.[108] In February 1660 a group of 15 soldiers were granted permission to take up 540 acres 'att a place called Sower sopp plantation next unto Ensign Vezen's quarters', possibly John Vizard who held 120 acres on the Clarendon Plain in 1670.[109] The following month 10 soldiers from the company of Captain Phillip Thompson were granted land 'in Halfe Moon plantation three miles from the towne formerly Captain Fuirthe's quarters'. Two of these soldiers, Joseph Peter and William Gibson, both held land in the same area in 1670.[110] On 20 April another private soldier, Thomas Lyons, was granted a parcel of land 'over the river by the towne of St. Jago neere the land of Wm. Davis'. Lyons

105 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.377.
106 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.377.
107 TNA, CO1/14, f.127v.
108 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.47.
109 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.166; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.103.
110 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.171; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.101.



Cassava (from *Brief discours des choses plus remarquables que Samuel Champlain de Brouage á reconneues aux Indes occidentales*, 1602?). (John Carter Brown Library, Rhode Island. 04684-57)

was still on his 96 acres in 1670, while Davis seems to have moved his plantation to Morant.[111] It was also common for small groups of soldiers to band together and obtain land to work jointly. In May 1659 three soldiers from Ward's company were granted land next to that belonging to Lieutenant Lewis Alton, though none of them were still landholders there in 1670.[112] In June soldiers from Barrington's regiment in the fertile Guanaboa Vale were granted several portions of land at a six mile and nine mile walk beyond Barrington's own farm, one of whom, Edward Allen, was still there in 1670.[113] In August six soldiers of Ward's regiment were granted land 'under the mountane' on the Liguanea Plain, but were not landowners in 1670.[114] In January 1661 two soldiers from Captain Freeman's company along with John Hambleton and his wife Anne, as well as Florence Makeiths, were granted 120 acres 'in Maunee Valley between the quarters of Guanaboa and six miles'. One of the soldiers, John Frizel, evidently prospered for in 1670 he had 300 acres outright under his name plus a share of another 300 acres with somebody else in the same area.[115] In addition to the land grant the two soldiers were given two broad hoes, a narrow one and a felling axe 'for their owne use'.[116] Whilst the land grant records for this period are incomplete it is clear that some private soldiers were able to obtain land to farm themselves or jointly, at least from 1659 onwards. How much land was granted to the soldiers prior to this is impossible to tell but grants were certainly made. How successful the soldiers were or how long they were in possession of their land, or even the terms on which they were granted, is also unknown. Undoubtedly they would have struggled on such small plots without access to capital to invest in their farms. Most probably sold up once the more wealthy landowners expanded their landholdings, when they converted their properties to sugar cane in the late 1660s and 1670s, if not before.

With the arrival of the Nevis settlers at the end of 1656 the first civilians began to develop plantations in the Morant region, which would have been a mixture of cassava, citrus and cash crops, though as Nevis was at the time

111 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.184; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, pp.101, 99.
112 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.185.
113 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.198.
114 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.211.
115 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.229–230; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.102.
116 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.230.

a developed sugar cane growing island it is likely that they brought with them the skills and experience to kick-start sugar production on the island, although many of the Barbados army recruits would have been familiar with this as well. Martin Noel was an experienced sugar grower and was well aware of the potential profits from such a crop, and so probably the 20,000 acre plantation he attempted to develop in Morant had a particular focus on sugar cane as well. How successful these private plantations were is unclear; the last reference to Noel's plantation is in April 1659 and it seems to have faded away after that. Many of the Nevis planters died, but the family of Luke Stokes prospered and eventually owned a very large plantation in Morant and the imposing family seat of Stokes Hall. In January 1661 John Damry (Danny) and his family, and who might have been a Nevis settler, were granted 50 acres of land in Liguanea next to James Howell's land. Danny was still alive in 1665 when his daughter was baptised, but he does not appear as a landholder in the 1670 census. However in 1670 Howell still owned his plantation of 1,233 acres which was then growing sugar, according to Sellers' map.[117]

Unfortunately there seems to be no surviving description of a typical plantation of this period, but from the disparate sources that have survived, a glimpse of how they might have appeared can be discerned. Most would have been quite small. Cromwell's proclamations decreed that settlers were able to obtain 20 acres for each male older than 12 years old but there is no evidence that confirms civilian settler landholdings before 1663 so there is no way of knowing the size of the Nevis or Bermuda settlers' plots, though presumably they were as promised. In 1670, of the 725 recorded landholders on the island in the census of that year 324, or just over half of them, held less than 100 acres and there is no reason to suppose that the settlers prior to the disbanding of the army were any better endowed.[118] Most likely soldiers grouped together and worked their land collectively, as some of the examples cited above illustrate. However it is very likely that the officers were able to make the soldiers under their command work on their plantations as well as letting them farm their own. As the land was fertile, and in many areas well irrigated, the soldiers would have had no real problems growing basic staples such as cassava as well as fruit for their personal consumption when they tried. Tobacco grew easily was well, and so no doubt the soldiers would have cultivated a handful of trees which when harvested they then combined and sold, perhaps to their officers or perhaps to enterprising individuals who were able to process the leaves before selling them to merchants for export. Most likely groups of soldiers, seemingly in companies, developed cacao walks as well where they cultivated cacao for personal use and later sale. Nearby were plenty of trees that could be felled to construct rudimentary dwellings for the soldiers, while other trees could be sold and exported. In 1663 it was reported that there was an abundance of wildlife on the island and that each plantation was well stocked with horses, cows and a 'great store of Hoggs and Poultry'. The rivers teemed with fish, plus lobsters and sea fish were also

117 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.231; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.100.
118 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, pp.99–104.

readily available from the nearby ocean so the soldiers were able supplement their diet with these as well as the fowl that inhabited the island.[119]

The census of 1670 graphically illustrates not only the massive population growth experienced by the colony since 1662 but also the vast expansion of land in private ownership. In 1661 it was estimated that 2,588 acres had been planted, and in the following year 2,917.[120] By 1670 a whopping 209,000 acres had been patented, though not necessarily farmed, in the parishes (excluding the urban centres of Santiago and Port Royal), of which all bar 20,000 acres were within the same area that the English army had been quartered between 1655 and 1662. This phenomenal increase can only be attributed to the enthusiasm of the civilian administration and confidence of newly arrived settlers as a result of the conversion from military government to civilian rule. Without the restraints of military governance entrepreneurship flourished which, was helped by the flood of wealth that poured into Jamaica as a result not just of the economic growth that the island was experiencing but also from the riches that the privateers and pirates were offloading at Port Royal in seemingly never-ending quantities. It would be natural to suppose that it was the army, and mainly the officers, that benefited the most from the massive growth, after all they had settled the land first and had defeated the Spanish, and they controlled the government, but this does not seem to have been the case. If extensive landholding is seen to be the primary measure of prosperity and wealth of individuals at the time it is surprising to note how little land the soldiers from the old army actually controlled in 1670. In 1661 when Doyley was faced by the threat of mutiny from Raymond and Tyson he called a meeting of the 25 principal officers under his command in the garrison, and who could be construed as being Doyley's governing inner circle. Given that these were the most important men on the island at the time and who had the governance of the colony in their hands, and more importantly perhaps, the opportunity that their positions afforded them for personal gain and enrichment, it is surprising that only 13 of them were landowners on Jamaica nine years later and who between them owned 11,363 acres, barely five percent of the entire developed area of the colony. Major Richard Hope, not even a company commander when he left England in 1654, was the largest landholder of this group with 2,467 acres followed by Thomas Ballard (2,391 acres), Henry Archbould (2,030), Henry Hilliard (1,768), Trooper (now Captain) Robert Nelson (1,300), John Cope (683), Samuel Barry (400), William Vallett (220), Captain William Rivers (60) and Major John Saunderson (44). Whilst it is clear that some officers at the centre of the colonial administration on the eve of civilian rule retained their wealth and influence, in the form of land ownership, under the new regime it is not to the extent that might have been assumed. There were certainly many officers who had amassed large estates by 1670, such as Captain John Noye (5,868 acres), Captain Hender Molesworth (2,480), Captain John Bourden (2,255), Captain William Parker (1,534) and Captain Joachim Hane (1,500)

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119 BL, Add MS 11410.

120 TNA, CO 1/15, f.193; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Statistics*, p.20.

to name just a few, but there is no record of them having served in the army in Jamaica prior to 1663 so these were probably militia ranks.[121]

There were, however, officers and colonial administrators who were not part of Doyley's inner circle who prospered and became significant landholders by 1670. Major Anthony Collier, who held 2,600 acres in 1670, was a captain in the army in 1660 and beyond when he received a land grant in Cagway.[122] Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bindlos, who held 2,815 acres in two parishes in 1670, was perhaps the doctor of that name aboard the *Coventry* in June 1660 when he was granted a permit to export 1,000 lb of tobacco, while in February 1662 he was being employed as surveyor for the navy in Cagway.[123] Captain Samuel Long, who is often cited as having arrived in Jamaica in 1655 as a lieutenant in Doyley's regiment, and later became the secretary to the commissioners after Cary's death, had by 1670 amassed an estate of 2,200 acres when he was also Speaker of the Jamaica Assembly.[124] No doubt there are many more soldiers of Cromwell's army who have not been identified and who continued to reap the rewards from their land in 1670. But perhaps the person who benefited the most from the English occupation of Jamaica in 1670, at least from the perspective of landownership and the wealth it could create, was one who had been involved in the project from its very inception in early 1654 when Cromwell had personally asked for his opinion on how best to plan an attack on the Spanish West Indies. Thomas Modyford, a colonist and plantation owner in Barbados, was appointed governor of Jamaica in 1664 and by 1670 he and his younger brother James held 11,229 acres of land on the island colony that he had helped create, making them the largest landowners on the island. Not only did Modyford benefit immensely from his landholdings but also from his patronage of the privateers and pirates that he encouraged by providing safe harbour and letters of marque.[125] Whilst some of the original participants in the occupation of Jamaica were able to obtain land and were to reap the rewards that ownership brought, most did not. Even though both the soldiers and new settlers were promised land, few lived long enough to get any benefit from it or they simply gave up and transferred their interest to others. It is sad to think that it was the newcomers who arrived after 1662 who were to capitalise the most from ownership of what was to become the jewel in the crown that was Britain's West Indian empire.

IV

The land, or more correctly the produce of the land, was the main stimulator of the island's economy during this period. The first real commercial activity under the English occurred very quickly after they arrived in

121 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, pp.99–104.
122 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.228, 243.
123 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.198, 263.
124 Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, *Samuel Long (1638–1683)*, ODNB.
125 Nuala Zahedieh, *Sir Thomas Modyford (c. 1620–1679)*, ODNB.

1655. The fleeing Spanish took with them just about everything of value that they could carry except for '10000 hides lying in the houses on the floures for their slaves &c. to lie on, which were brought into a church, and ready to be sent to New England, for bisket, meal, and pease'.[126] These hides were shipped from Jamaica in June, and once in Boston the hides were sold and provisions were purchased with the proceeds and then shipped back to Jamaica. These goods had arrived by early April 1656 but contrary to the orders issued by Cromwell that all plunder was to be disposed of for the benefit of the State, the proceeds of this particular sale were returned directly to the officers of the army. They agreed at a council of officers meeting held on 11 April that the goods purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the hides were to be given to the commissioned officers of the army 'that are now in commission and now heere'. The officers were then free to dispose of those goods as they pleased.[127]

Undoubtedly the first cultivation that took place on the island under the English was attempts at growing food for local consumption rather than for export. The poor physical state of the soldiers and their mental apathy against planting, added to the lateness of the year to start cultivating, as well their selecting unproductive land for agriculture, meant that in the first year virtually nothing of significance was grown. As the soldiers who survived grew stronger, had a better understanding of the climate and soil quality and were guided by people such as Holdip, Archbould and Barrington, a more systematic and efficient cultivation process developed for both staples and for cash crops that could be exported to England for sale. Tobacco and sugar, though in reasonably small quantities, had been grown on Jamaica by the Spaniards and they were crops known to many of the soldiers recruited in Barbados and the Leeward Islands as well as by the Nevis settlers. Once the English became settled it did not take long for them to choose to continue with the cultivation of these, particularly tobacco, which required significantly less capital investment to start up than sugar. Initially the land was divided into regimental quarters and then lots were allocated, possibly to each company and then again to individuals or groups of soldiers. Most likely a mixture of staples and cash crops were planted with the expectation that the cash crops be consolidated and sold for export. Whether this process was controlled entirely by the officers for their own benefit, using their soldiers as

Tobacco Plant, 1669. Filippo Maria Mancini. (John Carter Brown Library, Rhode Island. 83-69-1)

126 Anon., 'Letters Concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655', in Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.138, 139.

127 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.56–57.

free labour, or whether a more equitable arrangement was agreed, is unclear. Most likely the organisation differed from location to location. Probably during 1656 the first staples, cassava predominantly with corn and fruit, were harvested but in insufficient quantities to make the army self-sufficient and so they were still very much dependent on the food supplies provided by the army throughout the year. In 1657 and 1658 the yield would have grown significantly as by 1658 there is little mention of the army providing large quantities of staples to the soldiers so they were probably able to provide what they needed for themselves by mid 1658. This produce would have been supplemented by slaughtered local cattle and supplies of imported beef, pork, dried fish, oil and salt from the army stores.

The first cash crops of tobacco (which take about seven to nine months to seed, transplant, harvest and cure) were ready for export in mid 1657. Under the terms of a Council of State order of 29 May 1656 exporters of commodities from Jamaica could import them into England or any English colony free of duty and excise for a period of seven years in an attempt to stimulate trade.[128] In mid 1657 Samuel Lawson, master of a merchantman called the *Gift* loaded a consignment of 775 lb of tobacco in Jamaica and headed for England.[129] About the same time Captain Garret Tisen (Tyssen) who described himself as 'a free denizen' of Jamaica was granted permission from Brayne to export an undisclosed amount of tobacco to England on board the *Success*.[130] Brayne also allowed the *Bear* to carry 'some wood and other commodities on board her' that were being sent to England by some of officers in April 1657, though he prudently left the Commissioners of the Admiralty to decide how much freight should be charged.[131] Most likely the tobacco was first dried and then packed into bales rather than the more traditional method of packing in hogsheads (wooden barrels) which was more bulky but also less secure as they were prone to getting wet. On 3 September Tisen petitioned Cromwell directly, stating that his consignment had arrived in London but the commissioner of customs had seized the cargo claiming that it was a produce of Spain and was thus subject to the payment of duty and excise. The Council of State then instructed the commissioner of customs to investigate the matter and they reported, on 24 September, that Tisen had been 'unable to make positive proof that his tobacco is of the growth of Jamaica' and that he had freely offered to pay 12d per pound in excise. On 29 September the Council of State, having reviewed the matter, concluded that the tobacco was in fact from Jamaica and so exempt from duty and excise and ordered the cargo to be released.[132] However the matter did not end there, for on 29 October the poor Tisen once again petitioned Cromwell for assistance after the tobacco had been released from customs and he had transported it to his premises for storage pending sale. A certain 'Cowell and company, on 21 Oct, have by force, with

128 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.458.
129 Green, *CSPD 1657–58*, p.208.
130 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.458.
131 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.235.
132 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.458; Green, *CSPD 1657–58*, p.113.

swords and guns, seized the keys of my warehouse where the tobacco lay, and detain it to my utter ruin.' The Council subsequently issued an order 'that Cowell and company deliver up the tobacco, or appear before the Council to answer their contempt.'[133] Nothing further is recorded on the matter and so it is not known what became of Tisen's Jamaican tobacco, possibly the first to be imported into England. Lawson similarly had his consignment of tobacco detained by customs pending payment of duty and excise when it arrived in October 1657. In their report the customs officials also stated that 'they cannot relieve the petitioners, because there is no proof that it is from Jamaica' and they then added, perhaps adding insult to injury, as the tobacco was 'not worth 4d. the lb., they do not think it Spanish'. The Council of State, however, were satisfied that it originated in Jamaica and on 10 December instructed that it be 'free from duty'.[134]

It was standard for exports from the English West Indian colonies to have a certificate issued by the authorities at origin to confirm the cargo was a product of the colony, and so not contraband from Spanish or some other third country. Whether these were issued in the case of these first shipments from Jamaica is unknown, but certainly by September 1657 Doyley was issuing them, as he did for the 30 lb that the minister Nathaniel Lane wished to export.[135] A second batch of tobacco was ready to export in September 1657 aboard the *Martyn* of Southampton on which the merchant John Loving had 5,479 lb of tobacco that he had purchased on the island. Also shipped on board was 120 lb owned by Clement Jordan and 180 lb owned by John Wittington, while a further 'one hundred and sixty [hundred]weight of tobacco of the growth of this island' was being shipped by James Povey. It is not clear if this means he had just 160 lb or a massive 160 cwt of tobacco.[136] In 1657, being the first year of exports, at least 8,000 lb of tobacco was exported from Jamaica to England. By contrast in 1617, in the first year that it was exported from the newly established Virginia colony, only 2,300 lb was sent. By the mid 1650s, however, Virginia was exporting in excess of one million pounds per annum to England at an average selling price of 2d per pound.[137] Jamaica exports of tobacco continued, but in 1658 only 1,456 lb of tobacco appear in the records as being allowed for export though this seems to be an incomplete figure. In 1659 over 24,622 lb were permitted for export whilst in 1660 only 18,950 lb. Again, these figures are not necessarily accurate nor complete but they illustrate that over the first few years there was a considerable growth in the amounts grown and exported, even if in absolute terms the quantities were still small. Assuming an average price of 2d per lb then the export revenue generated was only 66*l* 3s 6d in 1657. In 1659 the revenue would have been 205*l* 0s 18d and in 1660 172*l* 1s 7d. Whilst not massive sums, the planters were starting to generate a return and cash was being injected into the local

133 Green, *CSPD 1657–58*, p.142.
134 Green, *CSPD 1657–58*, p.208.
135 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.72.
136 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.75.
137 G. Melvin Herdon, *Tobacco in Colonial Virginia "The Sovereign Remedy"*, Jamestown 350th Anniversary Historical Booklet, Number 20 (Williamsburg, VA:1957), p.47.

economy, leading to the inevitable trickle down to the workers and other service providers.[138] Tobacco was not just exported from Jamaica but was imported also. On 7 September 1657 Doyley ordered Burrough and Dallyson to 'survey such tobacco as Mr John Loving, merchant, hath brought here'.[139] Whether this was fully cured and processed tobacco or perhaps seedlings for replanting is unknown. Despite tobacco being the first cash crop produced and exported from Jamaica, production soon ceased, for – as a report of 1670 commented – despite the land being suitable for growing both cotton and tobacco 'the other commodities being more profitable, very few busy themselves with it'.[140] Indeed from 1670 onwards there are no records of any tobacco from Jamaica even being imported into England.[141]

Tobacco was not the only commodity being exported in 1657. The merchant John Loving also loaded aboard the *Martyn*, which was probably his own vessel, some 522 hides, 80 skins, 'two tunns and a halfe and fower hundred, thirty-three pound of fustick', some lignum vitae plus 'three-fowerths of a tunne and fifty-fower sticks of planke to be the growth of this island of Jamaica'. Clement Jordan also shipped 41 hides with his tobacco on the *Martyn*.[142] It seems likely that all of these exports were purchased from the islanders by visiting merchantmen, with the exception of Lane's small consignment. In this case the producers might have been paid in cash, but more likely they received goods in kind. The purchaser was then liable for the cost of the transportation to England where he would sell it to a London merchant who would either distribute and sell locally, or re-export it to Europe. As Barrington had rightly deduced, the profit was to be made by disposing of the tobacco in England and not in Jamaica. These soldiers turned farmers and merchants had much to learn about colonial commerce.

Also vital to the early colonial economy was the plant and seed of the *Theobroma cacao*, more commonly called the cacao tree. The nut of the tree, from which chocolate is produced and which was at that time turned into a drink, had long since been used by many of the pre-Colombian societies of South America as a form currency as well as a beverage, such was its value. The Spanish were introduced to the chocolate drink and the compact powdery cakes that could also be produced from the nuts, and soon began exporting the cacao nuts to Europe, where the drink spread. The Spanish had been cultivating cacao in Jamaica well before the English arrived and the invaders were soon to take over the 'Cacao-Walks', cultivated areas of 10–12 acres in which grew the trees that took about seven years to mature once planted. According to Hickeringill the Spanish valued each tree at one piece of eight per year, and so were a valuable commodity. Despite becoming famous in Europe as a sweet drink (and only later as a solid treat) to the inhabitants of Jamaica and South America it was the nutritional value that made cacao

138 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two',.*passim*.
139 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.72.
140 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.105.
141 David Eltis, 'New Estimates of Exports from Barbados and Jamaica, 1665–1701', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4,1995, p.639.
142 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.74, 75.

so beneficial. The seeds were removed from the cacao nut (pod), fermented and then ground. Once dried they formed a dry 'cake' that could be easily transported and then diluted with water to make a drink, into which other ingredients could be added for variety. The drink could also be added to other food during the cooking process and provided many necessary nutrients and was thus much valued for the energy and sustenance that it afforded.[143]

Thomas Gage was familiar with chocolate from his travels across South America, and wrote about it and how to use it extensively in 1648 so it was already known about in England before the expedition set sail in 1654, but seemingly not available to the English consumer.[144] It is possible that the first cacao to arrive in England was a direct result of English activities in the Caribbean in 1656. In May of that year Goodsonn seized a Spanish vessel en route from St Domingo to Cartagena that was carrying an estimated 81 tons of cacao. This was immediately shipped to England aboard the *Great Charity*, arriving in September. The Council of State approached Martin Noel to see if he was interested in purchasing it, which he agreed to do for the sum of 2,865*l* 18s, and when weighed it amounted to 145,333 lb.[145] One of the first references to chocolate being available in England occurs in 1657 when it was being sold by a Frenchman at Queen's Head Alley in Bishopsgate, London. In June 1659 this unknown Frenchman was still selling it from his premises in Bishopsgate, but had previously sold it at premises in both Gracechurch Street and in the churchyard of St Clement Danes, in the City of Westminster. At the time it was sold both as a drink or 'unmade' and was described as 'an excellent *West-India* Drink' which 'cures and preserves the Body of many diseases', while a book was also available for sale that expounded the many uses of it.[146] It seems likely that the chocolate being sold by the Frenchman was from the cacao seized by Goodsonn the previous year and purchased by Noel. Within two years of the English arriving in Jamaica they were able to harvest and export some of their own



Cacauifere ou arbre du Cacao, 1687. Johann Hainzelman. (John Carter Brown Library, Rhode Island. 15-180-005)

143 Hickeringill, *Jamaica Viewed*, pp.19–23.

144 Thomas Gage, *The English-American his travail by sea and land: or, A new survey of the West-India's* (London: R.Cotes, 1648), pp.106–110.

145 TNA, CO1/33, Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series), Addenda, 1656, f.5; Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, pp.151–152; Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 5, p.96; Green, *CSPD 1656–7*, pp.115, 121, 450.

146 Marchamont Nedham, *The Publick Adviser*, 16 June–22 June 1657, 138:E.915[5], p.80; John Hall, *Mercurius Politicus*, 16 June–23 June 1659, 117:E.766[5], p.521.

cacao. In July 1658 Samuel Barry was granted a certificate to export 1,100 lb of cacao from Jamaica to England, while in August 1658 Cornelius Burrough and Henry Archbould were both granted a certificate to export cacao from Jamaica to England for 1,500 lb and 2,922 lb respectively.[147] There seem to be no records of cacao being exported from Jamaica in 1659, but in but April 1660 Burrough exported 4,000 lb on board the *Hound*, while Anthony Wells, purser of the *Coventry*, had purchased 500 lb locally and was allowed to take it back to England with him when the State ship departed Jamaica in June. The following month William King, a merchant and probably the owner of the *Mary* of Southampton, was permitted to export a further 6,983 lb to England.[148] These exports, small as they were, were an important part of the economy, for they brought in much-needed cash, or perhaps more likely, were traded for imported commodities which helped to fuel further economic growth. By 1670 it was reported that the island was exporting 188,000 lb of cacao nuts annually and so it had soon developed into a significant industry, but that year the cacao trees were hit by a blight from which the industry on the island was never to recover.[149]

In addition to these exports there is considerable evidence to show that cacao was also used in the place of money on the island. With provisions from England short in April 1658, Doyley issued cacao nuts to the army officers instead. The officers of his own regiment received 1,620 lb, Barrington's were given 2,032 lb, Ward's officers got 1,760 lb and Barry's received 1,920 lb while the troop of horse received 200 lb.[150] It is possible that it was these cacao nuts that Barry, Burrough and Archbould acquired and exported to England in July/August 1658. The following year a significantly greater amount was issued to the army when in May over 58,000 lb of cacao nuts were issued to the six regiments and the troop of horse, plus to the general officers and the reformadoes.[151] How this was distributed to the soldiers or if it was subsequently exported is not known, but it was as good as money for the nuts could be sold or traded and were frequently used as a cash substitute across South America. In May 1659 when the English were attempting to negotiate with the African-Caribbeans over them changing sides, 500 lb of cacao nuts were given to two African-Caribbeans 'in order to their future encouragement'. In November 1659 when Major Fairfax went out with a party in an attempt to negotiate with the African-Caribbeans he took with him 1,000 lb of cacao nuts, presumably as a further inducement for them to surrender.[152] In June Burrough was instructed to purchase 10 barrels of resin for the fleet from a French merchantman at a cost of 3*l* per barrel, and was to pay using cacao nuts which were valued at four pence and a farthing per pound. In January 1659 the French hunters, the original buccaneers, were

147 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.113, 115.
148 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.177, 197, 203.
149 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.104; J. Harry Bennett, 'Cary Helyar, Merchant and Planter of Seventeenth-Century Jamaica', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1964, p.64; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, pp.84, 239, 241.
150 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.103.
151 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.120.
152 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.132, 148.

given 6,000 lb of cacao nuts 'in lieu of so much jerkt meat bought of him for the use of the state'.[153] Captain Harrington, commander of the English garrison in Passage Fort was given 2,000 lb in January 1660 for 'one month's provisions for his garrison'. The same was provided again the following month to Harrington as was a similar amount to Fairfax at Fort Henry. Most likely it was then bartered or exchanged for provisions as this implies there was a ready market in the colony for it.[154]

The State ships at Cagway also benefited from the useful cacao nuts. In January 1660 the doctor of the *Diamond* was given two hundredweight 'for his paines takeing about cureing a sore legges of one Smith a seaman belonginge to the Hound frigott'.[155] Also in January 1660 4,416 lb was given to the commander of the *Diamond* frigate, valued at 66*l* 15s, to pay for repairs and provisions for the ship.[156] In March the same year 12 tons of nuts were ordered to be sold and the proceeds used to provision the *Coventry* and the ketch *Chestnut*, 'there being noe provision in the state's storehouse'. At the same time a further 510 lb were provided to the warrant officers of the *Chestnut* to 'pay for their present reliefe wantinge provisions'.[157] That the cacao nuts had a meaningful value is demonstrated by the occurrences of senior officers acquiring it from the State stores, on their personal account, which meant that the value of them was deducted from the pay arrears that they were owed, so it provided for a method of being paid when there was no cash available. Doyley acquired a ton of the nuts thus in August 1659 and another the following month, and another ton in both October and December. Burrough himself received three tons in September 'on accompt of his salary', while in September 1659 Barrington, Archbould and Fairfax were each given a ton 'in consideration of their expense in cominge to Point Caguay monethly to assist the Generall [Doyley] in hearinge and determinge civill affairs and to be placed to their military accompt'.[158] Another illustration of the value of cacao can be seen in November 1658 when a Spanish ship was seized in Montego Bay, on the north side of the island. The *Cagway* was dispatched to bring the prize back and its captain was specifically instructed to return it 'without imbeazelment. You are especially to see that none of the cocoa be stolen or taken out of her.' These were possibly some of the 'five tonne of cocoa nutts prize nutts' that were sold 'for the use of the state' in February 1659.[159]

Not surprisingly the officers dominated the farming of the cacao trees, which was regulated by Doyley through the issuance of permits, though there is evidence to suggest that at least in some instances these permits were granted for the benefit of companies rather than individuals. In October 1660 Captain Freeman and Lieutenant Gysom were permitted to create a cacao walk at a place 'called Hiblatoce twelve miles beyond Guanaboa'. The

153 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.132, 133, 156.
154 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.154, 164.
155 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three' f.157.
156 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.158.
157 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.173.
158 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.122, 126–127, 136, 144, 152, 146.
159 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.14, 165.

following month the companies of Major Fairfax and captains Morgan, Heblethwaite, Aston and Ballard were granted the right 'to enjoy the twelve mile cocoa walke and receive the benefit thereof till further order'. At the same time John Thomas (servant) and Richard (surname unknown) from Doyley's own company, William Grace the servant to Captain Fuller, Thomas Thompson the servant to Captain Morgan, Robert Turner the gentleman-at-arms to Captain Ayscough and trooper John Hardinge were all granted a permit to 'enjoy the ground and cocoa walke they possesse … till further order.'[160]

Salt was a commodity in short supply in the colony and was vital in the preservation of meat, both for the cattle that could be killed on the island and for preserving the turtle that the English regularly caught off the Cayman Islands. Initially salt had to be imported from England or purchased from passing merchantmen. In March 1658 the *White Roach* of London arrived in Cagway with much-needed supplies including 'Salte, thirty-seaven puncheons, three hundred fifty-five hogsheads, ninety-six barrells.'[161] One of the first improvements Brayne made on his arrival in 1657 was to 'sett people at worke, to make sault' which he hoped to be able to sell to the New England merchants for use on their return voyages, but initially was unable to make much due to the heavy rains experienced in early 1657.[162] Salt production is relatively easy to establish, and so it is likely that some enterprising individuals soon commenced manufacturing their own, but the extent to which this developed is unknown. Possibly one site this occurred at was Salt Pan Point, which appears on a 1683 map of Jamaica and is modern-day Coleman's Bay. Certainly in 1659 the fleet was required to purchase salt from visiting merchantmen, including the two tons that Burrough purchased in 1661, so it would seem that the development of this industry was slow in taking off.[163] Maybe salt production in Jamaica only really grew after Captain Noyes was granted 5,000 acres of 'waste land by the sea side mostly covered with salt water, where is a very hopeful work begun for salt' around 1670.[164]

In 1661 Hickeringill noted that the English plantations were growing mainly cassava, corn and potatoes.[165] Cassava was a most versatile root vegetable and could be used as a potato substitute, ground to make flour for bread and distilled to make alcohol. High in calories, it was easy to grow even in poor soil and with the minimum of cultivation was the primary staple that the English would have consumed. Grown for personal consumption initially, there was no export potential, but as the yield on the island grew it could be sold locally to ships calling at Cagway and needing supplies, as was the case in June 1660 when Burrough sold 1,083 lb of cassava to the *Edward* for 11*l* 18s, and in April 1661 when 7,541 lb

160 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.219, 225–226.
161 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.98; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.60.
162 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.110, 212.
163 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.147, 168, 184, 249.
164 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.98.
165 Hickeringill, *Jamaica Viewed*, p.18.

was sold to the *Bear*.[166] Such was the importance of cassava that Edward Tyson was given 30*l* reward in May 1660 for the 6,000 lb of cassava aboard the *Pearl* which he recaptured from the Spanish.[167] There is no reference to corn in any of the extant sources so presumably there was little available, being difficult to grow; potatoes were being grown but again the dearth of references suggest they were only grown in small quantities. In March 1660 3*l* worth were sold by Major Hope to the steward of the *Coventry*, while in April 1661 400 were sold for 16s.[168]

Small amounts of cotton were being produced, as Captain Lieutenant John Forther exported 500 lb in June 1659 and 450 lb was exported the following by Captain Aylett. However as cotton requires a lot of water and sophisticated irrigation, as well as labour for harvesting, it was probably too complex for much cultivation to be undertaken at this point; according to Sellers' 1674 map, four plantations were noted as producing it then, including Henry Archbould's.[169] In 1660 Lynch noted that cotton was being cultivated throughout the plantations and was of 'an asspecial fineness'.[170] Hickeringill recorded that indigo was being produced in 1661 but there is nothing in the existing records that show how it was disposed of, while Lynch claimed in 1660 'little (as yett) hath been made'. Certainly by 1671 it was being grown in the St Catherine and Clarendon parishes, as well as further west, but not on the eastern side of the island. An average of just two metric tons a year was being exported between 1671–75 but by 1700 an average of just 110 tons per year was exported.[171]

Despite sugar later becoming the driver of the Jamaican economy, in these early days there was little production on the island, as the high cost of the initial start-up investment was beyond the means of the settlers and there was a lack of labour able to undertake the work required to cultivate it. In 1690 it was estimated that it would take an investment of 3,620*l* to establish a sugar plantation for 100 acres, which needed 50 African slaves and a handful of white overseers to manage, plus annual running costs of around 329*l*.[172] The capital resources required to invest in such a project were unavailable to the first English settlers,so sugar production was minimal until after 1670 when the massive returns from privateering and contraband trade with Spanish territories began to be reinvested in the local economy. Nonetheless, by the end of 1658 it was recorded that there were 'two sugar mills grinding cane' on the island.[173] The first records of sugar being exported are in January

166 The Huntington Museum California, BL 313, The ship Edward, her account for Victualling 20 men ... for four months, William Blathwayt Papers, 1657–1770, 1660; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.249.
167 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.184–185.
168 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.168.
169 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.42, 198; Ogilby, *The Island of Jamaica*, 1671 (map).
170 TNA, CO1/14, ff.127, 129v.
171 TNA, CO1/14, f.129v; Eltis, 'New Estimates of Exports from Barbados and Jamaica, 1665–1701', p.639.
172 Nuala Zahedieh, 'Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in Early English Jamaica, 1655–89', *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1986, p.208.
173 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.125.

1660 when Archbould exported 1,500 lb and Captain Stanley a further 1,600 lb. The following month Burrough was able to export 4,400 lb with a further 6,700 lb exported in April.[174] Lynch was hopeful in 1660 that more sugar production would soon begin.[175] In 1663 it was recorded that there were just 18 sugar mills on the island producing around 20–30 hogsheads per week (a hogshead could hold 1,000 lb of sugar), but of such high quality it could sell for 50 percent more than Barbados sugar.[176] By 1670 there were 57 sugar mills on the island producing 1,710 hogsheads of sugar a year.[177] Between 1671 and 1679 Jamaica exported an average of 809 metric tons (1,561,140 lb) per year but this had risen to massive 5,634 metric tons (12,422,970 lb) plus 30,000 litres of molasses and 20,000 litres of rum by the end of the century.[178]

V

One of the stated aims of Cromwell's design on the West Indies was to open up trade with the Spanish territories to English merchants, which trade had long been prohibited by the Spanish authorities to all nations. Despite this both English and Dutch traders had been trading illicitly for decades, supplying European luxury goods and slaves, cheaper and more reliably than the Spanish themselves could do. The occupation of Jamaica provided the English with the base from which they could develop further trade connections with the Spanish and ship contraband goods themselves into the interior of the Spanish Empire. This trade only became significant later in the century, especially after the Treaty of Madrid in 1670,[179] but during the first years of the English occupation early glimpses of it can be seen. Initially English contact with neighbouring Spanish territories were hostile, as Goodsonn's and Myngs' raids amply demonstrate. However with the growth of privateers operating out of Cagway the opportunity for trade grew as these ships captains would undoubtedly avail themselves of the opportunity to trade with remote Spanish settlements if the chance arose. Evidence of such activities is patchy at best, but in November 1659 the captain of a French privateer was granted permission from Doyley to transport some Spanish prisoners 'to the maine or some of the islands of the King of Spaine' which implies the Frenchman had a reason to sail there in the first place and that there was the likelihood he would be welcomed when he arrived. As Spain and France were technically at war, this suggests that the captain had reason to believe he would receive a good reception when he approached any Spanish territory and this can only be because he was known and trusted to

174 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.162, 163, 167, 177.
175 TNA, CO1/14, f.129.
176 BL, Add MS 11410.
177 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.104.
178 Eltis, 'New Estimates of Exports from Barbados and Jamaica, 1665–1701', p.639.
179 For the development of this trade and how it benefited the growth of the Jamaica economy see Nuala Zahedieh, 'The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1986.

trade there.[180] On 14 June 1661 Doyley himself demonstrated a willingness to personally trade openly with the Spanish when he acquired a cargo of African slaves, most of whom he sold to a Spanish ship that was in Port Royal. By then Spain and England were no longer at war, but the Spanish were still prohibited from trading with other Europeans in the Caribbean.[181] Only days later an order issued by the Jamaica Council clearly shows that Spanish wine was freely available for purchase in Port Royal, as it had also been at the time of Raymond's mutiny.[182] Two clear examples of the English illicitly trading with the Spanish, and how dangerous it could be, occurred in 1663 and were described by John Haines – a self-styled 'inhabitant amongst the Spanish' – who testified before the Court of Admiralty in Jamaica in January 1664. He first described how a party of English who landed near the River Cant (probably the River Cauto in Cuba) were killed by the Spanish, and then he explained how Nicholas Rion and Francis Peron 'were trading with the Spaniards in the river Civilia upon Cuba' in their bark from Jamaica, when they were also attacked and killed.[183]

There was also some informal communication between the English on Jamaica and their Spanish neighbours, and where communication begins trade usually follows, though certainly in the early years of the occupation such correspondence was primarily military in nature. Each time Doyley sent out a patrol on the island he encouraged its commander to attempt dialogue with the Spanish and African-Caribbeans in an attempt to negotiate a settlement, though without success. In 1658 at Rio Nuevo, and in 1660 after the murder of Edward Starkey, both Doyley and Ysassi corresponded by letter, but again these communications were solely related to military matters. Off the island the fleet on at least two occasions attempted negotiations with the Spanish on the Main in attempts to extort a ransom, while in April 1659 a prisoner swap in Cuba was attempted using a priest as a go-between. Interestingly when Doyley received the news of the cessation of hostilities on 4 February 1661 it was in a letter from the Spanish governor of Santiago de Cuba, which hints that perhaps the two had been involved in some ongoing correspondence.[184] With the increasing number of privateers frequenting Cagway after 1659 it is natural to suppose that these vessels acted as conduits of informal correspondence with the Spanish, either when the English attempted to seize their vessels or when they called into Spanish ports to trade. Certainly the beginnings of a trading relationship with Spanish America were created during these first years of the English occupation.

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180 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.144.
181 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.36.
182 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.37.
183 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.183; TNA, HCA45/59, Vice Admiralty Proceedings, Jamaica, f.55.
184 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.21.

VI

Apart from the external export economy there was also a domestic economy that was functioning almost as soon as the English arrived. The proceeds from the sale of hides sent to Boston in 1655 was returned to the officers, and whilst this was in kind rather than cash, it had a value and could be traded locally. How it was disposed of is unknown, but undoubtedly these proceeds were circulated within the economy. Between April and June 1656 Doyley issued eight licences to individual sutlers in both Santiago and at Passage Fort allowing them to 'buy and sell all manner of liquor and provisions usually bought and sold', which naturally implies that there were both items to buy and willing buyers with a form of money.[185] It is unclear if these sutlers were soldiers or civilians, though one at least was the wife of an army officer. It is surely no coincidence that the first licence issued, on 9 April, was only days after the return of the ships from Boston, so it is reasonable to suppose that there were private supplies aboard for sale at the new colony, as well as the goods acquired by and for the State. From this time onwards merchant vessels visited Jamaica bringing with them commodities from England and New England for sale or barter. For those with money in England they could acquire goods from the merchants by issuing a Bill of Exchange which the merchant would present once he returned to whoever was the nominated guarantor to receive their money; this was a method that benefited the officers more than the soldiers, but an enterprising officer could no doubt use this to his advantage.

Opportunities for paid employment were limited in the first years of the colony. With the majority of the colonists being soldiers, any work they did was at no cost to the State, but specialist employment civilians were required and they needed to be compensated for their labour. Initially this was in the form of provisions in lieu of wages, such as the three weeks provisions issued to Cornelius Sactfied and his assistant in April 1656 who were employed in Santiago preparing casks in which to store lime. The same was provided to Thomas Gibbons the following month undertaking the same role. In November seven labourers were provided with three weeks' provisions for their work on Fort Cromwell.[186] By the end of 1657 there were some small amounts of cash available to the colonial government which were administered by the newly appointed Treasurer, Peter Pugh, and which would have found their way back into the economy. In September Robert Langdale was paid 27s for salt which might well have been produced on the island, while 30*l* was provided to Captain Stanley Stevenson between November and January 1658 for men working on the fort at Santiago. But it was the construction of the new governor's residence in Cagway, started by Brayne in 1657, which provided the first recorded sustained cash injections into the economy by the State. The carpenter Thomas Roys was paid 40*l* for erecting the frames whilst Mr Brock received a further 31*l* for constructing the wooden walls

185 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.58–59.
186 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.59, 61, 106.

of the buildings. Joseph Allen was paid 31*l* 13s 6d for 'masticke, locust and cedar boarde' while John Durrant the bricklayer was paid 16*l*. These were significant sums of money and it all went into stimulating the local economy, providing people with jobs, food and the ability to purchase essentials or luxury imported goods.[187]

This stimulus increased in early 1658 when Captain Christopher Myngs arrived in Jamaica, carrying with him 2,570*l* cash to pay for the construction of the various fortifications that had been started. The money was spent purchasing lime, carrying stones, for the services of stonemasons as well as for labourers on all three forts throughout 1658 and into 1659.[188] Whilst the cash was only to be used on the fortifications, and not the soldiers' arrears, it is clear that Doyley used some of it as 'contingent money' to be used on the multitude of supplies the garrison needed, such as the 29*l* 15s paid to Mr Lovinge for 17 barrels of palm oil in August, or 8*l* 16s paid to John Goslinge for shoes for the army before the Rio Nuevo expedition.[189] Ready cash was available throughout 1659 as the State purchased a replacement horse for 40s, paid 20*l* 10s for five barrels of tar, paid 18*l* 4s for tallow for the fleet and the 14*l* 5s for 142 bushels of salt.[190] All of these were purchased from private traders and it demonstrates that there was a reasonable amount of commercial activity on the island at the time, admittedly centred around the needs of the State. But this money did not last long, and soon Doyley was again short of cash and was necessitated to find imaginative ways to obtain it for the expenditures he needed to administer the colony. In May 1659 he ordered that a consignment of brandy that had been seized and declared prize, presumably from a Spanish vessel, be sold to raise some much-needed revenue, while in February 1660 five tons of cacao nuts were also sold. In March a further 12 tons were sold to purchase provisions needed for the State ship *Coventry* to return to England.[191] Then in late 1659 an impost on strong liquor was introduced as a way of raising much-needed revenue locally.[192] It is unclear how such revenue this raised, but between November 1659 and January 1660 over 125*l* was spent from the 'impost money'.[193] If all this money was raised on the levy on liquor it illustrates just how much liquor was being sold at the time, but also how much money was being spent on it by the colonists, which suggests that there was plenty of money in circulation, though it was most likely unevenly distributed amongst the population. Doyley also sold equipment belonging to the State to raise money. In September 1659 the *Cagway*, originally a prize vessel captured by a State ship, probably in late 1657 or early 1658, was sold to two partners for 80*l* along with all of its armaments, fixtures and fittings.[194]

187 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.78, 84, 82, 91.
188 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.95, passim.
189 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.114, 107.
190 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.17, 48, 54, 61.
191 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.116, and ff.165, 173.
192 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.133.
193 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.145, 153, 164.
194 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.95; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.134.

Such was the English need for money in 1659 that they even began to sell their surplus provisions to passing ships and privateers to raise some ready cash. In November three barrels of powder were sold to a French privateer for an undisclosed amount whilst in December the Danish privateer Pietersen was sold a single barrel and a hundredweight of musket balls.[195] In early June 1660 the *Edward*, a merchantman of 20 hands under the command of Captain James Carr, arrived in Cagway and needed an extensive resupply of both provisions and supplies. Carr purchased 94*l* 12s 2d of provisions including bread, cassava, fish, pease, pork, beef, 'Jerkt beefe', butter and brandy. It is not known how much of this had been previously sent from England for the use of the garrison, but certainly some of it would be the produce of Jamaica, such as the cassava and 'Jerkt beefe', whilst the pease might have come from New England. A further 246*l* 2s 1d was spent by Carr when he purchased from the English stores various supplies of tallow, tar, resin, candles, canvas, casks, a grindstone, an iron pot, nails and a 'Boate & Oares'. Included in this payment were 20 hogsheads of water 18d each, three barrels of powder, shot, as well as 365 feet of cedar board and four gallons of oil. He utilised the services of carpenters, a sail maker, a bricklayer and a smith. Obviously the *Edward* had incurred some serious damage en route to Jamaica and needed extensive repairs before returning to England, which it seems to have done around 10 July, but prior to that the colony was able to gain a considerable benefit as the 340*l* that Carr spent on services would have greatly helped the island's acute cash shortage.[196]

It seems also that the *Edward* enlisted a crew in Jamaica as well, for a certificate exists which names his crew and provides the dates when the majority of them signed on, all when the boat was in Jamaica. The *Edward* was probably not a privateer, however, as the crew were to receive wages for the three months it was expected to take to return to England; it also carried a cargo of indigo belonging to, amongst others, Edward Doyley, and it is unlikely he would run the risk of a privateer shipping cargo home for himself. How many of the crew came out with the vessel and re-enlisted in Jamaica to sail home is unknown but it certainly demonstrates that Jamaica was able to provide crews for passing vessels when needed. The name of Henry Morgan appears as the gunner of the *Edward*, and this is possibly the first reference to the infamous pirate in Jamaica.[197]

Despite some money coming in from the impost and from the disposal of prize goods the colony was constantly short of cash, having no regular income and getting no support from England. In August 1660 it was noted that there were 'severall debts upon the treasury and noe money to make payment'. All that remained in the stores was a bar of silver which Doyley wanted to sell but believed he would get a poor price for it 'by reason of the

195 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.144, 153, 154.

196 Huntington Museum, The ship Edward, her account for Victualling 20 men ... for four months; Huntington Museum, BL 317, An account of the Costs and Charges of the ship "Edward", William Blathwayt Papers, 1657–1770, 1660; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.202.

197 The Huntington Museum California, BL 316, An account of the ship "Edward's" Men, William Blathwayt Papers, 1657–1770, 1660.

scarcity of money' amongst the settlers. As such Doyley personally purchased the silver for the sum of 100*l*.[198] The situation had not improved in April of the following year when Doyley noted there was 'urgent necessity for money for carryinge on his Majestie's affairs here and noe money left in the treasury' and he was forced to sell 13 anchors from the naval stores to Captain John Shawe for 70*l*. He then sold 10,000 lb of iron, cables, cordage and even a small shallop 'for the supply of his Majestie's shipp Beare'.[199]

Such was the acute shortage of money available to the government at the very first meeting of the Council of Jamaica in June 1661, that an impost of 2*l* per pipe of wine, 6d per gallon of brandy, 1*l* per tun of beer and 1s per ton on other cargoes was imposed in an attempt to provide a sufficient and regular income for the newly established civilian administration.[200] Povey estimated at the time that 600 pipes of wine, 10,000 gallons of brandy and 100 tuns of beer would be imported per year giving the island a revenue of 1,550*l*, plus he estimated a further 2,000 tons of other supplies from around 20 ships expected to call at Cagway each year would provide a further 100*l* in income. How accurate these estimates were for the imports is unknown but they give an interesting insight on what was imported and just how reliant the island still was on supplies from overseas. Povey further budgeted the expenses of the civil administration of the colony to be 1,640*l* per annum. Not surprisingly the Governor's expenses accounted for a significant portion of this (800*l*) but the costs associated with maintaining the prisons, judges and courthouses (610*l*) suggest that there was already a law and order problem on the island.[201] Whilst the impost on alcohol imports was likely to raise a considerable sum it is worth noting that the islanders were consuming massive amounts of alcohol at the time, which was likely to have had an impact on attempts to develop farming on the island as well as causing the negative social affects that come with excessive consumption. In July 1663 it was recorded that 40 licences to sell liquor had been issued in Cagway alone, with a further 10 in Santiago, four at Passage Fort, three at Liguanea, two in Yallah and a further two at Port Morant.[202] With such large amounts of liquor being imported and sold, not to mention anything produced locally, it is not surprising that a significant portion of the colonial government's expenditure was earmarked for law and order. It is apparent that by 1662 Jamaica, and Port Royal especially, was well on the way to becoming the den of iniquity it was later infamous for, as was alluded to by Lord Windsor in his report of that year.[203]

Money was just as short under the new regime of Charles II. One of the first attempts of the new government in England to provide assistance to Jamaica also involved alcohol when 1,000*l* worth of brandy in January 1661 was sent 'be sold to the best advantage and laid out for repairing the

198 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.215.
199 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.245, 248.
200 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.37; The National Archives, CO140/1, Jamaica Sessional Papers, 1661–1667, f.2.
201 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.38; TNA, CO140/1, ff.1–5.
202 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.43.
203 BL, Add MS 11410.

forts, especially that of Cagway'.[204] The brandy, purchased in England from a French merchant for 40*l* per ton, arrived in May in good condition bar some leakage, aboard the *Diamond* and the *Rosebush*, though there is no record of how much it was sold for or how the proceeds were disbursed; however an order of the newly constituted Council of Jamaica dated 18 June decreed that no brandy on the island was to be sold 'before the King's brandy is disposed of'. No doubt it was a welcome addition to the parlous finances of the island but further illustrates the extent of alcoholic consumption in the colony.[205] However it was only in April 1661 that the newly formed Council for Foreign Plantations in London began to consider the sending of provisions and 2,000*l* in cash to Jamaica, with the cash to be used for the strengthening of the island's fortifications, and not for army pay.[206] The provisions were dispatched aboard the *Charity* when it departed in July, but there is no further mention of whether the money was ever sent.[207] When Lord Windsor arrived in Jamaica in August 1662 he brought with him the last financial support from England for the colony prior to the disbandment of the army, in the shape of 20,596*l* 16s in cash and trade goods for resale.[208] Of this 12,274*l* was given to the army by way of a donative in lieu of their pay arrears,[209] and whilst it is believed that Windsor kept a significant portion for himself, an enormous amount of money subsequently entered the Jamaican economy which undoubtedly helped boost the subsequent growth in plantations and the production of export commodities. Few details survive of the donative and what trade goods were brought with Windsor, but it is believed that part of it was provided from the proceeds of slavery.

VII

In 1660 the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa (later called the Royal Africa Company) was established as a monopoly on all English trade with the west coast of Africa. The King and the Duke of York were major shareholders in the company, and it was not long before it laid plans to ship slaves from Africa for sale in the West Indies, with the intention of using Jamaica as its hub; the slaves were expected to be sold to the authorities there for 19*l* per head, after which they would be resold to anybody wishing to purchase them.[210] By April 1662 the company had agreed for a consignment of 300 Africans to be sent to Jamaica 'in ten months' and Windsor was

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204 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.3, 4.

205 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.4, 36; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.254, 260.

206 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.24.

207 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.24, 47.

208 BL Egerton MS 2395, Order of the King in Council for the payment of the army in Jamaica, followed by a detailed account of a day's pay, 1662, f.351; Taylor, *The Western Design*, p.207; Pestana, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.231, 340, n.47; Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, pp.275–276.

209 Long, *A History of Jamaica*, p.614.

210 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.491, and *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.120.

given instructions for their 'distributing'.[211] These Africans were probably amongst the 440 slaves that the Company transported to Jamaica in 1663.[212] An interesting document in the Huntington Library suggests a connection between this consignment and the donative, in particular how the money from the proceeds of the sale was to be used for soldiers' wages. Whilst the document is undated and unsigned it certainly relates to the disposal of slaves and the use of the proceeds to pay the army; whether it definitely relates to the shipment referred to in Windsor's instructions cannot be confirmed, but it seems likely. The document indicates that a total of 299 slaves were received and each was assessed to be valued at 30*l* each, giving them a total value of 8,970*l* when sold, the proceeds from which were to be used for payment to the soldiers.[213] Whether it was a true account of the slaves sold or just an estimate of likely income is also not clear. What is clear, however, is that this was State-sponsored participation in the slave trade, with the expectation that the proceeds of such involvement were to be used to partially finance State obligations related to an organ of government, namely the army. This is perhaps the earliest evidence of the English State's involvement in Jamaica with this reprehensible trade, though it was not the first instance of slavery upon the island.

The economic need for slaves in the Caribbean came as a result of the endemic labour shortage faced, first by the Spanish and later by the English and the other European colonists. As the Spanish colonised the region in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they initially utilised the indigenous population for their enforced labour requirements. The cash crops the Spanish grew, mainly tobacco, cotton and indigo were not particularly labour-intensive and so the local population was sufficient to meet the Spaniards's needs; however over time much of the indigenous population died, mainly as a result of overwork, and disease caught from the Europeans to which they had little or no immunity, but also from suicide as life became intolerable. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the Spaniards had begun to import West African slaves into their South American colonies to make up the labour shortages, and at the time of the English attacks on Hispaniola and Jamaica these slaves and their offspring comprised a significant proportion of both islands' population. The English Caribbean and North American colonies faced similar labour shortages in the mid seventeenth century but they solved this by importing large numbers of indentured servants from England. Generally from the poorer classes of society, these servants were brought out in their thousands under contracts that stipulated that they were required to work for a particular employer for a fixed term, generally from three to 10 years. The employer paid for the servants' transportation and provided food and lodging for the duration of the indenture, after which the servant was released, normally with a parcel of land which he or she was

211 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.88.

212 Slave Voyages Project. [Internet] Available from <www.slavevoyages.org> [Accessed 26 March 2020].

213 The Huntington Museum California, BL 319, Memorandum of the Devident, William Blathwayt Papers, 1657–1770, 1660?

entitled to own or lease. Despite the requirement that they were to be cared for, many of these servants were poorly treated throughout the duration of their indenture and were unable to quit unless they were able to compensate their employer. Nonetheless, they were a significant investment on the part of the employer, who could expect to pay up to 20*l* for their services over the reasonably short period of their indenture, after which the servant was free to leave and the employer had no further return from his investment. From a purely economic perspective a slave, who might cost 10–30*l* to purchase, but who could be utilised for the duration of their life with no prospect of freedom and under unregulated living and working conditions, was a more viable alternative.

It was the introduction of sugar cultivation into Barbados and the other English islands in the 1640s which caused the demand for slaves to rise dramatically amongst the English colonies. Farming of sugar cane was very labour-intensive and the working conditions were brutal, which made English indentured servants unsuitable for such employment. Therefore the English plantation owners chose to purchase slaves from passing Dutch vessels that had acquired them in West Africa, mainly from the Portuguese, and knew they could sell them to either the English or Spanish islands. By the time Venables and his army arrived in Barbados in 1655 there were probably as many as 20,000 slaves on the island, and so the English officers with him who later became plantation owners in Jamaica would have seen first-hand how they were being utilised and their economic advantage over traditional indentured servants. For the first few years of the English occupation of Jamaica those plantations that were established, mainly by the army officers, focused mainly on growing food for subsistence and cash crops such as tobacco and cacao for export. A ready source of manpower was available to them in the soldiers under their command, no matter how unwillingly they toiled. Conditions were then not yet right for wide-scale sugar production and so the need for slaves, prior to the mid 1660s, was limited.

When the English arrived on Jamaica there were perhaps as many as 500–600 African slaves on the island, many of whom fled from their Spanish masters into the interior and later formed free communities of ex-slaves, but also created a nucleus of the resistance movement against the English. Over time the English did capture some of these ex-slaves, but there is little evidence that the English forced them into bondage prior to 1660. Jamaica, from the mid 1660s onwards, developed into an extensive sugar production centre and along with this came a massive influx of African slaves, but there is little evidence of their usage by the English prior to this. As the English wished initially to subdue these African-Caribbean communities by diplomacy and persuasion rather than force, it is likely that they were quite lenient on those they captured to encourage others to submit rather then demotivate them by forcing those they captured into servitude. This, however, was not the case for Africans who arrived in Jamaica by accident or design.

Despite Jamaica having little demand for slaves at this time it soon became a hub for receiving slaves and for their disposal, while Doyley's liberal attitude to trade helped to encourage slavers to visit Jamaica and spend the proceeds of their trade on the island. When the Danish pirate Jan

Pietersen seized a Dutch cargo of slaves off Curaçao in November 1659 he was soon to be found in Jamaica, where if not actually disposing of them in Cagway (there is no evidence to suggest he sold them on the island) he and his crew were certainly spending the proceeds there by purchasing supplies and frequenting the taverns.[214] On 23 September 1661 a Dutch vessel, the *Bonaventure*, called at Cagway 'in great distress'. The vessel was in an urgent need of careening but was carrying a cargo of 'candles and negroes' and its master, Isack Mithelsen, requested permission to sell his cargo in Cagway so he could then proceed to careen his ship. How successful he was in selling the slaves is not recorded but he was able to dispose of 'two [hundred weight?] of himericke fence and five pounds of twyne' that he carried.[215] On 16 January 1662 another Dutch vessel, the *Martin Van Rosen* of Middleburgh, called into Cagway and requested, and received, permission from the Council to dispose of some Africans that she was carrying to cover the cost for provisions and repairs she was in need of. However, Captain Whiting of the *Diamond* then seized the vessel on 2 February for contravening the Navigation Act 'but after 24 hours the Governor dispossessed him, took out the negroes and money, and sent her away'. Whiting claimed that 'before her seizure 48 negroes had been sold'.[216]

In June of 1661 Doyley himself was accused of dealing in the sale of slaves. According to an anonymous report, a Dutch vessel called into Cagway on 14 June carrying a cargo of 180 Africans seeking to sell them. By then the Council of Jamaica had been established, and according to the report Doyley 'being desirous to make a profit for himself out of them' called the council to sit and permit the Dutch vessel to trade with the island for the 'negroes were much needed'; despite it being contrary to the Navigation Act the only likely penalty would be his own loss of office, which he claimed 'he had virtually lost already'. In what was perhaps the first example of Doyley being unable to get his own way now that he no longer had independent authority to govern, the council refused to grant permission for the Dutch trader to dispose of its human cargo in Jamaica. If the report is to be believed, Doyley then became enraged and said the council only refused 'because they were themselves were poor and could not buy'. Doyley was then purported to have said he would purchase all of the slaves himself 'within two or three hours'. The council ordered Captain Whiting, commander of the newly arrived frigate *Diamond*, to seize the ship and its cargo but Doyley was able to 'rescue and retrivall' 40 of the Africans whom he sold to Major John Coape, 'a Quaker and ancient rebel' and then sold the rest to a Spanish vessel that happened to be in the harbour at the time for a 'great price'. When the council then demanded an explanation from Doyley for his actions, he is said to have responded that he would not accept such questioning from the council and that 'he could not forget he had been a General, though it was for the rebels', that Whiting's commission was not in force 'where Governor Doyley commanded', and

214 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.153; Gehring, *Curaçao Papers 1640–1665*, pp.158–164.

215 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.256, 257.

216 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.69, 80.

that he was not accountable to the council and 'would answer to his Majesty at home'.[217] But perhaps the most blatant example in the disposal of slaves during this early period of English rule occurred in February 1661 when Captain Ballard returned from an attack on Juan de Serras' *palenque* with 100 captured African-Caribbeans who had previously been active in fighting against the English. After some discussion Doyley and his officers agreed that these captives were a war prize, and as such could be disposed of by the soldiers for their personal gain.[218] Undoubtedly they would have been sold and the proceeds distributed amongst the soldiers.

It is not known how many of these slaves who arrived in Jamaica before 1662 were purchased to work on the English plantations, though very few of the English would have had the money to purchase for themselves. Possibly most were sold on to the Spanish, who had both the need and the money, either by privateers that left Cagway to trade with the Spanish Main or directly with Spanish vessels that called in after the peace had been declared in early 1661. Only 584 African-Caribbeans were recorded as being present on the island in 1661,[219] but it is unclear if this figure relates to slaves or those members of the *palenque*. The following year the number recorded was only 552.[220] Despite the relatively small numbers of slaves on the island, the newly established civilian government still found it necessary to take measures in June 1661 to regulate the 'punushing and ordering of Negroe slaves' and instituting penalties for aiding runway slaves.[221] In 1670 Modyford estimated there to be 2,500[222] African-Caribbeans and slaves on the island but by 1673 this had grown to 9,504; in 1713 there were around 55,000 but in the nineteenth century the population exploded to between 200,000 and 300,000.[223] In total it has been calculated that between 1588 and 1857 over 1,079,000 African slaves were forcibly transported from their homelands to Jamaica (although an undefined number were then re-exported to other places in the Caribbean or North America), almost 10 percent of the known transatlantic slave trade for the same period.[224] Jamaica was to later became a major centre for the slave trade, and the genesis of this business begin during the first few years of the English occupation.

VIII

Despite the Lord Protector's hyperbole in attempting to justify the war with Spain to Parliament in September 1656 in religious terms, in truth religion

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217 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.36.
218 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.21.
219 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.65.
220 *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, Statistics*, p.20.
221 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.38, 111.
222 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1669–1674*, p.52.
223 Quoted in R.S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Va., 1972), pp.155, 165.
224 Slave Voyages Project.

was not the main motivating factor behind the war and neither did it have any significant influence while it was being fought out in the West Indies. Cromwell might have informed Parliament that Spain had been England's natural enemy since the English Reformation, and had ever since attempted to 'seek the ruin and destruction of these Kingdoms', that Spain was the enemy of all non-Catholic nations and it was they who were responsible for persecuting Protestants across Europe. He continued that Spain had denied English merchants from freely practising their religion when on Spanish territory when all they desired was'such liberty as that they might keep their Bibles in their pockets, to exercise their liberty of religion for themselves, and not under restraint. But there is not liberty of conscience to be had from the Spaniard.'[225] Whilst he fell short of declaring the war as a crusade, there is no doubt that he attempted to justify it in strongly religious terms.

But in his instructions to Venables, Penn and the other commissioners in 1654 Cromwell barely mentioned religion nor did he speak of the expedition in terms of a crusade or even that attempts to make converts to Protestantism were a priority. His instructions to the men tasked with leading the attack in the West Indies were more concerned with practical matters and commercial benefits than religious ones. In fact his only mention of any religious overtones to the venture in these instructions was almost an afterthought when he commented that natives in Spanish America lived under a 'Miserable Thraldome and Bondage' who 'are subjected to and lye under by meanes of the Popish and cruell Inquisition'. He added that if through God's Providence the English were successful in their venture and threw off the Spanish yoke, that could 'make way for the bringing in the light of the Gospell and power of true Religion and Godlines to the natives and that this would prove to be the best and most Glorious part of any Successe or Acquisition it shall please God to blesse us with'.[226] Despite this Venables was later to write, with a hint of cynicism, that 'the design was alledg'd to be for the propagation of the Gospel'.[227] This was certainly no crusade, and nor was it a religious war; not a single man of God sat on Riccard's organising committee. Nevertheless this was an army that was devoutly religious. Most people in seventeenth-century England believed in the Christian God and so the army would have comprised men from all of the Protestant variations of the faith: Presbyterians, Independents, Anglicans, Sectaries and a scattering of Catholics. If Venables' army was a mirror image of the main armies in Britain at the time it would have been predominantly officered by trusted Independents with a significant number of the soldiers following this creed as well as a scattering of Sectaries, Fifth Monarchists and Baptists, but with very few Presbyterians in positions of authority. But there is evidence to suggest that this was simply not the case. Unlike the purged post-1647 New Model Army in which religious devotion and political reliability shaped its ranks, the army that left England in 1654 was essentially comprised of anybody who would agree to go, irrespective of their religious or political views. This gave the opportunity for old soldiers,

225 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, pp.162, 164.
226 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.109.
227 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.6.

purged in 1647 for not supporting the Independents over the Presbyterians, to rejoin the army. Fortescue was perhaps the most prominent of these, being a Presbyterian who chose to resign his commission in 1647 rather than accept the ascendancy of the religious Independents in the army. It is likely that many of the other officers who had served during the First Civil War but who were not employed thereafter and enlisted in 1654 were also Presbyterian, such as Archbould, Buller and Bowers. Heane and Carter had both survived the 1647 purges, and this suggests that they were more likely Independent and therefore more politically reliable. The same also might be true of Venables himself.

Nothing is known of the religious persuasion of the individual common soldiers; again most would have adhered to one of the Protestant creeds, but according to Venables there were even some Catholics who managed to enlist 'among those thus entertained were diverse Papists, in perticular Sixteen, and four of them Irish, and one a Priest, were put upon us out of the Tower Regiment: many more were found since, though all we could discover were cashiered at Barbadoes.'[228] The spiritual needs of the soldiers were supplied by the regimental chaplains, although Venables later complained that 'Instead of Ministers to the Six Regiments I press'd for … [the like] Number of black coats were offered.'[229] His contemptuous comment regarding the black coats suggests that they were of the more formal Presbyterian persuasion than Independent, which might also illuminate his own religious beliefs. At least five chaplains departed England with the army: William Chidley (Carter), Thomas Gage (Venables), Nathaniel Lane (Fortescue), Roger Manners (Heane) and John Vaughan (Buller).[230] In January 1658 Nathaniel Lane personally wrote to the Lord Protector from Jamaica, claiming he was the only one of seven ministers sent from England still alive. Despite being a man of God, Lane was still mortal and so during the uncertain days of the summer of 1656 he had been issued with both a sword for his self defence and presumably a horse as well, as he was provided with a saddle on 11 July. He was also able to export 30 lb of tobacco in September 1657.[231] Gage died quite early in the occupation and it is quite likely that the rest had died by February 1656 for on that date an entry in *Doyley's Journal* soberly noted that:

> whereas by reason of the great Mortality it hath pleased God to vissit this Army w[i]t[h]all, almost all the Chaplains, and Ministers of the Army are dead. Whereby we are much deprived of the benefitt of the preaching of the Gospell amongst us. It is this day ordered by the President that Mr Henry Palmer Minister of the Word, be appointed to preach at the Redd Church within this Towne (the usual place of meeting) to ye officers and souldiers of this garison and to receive for his care and paines therein ye same allowance that other ministers officiating in the same place have formerly received.[232]

228 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.6.
229 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, p.6.
230 TNA, CO1/32, f.56.
231 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.72, and 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.72.
232 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.24–25; Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', p.46.

Despite the heavy death toll amongst the men of God, replacements were found to tender to the spiritual needs of the colony, though whether they were transported to Jamaica or were already present in the army is not always clear. Goodsonn requested that more ministers be sent when he returned to England in 1657, along with money to maintain them.[233] In September 1657 Doyley sent the sum of 40*l* sterling to Dr Thomas Browne of Bermuda as an 'encouragement ... to transport himself to Jamaica'. This obviously had the desired effect, and upon his arrival Browne was provided with bread, pork and pease for his food allowance in February 1658.[234] Little is heard of him thereafter, so it might well be that he, along with so many newly arrived settlers, died soon after his arrival though he was still alive in April 1658.[235] In January 1658 another new minister, Mr. Barrowe, is noted in the records for the first time, but how he came to Jamaica, and from where, is unknown; whilst he was still alive in October 1660, it is unclear if he was the same man as the Parson Barrows whose farm was mentioned on Sellers' 1671 map in St Elizabeth parish.[236] The minister George Johns, also mentioned in January 1660, was an unordained preacher in the army, but by 1661 there were still only a handful of ministers on the island.[237] These ministers must have been busy during the first months of the occupation giving support to those gravely ill, and presumably officiating at the countless funerals that must have taken place, including many of their own colleagues. There is little evidence that records the activities of these first ministers, other than them preaching at the Red Church (now the cathedral), though an unknown minister was permitted to marry John Peacock and Judith Harper in September 1657.[238] The shortage of ministers on the island was reported to England in 1657 but little seems to have been done to send more, although a scheme presented by the Frenchman Rene Augier to the Council of State to send foreign Protestant ministers to Jamaica and elsewhere in the Caribbean 'so as to negative the designs of the Jesuits in those parts', was briefly considered.[239]

Whilst ministers might have been in short supply, Bibles were not. On 9 June 1655 the Council of State ordered that 2,000 copies be purchased and sent the West Indies. However nothing was done immediately to send these, and it was only in November, after news of the Hispaniola disaster and the occupation of Jamaica had reached England, that the Council ensured that they were purchased and sent with other provisions at a cost of 242*l* 10s 4d to the State.[240] These Bibles had finally arrived in Jamaica by August 1656 when 1,605 of them were issued 'for ye use of ye private souldiers belonging

233 TNA, CO1/33, f.64.
234 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.73, 95.
235 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.73, 95, 103.
236 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.82; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.220.
237 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.220; Pestana, *The English Conquest of Jamaica*, pp.236–237.
238 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', p.72.
239 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, pp.456, 459.
240 Green, *CSPD 1655*, p.204, and *CSPD 1655–6*, pp.14, 44, 142.

to the severall regiments of the army', but with the cavalry only getting their 46 some six weeks later.[241]

When the English arrived in Santiago there were two churches and a handful of smaller chapels.[242] Most likely these were quickly ransacked and despoiled by the soldiers, just as they had done in Hispaniola, but one, the Church of the Red Cross, was turned into the main English church, which the soldiers called 'Redd Church'. This church was dedicated to St Catherine (after Charles II's wife) in around 1666, but was destroyed by a hurricane in 1712; it was rebuilt as St Catherine's Cathedral, but is now known as the Cathedral of St Jago de la Vega.[243] This seems to have been the only church used by the garrison until one was constructed in Cagway in early 1658, on the site of the present St Peter's Church. This church was in fact a church-cum-market/store building that was made entirely of wood. The church was rebuilt during the Earl of Carlisle's governorship in the late 1670s but was then destroyed in the earthquake of 1692.[244] Both churches were most likely Presbyterian, while the religious Independents probably congregated in private houses or perhaps under the shade of a tree somewhere close by. However, in 1661 Doyley was clearly instructed by Charles II to sanction only the newly restored Church of England on the island. He was told to encourage all ministers 'that now are or shall come or be sent unto you' to follow 'Christianity and ye Protestant Religion according to p[ro]fession of ye Church of England'.[245] With the introduction of the Anglican Church the island was soon after divided into parishes, but it was still some years before any other churches were constructed.

There is an interesting connection between the early Jamaican colony and the Quaker movement, which had sprung up in England during the Civil War and was led by George Fox. Fox believed that individuals could reach God by themselves, without the assistance of a priesthood, and that women could play a dominant role in spreading this faith. He travelled the country preaching this new doctrine and soon fell foul of the authorities who saw him and his followers, known to each other as 'friends' but derogatorily called Quakers by their detractors, as a threat to the traditional order of male-dominated religion. In 1655 Mary Fisher and Ann Austin left England for Barbados to preach and convert, where they soon gained a faithful following. It is possible that the two visited Jamaica in 1656, as they certainly visited some of the other English islands, but there is no conclusive proof of this. They sailed for Boston in July 1656, but were imprisoned upon their arrival and then sent back to Barbados.[246] How long they remained there is also unclear but they did return to England at some point in 1657.

241 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.82, 91.
242 Hickeringill, *Jamaica Viewed*, p.39.
243 Cundall, *Historic Jamaica*, pp.89–91.
244 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.82, 92; JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.16; Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.12.
245 The Huntington Museum California, BL 321, Instructions to Edward Doyley, William Blathwayt Papers, 1657–1770, 1661.
246 Rufus M. Jones, *The Quakers in the American Colonies* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1923), pp.26–29.

Certainly Quakers visited Jamaica at the end of 1657 or the beginning of 1658, and a confused Doyley wrote to Thurloe seeking instruction on how he was supposed to deal with them. He wrote that 'There are some people lately come hither, called Quakers, who have brought letters of credit, and do disperse books amongst us.' He informed the Secretary that he was aware 'that the heads of their people are contriving against the government, and accounted conspirators against his highness', and yet he found them 'a people of an unblameable life, and to whose acting I am a stranger'. He requested guidance in how best to treat these missionaries as he did not want to incur the Lord Protector's displeasure through his own ignorance.[247] There is no record of Thurloe's response or how successful the visiting Quakers were in their attempts at converting the island's population, but they must have had some success for by 1661 Captain John Cope, who was one of the senior officers on the island at the time, was referred to derogatorily that year as 'a Quaker and ancient rebel' and he might well have come from Barbados.[248] In 1672 none other than George Fox himself visited Jamaica, when it was noted that on the island there was already an established Quaker community. Some of these people had probably been transported there in the early years of the Restoration, as they were seen more and more as a threat to the stability of the nation. Some of Fox's followers chose to remain in Jamaica when he departed for New England, but not before one of his very first converts, the longtime Quaker preacher Elizabeth Hooton, died and was buried on the island.[249] Coincidentally it was Admiral William Penn's son, also called William, who later became a Quaker and went on to found the colony of Pennsylvania in 1681. Charles II's Declaration of Breda in April 1660 had promised religious toleration throughout the English realm, which led to at least a temporary acceptance of the Quakers in the West Indian colonies but also of Jews. The first reported Jewish settlers in Jamaica arrived March 1663 when a party of six arrived from London.[250]

Jamaica, and in particular Port Royal, was later to gain a reputation for debauchery, hedonism and sin, even being given the moniker of the wickedest city in the world, and there is no reason to suppose that the origins of this epithet are not to be found in the early days of the English occupation. The army started off with a low moral base when the soldiers who enlisted in England were described by Venables as 'Prophane Persons', Daniel How lamented that 'that in our poor Army we have few that either fear God or reverence Man', while the anonymous I.S. described them as 'hectors, and knights of the blade, with common cheats, thieves, cutpurses, and such like lewd persons, who had long time lived by the sleight of hand, and dexterity of wit, and were now making a fair progress unto Newgate, from whence they were to proceed towards Tyburn', before jumping at the chance of

247 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.834.

248 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, p.36.

249 John L. Nickalls (ed.), *The journal of George Fox* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp.43, 493, 608, 611.

250 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, pp.279–280; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, pp.48–49.

reprieve and joining the army.[251] I.S. was just as scathing of the character of those recruited in Barbados whom he called 'vagabonds, robbers, renegado servants, certainly these islanders must be the very scum of scums, and mere dregs of corruption'.[252] With so many people of such dubious character it is not surprising that Jamaica would gain a reputation of ill repute. As early as April 1656 Doyley issued licences to sutlers in both Santiago and at Passage Fort to sell 'all manner of liquor and provisions' which would only have encouraged those of weak faith to forsake their religion even more, and by October 1656 the area around Passage Fort was already renowned for iniquity as 'tippling houses' had been established by the shore to relieve soldiers and sailors alike of any spare change they might have had. Harrington, the commander of the fort, was instructed by Doyley 'keepe in good order the inhabitants there and especially such as keepe tippleing-houses and see that no disorderly houses be kept nor immoderate drinking and to prevent all miscarriages of that nature'.[253] To what extent drinking impacted the army is not known, but a comment by Doyley in early 1660 suggests that it was having detrimental effect. He notified the Admiralty that the increased attacks by the African-Caribbeans had 'necessitated him to set an impost on strong liquors' which suggests that readily available alcohol had certainly impaired the efficiency of the army somewhat.[254] It seems likely that the flames of Raymond's mutiny of 1660 were fanned by the flow of wine.[255] The ubiquitous cassava could be distilled into an alcoholic beverage and it must be supposed that it did not take the soldiers long to start making it. Where strong liquor flows and an army is quartered prostitution usually follows, but perhaps surprisingly, there is no mention of it in any of the extant sources prior to the Restoration. Whilst there were only a limited number of women with the army it would be highly likely that opportunities for prostitution soon emerged in some form in Santiago, around Passage Fort and later in Cagway. In January 1658 when writing to the Lord Protector, Nathaniel Lane noted that 'surely never did a people lye more open to sin and wrath, then wee doe … Here is a place, that deserves your care.'[256] So whilst the evidence for Jamaica becoming a den of iniquity so early in its occupation is not compelling, there is sufficient to suggest many of the inhabitants were more inclined to a sinful life than a godly one. Justification of this conclusion is perhaps to be found in the instructions issued to Doyley by Charles II in February 1661 in which the governor was instructed to 'take care yt Drunckeness and Debauchery be discountinancit [discountenanced] and punished'.[257] Lord Windsor in his report of 1662 observed that the 'intemperance of the Inhabitants' had caused much 'mortality' amongst them.[258]

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251 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.6, 41; T. Park (ed.), *A Brief and Perfect Journal … of the English Army in the West Indies … by I.S.*, Vol. 6 (London: Robert Dutton, 1810), p.377.
252 Park, I.S. – *A Brief and Perfect Journal*, p.379.
253 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.58, 102.
254 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1675–1676*, p.133.
255 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.52.
256 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.23–24.
257 Huntington Museum, Instructions to Edward Doyley.
258 BL, Add MS 11410.

IX

As early as October 1655 Cromwell had stated his intention that the new colony of Jamaica was expected to be governed by a civilian rather than a military government.[259] In fact the civilian aspect of the entire expedition, and the role civilians were expected to play in it, is demonstrated by the fact that three of the five commissioners were civilian and the subsequent commissioners, Sedgwick and Stokes, were also civilians. It is also clear that it was not the Lord Protector's intention at the outset that the expedition and the colonies that it created be run by the military, but rather by civilians. However the ongoing war of resistance and the distractions of war and politics in England deflected this desire and it was only after the Restoration, with the reintroduction of civilian government in England, albeit of a monarchical variety, that the home government had the time and inclination to dismantle the military junta and replace it with civilian structures. Until 1661 the vast majority of the English on the island were either army or navy, and as such the individuals were out of necessity governed by the rules of war dictated by their respected services. Out of simplicity, and lacking instructions to the contrary, those civilians living in Jamaica were also governed by martial law, or more correctly the diktat of the commander-in-chief. That there seems to have been no dissent against this was perhaps more to do with the recognition that the civilians needed the army for security and food than from any lack of fervour for self-governance and the traditional forms of government that they were used to. It is to Doyley's credit that he does not seem to have abused the almost limitless powers he had on the island. However, attempts were made to introduce a form of civilian governance for at least the Nevis settlers and again it is to the credit of the army that they encouraged this.

Luke Stokes was himself a duly appointed civilian governor of an English colony and he therefore knew what governing was about and the importance of the civilian institutions of executive, legislature and judiciary in a colonial outpost, even if they were a truncated form of those of the mother country. He would have read Cromwell's decrees of civilian government for settlers and no doubt used that argument to help convince those on Nevis to follow him to Jamaica. Whether a form of governance was discussed between him and Sedgwick prior to his arrival at the end of 1656 is not known, but it must certainly have been considered by all beforehand and discussed on Stokes' arrival. Even though the army recognised that they had a duty to provide security for the settlers in Morant they also recognised, and seemingly accepted, that their settlement was to be separate from the army settlements, both physically and administratively. It is certain that a set of rules for self-governance of the Morant area by the civilian settlers were established but the specifics of the nature of this self-government no longer survive. In a letter from Sedgwick to Cromwell in April 1657 he wrote that after Stokes' death he was necessitated to 'establish a government among the planters ... otherwise the whole business here would have bin in confusion'. The context

259 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 3, p.753.

clearly suggests that Stokes had been responsible for government there, and his premature death created a vacuum in governance that needed to be filled quickly. His letter also mentions that there were commissioners in Morant he needed to work with and this certainly implies that some individuals amongst the settlers had been appointed to govern themselves.[260]

That commissioners had been appointed and their role as local (civilian) governance in Morant is confirmed by an instruction issued in November 1657 by Doyley. The proclamation began by acknowledging that commissioners had previously been 'appointed to manage the affairs at Port Morant' but as they had subsequently died he was necessitated to appoint additional ones. The instruction, actually called an additional instruction, was in the form of a blank appointment to an unknown individual, 'desiringe you to join with them [the remaining Commissioners] in the administration of justice to the people and planters att Port Morant according to this and former instructions given unto them which are both to continue untill further order'. Unfortunately the previous instruction has not survived, while this supplement provides little evidence of how the settlement was to be managed other than by commissioners. It does demonstrate that land had been apportioned to the settlers, the commissioners were to ensure that none of them were to leave Jamaica without permission, and that the commissioners had the authority to reassign land when it became vacant.[261] It is certain from the little remaining evidence that exists that a different form of governance was in place in Morant and that the settlers, all civilians from Nevis and later probably Bermuda, had some involvement in it. What is also clear is their dependence on the army for support when their own structures collapsed due to the high mortality rate sustained by the settlers. If nothing else Morant points to the attempt of the military authorities to provide the civilian government promised settlers by the Lord Protector.

Despite Doyley never having received any formal commission for his activities in Jamaica he at least had the assurance that not having been replaced by somebody else probably meant that the government in England at least accepted him as the head of government and were satisfied with his performance, even if his authority was only de facto instead of *de jure*. But with the Restoration in England the legality of governance of Jamaica was once more thrown open to question. Doyley first heard of the change of government when the *Convertine* sailed into Cagway harbour on 15 August 1660 flying the King's colours, and not those of the Commonwealth. Naturally it would take time for the intentions of the new government in London to be formulated and made known, but Doyley still needed to run the colony, and now had to second-guess what his new political masters expected from him. The first thing Doyley needed to do was make the political statement proclaiming Charles II as the rightful King on the island, and so acknowledging him as the head of government. But this was not as simple as it might seem. Did the majority of the island support the Restoration? How would the Republicans on the island react? The majority of the community

260 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, p.212.

261 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Two', pp.85, 86.

was made up by soldiers whose army had actively opposed the House of Stuart for almost two decades, so there was no guarantee that they would welcome the King and acknowledge his authority. Barbados had refused to acknowledge the Parliament in 1649, even though it was obvious to all that it was the government of England, however its members had obtained that power. So there was no guarantee that Jamaica would accept the King with a government and army full of ex-Parliamentarians.

The commanders of the *Convertine*, and the *Bear* which sailed with her but which arrived two days later, had been ordered by 'His Majesty's Admiralty and Navy' to proceed to Jamaica, and upon arrival they were instructed to 'observe such orders and direccons [*sic*] as you shall receave from the commander-in-chief of his Majestie's forces att Jamaica'.[262] The Admiralty was certainly making the assumption that Doyley would be willing to accept the authority of Charles II. Undoubtedly Doyley would have discussed with his senior officers how they ought to react, and whether they should acknowledge Charles II as the rightful head of state. The fact that they acquiesced so quickly suggests that there were few dissenters or perhaps the reality of Jamaica's precarious position meant they felt that they had little option. The island was still insecure and reliant for much of its provisions and weapons from England and so was in no position to resist. Or perhaps they no longer had any firm opinion as to who governed in England, having been neglected by successive governments there, so as long as they were provided the support they needed to live their lives as they sought fit they did not care. And so Doyley dutifully proclaimed Charles II as the head of state.

In February 1661 Doyley was to write that the islanders, upon receiving the news the Charles II had been proclaimed King throughout England, with 'the like joy and satisfaction did receave the same … And wee did cause his Majesty to be proclaimed in the severall quarters and places in this island.'[263] Exactly when Doyley had the King proclaimed is not clear. It seems the King's amnesty was only circulated on 18 August 1660, three days after the news of the Restoration was received.[264] This seems a long delay which might suggest there was some lengthy discussion between the senior officers on how best to proceed. However, whereas Burrough received an order to credit himself for brandy used to proclaim the King dated 16 August which suggests the opposite,[265] this order was actually only entered into *Doyley's Journal* in mid September and so does not necessarily mean the brandy was actually issued on 16 August. On 18 August 1660 Doyley had the King's Amnesty, also known as the Declaration of Breda, proclaimed. The Amnesty, actually issued by Charles on 14 April as a precondition to being offered the throne, declared that he was pleased 'to grant a free and generall pardon to all his subjects of what degree or quality soever' provided that they 'shall by any publique act declare theire doeinge soe'. Doyley added that 'there shall be an instrument drawne declaringe their obedience and subjection to his Majesty

262 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.212.
263 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.241.
264 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.213.
265 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.216.

to which they may subscribe their hands all [*sic*] my house att point Cagway which sh[a]ll be post as a record of their loyalty and obedience forever'.[266] The instrument that Doyley referred to was made available for signing on 21 August. By signing the document the inhabitants did 'declare and signifie hereby our acceptance and thankes for his Majesty's soe gracious tender and [ ] and doe lay hold thereof faithfully promising to behave ourselves as true and loyal subjects to his most sacred Majesty and thankfull servants for this soe great a favour and mercy'.[267] And with that the past was put behind them and Jamaica became a Royal colony, subject to the governance of Charles II. But in reality very little changed upon the island.

The two ships that brought Jamaica news of the Restoration did not bring Doyley any instructions of how the new government in England expected him to act, however. Sir Edward Nicholas had been appointed Secretary of State by Charles II and so at least Doyley now had somebody specific to correspond with, unlike for the previous couple of years. On 11 September he wrote to Nicholas, and choosing his words carefully, notified him that he had nearly 2,000 men under his command which were the 'remains of a far greater number, mostly gentlemen of good families, whom the jealousy of Cromwell banished thence'. Acting contrite, he added he could 'say much of his own and their sufferings, but intends not to excuse their past error'. He acknowledged 'the King's favour of pardon and promise of their arrears' but above all he requested he be sent positive orders and instructions during his stay in the island, so that 'he may not walk hoodwinked'.[268]

Much to Doyley's frustration he received no timely instructions from England, nor did he receive any clarification as to his own position. Confusingly, however, he did receive instruction in December 1660 of his appointment as commander of the fleet in Jamaica from the Duke of York, now Lord High Admiral.[269] In early February 1661 he received a letter from the Spanish governor of Santiago de Cuba with which was a copy of a declaration from Sir Henry Bennet, the King's ambassador in Spain, notifying all concerned of the cessation of hostilities between England and Spain. This notification formally ended the Anglo-Spanish War in September 1660, a war fought over two continents, at sea in the Atlantic, the Caribbean and along the length and breadth of the English Channel. It had been fought on land in Flanders, Hispaniola, Jamaica and along the Spanish Main. The war was fought at the instigation of England's Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell, to expand the boundaries of the English empire by seizing Spanish territories and wealth in the Americas. With the war now formally over Doyley no doubt was glad to proclaim the cessation on 6 February, but he was wrong if he thought the end of hostilities would be welcomed by most of the inhabitants of Jamaica.[270]

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266 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.213.
267 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.214.
268 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.489.
269 Taylor, *The Western Design*, p.202.
270 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.5, 21.

In March 1661 he wrote once again to Secretary Nicholas requesting instructions on how to regulate the now Royal colony, but at the time he was unaware of what had already been decided in England that would affect both his fate and that of Jamaica. [271] Under the terms of the Treaty of Brussels between the exiled Charles and Spain it had been agreed that in return for Spanish assistance to regain the English throne, Charles would return all Spanish territory captured in the West Indies. By the time Charles returned to England, without the assistance of Spain, Jamaica had survived its first five years and was starting to develop and was proving to be useful base for commercial and military forays against the Spanish in the Caribbean, and its benefit was beginning to be discerned. Recognising how weak Spain had become, Charles himself was not particularly in favour of a pro-Spanish foreign policy, being more inclined to prefer an alliance with Portugal instead, but he still wanted peace with Spain. As such he quickly agreed a cessation of hostilities with Spain in September 1660 but made no attempt to negotiate a treaty and gave no hints that he was prepared to relinquish either Jamaica or Dunkirk. To consider the future of Jamaica a committee was established in October, and it quickly concluded that it was in England's best interests to retain the island and the Spanish were notified accordingly on 5 December.[272] As an interim measure Doyley was appointed governor of Jamaica on 17 October and a draft commission prepared and approved on 30 November, but only issued on 8 February 1661.[273]

Doyley's commission instructed him to choose (not elect) a council of 12 persons from which he was to receive advice, and 'to erect and constitute Civil Judicatories'. He was to protect the island from enemies, inside and out, to appoint commissioners to regulate trade and to pass acts 'tending to their security and prosperity'. In the event of his death the council was to assume the mantle of government and to appoint a new governor until further instruction from England was received. A set of instructions were also issued, which laid out what was expected from the council, which was to establish a framework for civil governance on the island that covered the appointment of judges, maintaining law and order, encouraging the populace to continuing farming and encourage new settlers and trade. The council was to cause a comprehensive survey of the island to be undertaken, and to formally register land allocations with clear boundary descriptions.[274]

Finally, Doyley had the indisputable authority to act and a clear mandate on what was required of him and how to achieve it. He received these instructions in early June, and immediately set about calling together the civilian Council of Jamaica for the first time.[275] The inaugural meeting of the Council was held in Cagway on 18 June 1661 and the councillors chosen

271 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.21.

272 Grant et al., *Acts of the Privy Council*, pp.299, 302; Agnes Whitson, *Constitutional Development Of Jamaica – 1660 to 1729*, Historical Series No. LII (Manchester: The University of Manchester, 1929), p.9.

273 Grant et al., *Acts of the Privy Council*, p.299; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.4–6; TNA, CO138/1, ff.3–9.

274 TNA, CO138/1, ff.3–9; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.6.

275 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', f.251.

by Doyley were Samuel Barry, Philip Ward, Richard Wilbraham, Henry Archbould, Thomas Fairfax, John Coape, Richard Povey, William Valet, Thomas Ballard, Cornelius Burroughs, John Harrington and Humphrey Groves, all of whom were either serving officers of the army or senior members of Doyley's previous military administration. This is not surprising, as he needed the continued support of the influential officers and his experienced administrators to continue to manage affairs on the island, but at least now they were involved in their civilian capacity. In time many of these men were replaced by civilians as the colony lost its military influence. Over the next two and a half years the island was governed through the Council, and they collectively issued numerous orders that established the mechanisms of civilian rule and administered justice to the military and non-military alike. At the fortnightly meetings of the Council its members considered and approved such mundane matters as the issuance of trading and hunting licences, appointments of justices of the peace, the introduction of an impost on wine and other cargoes to give the colony regular income, the regulating of servants and punishing slaves, oversight of the courthouses and justice. Acts were promulgated covering such diverse matters as establishing the courts of law and a provost marshal's office, the upkeep of the roads and bridges, regulating boats and wherries, providing incentives to encourage trade and commerce, and the division of the island into parishes and precincts, as well as the regulating of marriages, christenings, churchings and burials and the establishment of a survey office.[276]

Doyley, as always, provided strong and effective leadership throughout this period of transition, but to the government in England he was only a temporary incumbent to be discarded once another governor, without the taint of rebellion, could be identified and chosen. Doyley would have known this, and though loyal to the new government in London, he was ready and willing to relinquish the reins of government and return home to the quiet life he had long desired. On 2 August 1661 the King issued a commission as governor of the island to Thomas, Lord Windsor, and invalidated Doyley's own commission.[277] Thomas Hickman-Windsor had supported the Royalist cause throughout the Civil War, had fought at the Battle of Naseby in 1645 and had been created Baron Windsor in June 1660. Windsor, however, was in no rush to set out for Jamaica and only departed England in May 1662. His instructions were to continue to oversee the transition to civilian rule, but he was given sweeping powers to grant land and administer the collection of rents on behalf of the Crown. Furthermore, on 23 April 1662, just before departing, he was instructed to formally disband the army in Jamaica and constitute a civilian militia in its place.[278] In almost an echo of the instructions issued by Cromwell he was also instructed to seek trade concessions and the opening of Spanish ports to English commerce, and to use force if required. Charles II was as duplicitous in his dealings with Spain as Cromwell had been by proclaiming peace in Europe while preparing for war in the West

276 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, pp.37-38.
277 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, p.50.
278 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661-1668*, pp.81, 88.

Indies. Windsor was well aware that the English were looking to continue their war against Spain beyond the line, and even fitted out his own privateer vessel which he brought with him to Jamaica so he could personally benefit from the upsurge in hostilities that was clearly being planned. To the English government, even though the war had formally ceased in Europe, they were still willing to continue it in the West Indies, but it was no longer Cromwell's war but Charles'.

Once again, and for the final time, Doyley was put into an awkward position. Technically replaced as governor in August 1661 he remained de facto governor until August 1662 when Windsor finally arrived, although he had heard the rumours that he was being replaced as early as October 1661. Nevertheless Doyley continued to loyally undertake his duty until his replacement arrived, who unceremoniously shunted him off the island within a few weeks of his arrival. Windsor himself only remained on Jamaica for two months before returning to England, citing ill-health, leaving his deputy, Sir Charles Lyttleton, in his place.[279]

After Doyley's return to England he wrote a lengthy, and frank, report to the King concerning the state of Jamaica and offered some suggestions as to what policies the new government ought to pursue there. Doyley began by explaining that despite his obvious attachment to the island he would not exaggerate, or 'Hyerbolize', but would instead give 'the short true and plaine State of the Place att least my humble opinion of it'. He believed that the land was not as fertile as on other Caribbean islands and would only yield per acre one third of the sugar that Barbados did or half the tobacco that St Christopher could, plus it had an unhealthy climate that had led to many deaths. There were no mines on the island that he was aware of, though he admitted nobody had come to the island with the knowledge of how to locate and work them. He thought there were plenty of herbs, bark and roots suitable for making drugs but that somebody with knowledge of such science ought to be sent to make their own survey, though it was to be almost 25 years before Hans Sloane visited and did this, surveying the flora and fauna of the island. Doyley admitted that the English had virtually eradicated the wild cattle and horses when they first arrived but their stock had gradually increased and if husbanded well on the island the necessity to import the expensive horses required for the burgeoning sugar industry were not then needed. The turtles off the Cayman Islands provided a cheap, reliable and regular source of sustenance for the islanders and were an essential supplement to their diet. Doyley believed the 'Island is wonderfull healthfull for Negroes which are the life of Plantacons' with 'very few or none dyeing'. They did not need 'Seasoning' as the slaves did in Virginia, or the English did themselves upon their first arrival.[280]

Doyley acknowledged that the English settlers were very poor, but he believed this was in turn caused by the activities of the privateers. There was an acute labour shortage on the island but new arrivals were unprepared to commit to work for any employer 'but from weeke to weeke', for they were

279 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.112; BL, Add MS 11410.
280 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 347, ff.39–41.

hoping instead to be enlisted into a privateer's crew with the lure of quick and easy money. As a consequence landowners feared that they would not have sufficient labour to harvest the crops they had planted, and so were discouraged from expanding their plantations. He blamed the attacks by privateers on Cuba in 1662 and Campeche in 1663 for creating the expectation amongst many that wealth was to be had at the expense of 'the dull teadious waie of Planting' while such activities (which Doyley himself had encouraged) produced nothing but 'ill effects'. With the settlers more interested in plundering there were few people prepared to work the land. This had created a culture of borrowing money to establish individuals as privateers upon which 'great hopes are trusted att the Taverne' and large sums of money were borrowed 'To try their fortunes' but when the inevitable happened and the debtors could not repay this easy money it led many to 'bethinks how to quitt the Island to cleere the debt which otherwise they must serve for'. In fact so common was this absconding that when Doyley was in Virginia, on his return journey to England, he 'everywhere mett such persons runne from Jamaica on that account'. Any money made from such privateering activities was soon spent in the alehouses whose owners were the chief beneficiary of these actions.[281]

Doyley went on to comment on the rampant drinking that settlers partook of, and how this was being fuelled by the merchants. Whilst the merchants on the island imported the necessities Jamaica needed they also brought in vast amounts of alcohol, which the settlers consumed in great quantities which impoverished them even further, causing 'frequent Mutinies and disorders'. Doyley suggested that the settlers had created their own form of currency to pay for these drinks, instead of using the more economically sustainable tobacco as a currency. He commented that these merchants who had arrived brought no settlers with them and so had done nothing to sustain the colony, and he suggested that only merchants with established plantations ought to be permitted to import commodities onto the island.[282]

Doyley suggested that the King withdraw the commissions to the privateers for the Crown was gaining no benefit from them with little money being collected for its share, but much damage was being done to the colony and the economy. He also suggested that 500 slaves be sent to the island for 'Responsible honest men' to use on their plantations, for it would be a 'great encouragement' to the planters and provide them with the opportunity 'whereby their Losses by the late Actions may be Repaired'. Doyley suggested that the moratorium on the payment of customs duty be extended on produce of the island when imported into England in an attempt to stimulate the economy further. He recommended that expensive liquor such as brandy be prohibited from import into Jamaica which would then encourage the sale of locally produced rum instead.[283] None knew the problems and potential of the island better than Doyley and his matter-of-fact report ought to have been considered at the highest levels of government, but unfortunately it

281 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 347, ff.42–43.
282 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A vol. 347, ff.43–45.
283 Bodleian Library, Rawl. A Vol. 347, ff.45–46.

was not, and subsequent governors did little to discourage privateering or encourage the development of economy.

With the departure of Doyley, the disbandment of the army and the consolidation of civilian government under first Windsor and then Lyttleton, the Anglo-Spanish War, instigated at the behest of one man, was finally over. But the hostilities between England and Spain in the West Indies did not conclude with Doyley being shunted off Jamaica at the end of 1662, and instead a new era of warfare was about to begin which was to involve many of Cromwell's army, and in a form that the Lord Protector would surely have relished and approved of.

Epilogue

Lord Windsor brought with him instructions to force Spanish colonies in the New World to allow open English trade; he was to use military force if necessary to open this lucrative trade and enforce religious toleration for the English that visited them, just as Venables and Penn had been instructed to do eight years previously. Not surprisingly the local Spanish governors responded to Windsor's half-hearted attempts to open dialogue on the subject in the same way the previous ambassador to England, Alonso de Cardenas, had responded when he famously replied that it was to ask his master's two eyes. With these rejections Windsor instigated a new phase of the war in the Caribbean, one that was to be fought not by the army and navy of England but by the privateers acting under licence of the State.

As a result, on 6 October 1662 Christopher Myngs, with a force of English sailors, privateers and ex-soldiers stormed the Spanish city of Santiago de Cuba. Over the next several days the city, harbour and citadel were all captured, plundered, and in the case of the fortress, levelled.[1] Myngs was acting under the orders of the newly arrived English governor of Jamaica who was determined to continue the war with Spain in the West Indies, notwithstanding the general peace in Europe which had been in force since late 1660. Myngs was able to effect what the English had hitherto been unable to achieve in the Caribbean since their arrival in 1655 – the successful attack and capture of a major Spanish possession. Goodsonn had planned an attack on Santiago at the end of 1655, but a lack of resources and the arrival of Sedgwick shelved his plans, and it was to be another seven years before the English were sufficiently strong and confident enough to try.[2] Myngs' raid was a success, though it brought little in the way of material gain for the English who quickly sailed away and left the city's smouldering ruins in their wake. But the benefit of the raid was more symbolic than material, for not only were the English able to obtain revenge upon the city that more than any other had supported the Spanish resistance in Jamaica, but finally Cromwell's vision of the English rampaging across the Caribbean, attacking Spanish territories at will, disrupting commerce and gaining plunder, had

1 Captain Mines Myngs and Charles Harding Firth, 'The Capture of Santiago, in Cuba, by Captain Myngs, 1662', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 14, No. 55,1899, pp.538–540.

2 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, pp.159–160.



Descripción chronográphica del puerto y baya de Santiago de Cuba, *c.*1651.
(Archivo General de Indias. MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 51)



Caerte vande Bay St. Tiago (Santiago de Cuba, Cuba) *c.*1639. Joan Vinckeboons.
(The Library of Congress, Washington DC. G3291.S12 coll. H3)

eventually become a reality. Myngs followed up this raid the following year with an attack on Campeche, fostering yet more fear amongst the Spanish in the region.[3]

When Sir Thomas Modyford was installed as Jamaican governor in 1664 he actively encouraged the growing numbers of privateers, whom Doyley had first encouraged to frequent Port Royal to attack Spanish targets; they soon became the scourge of the seas as they attacked shipping at will and raided the Spanish Main in search of booty. English and French privateers were based in both Port Royal and lawless Tortuga while adventurers, runaways, criminals, and assorted desperadoes flocked to serve with captains whose names became infamous across the West Indies and Europe. The most famous of these, Captain Henry Morgan, was even able to sack Porto Bello in 1668 and Panama in 1671 and returned to Jamaica with his haul of plunder. In the 12 years since Cromwell's death Jamaica had grown prosperous on the back of plundered Spanish treasure, just as he had hoped.

The war in Europe between England and Spain had ended by mutual agreement in the autumn of 1660 but peace had never been formalised by treaty. The English had initiated negotiations with Spain in 1664 but these efforts were complicated by England's alliance with Portugal which had culminated with Charles I's marriage to Catherine of Braganza, and the ceding of Tangier and Bombay to England. Spain, weakened by years of fighting in Europe, was forced into a peace treaty with England in 1667 which, though advantageous to England as it opened trade with the Iberian Peninsula, made no mention of the war in the West Indies and so both parties were happy to assume its terms did not apply beyond the line. Despite this the English understood that until Spain formally acknowledged English ownership of Jamaica and its other American territories, there would be no peace in the West Indies. Consequently the war in the Caribbean escalated as the Spanish sought reprisals and the English unleashed Morgan and his associates to attack the Main at will, but with Spain once again defeated in Europe by France in 1668 during the War of Devolution, and racked by political problems at home, it was too exhausted and bankrupt to fight any longer. In 1670 the English were able to force the Spanish to acknowledge their possessions in the Americas in the Treaty of Madrid, which was entitled 'A treaty for the composing of differences, restraining of depredations, and establishing of peace in America, between the crowns of Great Britain and Spain, concluded at Madrid the 8/18 day of July, in the year of our Lord 1670'.[4]

The treaty declared that there be 'an universal peace, true and sincere amity, in America, as in the other parts of the world … which shall endure from this day for ever … by land as by sea and fresh-waters.' Both nations undertook to 'forbear and abstain from all plundering, depredation, injuries, and infestation whatsover' and to 'revoke all commissions and letters of reprisal and mart, or otherwise containing licence to take prizes'. They

3 C.S. Knighton, *Sir Christopher Myngs (bap. 1625, d. 1666)*, ODNB.

4 G. Chalmers, *A Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers*, Vol. 2, (London: J. Stockdale, 1790), p.34.

further agreed that 'All offences, damage, losses, injuries' suffered by both nations be 'expunged out of remembrance, and buried in oblivion, as if no such thing had ever past.'[5] But it was Clause VII that gave the English what they craved the most – legitimacy:

> Moreover, it is agreed, that the most Serene King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors, shall have, hold, keep, and enjoy for ever, with plenary right of sovereignty, dominion, possession, and propriety, all those lands, regions, islands, colonies, and places whatsover, being or situated in the West Indies, or any part of America, which the said King of Great Britain and his subjects do at present hold and possess; so as that in regard thereof, or upon any colour or pretence whatsoever, nothing more may or ought to be urged, nor any question or controversy be ever moved concerning the same hereafter.[6]

The treaty did not give the English the unrestricted access to trade they had long demanded, in fact it specifically prohibited both parties from trading in each other's possessions, but a subsequent clause added that notwithstanding this prohibition both nations were free to grant such trading privileges if either nation thought it fit.[7]

When the English representative, William Godolphin, and his Spanish counterpart signed this treaty on 8 July [OS]/18 July [NS] 1670 the war between England and Spain in the West Indies formally came to an end and with the stroke of a pen the need for English privateers to continue the war vanished. Thomas Modyford, who had led the war against Spain with the privateers he sanctioned, was now an embarrassment to the government in England, as was his henchman Henry Morgan, especially after news was received of the latter's attack on Panama. In 1671 Modyford was replaced as governor by Sir Thomas Lynch, formerly a captain in Brayne's regiment, and Modyford and Morgan were sent to England where they were arrested and imprisoned in a show of amity with the Spanish. Nevertheless, Lynch was reluctant to suppress the privateers of Jamaica and continued to issue them with commissions to attack Spanish shipping and to use Port Royal as a haven to recruit and spend their ill-gotten gains, despite his orders to the contrary. Lynch was recalled to England in 1676 having failed to eradicate the privateers, which were by now a serious embarrassment to the English government as it attempted to develop the new-found relationship with Spain to counter the growing French influence in Europe. A succession of governors similarly failed to cleanse Jamaica of the privateers, now nothing more than pirates, and in 1684 Lynch returned as governor again to deal with the menace once and for all. By now piracy had spread from Jamaica and most of the islands of the Caribbean harboured pirates, with ships of English, French, Dutch and others prowling the seas in search of lucrative targets. Gradually Jamaica ceased to be the main centre of piracy, thanks in part to Lynch, but helped considerably by the destruction of most of Port Royal

5 Chalmers, *A Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 2, p.37.
6 Chalmers, *A Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 2, p.37.
7 Chalmers, *A Collection of Treaties*, Vol. 2, pp.37–38.

in the 1692 earthquake. The English realised that they needed to deploy a considerable naval force in the West Indies if they were to counter the pirates, who by now were happy to plunder legitimate English trade as well as Spanish and French. By the early eighteenth century the golden age of the pirate, which had grown because of the English occupation of Jamaica, had ended, allowing Jamaica and the other West Indian possessions to develop and prosper.[8]

After the Restoration of 1660 the colony of Jamaica expanded as settlers flocked there from England, the New England colonies and elsewhere, encouraged by easily obtainable land grants, a reputation for being the place to amass great wealth from privateering and pirating, and for a lack of oversight from the local government. The death and disease that had racked the island for the first few years were now forgotten. The steadily growing wealth of the island was reinvested in the economy, especially in lucrative sugar plantations which though expensive to establish were immensely profitable and which naturally spurred greater investment and consumption. To work these sugar mills African slaves were imported en masse and Jamaica soon became the major slave market of the West Indies, not just for English territories but also for the Spanish who had no ability to obtain slaves directly from Africa for themselves. Jamaica flourished throughout the eighteenth century, when English proprietors and landowners grew phenomenally wealthy off the sugar and slave trades.[9] This, surely, was Cromwell's legacy, right or wrong. Whilst it never eventuated in his lifetime, nor indeed had he even planned for Jamaica to be the centre of this English commercial empire, it was his vision that eventually made it possible and was a direct consequence of the expedition that left England at his behest in December 1654.

Undoubtedly much suffering resulted from Cromwell's desire to carve out an empire in the West Indies. For the soldiers of his army who died a pitiful death in the first years of the occupation and by the dispossessed Spanish who fled from their homes to foreign lands, taking with them the diseases that the English had brought to Jamaica; for the countless slaves who were forced to work in the abominable conditions of the later sugar plantations, and by the victims of the pirate menace that continued well into the following century; and for the Maroons, the descendants of the African-Caribbeans who inhabited the island when the English arrived and who just wanted to live a life of peace and freedom but were brutalised by the English over many decades and finally eradicated in the Maroon Wars of the eighteenth century. In time Jamaica became a more humane and peaceful country, which is now independent and democratic, but the legacy of Cromwell's first, and only, Caribbean colony lives on. Many locations on the island are still named after the English soldiers Cromwell sent out, and their blood still courses through

8 Trevor Burnard, *Sir Thomas Lynch (d. 1684)*, ODNB; Nuala Zahedieh, *Sir Henry Morgan (c. 1635–1688)*, ODNB; Nuala Zahedieh, *Sir Thomas Modyford (c. 1620–1679)*, ODNB; Nöel B. Livingston, *Sketch pedigrees of some of the early settlers in Jamaica. Comp. from the records of the Court of chancery of the island with a list of the inhabitants in 1670 and other matter relative to the early history of the same*, (Kingston, Jamaica: Educational Supply Co., 1909), *passim*.

9 Nuala Zahedieh, 'Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development'.

the veins of the white and mixed-race population. The principals of law and order enjoyed by all were the result of colonial attempts to regulate the island after the Restoration, when Charles II decided to retain the hard-won colony that his antithesis had created.

If Cromwell's primary objective in sending out Venables, Penn, Heane, Fortescue, Doyley, and their cohort in 1654 was to steal the wealth of Spanish America, it failed, but his less ambitious aim of creating strategically located colonies that would be self-sufficient, ultimately prosperous and wealthy was realised in Jamaica in a relatively short period of time. Matters of State are rarely simple, never black or white, and so it is impossible to say that the Lord Protector's 'especial design' was a failure. It was successful in many ways, but in ways unimagined by Cromwell at the time, and it took decades and centuries for these things to come to fruition and not the few years he had hoped. As a result of one man's vision and ambition, against the odds of distance, disease and limited resources, Cromwell, rightly or wrongly, laid the foundations of a prosperous English empire in the Caribbean.

The Anglo-Spanish War of 1655–1660 was Cromwell's war. Despite him claiming historical causes it was a war launched at his behest, not for personal glory as so many wars are fought, but for religious, political, and commercial reasons. It was a war the English could ill-afford and were ill-prepared for. With his death the war in Europe soon fizzled out, but in South America it continued for a decade after the last Spanish governor of Jamaica fled the island ignominiously in an overcrowded and hastily constructed canoe. England, and the other European nations, had never acknowledged Spain's exclusive right to the Americas but the Treaty of Madrid, which came about as a direct consequence of Cromwell's invasion of the West Indies and subsequent English meddling, in a sense legitimised England's previous claim to ownership of the territory it occupied in the New World. Spain's recognition, no matter how reluctantly given, that England had the right to be an American as well as a European power, projected the tiny island nation into a world power and onto a trajectory that would see it become, within a century, the world's first superpower. Perhaps this was the most significant legacy of Oliver Cromwell's 'Western Design'.

Appendix I

Order of Battle for English Forces in the Caribbean, Summer 1655[1]

Expedition Commissioners

General Robert Venables
Admiral William Penn
Edward Winslow (d. May 1655)
Gregory Butler
Daniel Searle (Governor of Barbados)

English Army

Senior Officers

Commander-in-Chief General Robert Venables
Major-General Richard Heane (k. April 1655) – commander of the infantry
Captain Henry Jones – commander of the cavalry
Captain Robert Hughes – commander of the ordnance

Infantry Regiments

General Robert Venables (raised England, 1654. Commanded by Philip Ward after Venables returned to England in summer 1655)
Major General Richard Heane (raised England, 1654. Commanded by Richard Holdip after Heane's death until 1656 and then Samuel Barry)
Colonel Richard Fortescue (raised England, 1654. Commanded by Richard Wells after Fortescue's death in autumn 1655)
Colonel Anthony Buller (raised England, 1654. Commanded by Francis Barrington after Buller returned to England in summer 1655)
Colonel Andrew Carter (raised England, 1654. Commanded by Henry Archbould after Carter's death in 1655)

1 See Sutton, *The Anglo-Spanish War 1655–1660: War in the West Indies*, Chapters 3 and 4.

Colonel Lewis Morris (raised Barbados, 1655. When Morris refused to leave Barbados in April 1655 command passed to Edward Doyley)
Colonel Richard Holdip (raised Leeward Islands, 1655. Disbanded summer 1655)

Cavalry Troops

Captain Henry Jones (raised England, 1654. Departure from England was delayed and the troop did not serve on Hispaniola, only arriving on Jamaica in late May 1655)
Captain James Heane (raised Barbados, 1655. Probably fought on foot at Hispaniola, where it was destroyed)

Reformadoes

A troop of approximately 100 reformadoes served with the army in Hispaniola, where most were killed.

English Fleet

Senior Officers

Admiral William Penn
Vice Admiral William Goodsonn
Rear Admiral George Darkin

Warships

Admiral Penn's Squadron:

Swiftsure
Matthias
Marston Moor
Laurel
Great Charity
Discovery
Sampson
Arms of Holland
Golden Cock
Half Moon
Hound
Rosebush
Selby

Vice Admiral Goodsonn's Squadron:

Paragon
Lion
Bear
Heart's Ease
Dover
Pelican
Falmouth

Little Charity
Marigold
Cardiff
Adam and Eve
Grantham

Rear Admiral Darkin's Squadron:
Indian
Torrington
Gloucester
Katherine
Convertine
Portland
Westergate
Falcon flyboat
Tulip
Crow
Falcon fireship
Gilliflower
Martin galley

Infantry Regiment
Sea Regiment (raised Barbados, 1654 and commanded by Vice Admiral Goodsonn. Served in Hispaniola but disbanded prior to arrival in Jamaica)

Appendix II

Tortuga

The island of Tortuga provides an interesting glimpse into the life of the Caribbean privateers and pirates of the time. Located off the north-west coast of Hispaniola, it had first been occupied in 1492 by Columbus, but being a relatively unimportant island the Spanish rarely visited it. However after 1625 both English and French settlers attempted to claim it, leading the Spanish to evict them by force on three separate occasions, the last in early 1654, only to evacuate the island later the following year after Venables' attack on San Domingo. In 1656 an English vessel visited Tortuga and the crew found it unoccupied and the Spanish fort dismantled, but they also found a letter composed in French and poor English, written by a Spaniard, stating that the island belonged to the King of Spain and was not to be settled by any other nationality.[1] Tortuga might have been of little value to the Spanish but it was strategically important to the English on Jamaica. It had a good harbour from which the Windward Passage between Hispaniola and Cuba could be guarded, through which vessels bound for Jamaica from the north must sail. Brayne sensed an opportunity and immediately sent a small English force of 10 men in a small shallop to occupy the island under the command of Captain Elias Watts in 1656. The island was not entirely uninhabited when Watts arrived as there were some French hunters, the *boucanes*, on the island, and it was probably at this time that they were invited to go to Jamaica to hunt for the English. Over the next few years more French and English arrived on the island and it soon became a base for privateers of both nations who preyed on Spanish shipping when they could, and by 1663 it was seen as a rival to Port Royal.[2]

In 1659 an audacious plan was hatched by Watts, his deputy Colonel James Arundell (an exiled English Royalist) and their French privateer allies, to raid the town of Santiago de Los Caballeros on Hispaniola in retaliation for the Spanish seizure of a French privateer based in Tortuga. A mixed force of some 400 English and French privateers, commissioned by Watts, attacked the town on the morning of 30 March having marched there overnight. The privateers plundered the town for a full day and ransomed the governor for

1 Firth, *The Narrative of General Venables*, pp.170–171.

2 BL, Add MS 11410; Sainsbury, *CSPD Colonial*, p.241; C.H. Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1910), pp.113–114.



Planta de la ysla Tortuga, c.1638. (Archivo General de Indias. MP-VENEZUELA, 24)

60,000 pieces of eight, though the ransom was never paid. On their march back to their ships the privateers were attacked by a Spanish force sent after them, but fought their way to safety. It was believed at the time that each privateer received 300 crowns as their share of the spoils. How many of the privateers were from Jamaica, and whether they were soldiers or settlers, is impossible to tell, but it is likely that all of those that were English who had taken part in the attack had spent some time in Jamaica previously.[3]

Who Elias Watts actually was is not clear, nor is it clear if he was even trusted by the English to govern the island. For reasons that remain obscure, in December 1658 the Council of State in England appointed the Frenchman Jeremie Deschamps to be the governor of Tortuga in his place and sent him to Jamaica with instructions that Doyley provide him a commission as such.[4] Apparently the French king had also appointed him governor of Tortuga in 1656 as well and Deschamps probably used this to get an introduction to the Council in England who, at the time, had more important matters to attend to as Oliver Cromwell had died just three months previously. Whatever Deschamps did to convince the English government that he was entitled to be the governor of Tortuga worked, but he seems to have been in no rush to take up his post,

3 Haring, *Buccaneers*, pp.114–115; Jean Baptiste Du Tertre, *Histoire generale des Antilles habitées par les François*, Vol. 3 (Paris:1671), pp.130–134.

4 Green, *CSPD 1658–9*, p.225.

for Doyley only issued him a commission as governor in May 1660. Doyley's commission makes it clear that Deschamps was to be the sole governor of the island 'to rule, govern and comand the said island and all persons therein settled … as well English as French.' He was to defend the island from the King of Spain and was required to 'obey and observe such orders and comands as you shall from time to time receave from the Councell of State or other therof authority in England, myself or the comander-in-cheife for the time beinge of the English forces in America.'[5] There was certainly no doubt in Doyley's mind that Deschamps was to be subordinate to the English, but as events were to later demonstrate this is not how Deschamps perceived matters. Watts is believed to have heard that he was being replaced and fled to New England.[6]

It was not long before Doyley heard that Deschamps was acting contrary to his commission as governor by issuing his own commissions to privateers, that he had raised the French flag on the island and claimed the colony for France and not England.[7] This provocative action put Doyley once again into a quandary as he needed to respond resolutely, but as France was an ally in the war with Spain he needed to act carefully. By then Doyley was aware that Charles II had been restored and once again he knew he had no formal appointment in his role as governor, nor know what the new government's policy was towards Jamaica, France or Spain. The ever-careful Doyley decided that he was unprepared to use force against the French on Tortuga and decided to wait on further instructions from England before proceeding. However, he seems to have been convinced by James Arundell that he could himself sail to Tortuga, and using the influence he believed he still had on the island, he would kidnap Deschamps and bring him back to Jamaica. Arundell was described as a 'poor distressed gentleman' who had married Watts' daughter during his time on Tortuga and who certainly felt he could command the loyalty of enough people on the island, presumably the English population, to pull off this risky plan. In early March 1661 Doyley duly appointed Arundell as the governor of Tortuga and gave him permission to organise an expedition to apprehend Deschamps, and he departed Jamaica around the middle of March aboard the *Convertine*.[8]

Upon Arundell's arrival at Tortuga Deschamps was found to be on Hispaniola, but he was able to arrest the deputy governor and for a time secured the island. However, his subsequent bungling of events led to his own arrest and he was sent back to Jamaica in humiliation. On his voyage back to Port Royal his vessel was attacked and seized by a Spanish ship, seemingly as uninterested in the cessation of hostilities between the two nations as the English were, and he and his crew were detained and sent to Cuba as prisoners. A month later both Arundell and his ship's master, Bartholomew Cock, were decapitated by African-Caribbeans in the bush and their heads subsequently paraded as trophies, while the rest of the crew were only saved by the timely intervention of a Flemish friar.[9]

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5 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.187–189.
6 Haring, *Buccaneers*, p.116; TNA SP94/47, 1664.
7 Haring, *Buccaneers*, p.116.
8 JARC, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part Three', ff.244–245.
9 Haring, *Buccaneers*, p.117; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.184.

A second attempt to retake Tortuga was made by the English from Jamaica in early 1663, but this was as unsuccessful as Arundell's efforts had been. In February 1662 Lord Windsor, prior to his departure for Jamaica, was instructed upon his arrival to 'use his utmost endeavours to reduce … said island [Tortuga] to obedience.'[10] Immediately upon his arrival in Jamaica the reduction of the island was discussed in the Jamaica Council and was supported by at least two of its members for 'the better security of Jamaica.'[11] On 16 December the Council appointed Colonel Samuel Barry, formerly the commander of Heane's old regiment, and Captain Abraham Langford who was a sea captain extensively employed by Doyley administering naval affairs on the island. Barry, who was to be governor of the island, embarked his force aboard the *Charles*, commanded by Captain Robert Munden who had been instructed to take his orders from the experienced Barry.[12] Upon Barry's arrival aboard the *Charles* it was apparent that the French were prepared to contest his landing and so he ordered Munden to open fire upon the French defenders. For some reason Munden refused to do this and he immediately sailed away and put Barry ashore at Coridon, in modern-day Haiti. Why he did this is unclear, though treachery was suspected at the time. Barry was able to acquire 'a small boat' which took him back to Jamaica where he promptly accused Munden 'with the miscarriage of the whole business'. Langford was set ashore upon the island of Petit-Goave (Gonâve Island) on the west coast of Hispaniola where he seems to have attempted to establish an English colony, though he was back in England by the end of 1664, where he was actively seeking support from the government for another attempt to retake Tortuga.[13]

By 1660 Tortuga had become a lair for privateers, probably actively encouraged by Watts himself, and whilst the numbers were most likely small they were completely free of state interference, unlike those on Jamaica. The majority were probably French with a smattering of English including, it is believed, Henry Morgan. It was lawless, and as Deschamps had demonstrated, a place where might and not right predominated. In 1663 there were at least four privateering ships based in Tortuga with 258 men and 32 guns between them. They were described as 'all Frenchmen'.[14] But despite its lawlessness the island was a centre for trade through which French exports reached the West Indies, much of which ended up in Jamaica, as Windsor was able to confirm in 1662.[15] The English government never again made an attempt to retake Tortuga and during the late 1660s it grew as a privateering base in tandem with Jamaica. When Sir Thomas Lynch closed Jamaica to privateers after 1670 Tortuga replaced it as the main centre of activity in the Caribbean, until after it was itself cleansed of pirates a decade later.

10 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.76.
11 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.108.
12 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.116.
13 Anon., *Some interesting tracts*, p.279; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, pp.137–139,241–243; Haring, *Buccaneers*, pp.117–119.
14 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1661–1668*, p.177.
15 BL, Add MS 11410.

Appendix III

The Cayman Islands

The group of three uninhabited islands now known as the Cayman Islands were first sighted by Christopher Columbus in May 1503 when he named them *Las Tortugas*, after the multitude of sea turtles swimming in the waters around them. In time the islands became known as the Caymanes, a derivative of the ethic Carib word for the local marine crocodiles that inhabited the area. The islands soon became a rendezvous for Caribbean sailors during the summer months, where sea turtles could be found in abundance on the islands and which were easily killed, providing a nutritious meat to supplement the sailors' meagre meat rations, and when salted could be preserved for some months, if not years. Even before the English arrived on Jamaica, barely a two-day sail south-west from Cagway, it was known by English seafarers who frequently hunted turtle there, as Jackson had done in 1642.[1]

Prior to the English arrival in Jamaica the Caymans were well known to English sailors as a source of fresh meat, while Thomas Gage had eaten it many years ago when he first arrived in South America. He recounted that:

> We fed for the first week almost upon nothing but Tortoise, which seemed likewise to us that had never before seen it, one of the Seamonsters the shell being so hard as to beare any Cartwheel, and in some above two yards broad; when first they were opened, we were amazed to see the number of egges that were in them, a thousand being the least that we judged to be in some of them. Out Spaniards made with them an excellent broth with all sorts of spices. The meat semed rather flesh then Sea fish, which being corned with salt, and hung up two or three dayes in the aire, tasted like Veal.[2]

In early June 1655 Penn dispatched the *Dover*, *Arms of Holland* and *Falmouth* from Jamaica to the Cayman Islands as he had heard reports that two French vessels were there turtling and he presumably hoped to capture both them and their haul. The English failed to encounter the French, but they were

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1 Vincent Todd Harlow (ed.), *The Voyages of Captain William Jackson* (London: Camden Society Publications, 3rd Series, 1924), p.21.

2 Gage, *The English-American his travail by sea and land*, p.20.

The Cayman Islands (from *Brief discours des choses plus remarquables que Samuel Champlain de Brouage à reconneues aux Indes occidentales*, 1602?). (John Carter Brown Library, Rhode Island. 04684-33)

able to capture some turtles, which they brought back, but whether this meat was shared with the army is not recorded.[3] Such was the English desperation for food that in July 1656 it was agreed by the council of officers, and in contravention of the Navigation Act that they were empowered to enforce, to purchase 100*l* worth of turtles from a passing French vessel that had called into Cagway, and subsequently on 30 July 10 lb of turtle meat was issued to each person in the army. However, just 10 days later it was brought to the attention of the council of officers that much of this meat, as well as the other provisions, had been embezzled by the quartermasters of the regiments on the grounds that it was already bad. The quartermasters were instructed to ensure there was no repetition of this when the next batch was issued, which was on 20 August when each person was given just five pounds each. The stock had dwindled considerably by 10 September when only one pound was issued to each soldier. By the end of October there was still enough to issue Humphrey's regiment with just one pound per man per day for 10 days.[4]

3 Penn, *Memorials*, p.108; Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.93.

4 Osborne and Taylor, 'Edward Doyley's Journal, Part One', pp.71, 75, 80, 83, 87, 103.

These turtles had almost certainly been caught off the Caymans and the meat was a welcome, if small, addition to the army's diet at a time when they were desperate for food.

The turtles climbed ashore on the Cayman Islands, especially on the two smaller islands, to lay their eggs in the sand between May and July each year before making their slow way back to sea, and so seafarers would visit the islands in these months to catch the adult turtles. All the seamen needed to do was turn them on their backs and they were totally incapacitated, although some were so large and heavy a group of men were required to do this. The turtles could remain alive for several weeks as long as they were given saltwater daily, and so provided an excellent source of fresh meat which tasted like veal. The meat could be eaten in a broth, barbecued or 'pickle[d] in bulk' using salt and stored for months before going off.[5] It is likely that the English regularly sent State vessels there to catch turtle for themselves, as Penn did in 1655 and Sedgwick in early 1656,[6] but there is also plenty of evidence that they purchased substantial amounts of it from traders as well. In the summer of 1657 the merchant William James was contracted by Brayne to go to the Cayman Islands to catch as much as 'his ship could bring', for which it was agreed he would be paid 3d per pound. He caught a massive 50,603 lb of the meat which cost the State 632*l* 10s 3d.[7] Captain Myngs purchased turtle to supplement his ship's rations when he returned to England in 1657, though this does seem to have been from the Bahamas.[8] The English overreliance on it can been seen in Brayne's letter to Cromwell in April 1657 when he admitted that they 'doe wholly trust to their takeing turtle at Caymanes', which was not without its problems. Due to the heavy rains in Jamaica that year the English had been unable to make as much salt as they would have liked, and in consequence this limited the number of turtles they could catch and preserve in the Cayman Islands.[9] Little more has been recorded of the English activities in catching turtles there after 1657. Most likely private individuals like William James frequented the islands regularly and then sold their catch in Jamaica directly to the populace, who by this time were less reliant on State assistance, although certainly Doyley was still sending State vessels there in the summer of 1662 to catch turtles for their return voyage to England.[10]

Given the proximity to Jamaica it was only natural that the English looked upon the Cayman Islands as an extension of their new colony, and it was soon being used as a place of rendezvous for their ships. After Sibada's raid on the Pedro Plains in early 1656 he headed first for the Cayman Islands, which he called 'the Turtle islands', looking for one of his vessels, only to

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5 Roger Craig Smith, *The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands: Contributions in Nautical Archaeology* (MA Thesis, Texas A&M University, 1981), pp.60–69; Anon., *The present state of Jamaica*, p.18.

6 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.748.

7 Sainsbury, *CSP Colonial 1574–1660*, p.119.

8 Green, *CSPD 1657–58*, p.25.

9 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 6, pp.211, 212.

10 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles II 1661–1662*, Vol. 2 (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1861), p.446.

find Goodsonn there instead.[11] With little on the islands themselves there was no reason to attempt to colonise them at this point but certainly the English saw that they now had dominion over them. If there was a symbolic declaration that the islands had been claimed by England it has not survived, but there was certainly an acceptance by the government in London that they were an English possession in 1662, for when Lord Windsor received his instructions before departing England he was left in no doubt that his commission extended to the Caymans as well.

When the English settled permanently in the Caymans is unclear. In 1773 a Royal Navy survey team led by George Gauld spent time on Grand Cayman, the largest of the three islands, during which Gauld had discussions with one of the then settlers, a man called Isaac Bodden. Bodden was almost 70 years old when Gauld interviewed him but he remembered when he was much younger there were only five families of settlers on the island. He also claimed his grandfather was 'one of Oliver Cromwell's soldiers who had been at the taking of Jamaica' and was the first settler to live there. Over a century later the inhabitants still made their living from catching turtles and selling the meat to passing ships.[12] Island tradition has it that Bodden (or Bawden) arrived first with his companion, a Welshman by the name of Watler (Walters), sometime after the English occupation of Jamaica and to this day their descendants are still to be found on the islands.

Certainly by the late 1660s settlers had made Grand Cayman home, for in that year a Portuguese privateer attacked the settlement and destroyed much of it.[13] By the early 1670s the island had become a haven for fugitives from Jamaica, most likely privateers who had incurred the wrath of the English authorities in Jamaica, for a decree was promulgated in Jamaica granting them pardons if they returned to Jamaica and gave themselves up.[14] After the 1670 Treaty of Madrid the English government happily included the Cayman Islands as one of the territories that they were in possession of, which the treaty gave them the right to retain, and which provided Spanish acknowledgement of English ownership. The Cayman Islands have been a Crown colony ever since, and are therefore the longest-surviving vestige of English territorial ambition that can be directly attributed to the Anglo-Spanish War in the West Indies.

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11 Birch, *TSP*, Vol. 4, p.544.
12 TNA, ADM 352/249, The Island of Grand Cayman, 1773.
13 Roger C. Smith and K.C. Smith, 'Archaeology of the Cayman Islands', *Archaeology*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1983.
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